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Avinash Dixit's
Scholarly Papers
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1,926 |
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Citations
230 |
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1.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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13 Nov 01
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01 Sep 04
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339 (23,705)
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29
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Abstract:
I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners' dilemmas between pairs of players selected from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit-maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to achieve social optimality.
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2.
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Evaluating Recipes for Development Success
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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09 Aug 06
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09 Jul 08
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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16 Jun 08
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09 Jul 08
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This article offers a provocative critique of the ability of research on the impact of institutions on growth to offer immediate and practical recommendations for reforming and redesigning institutions in developing countries and transition economies. The literature traces the sources of growth to unalterable historical and geographic features. It contains equally plausible recommendations for opposite courses of action. It is sometimes driven by fads or recommends imitation of the latest success story. Some recommendations are too vague or too general to constitute practical advice. The article suggests a Bayesian diagnostic procedure to identify the causes of economic failure in an individual country as a first step toward remedying the failure.
O43, O17, O20, P30, P48
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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09 Aug 06
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13 Feb 07
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284
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This paper provides a review of the contradictions and conflicts in the literature on economic governance and sketches an approach to use some of the conceptual and empirical findings from that literature for development policy. The literature offers conflicting conclusions on big questions: whether history and geography preordain a country's economic fate, whether democracy or authoritarianism promotes growth; whether informal or formal mechanisms are best; whether big bangor gradual transitions promote growth; and whether disasters and demographics are stumbling blocks or stepping stones. The author finds recipes for success that are infeasible, contradictory and shifting, and that ignore the role of luck in development policy. While the researcher may ask, What creates success on average across countries? the policymaker needs to know, What is going wrong in this country and how can we put it right? The author suggests a preliminary approach to combine the practitioner's detailed knowledge of country conditions with the broader patterns uncovered by scholars, building on growth diagnostics that identify binding constraints to development. But he shifts from the sequential decision tree framework to a more directly diagnostic approach that recognizes that policymakers must deal with many factors simultaneously. The framework he suggests combines empirical information on potential causes, estimates of their probabilities, and observed effects. He proposes this framework as the foundation, not for another recipe, but for a broader mode of thought to tackle the complexity and variance in development processes and patterns across countries and time-one country at a time.
Governance Indicators, National Governance, Children and Youth, Economic Theory & Research, Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Luisa Lambertini Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
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13 Jul 00
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17 Jul 00
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277 (30,331)
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We consider the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, in one country and in a monetary union. In a Nash equilibrium, at least one of the outcomes (output and inflation) are more extreme than the ideal points of both policy authorities. We allow very general stochastic shocks to the parameters, and find the fully optimal monetary policy rule as a nonlinear function of these shocks. We find that the rule does no better than discretionary leadership of monetary policy in every realization of the shocks.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Pierre M. Picard University of Manchester - School of Social Sciences
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19 Mar 02
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10 Apr 02
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271 (30,833)
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The law of insurance contracts provides that if the policyholder is shown to have knowingly misrepresented material facts about his risks in his application, the insurer can cancel the contract ex post facto and refuse to pay any claims. This good faith principle is widespread, but implemented with unequal strictness, under common law or statute law. In this paper, we analyze the role of good faith in insurance application, when policyholders are imperfectly informed about their risk type. We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model of an insurance market with adverse selection to the situation where individuals only receive a signal of their risk type and where a costly verification of the individuals' risk type and/or signal is possible. We characterize the optimal investigation strategy of the insurer, and the insurance indemnity that should be paid contingent on the result of the investigation, when the insurance market is at a competitive equilibrium. We show that the high-risk types get full, fair insurance without any investigation. The contract intended for the low-risk types involves probabilistic investigation, either of the signal directly, or of the risk type and then of the signal if a high risk type is revealed, depending on the costs of the two types of investigation and the posterior probability of the signal. In either case, the equilibrium is Pareto superior to that in the original Rothschild-Stiglitz model, and exists for a larger range of the population proportions of the two risk types. We also analyze the issue of the onus of the proof when intentional misrepresentation of risk is alleged by the insurer, and find the dependence of the optimal choice of the legislative rule depends on the rival parties' costs of proving good or bad faith.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Luisa Lambertini Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
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18 Feb 00
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07 Aug 09
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231 (36,766)
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Abstract:
We consider the interaction between the monetary policy of a common central bank in a monetary union, and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries. We construct a model of the Barro-Gordon type extended to many countries and countercyclical fiscal stabilization policies. Each country's fiscal policies inflict positive (output expansion) and negative (inflation) externalities on other countries, and the common monetary policy has its time-consistency problem. But we find that each kind of policy helps solve the other kind's problem. The first-best can be achieved despite the inevitability of some ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy, without the need for fiscal coordination, without the need for monetary commitment, without the need for a conservative central bank, and irrespective of whether the fiscal or the monetary authorities have the first move.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Henrik Jensen Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
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09 Feb 01
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10 Aug 04
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158 (53,809)
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We consider the political economy of a monetary union where member governments attempt to influence the policy of the common central bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentive contracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank, the equilibrium implements a weighted average of the countries' most preferred policy. We then argue that making the bank inflation averse and/or attentive towards the countries' economic developments is undesirable in this context.
Monetary Union, Incentive Contracts, Common Agency
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7.
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Leonardo Bartolini Author - Deceased Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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15 Feb 06
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15 Feb 06
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75 (95,821)
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We develop a formula for the market value of debt when the borrower`s repayment capacity varies stochastically, and shortfalls are rolled over. The value of a marginal dollar of nominal claim is an S-shaped function of the ratio of the repayment capacity to the amount of nominal debt. Shifts of this curve are examined in response to changes in the underlying parameters. The calculations bring out some conflicts of interest among lenders of differing degrees of seniority. Most surprisingly, junior creditors gain when the loan is rescheduled on terms more favorable to the debtor.
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8.
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Options, the Value of Capital, and Investment
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Andrew B. Abel University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Janice C. Eberly Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Posted:
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24 Aug 98
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17 Mar 08
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57 (111,827) |
44
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Andrew B. Abel University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Janice C. Eberly Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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19 Jul 00
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17 Mar 08
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57
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Capital investment decisions must recognize the limitations on the firm's ability later to sell off or expand capacity. This paper shows how opportunities for future expansion or contraction can be valued as options, how this valuation relates to the q-theory of investment, and how these options affect the incentive to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. We show how these options interact to determine the effect of uncertainty on investment, how these option values change in response to shifts of the distribution of future profitability, and how the q-theory and option pricing approaches to investment are related.
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Andrew B. Abel University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Janice C. Eberly Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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24 Aug 98
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24 Aug 98
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Capital investment decisions must recognize the limitations on the firm's ability to later sell off or expand capacity. This paper shows how opportunities for future expansion or contraction can be valued as options, how this valuation relates to the q-theory of investment, and how these options affect the incentive to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. We show how these options interact to determine the effect of uncertainty on investment, how these option values change in response to shifts of the distribution of future profitability, and how the q-theory and option pricing approaches to investment are related.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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16 Jul 08
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16 Jul 08
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43 (126,675)
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Abstract:
This paper analyses optimal irreversible investment policy when profits are subject to a multiplicative geometric Brownian motion shock. The marginal product of capital is increasing initially and decreasing thereafter. In the latter range, optimal policy is familiar: capacity is added gradually as the shock rises to a threshold where the expected return on the marginal unit is a required multiple of the cost of capital. The multiple reflects the option value of waiting. The optimal policy in the increasing marginal product range obeys the same multiple, now applied to the total return on the discrete increase in capital. Implications for economic growth, and suboptimal equilibria under external economies, are examined.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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15 Feb 06
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15 Feb 06
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32 (140,918)
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When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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03 Sep 03
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03 Sep 03
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29 (145,664)
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Transaction-cost politics views economic policy-making as a political process constrained by asymmetric information and limited commitment possibilities. This paper examines some implications of this perspective for less-developed countries (LDCs) considering policy reform. It emphasizes that success requires reform of the rules and institutions which govern the strategic interaction of the participants in the political game, and that reforms must cope with the special interests and asymmetric information which already exist. In this light, it examines some broad issues of the design of constitutions and institutions (definition and enforcement of property rights, control of inflation, and of government expenditures, federalism, and redistribution), as well as some specific issue of the design of organizations and incentives (problems posed by the interaction of multiple tasks and multiple interests, and their interaction with the limitations on auditing and administration that exists in many LDCs).
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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14 Jul 00
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06 Jun 02
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27 (149,394)
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We develop continuous-time models of capacity choice when demand fluctuates stochastically, and the firm's opportunities to expand or contract are limited. Specifically consider costs of investing or disinvesting that vary with time, or with the amount of capacity already installed. The firm's limited opportunities to expand or contract create call and put options on incremental units of capital; we show how the values of these options affect the firm's investment decisions.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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16 Aug 06
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16 Aug 06
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23 (158,762)
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Abstract:
No abstract available.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Sigbjorn Sodal Agder University College
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08 Jul 00
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03 Apr 08
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23 (158,762)
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We re-examine the basic investment problem of deciding when to incur a sunk cost to obtain a stochastically fluctuating benefit. The optimal investment rule satisfies a trade-off between a larger versus a later net benefit; we show that this trade-off is closely analogous to the standard trade-off for the pricing decision of a firm that faces a downward sloping demand curve. We reinterpret the optimal investment rule as a markup formula involving an elasticity that has exactly the same form as the formula for a firm's optimal markup of price over marginal cost. This is illustrated with several examples.
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15.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Gene M. Grossman Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
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08 Mar 07
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08 Mar 07
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20 (167,186)
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In this paper we ask whether a policy of targeted export promotion can raise domestic welfare when several oligopolistic industries all draw on the same scarce factor of production. Our point of departure is one of Cournot duopoly in which a single home firm competes with a single foreign firm in a market outside the horse country. It has been shown previously that when there is only one such industry in an otherwise perfectly competitive world economy, a subsidy policy by the home government transfers profits to the domestic firm, and thereby raises domestic welfare. However,when many such industries (and only these) utilize the same inelastically supplied resource, promotion of one bids up the return to the specific factor, and consequently disadvantages all of the non-targeted industries in their respective duopolistic competitions. Our question then is which industry(s), if any, is worthy of promotion. We find that, when the specific factor is used in fixed proportion to output, and all of the duopolies have similar demand and cost conditions, a policy of free trade is optimal. We identify the conditions for welfare improvement when a single industry is selected for targeting under asymmetric conditions, and also investigate whether a uniform subsidy to all industries in the imperfectly competitive sector will raise domestic welfare.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Henrik Jensen Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
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13 Jul 03
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13 Jul 03
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20 (167,186)
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We extend the theory of common agency to the situation where the principals' payoffs are affected by their ex ante expectations of the agent's ex post choice. We show how the usual truthful schedules must be modified to account for the rational expectations constraint. We apply the model to a monetary union where member governments influence the policy of the common central bank using incentive contracts. We examine how the outcomes depend on different delegated objectives of the bank, and find that some often-advocated rules create an excessive deflationary bias.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Gene M. Grossman Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
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04 Mar 07
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04 Mar 07
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13 (187,291)
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This paper analyzes trade in manufactured goods that are produced via a vertical production structure with many stages, where some value is added at each to an intermediate product to yield a good-in-process ready for the next stage. We consider the stage at which a good is traded to be an economically endogenous variable, with comparative advantage determining the pattern of production specialization by stages across countries. We study how endowment changes and policy shifts move the margin of comparative advantage, which thus provides a channel for resource allocation adjustment that is additional to the usual ones of factor substitution and changes in the quantity of output.
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Luisa Lambertini Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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07 Aug 09
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28 Sep 09
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4 (209,890)
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We consider monetary-fiscal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. With both policies discretionary, (1) Nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities, (2) of the two leadership possibilities, fiscal leadership is generally better. With fiscal discretion, monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Second-best outcomes require either joint commitment, or identical targets for both authorities - output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative - or complete separation of tasks.
E61, E63
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Luisa Lambertini Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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14 Oct 09
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14 Oct 09
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We consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Leadership of either authority is better. Fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment: The optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy. Agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary-fiscal symbiosis, yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives, for any order of moves, without fiscal co-ordination, and without monetary commitment.
Monetary union, Monetary policy, Fiscal policy
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics
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24 Nov 03
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22 May 08
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Consider a world of traders separated in geographic, economic, or social space. Honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders, but frequencies of meetings, and information flows about cheating, have local bias. Honesty is self-enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors. Global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world. The extent of self-enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size. Costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large, and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self-governing small community. Intermediate-size worlds fare worst.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Gene M. Grossman Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Faruk R. Gul Princeton University
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29 Sep 98
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15 Aug 00
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We study political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periods. In each period, the party in power has ultimate authority to divide the pie. Power evolves according to a Markov process among a set of political states corresponding to different degrees of political strength for the two. The political strength of each party is a state variable, and the game is dynamic, rather than repeated. Allocations in an efficient, sub-game perfect equilibrium do not follow a Markov process. Rather, a party's share reflects not only its current strength, but also how it got there in the recent history. We characterize the efficient division processes for majority rule and supermajority rule, and ask whether one regime allows greater compromise than the other.
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22.
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Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics John Londregan University of California, Los Angeles - Department of Political Science
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Posted:
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01 May 98
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28 Jul 07
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0 (218,772) |
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics John Londregan University of California, Los Angeles - Department of Political Science
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31 May 98
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27 Jul 07
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We model the electoral politics of redistribution. Taxation has efficiency and equity effects. Citizens and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively. In equilibrium, each party's strategy can be implemented by a proportional income tax at a rate common to all groups, and group-specific pork-barrel transfers proportionate to each group's political clout. The proportion coefficients chosen by each party reflect a compromise between its ideology and power hunger. Our results relate to "Director's Law", which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics John Londregan University of California, Los Angeles - Department of Political Science
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01 May 98
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28 Jul 07
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Abstract:
We model the electoral politics of redistribution. Taxation has efficiency and equity effects. Citizens and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively. In equilibrium, each party's strategy can be implemented by a proportional income tax at a rate common to all groups, and group-specific pork-barrel transfers proportionate to each group's political clout. The proportion coefficients chosen by each party reflect a compromise between its ideology and power hunger. Our results relate to "Director's Law", which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Mancur Olson University of Maryland - Department of Economics
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19 Apr 98
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21 Apr 98
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Abstract:
The Coase Theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes. We argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of voluntariness: it requires a two-stage game; a non-cooperative participation decision, followed by Coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate. We illustrate this in a simple public-goods model, and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient. However, the efficient equilibrium is not robust to even very small transaction costs. Thus we cast doubt on Coaseian claims of universal efficiency. Finally, we outline a kind of coercion that restores efficiency. * Note: Mancur Olson is deceased. Please direct inquiries about his papers to Carol Kaplan at the e-mail address below.
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24.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Gene M. Grossman Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Elhanan Helpman Harvard University - Department of Economics
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25 Sep 96
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19 Aug 00
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Abstract:
We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to construct a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum taxes or transfers. The lobbies use only the non- distorting transfers in their non-cooperative equilibrium, but their inter-group competition for transfers turns into a prisoners' dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties. Therefore, we suggest that pressure groups capable of sustaining an ex-ante agreement will make a commitment to forgo direct transfers and to confine their lobbying to distorting taxes and subsidies.
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