• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
As part of the REAL ID Act, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to restrict judicial review of adverse credibility determinations by immigration judges. The change came in the wake of controversy of judicial reversals of adverse credibility determinations that the reviewing courts saw as inappropriately speculative and lacking in evidentiary support. Critics, including some appellate judges, have in turn alleged that the appellate courts have been insufficiently deferential to the factual determinations of Immigration Judges (IJs) and the BIA.

This paper examines the argument offered in support of limiting judicial review in this area, and provides an empirical assessment of the appellate courts' disposition of IJ/BIA credibility determinations in asylum cases in recent years. The paper concludes that the stated justifications for restricting judicial review of credibility determinations in asylum cases thus appear to be unfounded. Rather, it argues that the controversy and legislative response can best be understood as an instance of symbolic politics and moral panic.

immigration, administrative law, judicial review, terrorism, moral panic, symbolic politics, legislation

Abstract:
As part of the REAL ID Act, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to restrict judicial review of adverse credibility determinations by immigration judges. The change came in the wake of controversy of judicial reversals of adverse credibility determinations that the reviewing courts saw as inappropriately speculative and lacking in evidentiary support. Critics, including some appellate judges, have in turn alleged that the appellate courts have been insufficiently deferential to the factual determinations of Immigration Judges (IJs) and the BIA.

This paper examines the argument offered in support of limiting judicial review in this area, and provides an empirical assessment of the appellate courts' disposition of IJ/BIA credibility determinations in asylum cases in recent years. The paper concludes that the stated justifications for restricting judicial review of credibility determinations in asylum cases thus appear to be unfounded. Rather, it argues that the controversy and legislative response can best be understood as an instance of symbolic politics and moral panic.

immigration, administrative law, judicial review, terrorism, moral panic, symbolic politics, legislation

Abstract:
Online social network sites (“SNSs”) have emerged as a significant socio-technical phenomenon in the past several years. Scholars from various disciplines have examined these sites to develop a better understanding of their social significance and implications from a variety of perspectives. Within the burgeoning field of SN studies, one strand of work focuses on the place of SNs in students’ educational experiences and the potential pedagogical applications of SNSs. However, the SNS phenomenon generally, and its educational/pedagogical significance in particular, have received scant attention from legal scholars. This article presents a case study of Facebook use by students at one law school, as a way of beginning a more robust examination of the place of SNSs within the contemporary law school experience. The article gauges differences in Facebook use among law students by age, gender, race/ethnicity, and other characteristics; explores students’ use of Facebook to manage and cultivate social ties with others in the legal world; and examines students’ self-presentation and communication on Facebook as an aspect of their professional socialization and identity construction.

law students, social networks, social media, socialization,

Abstract:
One problem that is ripe for socio-legal inquiry is the emergence and diffusion of the Law and Economics movement. A socio-legal approach would consider Law and Economics not simply as a style of legal analysis or a school of thought within law, but as a discursive project, constituted by and constitutive of an emergent socio-legal matrix. That approach would be attentive not only to the instrumental significance of Law and Economics, but also what difference, if any, Law and Economics makes in deciding legal cases; who employs and benefits from Law and Economics; and similar concerns. This approach would additionally be particularly attentive to its constitutive significance for socio-legal praxis - how Law and Economics frames meaning and action across the multiplicity of socio-legal fields. In order to more closely examine this breadth, this Article represents an attempt to sketch the outlines of a socio-legal analysis of Law and Economics, and to suggest some starting points for socio-legal research into the Law and Economics movement.

socio-legal, law & economics, critical theory,