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Abstract:
Can international predatory pricing be dealt with under the WTO framework, outside of an anti-trust regime? If predation is taking place in the form of dumping, as understood in GATT/WTO, it can be tackled under the Anti-Dumping Agreement; otherwise it can be addressed under the safeguards agreement

International Predation, Anti Dumping, safeguards

Abstract:
This paper analyses the relationship between the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the human right to health. The paper shows that the TRIPS agreement is in conflict with the human right to health as contained in human rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The paper also discusses the limitations of the flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement in safeguarding the human right to health. The WTO member countries have taken steps in order to mitigate the adverse impact that the TRIPS agreement may have on human right to health. However, the paper discusses the limitations of these measures and shows that notwithstanding their limited significance, these measures may not be adequately effective in enabling countries to promote, protect and fulfill the human right to health.

TRIPS, human rights, right to health, TRIPS flexibilities.

Abstract:
International Investment Agreements (IIAs), signed by countries to protect and boost investment, restrict the regulatory discretion of the host nation. This paper examines how Indian IIAs impact India's regulatory discretion by analysing four features namely definition of foreign investment, most favoured nation, national treatment and expropriation. India is pursuing a vigorous IIA programme aimed at attracting foreign investment. Indian IIAs contain broad provisions without delineating circumstances in detail where India could move away from investor protection to exercise regulatory discretion to pursue public policy objectives. One important safeguard in the Indian IIAs that preserves regulatory discretion is that all investments are subject to national laws. Nevertheless, the paper argues that in the backdrop of the emerging investor state case law, Indian IIAs need to be drafted more precisely to strengthen India's regulatory discretion.

BITs/IIAs, India, Regulatory Discretion, Investment

Abstract:
Many bilateral trade agreements signed by developing countries contain intellectual property rights rules more stringent than the standards given in the TRIPS agreement. These are known as TRIPS plus provisions. This article discusses whether the most favoured nation (MFN) clause occurring in the TRIPS agreement binds developing countries, which are parties to bilateral agreements containing TRIPS plus rules, to extend the same TRIPS plus provisions to rest of the WTO member countries. This article argues that such an expansive interpretation of the MFN rule is untenable because it will curtail the policy space of developing countries. A liberal interpretation of the MFN clause in this regard is also indefensible because the TRIPS agreement is governed by the fundamental GATT principles and one such principle is 'exception to non discrimination by signing bilateral agreements', consistent with the WTO. TRIPS plus provisions in bilateral agreements are an exception to MFN. Similarly, the MFN clause in the bilateral investment agreements should not be interpreted in a manner that allows a country to shop around for a beneficial intellectual property right provision from other investment agreements signed by the host country.

MFN, TRIPS, Bilateralism, FTAs, BITs