• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
This new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries should better inform advice about bank regulation and supervision and lower the marginal cost of empirical research.

International consultants on bank regulation and supervision for developing countries often base their advice on how their home country does things, for lack of information on practice in other countries. Recommendations for reform have tended to be shaped by bias rather than facts.

To better inform advice about bank regulation and supervision and to lower the marginal cost of empirical research, Barth, Caprio, and Levine present and discuss a new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries. The data, based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities, are now available to researchers and policymakers around the world.

The data cover such aspects of banking as entry requirements, ownership restrictions, capital requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing requirements, characteristics of deposit insurance schemes, loan classification and provisioning requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements, troubled bank resolution actions, and (uniquely) the quality of supervisory personnel and their actions.

The database permits users to learn how banks are currently regulated and supervised, and about bank structures and deposit insurance schemes, for a broad cross-section of countries.

In addition to describing the data, Barth, Caprio, and Levine show how variables may be grouped and aggregated. They also show some simple correlations among selected variables.

In a companion paper ("Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best") studying the relationship between differences in bank regulation and supervision and bank performance and stability, they conclude that: - Countries with policies that promote private monitoring of banks have better bank performance and more stability. Countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes tend to have poorer bank performance and more bank fragility. - Diversification of income streams and loan portfolios - by not restricting bank activities - also tends to improve performance and stability. (This works best when an active securities market exists.) Countries in which banks are encouraged to diversify their portfolios domestically and internationally suffer fewer crises.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group, and the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to compile data on financial regulation and supervision and the advise countries on what works best. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works and What Does Not."

Abstract:
This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources, (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership. The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.

Abstract:
The regulatory and supervisory practices most effective in promoting good performance and stability in the banking sector are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control.

Barth, Caprio, and Levine draw on their new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess different governmental approaches to bank regulation and supervision and evaluate the efficacy of different regulatory and supervisory policies.

First, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to support political constituencies.

Second, they assess the effect of an extensive array of regulatory and supervisory policies on the development and fragility of the banking sector. These policies include the following:
- Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce.
- Regulations on entry by domestic and foreign banks.
- Regulations on capital adequacy.
- Design features of deposit insurance systems.
- Supervisory power, independence, and resources; stringency of loan classification; provisioning standards; diversification guidelines; and powers to take prompt corrective action.
- Regulations governing information disclosure and fostering private sector monitoring of banks.
- Government ownership of banks.

The results raise a cautionary flag with regard to reform strategies that place excessive reliance on a country's adherence to an extensive checklist of regulatory and supervisory practices that involve direct government oversight of and restrictions on banks. The findings, which are much more consistent with the grabbing-hand view of regulation than with the helping-hand view, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory practices most effective in promoting good performance and stability in the banking sector are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control.

This paper - a joint product of Finance, Development Research Group, and the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to analyze the effect of financial sector regulation on development. The authors may be contacted at jbarth@business.auburn.edu, gcaprio@worldbank.org, or rlevine@csom.umn.edu.

Abstract:
October 1996

A growing body of theoretical and empirical work would push even skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is critical to economic growth, rather than a sideshow or a passive response to growth.

Levine argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive, first-order relationship between financial development and economic growth. There is even evidence that the level of financial development is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological change.

Moreover, cross-country, case-study, industry-level, and firm-level analyses document extensive periods when financial development (or the lack thereof) crucially affects the speed and pattern of economic development.

Levine explains what the financial system does and how it affects, and is affected by, economic growth. Theory suggests that financial instruments, markets, and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs. A growing literature shows that differences in how well financial systems reduce information and transaction costs influence savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, and long-run growth rates.

A less developed theoretical literature shows how changes in economic activity can influence financial systems.

Without minimizing the role of institutions, Levine advocates a functional approach to understanding the role of financial systems in economic growth. This approach focuses on the ties between growth and the quality of the functions provided by the financial system. Levine discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, such as money, or a particular institution, such as banks. Instead, he addresses the more comprehensive, and difficult question: What is the relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system?

More research is needed on financial development. Why does financial structure change as countries grow, for example? Why do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? Are there long-run economic growth advantages to adopting legal and policy changes that create one type of financial structure rather than another?

This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department.

Abstract:
This paper uses new statistical techniques and two new databases to reassess the relationship between economic growth and FDI. After resolving biases plaguing past work, we find that the exogenous component of FDI does not exert a robust, independent influence on growth.

Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Growth, International Finance

Abstract:
Do well-functionning stock markets and banks promote long-run economic growth? This paper shows that stock market liquidity and banking development both positively, predict growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvements when entered together in regressions, even after controlling for economic and political factors. The results are consistent with the views that financial markets provide important services for growth, and that stock markets provide different services from banks. The paper also finds that stock market size, volatility, and integration with world markets are not robustly linked with growth, and that none of the financial indicators is closely associated with private saving rates.

Abstract:
Do well-functioning stock markets and banks promote long-term economic growth? Yes, but stock markets and banks differ in the financial services they provide.

Using data on 49 countries from 1976 to 1993, the authors investigate whether measures of stock market liquidity, size, volatility, and integration in world capital markets predict future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, productivity improvements, and private savings.

They find that stock market liquidity-as measured by stock trading relative to the size of the market and economy - is positively and significantly correlated with current and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, productivity growth, even after controlling for economic and political factors.

Stock market size, volatility, and integration are not robustly linked with growth. Nor are financial indicators closely associated with private savings rates.

Significantly, banking development - as measured by bank loans to private enterprises divided by GDP - when combined with stock market liquidity predicts future rates of growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth when entered together in regressions. The authors determine that these results are consistent with views that (1)financial markets and institutions provide important services for long-run growth, and (2)stock markets and banks provide different financial services.

This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediary Growth" (RPO 679-53).

Abstract:
Financial systems tend to be more market-based in higher income countries, where stock markets also become more active and efficient than banks.

Financial systems also tend to be more market-based, even after controlling for income, in countries with a common law tradition, strong protection of shareholder rights, good accounting standards, low levels of corruption, and no explicit deposit insurance.

What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of bank-based financial systems (as in Germany and Japan) and market-based financial systems (as in England and the United States). Does financial structure matter?

In bank-based systems banks play a leading role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers, and providing risk management vehicles.

In market-based systems securities markets share center stage with banks in getting society's savings to firms, exerting corporate control, and easing risk management.

The unresolved debate about whether markets or bank-based intermediaries are more effective at providing financial services hampers the formation of sound policy advice.

Demirguc-Kunt and Levine use newly collected data on a cross-section of roughly 150 countries to illustrate how financial systems differ around the world. They (1) analyze how the size, activity, and efficiency of financial systems differ across different per capita income groups, (2) define different indicators of financial structure and identify different patterns as countries become richer, and (3) investigate legal, regulatory, and policy determinants of financial structure after controlling for per capita GDP.

A clear pattern emerges:
- Banks, other financial intermediaries, and stock markets all grow and become more active and efficient as countries become richer. As income grows, the financial sector develops.
- In higher income countries, stock markets become more active and efficient than banks. Thus, financial systems tend to be more market based.
- Countries with a common law tradition, strong protection for shareholder rights, good accounting standards, low levels of corruption, and no explicit deposit insurance tend to be more market-based, even after controlling for income.
- Countries with a French civil law tradition, poor accounting standards, heavily restricted banking systems, and high inflation generally tend to have underdeveloped financial systems, even after controlling for income.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the impact of financial structure on economic development.

Abstract:
Legal and accounting reform that strengthens creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boosts financial development and accelerates economic growth.

Levine, Loayza, and Beck evaluate:

Whether the level of development of financial intermediaries exerts a casual influence on economic growth.

Whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (such as creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting standards) explain differences in the level of financial development.

Using both traditional cross-section, instrumental-variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, they find that development of financial intermediaries exerts a large causal impact on growth.

The data also show that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help determine differences in financial development.

Together, these findings suggest that legal and accounting reform that strengthens creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boosts financial development and accelerates economic growth.

This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth. Thorsten Beck may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
This paper evaluates (1) whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development influences economic growth and (2) whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (e.g., creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting standards) explain differences in the level of financial development. Using both traditional cross-section, instrumental variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, we find that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development is positively associated with economic growth. Also, the data show that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help account for differences in financial development. Together, these findings suggest that legal and accounting reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices can boost development and accelerate economic growth.

Financial development, economic growth, legal system

Abstract:
A country's legal origin - whether British, French, German, or Scandinavian - helps explain the development of its financial institutions today. Legal systems differ in their ability to facilitate private exchanges and to adapt to support new financial and commercial transactions. A country cannot change its legal origin, but it can (with considerable effort) reform its judicial system by emphasizing the rights of outside investors, by providing more certain and efficient contract enforcement, and by creating a legal system that adapts more readily to changing economic conditions.

Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine assess three established theories about the historical determinants of financial development. They also propose an augmented version of one of these theories.

The law and finance view stresses that different legal traditions emphasize to differing degrees the rights of individual investors relative to the state, which has important ramifications for financial development.

The dynamic law and finance view augments the law and finance view, stressing that legal traditions also differ in their ability to adapt to changing conditions.

The politics and finance view rejects the central role of legal tradition, stressing instead that political factors shape financial development.

The endowment view argues that the mortality rates of European settlers as they colonized various parts of the globe influenced the institutions they initially created, which has had enduring effects on institutions today. When initial conditions produced an unfavorable environment for European settlers, colonialists tended to create institutions designed to extract resources expeditiously, not to foster long-run prosperity.

The authors' empirical results are most consistent with theories that stress the role of legal tradition. The results provide qualified support for the endowment view. The data are least consistent with theories that focus on specific characteristics of the political structure, although politics can obviously affect the financial sector.

In other words, legal origin - whether a country has a British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal heritage - helps explain the development of the country's financial institutions today, even after other factors are controlled for. Countries with a French legal tradition tend to have weaker financial institutions, while those with common law and German civil laws tend to have stronger financial institutions.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the link between financial development and economic growth. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Financial Structure and Economic Development" (RPO 682-41). The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org, ademirguckunt@worldbank.org, or rlevine@csom.umn.edu.

Abstract:
For over a century, economists and policy makers have debated the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial systems. Recent research, however, argues that classifying countries as bank-based or market is not a very fruitful way to distinguish financial systems. This paper represents the first broad, cross-country examination of which view of financial structure is more consistent with the data. The results indicate that although overall financial development is robustly linked with economic growth, there is no support for either the bank-based or market-based view.

Abstract:
For over a century, economists and policy makers have debated the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial systems. Recent research, however, argues that classifying countries as bank-based or market is not a very fruitful way to distinguish financial systems. This paper represents the first broad, cross-country examination of which view of financial structure is more consistent with the data. The results indicate that although overall financial development is robustly linked with economic growth, there is no support for either the bank-based or market-based view.

Banks, Stock Markets, Law, Economic Growth

Abstract:
This new database of indicators of financial development and structure across countries and over time unites a range of indicators that measure the size, activity, and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets.

Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine introduce a new database of indicators of financial development and structure across countries and over time.
This database is unique in that it unites a variety of indicators that measure the size, activity, and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets.

It improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks, by introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions, and by presenting measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets.

The compiled data permit the construction of financial structure indicators to measure whether, for example, a country's banks are larger, more active, and more efficient than its stock markets.

These indicators can then be used to investigate the empirical link between the legal, regulatory, and policy environment and indicators of financial structure. They can also be used to analyze the implications of financial structure for economic growth.

Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine describe the sources and construction of, and the intuition behind, different indicators and present descriptive statistics.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a broader effort in the group to understand the determinants of financial structure and its importance to economic development. The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org, ademirguckunt@worldbank.org, or rlevine@csom.umn.edu.

Abstract:
We document five stylized facts of economic growth. (1) The "residual" rather than factor accumulation accounts for most of the income and growth differences across nations. (2) Income diverges over the long run. (3) Factor accumulation is persistent while growth is not persistent and the growth path of countries exhibits remarkable variation across countries. (4) Economic activity is highly concentrated, with all factors of production flowing to the richest areas. (5) National policies closely associated with long-run economic growth rates. We argue that these facts do not support models with diminishing returns, constant returns to scale, some fixed factor of production, and that highlight the role of factor accumulation. Empirical work, however, does not yet decisively distinguish among the different theoretical conceptions of "total factor productivity growth." Economists should devote more effort towards modeling and quantifying total factor productivity.

Economic Growth, Factor Accumulation, Total Factor Productivity, Increasing Returns

Abstract:
Analysis of a panel data set for 1976-1998 shows that on balance stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth - findings that do not result from biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables, or unobserved country-specific effects.

Beck and Levine investigate the impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth using a panel data set for 1976-1998 and applying recent generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques developed for dynamic panels. The authors illustrate econometrically the differences that emerge from different panel procedures. On balance, stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth - and these findings are not a result of biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables, or unobserved country-specific effects.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth. The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org or rlevine@csom.umn.edu.

Abstract:
Levine examines the corporate governance of banks. When banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts capital formation, and stimulates productivity growth. So, weak governance of banks reverberates throughout the economy with negative ramifications for economic development. After reviewing the major governance concepts for corporations in general, the author discusses two special attributes of banks that make them special in practice: Greater opaqueness than other industries and greater government regulation. These attributes weaken many traditional governance mechanisms. Next, he reviews emerging evidence on which government policies enhance the governance of banks and draws tentative policy lessons. In sum, existing work suggests that it is important to strengthen the ability and incentives of private investors to exert governance over banks rather than to rely excessively on government regulators. These conclusions, however, are particularly tentative because more research is needed on how legal, regulatory, and supervisory policies influence the governance of banks.

This paper - a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries.

Abstract:
Empirical results highlight the downside of imposing certain regulatory restrictions on commercial bank activities. Regulations that restrict banks' ability to engage in securities activities and to own nonfinancial firms are closely associated with more instability in the banking sector.

And keeping commercial banks from engaging in investment banking, insurance, and real estate activities does not appear to produce positive benefits.

Barth, Caprio, and Levine report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability.

They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of nonfinancial firms and nonfinancial firms' ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized?

They find:
· There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks` ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and a) how well-developed the banking sector is, b) how well-developed securities markets and nonbank financial intermediaries are, or c) the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits - or harms - the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition.
· There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce.
· Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks' ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing - and all aspects of the mutual fund business - tend to have more fragile financial systems.
· The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility.
· On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to examine the effects of financial sector regulation. The authors may be contacted at jbarth@business.auburn.edu, gcaprio@worldbank.org, or rlevine@csom.umn.edu.

Abstract:
The three most developed stock markets are in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the most underdeveloped markets are in Colombia, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Markets tend to be more developed in richer countries, but some markets commonly labeled emerging (for example, in Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand) are systematically more developed than some markets commonly labeled developed (for example, in Australia, Canada, and many European countries).

World stock markets are booming. Between 1982 and 1993, stock market capitalization grew from $2 trillion to $10 trillion, an average 15 percent a year. A disproportionate amount of this growth was in emerging stock markets, which rose from 3 percent of world stock market capitalization to 14 percent in the same period. Yet there is little empirical evidence about how important stock markets are to long-term economic development. Economists have neither a common concept nor a common measure of stock market development, so we know little about how stock market development affects the rest of the financial system or how corporations finance themselves.

Demirguc-Kunt and Levine collected and compared many different indicators of stock market development using data on 41 countries from 1986 to 1993. Each indicator has statistical and conceptual shortcomings, so they used different measures of stock market size, liquidity, concentration, and volatility, of institutional development, and of international integration. Their goal: To summarize information about a variety of indicators for stock market development, in order to facilitate research into the links between stock markets, economic development, and corporate financing decisions. They highlight certain important correlations:

In the 41 countries they studied, there are enormous cross-country differences in the level of stock market development for each indicator. The ratio of market capitalization to GDP, for example, is greater than 1 in five countries and less than 0.10 in five others.

There are intuitively appealing correlations among indicators. For example, big markets tend to be less volatile, more liquid, and less concentrated in a few stocks. Internationally integrated markets tend to be less volatile. And institutionally developed markets tend to be large and liquid.

The three most developed markets are in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The most underdeveloped markets are in Colombia, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland seem to have highly developed stock markets, whereas Argentina, Greece, Pakistan, and Turkey have underdeveloped markets. Markets tend to be more developed in richer countries, but many markets commonly labeled emerging (for example, in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) are systematically more developed than markets commonly labeled developed (for example, in Australia, Canada, and many European countries).

Between 1986 and 1993, some markets developed rapidly in size, liquidity, and international integration. Indonesia, Portugal, Turkey, and Venezuela experienced explosive development, for example. Case studies on the reasons for (and economic consequences of) this rapid development could yield valuable insights. The level of stock market development is highly correlated with the development of banks, nonbank financial institutions (finance companies, mutual funds, brokerage houses), insurance companies, and private pension funds.

This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study stock market development. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediary Growth (RPO 678-37).

Abstract:
Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and concentrated cash flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will increase the market valuation of banks.

Abstract:
Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? Is the governance of banks different from other corporations? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and concentrated cash-flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will increase the market valuation of banks.

Abstract:
This paper uses new data and new econometric techniques to investigate the impact of international financial integration on economic growth and also to assess whether this relationship depends on the level of economic development, financial development, legal system development, government corruption, and macroeconomic policies. Using a wide array of measures of international financial integration on 57 countries and an assortment of statistical methodologies, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that international financial integration does not accelerate economic growth even when controlling for particular economic, financial, institutional, and policy characteristics.

International Finance, Economic Growth, Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment, Developing Countries

Abstract:
This paper uses new data and new econometric techniques to investigate the impact of international financial integration on economic growth and also to assess whether this relationship depends on the level of economic development, financial development, legal system development, government corruption, and macroeconomic policies. Using a wide array of measures of international financial integration on 57 countries and an assortment of statistical methodologies, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that international financial integration does not accelerate economic growth even when controlling for particular economic, financial, institutional, and policy characteristics.

Abstract:
This paper uses new data and new econometric techniques to investigate the impact of international financial integration on economic growth and also to assess whether this relationship depends on the level of economic development, financial development, legal system development, government corruption, and macroeconomic policies. Using a wide array of measures of international financial integration on 57 countries and an assortment of statistical methodologies, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that international financial integration does not accelerate economic growth even when controlling for particular economic, financial, institutional, and policy characteristics.

International Finance, Economic Growth, Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment, Developing Countries

Abstract:
Those who believe stricter restrictions on allowable bank activities will limit risk-taking behavior may be surprised to learn that in countries where bank activities are restricted, the likelihood of a banking crisis may be greater.

Costly bank failures in the past two decades have focused attention on the need to find ways to improve the performance of different countries' financial systems. Belief is overwhelming that financial systems can be improved but there is little empirical evidence to support any specific advice about regulatory and supervisory reform. With scant cross-country comparisons of financial regulatory and supervisory systems, economists cannot decide how to correct incentives and moral hazard problems in developing economies - whether, for example, to require higher (and more narrowly defined) capital-to-asset ratios, to mandate stricter definition and disclosure of nonperforming loans, to require that subordinated debt be issued, or to install world-class supervision. Proposed reforms usually involve changes in financial regulations and supervisory standards, but many pressing questions about reform remain unanswered.

Making use of a new database, Barth, Caprio, and Levine come up with brief answers to three key questions:

- Do countries with relatively weak governments and bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on bank activities? Yes.
- Do countries with more restrictive regulatory regimes have poorly functioning banking systems. No- or at least the evidence is mixed.
- Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have less probability of suffering a banking crisis? No. In fact, the reverse is true. In countries where banks` securities activities are restricted, the likelihood of a banking crisis is greater, other things being equal.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to study the effect of financial regulation and supervision.

Abstract:
Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between the market structure of the banking industry and bank fragility, this paper studies the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 70 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with (i) more concentrated banking systems, (ii) fewer regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and (iii) national institutions that encourage competition.

Abstract:
Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between the market structure of the banking industry and bank fragility, this paper studies the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 70 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with (i) more concentrated banking systems, (ii) fewer regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and (iii) national institutions that encourage competition.

Industrial Structure, Banking System Fragility, Regulation

Abstract:
The authors examine whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. They define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industrial specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.

This paper - a product of the Finance Group, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the growth finance link.

Firm Size, Financial Development, Economic Growth

Abstract:
This paper examines whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. We define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industry specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.

Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, market structure, and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures. Thus, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation; they reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, market structure, and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures. Thus, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation; they reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

banks, regulation, policies, institutions, concentration, interest margins

Abstract:
This paper assesses empirically two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. The political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis-a-vis the state and this has repercussions for financial development. The adaptability channel holds that legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and legal systems that adapt quickly will foster financial development more effectively. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions.

Law, Financial development

Abstract:
New research suggests that cross-country differences in legal origin help explain differences in financial development. This paper empirically assesses two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. First, the 'political' channel stresses that (i) legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis-a-vis the state and (ii) this has repercussions for the development of property rights and financial markets. Second, the 'adaptability' channel holds that (i) legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and (ii) legal systems that adapt quickly to minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy and the legal system's capabilities will foster financial development more effectively than would more rigid legal traditions. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions.

Abstract:
A growing body of work suggests that cross-country differences in legal origin help explain differences in financial development. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine assess two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. First, the "political" channel stresses that (1) legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors compared with the state, and that (2) this has repercussions for the development of property rights and financial markets. Second, the "adaptability" channel holds that (1) legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances, and (2) legal systems that adapt quickly to minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy and the legal system's capabilities will foster financial development more effectively than would more rigid legal traditions. The authors use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of financial development.

Abstract:
Development of the banking sector exerts a large, causal impact on total factor productivity growth, which in turn causes GDP to grow. Whether banking development has a long-run effect on capital growth or private saving remains to be seen.

Beck, Levine, and Loayza evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources- total factor productivity growth, physical capital accumulation, and private saving.

They use (1) a pure cross-country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and (2) a new panel technique that controls for country-specific effects and endogeneity. They find that:

- Banks do exert a large, causal impact on total factor productivity growth, which feeds through to overall GDP growth.
- The long-run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth.

Abstract:
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine explore the relationship between the relative size of the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector, economic growth, and poverty using a new database on the share of SME labor in the total manufacturing labor force. Using a sample of 76 countries, they find a strong association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth. This relationship, however, is not robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. So, while a large SME sector is characteristic of successful economies, the data fail to support the hypothesis that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that SMEs reduce poverty. Finally, they find qualified evidence that the overall business environment facing both large and small firms - as measured by the ease of firm entry and exit, sound property rights, and contract enforcement - influences economic growth.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the role of SMEs.

Abstract:
A burgeoning literature finds that financial development exerts a first-order impact on long-run economic growth, which raises critical questions, such as why do some countries have well-developed growth-enhancing financial systems while others do not? The law and finance theory focuses on the role of legal institutions in explaining international differences in financial development. First, the law and finance theory holds that in countries where legal systems enforce private property rights, support private contractual arrangements, and protect the legal rights of investors, savers are more willing to finance firms and financial markets flourish. Second, the different legal traditions that emerged in Europe over previous centuries and were spread internationally through conquest, colonization, and imitation help explain cross-country differences in investor protection, the contracting environment, and financial development today. But there are countervailing theories and evidence that challenge both parts of the law and finance theory. Many argue that there is more variation within than across legal origin families. Others question the central role of legal tradition and point to politics, religious orientation, or geography as the dominating factor driving financial development. Finally, some researchers question the central role of legal institutions and argue that other factors, such as a competitive products market, social capital, and informal rules are also important for financial development. Beck and Levine describe the law and finance theory, along with skeptical and competing views, and review empirical evidence on both parts of the law and finance view.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the link between financial development and economic growth. It was prepared for Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, eds., Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Kluwer Dordrecht (The Netherlands), forthcoming (2004).

Abstract:
This paper provides a concise, selective review of research on the role of legal institutions in shaping the operation of financial systems. While a burgeoning literature finds that financial development exerts a first-order impact on economic growth, the law and finance literature seeks to understand the role of legal institutions in explaining international differences in financial systems. Considerable research dissects, critiques, and debates the influence of investor protection laws, the efficiency of contract enforcement, and private property rights protection on the effectiveness of corporate governance, the efficient allocation of capital, and the overall level of financial development. Furthermore, legal scholars, political scientists, historians, and economists are questioning and assessing the importance of historically determined differences in legal traditions in shaping national approaches to investor protection laws, contract enforcement, and property rights. The field of law and finance promises to be a contentious and important area of inquiry in coming years.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Is there a strong empirical association between stock market development and long-term economic growth? Cross-country regressions suggest that there is a positive and robust association.

Levine and Zervos empirically evaluate the relationship between stock market development and long-term growth. The data suggest that stock market development is positively associated with economic growth. Moreover, instrumental variables procedures indicate a strong connection between the predetermined component of stock market development and economic growth in the long run.

While cross-country regressions imply a strong link between stock market development and economic growth, the results should be viewed as suggestive partial correlations that stimulate additional research rather than as conclusive findings. Much work remains to be done to shed light on the relationship between stock market development and economic growth. Careful case studies might help identify causal relationships and further research could be done on the time-series property of such relationships.

Research should also be done to identify policies that facilitate the development of sound securities markets.

This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the relationship between financial systems and economic growth. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediary Growth (RPO 679-53).

Abstract:
This paper investigates the impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth using a panel data set for the period 1976-98 and applying recent GMM techniques developed for dynamic panels. On balance, we find that stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth and these findings are not due to potential biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables or unobserved country-specific effects.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth using a panel data set for the period 1976-98 and applying recent GMM techniques developed for dynamic panels. On balance, we find that stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth and these findings are not due to potential biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables or unobserved country-specific effects.

Economic Growth, Stock Markets, Banks

Abstract:
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings have important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.

Abstract:
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings have important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.

financial economics, corporate finance, financial institutions, government policy

Abstract:
A country's level of financial development and the legal environment in which financial intermediaries and markets operate critically influence economic development. In countries whose financial sectors are more fully developed and whose legal systems protect the rights of outside investors, economies grow faster, industries dependent on external finance expand more quickly, new firms are created more easily, firms have more access to external financing, and firms grow faster.

Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Maksimovic explore the relationship between financial structure - the degree to which a financial system is market- or bank-based - and economic development.

They use three methodologies:
· The cross-country approach uses cross-country data to assess whether economies grow faster with market- or bank-based systems.
· The industry approach uses a country-industry panel to assess whether industries that depend heavily on external financing grow faster in market- or bank-based financial systems and whether financial structure influences the rate at which new firms are created.
· The firm-level approach uses firm-level data across a broad selection of countries to test whether firms are more likely to grow beyond the rate predicted by internal resources and short-term borrowings in market- or bank-based financial systems.

The cross-country regressions, the industry panel estimations, and the firm-level analyses provide remarkably consistent conclusions:
· Financial structure is not an analytically useful way to distinguish financial systems.
· Financial structure does not help us understand economic growth, industrial performance, or firm expansion.
· The results are inconsistent with both market-based and bank-based views.

In other words, economies do not grow faster, industries dependent on external financing do not expand faster, new firms are not created more easily, firms' access to external finance is not greater, and firms do not grow faster in either market- or bank-based financial systems.

The authors find overwhelming evidence that the overall level of financial development and the legal environment in which financial intermediaries and markets operate critically influence economic development.

This paper is a product of Finance, Development Research Group. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Financial Structures and Economic Development (RPO 682-41). The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org or ademirguckunt@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
Does economic development depend on geographic endowments like temperate instead of tropical location, the ecological conditions shaping diseases, or an environment good for grains or certain cash crops? Or do these endowments of tropics, germs, and crops affect economic development only through institutions or policies? We test the endowment, institution, and policy views against each other using cross country evidence. We find evidence that tropics, germs, and crops affect development through institutions. We find no evidence that tropics, germs, and crops affect country incomes directly other than through institutions, nor do we find any effect of policies on development once we control for institutions.

Abstract:
Does economic development depend on geographic endowments like temperate instead of tropical location, the ecological conditions shaping diseases, or an environment good for grains or certain cash crops? Or do these endowments of tropics, germs, and crops affect economic development only through institutions or policies? We test the endowment, institution, and policy views against each other using cross country evidence. We find evidence that tropics, germs, and crops affect development through institutions. We find no evidence that tropics, germs, and crops affect country incomes directly other than through institutions, nor do we find any effect of policies on development once we control for institutions.

economic development, geographic endowments, institutions

Abstract:
The first part of this paper reviews the literature on the relation between finance and growth. The second part of the paper reviews the literature on the historical and policy determinants of financial development. Governments play a central role in shaping the operation of financial systems and the degree to which large segments of the financial system have access to financial services. The paper discusses the relationship between financial sector policies and economic development.

Debt Markets, Access to Finance, Emerging Markets, Economic Theory & Research

Abstract:
This paper contributes to the literature on how a country's legal origin influences the operation of its financial system by using firm-level survey data on the obstacles that firms face in raising external finance. The paper assesses two channels through which legal origin may influence the financial system. It finds that the adaptability of a country's legal system is more important for explaining the obstacles that firms face in accessing external finance than the political independence of the judiciary.

Abstract:
This paper contributes to the literature on how a country's legal origin influences the operation of its financial system by using firm-level survey data on the obstacles that firms face in raising external finance. The paper assesses two channels through which legal origin may influence the financial system. It finds that the adaptability of a country's legal system is more important for explaining the obstacles that firms face in accessing external finance than the political independence of the judiciary.

Legal system, judicial independence, corporate finance

Abstract:
The Burnside and Dollar (2000) finding that aid raises growth in a good policy environment has had an important influence on policy and academic debates. We conduct a data gathering exercise that updates their data from 1970-93 to 1970-97, as well as filling in missing data for the original period 1970-93. We find that the BD finding is not robust to the use of this additional data.

foreign aid, growth, policy

Abstract:
The Burnside and Dollar (2000, AER) finding that aid raises growth in a good policy environment has had an important influence on policy and academic debates. We conduct a data gathering exercise that updates their data from 1970 -93 to 1970 -97, as well as filling in missing data for the original period 1970 -93. We find that the Burnside and Dollar (2002, AER) finding is not robust to the use of this additional data.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
The Burnside and Dollar (2000) finding that aid raises growth in a good policy environment has had an important influence on policy and academic debates. We conduct a data gathering exercise that updates their data from 1970-93 to 1970-97, as well as filling in missing data for the original period 1970-93. We find that the BD finding is not robust to the use of this additional data.

foreign aid, growth, policy

Abstract:
While substantial research finds that financial development boosts overall economic growth, we study whether financial development disproportionately raises the incomes of the poor and alleviates poverty. Using a broad cross-country sample, we distinguish among competing theoretical predictions about the impact of financial development on changes in income distribution and poverty alleviation. We find that financial development reduces income inequality by disproportionately boosting the incomes of the poor. Countries with better-developed financial intermediaries experience faster declines in measures of both poverty and income inequality. These results are robust to controlling for other country characteristics and potential reverse causality.

Abstract:
While substantial research finds that financial development boosts overall economic growth, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine study whether financial development is pro-poor: Does financial development disproportionately raise the income of the poor? Using a broad cross-country sample, the authors find that the answer is yes: Financial intermediary development reduces income inequality by disproportionately boosting the income of the poor and therefore reduces poverty. This result is robust to controlling for simultaneity bias and reverse causation.

This paper - a product of Finance Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the link between finance and poverty alleviation.

Abstract:
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political and regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, the authors find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of bank supervision and regulation.

Bank supervision, Corporate governance, Financing obstacles

Abstract:
We examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. We find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political/regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, we find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.

Abstract:
The authors address two questions: What happens to stock market size, liquidity, volatility, and integration with world capital markets after capital controls are liberalized? And what is the relationship between those indicators of stock market development and regulations about information disclosure, accounting standards, and investor protection? An analysis of data on stock markets in 16 developing countries suggests the following: a) stock markets become larger, more liquid, more integrated internationally, and more volatile after controls on capital and dividend flows are liberalized; b) easy access to information about firms is positively associated with the size and liquidity of stock markets; and c) countries that officially establish internationally accepted accounting standards and laws to protect investors do not have substantially better- functioning stock markets than countries that do not adopt those official standards.

Abstract:
By documenting the evolution of Tobin's "q" before, during, and after firms internationalize, this paper provides evidence on the bonding, segmentation, and market timing theories of internationalization. Using new data on 9,096 firms across 74 countries over the period 1989-2000, we find that Tobin's "q" does not rise after internationalization, even relative to firms that do not internationalize. Instead, "q" rises significantly one year before internationalization and during the internationalization year. But, then "q" falls sharply in the year after internationalization, relinquishing the increases of the previous two years. To account for these dynamics, we show that market capitalization rises one year before internationalization and remains high, while corporate assets increase during internationalization. The evidence supports models stressing that internationalization facilitates corporate expansion, but challenges models stressing that internationalization produces an enduring effect on "q" by bonding firms to a better corporate governance system.

Abstract:
By documenting the evolution of Tobin's q before, during, and after firms internationalize, the authors provide evidence on the bonding, segmentation, and market timing theories of internationalization. Using new data on 9,096 firms across 74 countries over the period 1989-2000, they find that Tobin's q does not rise after internationalization, even relative to firms that do not internationalize. Instead, q rises significantly before internationalization and during the internationalization year. But then q falls sharply in the year after internationalization, quickly relinquishing the increases of the previous years. To account for these dynamics, the authors show that market capitalization rises before internationalization and remains high, while corporate assets increase during internationalization. The evidence supports models stressing that financial internationalization facilitates corporate expansion, but challenges models stressing that internationalization produces an enduring effect on q by bonding firms to a better corporate governance system.

Abstract:
This paper examines whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. We define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industry specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.

Firm size, financial development, economic growth

Abstract:
This paper reviews, appraises, and critiques theoretical and empirical research on the connections between the operation of the financial system and economic growth. While subject to ample qualifications and countervailing views, the preponderance of evidence suggests that both financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth and that reverse causality alone is not driving this relationship. Furthermore, theory and evidence imply that better developed financial systems ease external financing constraints facing firms, which illuminates one mechanism through which financial development influences economic growth. The paper highlights many areas needing additional research.

Abstract:
Problems associated with Sub-Saharan Africa's slow growth are low school attainment, political instability, poorly developed financial systems, large black-market exchange-rate premia, large government deficits, and inadequate infrastructure. Improving policies alone boosts growth substantially. But if neighboring countries adopt a policy change together, the effects on growth are more than double what they would have been if one country had acted alone.

Africa's economic history since 1960 fits the classical definition of tragedy: potential unfulfilled, with disastrous consequences.

Easterly and Levine use one methodology - cross-country regressions - to account for Sub-Saharan Africa's growth performance over the past 30 years and to suggest policies to promote growth over the next 30 years.

They statistically quantify the relationship between long-run growth and a wider array of factors than any previous study. They consider such standard variables as initial income to capture convergence effects, schooling, political stability, and indicators of monetary, fiscal, trade, exchange rate, and financial sector policies. They also consider such new measures as infrastructure development, cultural diversity, and economic spillovers from neighbors' growth. Their analysis:

- Improves substantially on past attempts to account for the growth experience of Sub-Saharan African countries.
- Shows that low school attainment, political instability, poorly developed financial systems, large black-market exchange-rate premia, large government deficits, and inadequate infrastructure are associated with slow growth.
- Finds that Africa's ethnic diversity tends to slow growth and reduce the likelihood of adopting good policies.
- Identifies spillovers of growth performance between neighboring countries. The spillover effects of growth have implications for policy strategy. Improving policies alone boosts growth substantially, but if neighboring countries act together, the effects on growth are much greater. Specifically, the results suggest that the effect of neighbors' adopting a policy change is 2.2 times greater than if a single country acted alone.

This paper - a joint product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Division and the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the link between policies and growth. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Patterns of Growth (RPO 678-26).

Abstract:
An influential body of theoretical research and an emerging line of empirical work suggest that the operation of the formal financial system affects the degree to which economic opportunities are defined by talent and initiative rather than by parental wealth and social connections. This paper discusses the theory of how financial markets influence economic opportunity and reviews recent empirical work on the relation between formal financial systems and poverty, income inequality, and economic opportunity. The authors consider recent efforts to measure the ability of households and small enterprises to access financial services, the impact of this access, and the mechanisms through which finance affects poverty and inequality. The authors argue that considerably more research is needed to identify which formal financial sector policies enhance the operation of the financial system in ways that expand the economic horizons of the economically disenfranchised.

Access to Finance, Banks & Banking Reform, Emerging Markets, Debt Markets

Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, concentration, inflation, and national institutions on bank net interest margins using data from over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost net interest margins. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins. So, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation. They reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of bank concentration and competition.

Abstract:
This paper presents new and official survey information on bank regulations in 142 countries and makes comparisons with two earlier surveys. The data do not suggest that countries have primarily reformed their bank regulations for the better over the last decade. Following Basel guidelines many countries strengthened capital regulations and official supervisory agencies, but existing evidence suggests that these reforms will not improve bank stability or efficiency. While some countries have empowered private monitoring of banks, consistent with the third pillar of Basel II, there are many exceptions and reversals along this dimension.

Banks & Banking Reform, Access to Finance, Debt Markets, Emerging Markets

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Working Paper, Corporate governance

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Abstract:
What is the impact of firms that cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or raise capital in international stock markets on the liquidity of remaining firms in domestic markets? Using a panel of over 3,200 firms from 55 countries during 1989-2000, Levine and Schmukler find that internationalization reduces the liquidity of domestic firms through two channels. First, the trading of international firms migrates from domestic to international markets and the reduction in domestic liquidity of international firms has negative spillover effects on domestic firm liquidity. Second, there is trade diversion within domestic markets as liquidity shifts out of domestic firms and into international firms.

This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the effects of financial globalization.

International finance, globalization, cross-listing, ADRs, GDRs

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Corporate Governance, Large shareholders, Blockholders

Abstract:
This paper introduces the updated and expanded version of the Financial Development and Structure Database and presents recent trends in structure and development of financial institutions and markets across countries. The authors add indicators on banking structure and financial globalization. They find a deepening of both financial markets and institutions, a trend concentrated in high-income countries and more pronounced for markets than for banks. Similarly, the recent increase in cross-border lending and debt issues has been concentrated in high-income countries, while low and lower-middle income countries have experienced an increase in remittance flows. Low net interest margins, rising profitability and declining stability in high-income countries’ banking sectors characterize the recent financial sector boom in high income countries leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007.

Debt Markets, Emerging Markets, Banks & Banking Reform, Economic Theory & Research

Abstract:
Do industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster in market-based or bank-based financial systems? Are new firms more likely to form in a bank-based or a market-based financial system? Beck and Levine find no evidence for the superiority of either market-based or bank-based financial systems for industries dependent on external financing. But they find overwhelming evidence that industries heavily dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with higher levels of financial development and with better legal protection for outside investors - including strong creditor and shareholder rights and strong contract enforcement mechanisms.

Financial development also stimulates the establishment of new firms, which is consistent with the Schumpeterian view of creative destruction. Financial development matters. That the financial system is bank-based or market-based offers little additional information.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the link between financial development and economic growth.

Financial Structure, Economic Growth, External Finance

Abstract:
This paper critically reviews the literature on finance and inequality, highlighting substantive gaps in the literature. Finance plays a crucial role in most theories of persistent inequality. Unsurprisingly, therefore, economic theory provides a rich set of predictions concerning both the impact of finance on inequality and about the relevant mechanisms. Although subject to ample qualifications, the bulk of empirical research suggests that improvements in financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries expand economic opportunities and reduce inequality. Yet, there is a shortage of theoretical and empirical research on the potentially enormous impact of formal financial sector policies, such as bank regulations and securities law, on persistent inequality. Furthermore, there is no conceptual framework for considering the joint and endogenous evolution of finance, inequality, and economic growth.

Access to Finance, Economic Theory & Research, Debt Markets, Inequality

Abstract:
We assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income in the United States. From the 1970s through the 1990s, most states removed restrictions on intrastate branching, which intensified bank competition and improved bank performance. Exploiting the cross-state, cross-time variation in the timing of branch deregulation, we find that deregulation materially tightened the distribution of income by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution while having little impact on incomes above the median. The results suggest that regulatory impediment to competition among banks during the 20th century were disproportionally harmful to lower income workers.

Financial Institutions, Government Policy and Regulation, Income Inequality

Abstract:
Policymakers and economists disagree about the impact of bank regulations on the distribution of income. Exploiting cross-state and cross-time variation, the authors test whether liberalizing restrictions on intra-state branching in the United States intensified, ameliorated, or had no effect on income distribution. The analysis finds that branch deregulation lowered income inequality by affecting labor market conditions, not by boosting the business income of the poor, nor by enhancing educational attainment. Reductions in the earnings gap between men and women and between skilled and unskilled workers account for the bulk of the explained drop in income inequality.

Emerging Markets, Economic Theory & Research, Inequality, Fiscal & Monetary Policy

Abstract:
This paper explores the relationship between the relative size of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, economic growth, and poverty alleviation using a new database on the share of SME labor in the total manufacturing labor force. Using a sample of 45 countries, we find a strong, positive association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth. The data do not, however, confidently support the conclusions that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth. Furthermore, we find no evidence that SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality.

Abstract:
We model technological and financial innovation as reflecting the decisions of profit maximizing agents and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs earn monopoly profits by inventing better goods and financiers arise to screen entrepreneurs. A novel feature of the model is that financiers also engage in the costly, risky, and potentially profitable process of innovation: Financiers can invent more effective processes for screening entrepreneurs. Every existing screening process, however, becomes less effective as technology advances. Consequently, technological innovation and, thus, economic growth stop unless financiers continually innovate. Historical observations and empirical evidence are more consistent with this dynamic model of financial innovation and endogenous growth than with existing models of financial development and growth.

Invention, Economic Growth, Corporate Finance, Financial Institutions, Technological Change, Entrepreneurship

Abstract:
This paper assesses the impact of competition on racial discrimination. The dismantling of inter- and intrastate bank restrictions by U.S. states from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s reduced financial market imperfections, lowered entry barriers facing nonfinancial firms, and boosted the rate of new firm formation. We use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous intensification of competition in the nonfinancial sector, and evaluate its impact on the racial wage gap, which is that component of the black-white wage differential unexplained by Mincerian characteristics. We find that bank deregulation reduced the racial wage gap by spurring the entry of nonfinancial firms. Consistent with taste-based theories, competition reduced both the racial wage gap and racial segregation in the workplace, particularly in states with a comparatively high degree of racial prejudice, where competition-enhancing bank deregulation eliminated about one-quarter of the racial wage gap after five years.

Abstract:
This paper assesses the impact of competition on racial discrimination. The dismantling of inter- and intrastate bank restrictions by U.S. states from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s reduced financial market imperfections, lowered entry barriers facing nonfinancial firms, and boosted the rate of new firm formation. We use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous intensification of competition in the nonfinancial sector, and evaluate its impact on the racial wage gap, which is that component of the black-white wage differential unexplained by Mincerian characteristics. We find that bank deregulation reduced the racial wage gap by spurring the entry of non- financial firms. Consistent with taste-based theories, competition reduced both the racial wage gap and racial segregation in the workplace, particularly in states with a comparatively high degree of racial prejudice, where competition-enhancing bank deregulation eliminated about one-quarter of the racial wage gap after five years.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
While scholars have hypothesized about the sources of variation in property rights for over 2500 years, it is only very recently that researchers have begun to test these theories empirically. This paper reviews both the theory and empirical evidence supporting and refuting the law and endowment views of property rights. The law view holds that historically determined differences in national legal traditions continue to shape cross-country differences in property rights. The endowment view argues that during European colonization, differences in climate, crops, the indigenous population, and the disease environment influenced long-run property rights.

Abstract:
This paper describes a simple model of technology adoption which combines the two engines of growth emphasized in the recent growth literature: human capital accumulation and technological progress. Our model economy does not create new technologies, it simply adopts those that have been created elsewhere. The accumulation of human capital is closely tied to this adoption process: accumulating human capital simply means learning how to incorporate a new intermediate good into the production process. Since the adoption costs are proportional to the labor force, the model does not display the counterfactual scale effects that are standard in models with endogenous technical progress. We show that our model is compatible with various standard results on the effects of economic policy on the rate of growth.

Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal factor, the results are consistent with theories that stress intensified agency problems in financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities and indicate that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium.

Abstract:
This paper documents several new patterns associated with firms issuing securities in foreign markets that motivate the need for and help guide future research. Besides noting that these international capital raisings grew almost four-fold from 1991 to 2005, accounting for 35 percent of all capital raised through security issuances, the paper has three main findings. First, a large and growing fraction of capital raisings, especially debt issuances, occurs in international markets, but a very small number of firms accounts for the bulk of international capital raisings, highlighting the distributional implications of financial globalization. Second, changes in firm performance following equity and debt issuances in international markets are qualitatively similar to those following domestic issuances, suggesting that capital raisings abroad are not intrinsically different from domestic ones. Third, after firms start accessing international markets, they significantly increase the amount raised in domestic markets, suggesting that international and domestic markets are complements.

Debt Markets, Emerging Markets, Economic Theory & Research, Access to Finance, Microfinance

Abstract:
Public policy debates and theoretical disputes motivate this paper%u2019s examination of (i) therelationship between bank concentration and banking system fragility and (ii) the mechanismsunderlying this relationship. We find no support for the view that concentration increases thefragility of banks. Rather, banking system concentration is associated with a lower probability thatthe country suffers a systemic banking crisis. In terms of policies, we find that (i) regulations andinstitutions that facilitate competition in banking are associated with less
not more -- bankingsystem fragility and (ii) including these policy indicators does not change the results onconcentration. This suggests that concentration is a proxy for something else besides the competitiveenvironment. Also, we do not find that official capital regulations, reserve requirements, or officialprudential regulations lower crises probabilities. Finally, we present suggestive evidence thatconcentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks, which may help accountfor the positive link between concentration and stability.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.