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Abstract:
This paper illustrates how a company can use its performance measurement system to i) evaluate its operating strategy, ii) identify potential problems with its strategy, and iii) devise plans to mitigate these problems. Kaplan and Norton (1992) define strategy as a set of hypotheses linking non-financial measures to future value through a series of cause-and-effect relationships. Using data from a convenience store chain, we demonstrate how performance measures and the links between the measures can be used to identify potential problems with the firm's operating strategy. Furthermore, we explore whether the performance measurement system can highlight the causes of these problems and identify possible solutions. While preliminary tests indicate no significant direct relationship between non-financial measures of strategy implementation and the firm's financial performance, detailed analysis reveals that financial performance is associated with the interaction of measures of strategy implementation and employee skills. Financial performance also directly relates to employee skills and store location proxies. We find that the firm's strategy positively (negatively) impacts financial performance in stores with high (low) employee skill levels. Thus, a poor fit between strategy and capabilities primarily caused the ineffectiveness of the strategy. These findings highlight the importance of conditioning the formulation and implementation of a firm's strategy on its core competencies. More importantly, we demonstrate that performance measurement systems can be used to monitor, analyze, and revise a firm's strategy.

Performance Measurement, Balanced Scorecard, Control System, Non-financial Measures, Business Strategy

Abstract:
In this paper, we seek to provide empirical documentation of the effect of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) information on product and customer-related decisions made by managers in a company. Proponents of ABC argue that when an entity implements ABC, it reaps at least two important benefits: process improvements that promote more efficient use of resources and hence reduce costs, and a set of overhead cost numbers that, relative to traditional volume-based methods of costing, better represent the consumption of shared resources by the firm's products, and enable the firm to target a more profitable mix of products and customers. While there is much anecdotal evidence about the efficacy of ABC and ABM (Activity Based Management), there has been no systematic, statistical investigation of whether ABC really influences managerial decisions. An ABC analysis may not have any impact on a firm for two reasons. (1) It may not reveal any new information to the managers who intuitively know already what an ABC system formally captures. (2) Key managers may reject the ABC numbers and be unwilling to weather the organizational change and upheaval often required for effective ABM. In this study, we conduct a statistical analysis of firm-level data in order to shed light on whether ABC provides new information to managers and whether ABM significantly impacts product and customer-related decisions. We supplement this analysis with interviews with top managers in the company on whether and to what extent the ABC analysis influenced managerial decision making.

We do not find much support for the hypothesis that product prices reflect all costs even when a company does not have ABC information. We find that after the ABC analysis, Insteel displayed a higher propensity to discontinue or increase prices of products that were found unprofitable in the ABC study and to discontinue customers that were found unprofitable in the ABC. The changes to the portfolio of customers served were similar but not as striking as the product mix and pricing decisions. This finding is consistent with senior managers' intuition that product level decisions can be made faster than customer level decisions.

Abstract:
We examine whether taxes affect stock sales by mutual funds. For certain funds, the expected amount of a given stock sold in a given quarter is 62% greater when liquidation would trigger a capital loss equal to 1% of the value of the portfolio than when a like-size gain would be triggered, a greater effect than is associated with either contemporaneous excess stock returns of 50% or unexpected EPS equal to 50% of the stock price. For growth funds, responses to tax factors are consistent from year to year, and dispositions vary with the year-to-date realized gain.

Investment advisers, Overhang, Realized, Unrealized

Abstract:
We examine whether taxes affect stock sales by mutual funds. For certain funds, the expected amount of a given stock sold in a given quarter is 62% greater when liquidation would trigger a capital loss equal to 1% of the value of the portfolio than when a like-size gain would be triggered, a greater effect than is associated with either contemporaneous excess stock returns of 50% or unexpected EPS equal to 50% of the stock price. For growth funds, responses to tax factors are consistent from year to year, and dispositions vary with the year-to-date realized gain.

Investment advisers, Overhang, Realized, Unrealized

Abstract:
We examine whether taxes affect stock sales by mutual funds. For certain funds, the expected amount of a given stock sold in a given quarter is 62% greater when liquidation would trigger a capital loss equal to 1% of the value of the portfolio than when a like-size gain would be triggered, a greater effect than is associated with either contemporaneous excess stock returns of 50% or unexpected EPS equal to 50% of the stock price. For growth funds, responses to tax factors are consistent from year to year, and dispositions vary with the year-to-date realized gain.

Investment advisers; Overhang; Realized; Unrealized

Abstract:
In this paper, we seek to provide empirical documentation of the effect of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) information on product and customer-related decisions made by managers in a company. Proponents of ABC argue that when an entity implements ABC, it reaps at least two important benefits: process improvements that promote more efficient use of resources and hence reduce costs, and a set of overhead cost numbers that, relative to traditional volume-based methods of costing, better represent the consumption of shared resources by the firm's products, and enable the firm to target a more profitable mix of products and customers. While there is much anecdotal evidence about the efficacy of ABC and ABM (Activity Based Management), there has been no systematic, statistical investigation of whether ABC really influences managerial decisions. An ABC analysis may not have any impact on a firm for two reasons. (1) It may not reveal any new information to the managers who intuitively know already what an ABC system formally captures. (2) Key managers may reject the ABC numbers and be unwilling to weather the organizational change and upheaval often required for effective ABM. In this study, we conduct a statistical analysis of firm-level data in order to shed light on whether ABC provides new information to managers and whether ABM significantly impacts product and customer-related decisions. We supplement this analysis with interviews with top managers in the company on whether and to what extent the ABC analysis influenced managerial decision making. We do not find much support for the hypothesis that product prices reflect all costs even when a company does not have ABC information. We find that after the ABC analysis, Insteel displayed a higher propensity to discontinue or increase prices of products that were found unprofitable in the ABC study and to discontinue customers that were found unprofitable in the ABC. The changes to the portfolio of customers served were similar but not as striking as the product mix and pricing decisions. This finding is consistent with senior managers' intuition that product level decisions can be made faster than customer level decisions.

Abstract:
A series of caselets exploring the accounting for long-lived nonmonetary assets.

Abstract:
Supplement the (A) case. Transworld Auto Parts had to implement its new strategy flawlessly to survive the auto industry upheaval. The new CEO asked her leadership team to craft strategy maps and balanced scorecards to help each division implement their strategies.

Abstract:
Transworld Auto Parts had to implement its new strategy flawlessly to survive the auto industry upheaval. The new CEO asked her leadership team to craft strategy maps and balanced scorecards to help each division implement their strategies.

Abstract:
The credit crisis of 2008 placed compensation practices at publicly traded firms in the United States under scrutiny. This case examines perceived excessive pay and severance packages at several firms implicated in the credit crisis of 2008, the executive compensation provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, and discusses the implications for compensation committees at public companies.

Abstract:
As the recession lingered on into 2009, the U.S. government sought to limit executive pay and excessive risk. The debate raged over what constituted excessive risk and how best to mitigate it. This case describes the government restrictions on executive pay for TARP recipients and delves into the debate on executive compensation and incentives that encourage excessive risk.

Abstract:
Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO and that the directors had conflicts of interest because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

Abstract:
Two activist investors, one a founder and one a hedge fund manager, seek to improve board oversight at a chain restaurant company. Prestley Blake founded Friendly Ice Cream in 1935 with his brother and the two created a chain of full-service restaurants. In 1979 they sold the business and retired. In 2000, Blake became concerned that Friendly's CEO, who owned approximately 10% of Friendly and also owned a larger percentage of another restaurant company, was shifting expenses between the businesses in a way detrimental to Friendly shareholders, but personally advantageous to the CEO. Further, Blake believed that Friendly's board of directors was not meeting their fiduciary obligations to shareholders by properly overseeing the activities of the CEO and that the directors had conflicts of interest because they were involved with the CEO's non-Friendly business activities. In 2003, Blake filed a lawsuit against the CEO and the company. In 2006, Sardar Biglari, a hedge fund manager who had invested in Friendly, entered into negotiations with Friendly for him to join the board of directors to help improve the management of the business. When these negotiations failed, Biglari launched a proxy fight against Friendly in 2007. While these two activist investors shared similar objectives, they worked independently and chose different strategies.

Abstract:
Areva, the world's market leader in civilian nuclear power, was positioned to take advantage of the resurgence of nuclear power. However, three issues clouded the positive outlook: (1) 1.7 billion euro loss on the construction of the first next generation nuclear reactor in Finland, (2) the decision of German company Siemens to pull out of its partnership in Areva NP and exercise its 2.1 billion euro put option, and (3) the projected investment budget shortfall of 3 billion euros in 2008. How can Areva best generate cash to finance its investments for 2008 and beyond?

Abstract:
Virginia Mason Medical Center (VM) hired Owens & Minor (O&M) as its alpha vendor for medical/surgical supplies in 2004. By 2005, O&M was performing JIT and LUM services for VM, but they believed the pricing model in the industry was outdated. VM and O&M partnered to create the Total Supply Chain Cost (TSCC) pricing program, an activity-based model that assigned all the cost drivers of distribution and inventory handling to VM, but also assured O&M of a profit. The TSCC incented VM to streamline its distribution activities, since these would directly impact its fee. After beta testing the TSCC for one year, VM's Daniel Borunda and O&M's Michael Stefanic believed that TSCC was a better and more cost-effective pricing model, but could they convince their companies to continue to invest in TSCC?

Abstract:
The epilogue to Supply Chain Partners: Virginia Mason and Owens & Minor (A), the B case details the outcome of the issues discussed in Case A; namely that Virginia Mason and Owens & Minor did implement the TSCC contract. Virginia Mason also kept the suture contract with O&M because the TSCC model was able to prove that O&M was the low-cost provider. Case B also gives results metrics, such as reduction in line items, orders, and days sales outstanding.

Abstract:
This paper examines whether the trading decisions of institutional investors can be explained in part by the effects of taxation on portfolio returns. We find that advisers managing portfolios on behalf of persons who are taxable entities are 26 percent less likely to sell securities that trigger large capital gains than securities that trigger no capital gains. Also, tax considerations seem to weigh more heavily in trading decisions later in the fiscal year. The decision to sell a particular security appears to depend on the cumulative gain or loss realized by the institutions so far in the tax year. Tax-exempt institutional investors do not exhibit these tendencies. Surprisingly, all institutions are less likely to sell securities that would trigger a large loss. The inventory flow assumption adopted for tax purposes affects the size of the gain or loss realized in the sale of a block of stock. Consistent with tax planning, a HIFO (highest in, first out) inventory rule is most significant for taxable institutions; a FIFO inventory rule is most significant for non-taxable institutions.

Abstract:
This paper provides a theory to explain how recent phenomena in the retailing industry, such as electronic data interchange, continuous replenishment, and consignment sales, are related to mitigating agency costs in a distribution channel. These phenomena are linked to the manufacturer?s ability to monitor retail inventory levels. When the manufacturer is unable to monitor retail inventory levels and resale-price maintenance is illegal, the manufacturer uses the wholesale price to regulate both retail prices and inventory levels. However, when the manufacturer can monitor retail inventory, he will choose to subsidize unsold inventory in various forms. This ability to subsidize unsold inventory, we demonstrate, helps the manufacturer mitigate the trade-off between retail prices and inventory levels. The Accounting/Information systems, such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), help the manufacturer monitor retail inventory, and thus play a crucial role in reducing contract incompleteness in supply chains.

Abstract:
This paper presents an analytical model to study the trade- offs that managers face when they use accounting signals for multiple uses. We analyze the situation where a signal is informative about the agent's effort (and hence useful for contracting with the agent) and about the attractiveness of an investment proposal. We find that the principal will be better off by using the signal less intensively for performance evaluation (compared to the case without investment decision) in order to obtain a better information for her investment decision if:(1) the agent can manipulate the signal, (2) either manipulation cannot be communicated to the principal or the principal cannot commit not to use the information communicated against the agent, and (3) the principal cannot delegate the investment decision to the agent. If these assumptions do not hold, however, the principal would prefer to let the agent manipulate and extract high effort.

Abstract:
Retailers often stock competing products from multiple manufacturers. When the retailer stocks out of a particular item, customers who prefer the item are likely, with some probability, to switch to a substitute product from another manufacturer at the same store. In such an event, a "lost sale" for the manufacturer is not a "lost sale" for the retailer; thus, the cost associated with a stockout is different for the manufacturer and the retailer and consequently their target fill rates are different. Such differences in stockout cost influence the optimal contract between the manufacturer and the retailer and also impose agency costs on the channel. Such contracts, in turn, determine equilibrium inventory levels and fill rates. We show that the manufacturer would prefer higher inventory levels than the retailer. We also explore three options available to the manufacturer to mitigate this problem. We offer branding, electronic data interchange, and vendor managed inventory as marketing, informational, and structural solutions that partially redress the basic asymmetry of objectives between the manufacturer and the retailer.