Selected Entire List   Costa, Cristiano M.  Ph.D. Student   University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics  3718 Locust Walk  Philadelphia, PA 19104  United States  215-7460363 (Phone)  HOME PAGE: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~costam  email address   SSRN's personal information usage policy Authors: If anything on this page requires updating or correction, please go to your SSRN User HeadQuarters and make the change.

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. Costa, Cristiano M.'s Scholarly Papers Click on the title of any column to sort the table by that column. Aggregate Statistics Total Downloads 186 Total Citations 0 Papers (1) Authors Date Downloads  (Rank) Citations ACTIONS:    Email Selected Abstracts    Export Selected Bibliographic Info    VIEW: Selected   Selected   Selected      Original List  Original List     All Versions  Hide All Versions     All Abstracts  Hide All Abstracts     Legend Legend close   eDocument is available from the SSRN eLibrary for free eDocument is available for a fee 1.   Biased Managers, Organizational Design, and Incentive Provision | View 2 Versions | Show Abstracts | Hide Abstracts| Economics Letters, Vol. 86, No. 3, 379-385, March 2005 Working Paper Biased Managers, Organizational Design, and Incentive Provision | Show Abstracts | Hide Abstracts | Versions (2) | hide multiple versions | Export Bibliographic Info | Costa, Cristiano M. University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Ferreira, Daniel London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance Moreira, Humberto Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV) Posted: 22 Sep 04 Last Revised: 03 Apr 05 186 (80,360)   Biased Managers, Organizational Design, and Incentive Provision | Show Abstract Hide Abstract | Economics Letters, Vol. 86, No. 3, 379-385, March 2005 Accepted Paper Series Costa, Cristiano M. University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Ferreira, Daniel London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance Moreira, Humberto Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV) Posted: 09 Jan 05 0   Organizational Design, Incentive Provision, Common Agency   Biased Managers, Organizational Design, and Incentive Provision | Show Abstract Hide Abstract | Download | Working Paper Series Costa, Cristiano M. University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Ferreira, Daniel London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance Moreira, Humberto Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV) Posted: 22 Sep 04 186   Organizational Design, Incentive Provision, Common Agency   Records 1 - 1 of 1 matches [ 1 ]

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