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Abstract:
This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal" stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to" lengthen the more credible the program, the lower the long-term interest rate and the higher the" volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with" optimal debt management if information between the government and private investors is" asymmetric, as is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors" may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.

Abstract:
This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with optimal debt management if information between the government and private investors is asymmetric, as is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.

Abstract:
This paper examines public debt management during episodes of fiscal stabilization when long-term interest rates are generally higher than governments' expectations of future rates. We find that governments increase the share of fixed-rate long-term debt denominated in the domestic currency, the higher is the conditional volatility of short-term interest rates, the lower are long-term interest rates, and the stronger is the fall in long-term rates that follows the announcement of the stabilization program. This evidence suggests that governments tend to prefer long to short maturity debt because they are concerned about refinancing risk. However, when long-term rates are high relative to their expectations, they issue short maturity debt to minimize borrowing costs.

Abstract:
This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations. Such episodes provide valuable information on the way debt instruments are chosen because they allow to overcome the problem that policymakers' expectations of interest rates are generally not observable. We find that governments increase the share of fixed-rate long-term debt denominated in the domestic currency the higher is the conditional volatility of short-term interest rates, the lower are long-term interest rates, and the stronger is the fall in long-term rates that follows the announcement of the stabilization program. By contrast, conventional measures of the relative cost of issuing long-term debt, such as the long-short interest-rate spread, are not significant. This evidence suggests that debt managers tend to prefer long to short maturity debt because they are concerned about the risk of refinancing at higher than expected interest rates. However, when long-term rates are high relative to their expectations, they issue short maturity debt to minimize borrowing costs.

Credibility, Debt Maturity, Public Debt Management, Stabilization

Abstract:
This paper examines the interactions between monetary regimes and public debt management. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or price-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue conventional debt so as to reduce the cost of supply shocks and thus the need for policy accommodation. The role of debt management changes in a fixed exchange regime, since foreign currency debt may enhance the credibility of the peg. However, if a crisis nevertheless materializes, it would be worse than had foreign debt not been issued. Empirical evidence on the EMS appears to support this result. Probit estimates show that the decision to issue foreign currency debt significantly reduced the likelihood of an official realignment within the ERM. However, conditional on a crisis taking place, those countries that increased the share of foreign currency debt experienced larger devaluation sizes.

Abstract:
This paper presents a simple model in which debt management stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio in face of shocks to real returns and output growth and thus supports fiscal restraint in ensuring sustainability. The optimal composition of public debt is derived by looking at the relative impact of the risk and cost of alternative debt instruments on the cost of missing the stabilization target. The optimal debt structure is a function of the expected return differentials between debt instruments, of the conditional variance of their returns and of the conditional covariances of their returns with output growth and inflation. We then explore how the relevant covariances and thus the optimal choice of debt instruments depend on the monetary regime and on Central Bank preferences for output stabilization, inflation control and interest rate smoothing. Finally, we estimate the composition of public debt that would have supported debt stabilization in OECD countries over the last two decades. The empirical evidence suggests that the public debt should have a long maturity and a large share of it should be indexed to the price level.

debt management, debt structure, debt stabilization, inflation indexation, interest rates

Abstract:
This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue conventional debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.

central bank independence, public debt management, foreign currency debt, inflation-indexed debt

Abstract:
The Stability and Growth Pact introduces deficit stabilization as a new interesting objective of debt management. The interest payments on public debt may serve as an important buffer against the budget consequences of cyclical downturns and unexpected deflation. The optimal debt composition depends on the correlations between interest rates, output and inflation. Estimated correlations for the period 1960-1988 and the implied debt compositions provide benchmarks for implications regarding the EMU. The paper explores how relevant correlations between output, inflation and interest rates may have changed with the shift in the monetary policy regime and thus how the debt composition, which stabilizes the dificit, has changed. A longer maturity structure of conventional debt is optimal if the ECB places a lower weight on output stabilization then the national monetary authorities and if EMU member states are hit by asymmetric shocks. Short term conventional debt should instead be issued by countries which experience a relatively higher output and inflation uncertainty and a lower sensitivity of aggregate demand to interest-rate changes. The optimal share of inflation indexed debt is largest in a strict inflation targeting regime; the lower the weight that the ECB assigns to output stabilization, the more attractive is inflation indexation for deficit stabilization.

Abstract:
This Paper derives the optimal composition of the Brazilian public debt by looking at the relative impact of the risk and cost of alternative debt instruments on the probability of missing the stabilization target. This allows to price risk against the expected cost of debt service and thus to find the optimal combination along the trade-off between cost and risk minimization. The optimal debt structure is a function of the expected return differentials between debt instruments, of the conditional variance of debt returns and of their covariances with output growth, inflation, exchange-rate depreciation and the Selic rate. We estimate the relevant covariances by: i) exploiting the daily survey of expectations; ii) simulating a small structural model of the Brazilian economy under different shocks; iii) estimating the unanticipated components of the relevant variables with forecasting regressions. The empirical evidence strongly supports the funding strategy of Brazilian Treasury in 2003 of relying heavily on fixed-rate LTN bonds. It also supports its recent decision to revitalize the market for price-indexed bonds with the new NTN-B program of IPCA indexation. Though decreasing, the exposure to exchange rate risk appears too large suggesting that more efforts should be made to reduce funding in foreign currencies.

Abstract:
This paper derives the optimal composition of the Brazilian public debt by looking at the relative impact of the risk and cost of alternative debt instruments on the probability of missing the stabilization target. This allows to price risk against the expected cost of debt service and thus to find the optimal combination along the trade off between cost and risk minimization. The optimal debt structure is a function of the expected return differentials between debt instruments, of the conditional variance of debt returns and of their covariances with output growth, inflation, exchange-rate depreciation and the Selic rate. We estimate the relevant covariances by: i) exploiting the daily survey of expectations; ii) simulating a small structural model of the Brazilian economy under different shocks; iii) estimating the unanticipated components of the relevant variables with forecasting regressions. The empirical evidence suggests that a large share of the Brazilian debt should be indexed to the price level. Fixed-rate bonds should be preferred to Selic indexed bonds, while the share of dollar denominated (and indexed) bonds should be further reduced from the current high level.his paper derives the optimal composition of the Brazilian public debt by looking at the relative impact of the risk and cost of alternative debt instruments on the probability of missing the stabilization target. This allows to price risk against the expected cost of debt service and thus to find the optimal combination along the trade off between cost and risk minimization. The optimal debt structure is a function of the expected return differentials between debt instruments, of the conditional variance of debt returns and of their covariances with output growth, inflation, exchange-rate depreciation and the Selic rate. We estimate the relevant covariances by: i) exploiting the daily survey of expectations; ii) simulating a small structural model of the Brazilian economy under different shocks; iii) estimating the unanticipated components of the relevant variables with forecasting regressions. The empirical evidence suggests that a large share of the Brazilian debt should be indexed to the price level. Fixed-rate bonds should be preferred to Selic indexed bonds, while the share of dollar denominated (and indexed) bonds should be further reduced from the current high level.

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Abstract:
We examine both grants and net loans made to low income countries during the last two decades to understand the main reasons that motivated the behaviour of both donors and creditors. We find that the total amount of transfers to HIPCs, as compared to non-HIPCs, have been increasing with their debt level. Greater net transfers have taken the form of net loans from multilateral organizations and grants in exchange for loans from bilateral institutions. The evidence thus suggests that HIPCs have kept receiving large amounts of resources just because of their high indebtedness, thereby supporting both the hypothesis of defensive lending and defensive granting.

Debt relief, foreign aid, highly indebted poor countries

Abstract:
We examine both grants and net loans made to low income countries during the last two decades to understand the main reasons that motivated the behaviour of both donors and creditors. We find that the total amount of net transfers to HIPCs, as compared to non-HIPCs, have been increasing with their debt level. Greater net transfers have taken the form of net loans from multilateral organisations and grants in exchange for loans from bilateral institutions. This evidence thus suggests that HIPCs have kept receiving large amounts of resources just because of their high indebtedness, thereby supporting both the hypothesis of defensive lending and defensive granting.

Debt relief, Foreign aid, Highly indebted poor countries

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This Paper examines how public debt, government credibility and external circumstances affect the probability of exchange rate devaluations in a three-period open-economy version of the Barro-Gordon (1983) model with nominal public debt. Public debt creates a link between current and future policy actions: resisting a crisis may enhance or undermine the sustainability of the exchange-rate regime depending on whether the government's reputation or fundamentals - i.e. the level of public debt - are critical for sustainability. The focus is on the impact of public debt, debt maturity and government credibility on the expected devaluation for the current and future periods. This allows us to identify factors affecting the short-term interest rate and the forward rate and hence to derive predictions on the level and the slope of the term structure of interest rates.

Credibility, nominal debt maturity, fixed exchange rates, yield curve

Abstract:
We provide evidence that the movements in yield differentials between euro zone government bonds explained by changes in international risk factors as measured by banking and corporate risk premiums in the United States are more pronounced for bonds issued by Italy and Spain. Liquidity factors play a smaller role, so policies meant to increase financial market efficiency do not appear sufficient to deliver a 'seamless' bond market in the euro area. The risk of default is a small but important component of yield differentials movements, which signal market perceptions of fiscal vulnerability, impose market discipline on national fiscal policies, and may be reduced only by further convergence in debt ratios.

Bond market integration, credit risk, government bonds, liquidity premium, yield spreads