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Florencio Lopez de Silanes's
Scholarly Papers
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7,241 |
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1.
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Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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13 Dec 99
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Last Revised:
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18 Jun 08
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11,326 ( 56) |
770
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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29 Nov 03
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18 Jun 08
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Abstract:
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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26 Jul 00
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02 Apr 01
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91
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Abstract:
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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13 Dec 99
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29 Nov 03
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2,838
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Abstract:
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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27 Jul 00
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23 Aug 00
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8,397
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Abstract:
Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, summarize the consequences of these differences, and suggest potential strategies of reform of corporate governance. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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2.
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Corporate Ownership Around the World
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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31 Jul 98
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20 Apr 08
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4,206 ( 349) |
953
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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04 Aug 00
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20 Apr 08
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119
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We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely-held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely-held corporations is less common. The controlling shareholders typically have the power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest that the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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31 Jul 98
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26 Nov 03
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4,087
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Abstract:
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely held corporations is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest that the central agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders.
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3.
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What Works in Securities Laws?
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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05 Aug 03
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08 Mar 05
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2,581 ( 867) |
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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05 Aug 03
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05 Aug 03
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We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find almost no evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, and strong evidence that laws facilitating private enforcement through disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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29 Dec 04
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08 Mar 05
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Abstract:
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find almost no evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, and strong evidence that laws facilitating private enforcement through disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets.
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4.
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Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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Posted:
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14 Jan 98
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26 Nov 03
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2,379 ( 1,001) |
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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10 Jul 00
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11 Nov 00
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This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call outcome minority shareholders to force corporate outsiders to disgorge cash. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividends. On what we call substitute a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be associated with lower dividends. We compare these models on a cross-section of 4,000 companies from around the world, which operate in 33 countries with different levels of shareholder protection, and therefore different strength of minority shareholder rights. The findings on payout levels and other results support the outcome agency model of dividends.
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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14 Jan 98
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26 Nov 03
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2,275
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This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called "dividend puzzle," from the agency perspective. We outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call "the outcomes" model, dividends are the result of effective pressure by minority shareholders rights should be associated with higher dividends. On what we call "the substitutes" model, insiders choose to pay dividends to establish a reputation for a decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be associated with lower dividends. We compare these models on a cross-section of 4,000 companies from around the world, which operate in countries with different levels of investor protection, and therefore different strength of minority shareholder rights. The findings on payout levels, as well as other results, support the outcome agency model of dividends.
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5.
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The New Comparative Economics
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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05 Apr 03
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21 Dec 04
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2,328 ( 1,044) |
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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17 Jun 03
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19 Jun 03
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In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic trade-off between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We then apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Comparative economics, institutions, colonial transplantations, transition
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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05 Apr 03
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17 Jun 03
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Abstract:
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We then apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
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Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance
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21 Dec 04
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21 Dec 04
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2,267
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Abstract:
In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. The authors argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. They then apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice. This paper - a product of the Private Sector Advisory Department, Private Sector Development Vice Presidency - is part of a larger effort to understand institutional differences in the regulation of business.
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6.
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Tunnelling
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Simon H. Johnson Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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25 Jan 00
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17 Apr 08
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1,851 ( 1,674) |
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Simon H. Johnson Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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11 Jun 00
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17 Apr 08
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70
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Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles -- the duty of care and the duty of loyalty -- which courts use to analyze cases involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.
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Simon H. Johnson Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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25 Jan 00
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15 Nov 01
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Abstract:
Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles -- the duty of care and the duty of loyalty -- which courts use to analyze cases involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.
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Simon H. Johnson Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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25 Jan 00
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26 Nov 03
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1,781
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Abstract:
Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles - the duty of care and the duty of loyalty - which courts use to analyze cases involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.
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7.
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The Regulation of Entry
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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08 Sep 00
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30 Dec 04
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1,347 ( 2,962) |
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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25 Sep 01
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07 Dec 01
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54
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We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
Regulation, business entry
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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04 Oct 00
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30 Dec 04
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1,226
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New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses."
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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08 Sep 00
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07 Dec 01
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We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
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8.
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Government Ownership Of Banks
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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16 May 00
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26 Nov 03
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1,274 ( 3,241) |
229
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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22 Nov 03
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22 Nov 03
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We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports 'political' theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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09 Aug 00
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26 Nov 03
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1,232
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In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with optimistic "development" theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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16 May 00
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10 Apr 01
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Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with the optimistic "development" theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more recent "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
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9.
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Alberto Chong Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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11 Nov 03
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11 Nov 03
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1,199 (3,633)
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Abstract:
Privatization is under attack. Criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses. We evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from Latin America. There are four main results. First, the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases. Second, in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization, we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses, exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits. Third, the manner in which privatization is carried out matters. Transparencies and homogeneity in procedures, speed, and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for curruption and discretion. Finally, privatization's success is enhanced by two complementary policies: re-regulation or deregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces; and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms' access to capital at lower costs. Overall, the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity, firm restructuring, fiscal benefits, output growth and even quality improvements. Most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design, opaque processes with heavy state involvement, lack of re-regulation and a poor corporate governance framework.
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10.
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The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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07 Dec 05
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06 Apr 06
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1,049 ( 4,531) |
180
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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06 Apr 06
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06 Apr 06
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Abstract:
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically-grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the commonly used index of anti-director rights.
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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07 Dec 05
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Last Revised:
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06 Feb 06
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995
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180
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Abstract:
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically-grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the commonly used index of anti-director rights.
legal protection, disclosure, stock market
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11.
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The Guarantees of Freedom
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Versions (3)
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hide multiple versions |
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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23 Jan 02
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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915 ( 5,752) |
9
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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02 Feb 02
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Last Revised:
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29 Jul 02
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27
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9
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Abstract:
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American freedom, which allow judges to restrain law-making powers of the sovereign through constitutional review. We create a data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these institutions of English and American freedom, and ask whether these rules predict economic and political freedom in a cross-section of countries. We find that the English institutions of judicial independence are strong predictors of economic freedom and weaker predictors of political freedom. The American institutions of checks and balances are strong predictors of political but not of economic freedom. Judicial independence explains half of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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23 Jan 02
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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463
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9
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Abstract:
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American freedom, which allow judges to restrain law-making powers of the sovereign through constitutional review. We create a data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these institutions of English and American freedom, and ask whether these rules predict economic and political freedom in a cross-section of countries. We find that the English institutions of judicial independence are strong predictors of economic freedom and weaker predictors of political freedom. The American institutions of checks and balances are strong predictors of political but not of economic freedom. Judicial independence explains half of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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01 Feb 02
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Last Revised:
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29 May 02
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425
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9
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Abstract:
Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American freedom, which allow judges to restrain law-making powers of the sovereign through constitutional review. We create a data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these institutions of English and American freedom, and ask whether these rules predict economic and political freedom in a cross-section of countries. We find that the English institutions of judicial independence are strong predictors of economic freedom and weaker predictors of political freedom. The American institutions of checks and balances are strong predictors of political but not of economic freedom. Judicial independence explains half of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom.
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12.
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Do Institutions Cause Growth?
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Versions (2)
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hide multiple versions |
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Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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16 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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10 Oct 04
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903 ( 5,890) |
202
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Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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04 Jul 04
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Last Revised:
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14 Aug 04
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110
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202
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Abstract:
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
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Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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16 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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10 Oct 04
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793
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202
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Abstract:
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
Institutions, growth, human capital
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13.
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The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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09 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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29 Nov 07
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869 ( 6,300) |
76
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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27 Nov 07
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29 Nov 07
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33
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76
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Abstract:
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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09 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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09 Nov 07
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836
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76
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Abstract:
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
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14.
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Courts: The Lex Mundi Project
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hide multiple versions |
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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19 Mar 02
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Last Revised:
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20 Nov 09
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823 ( 6,818) |
45
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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18 Oct 03
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24 Oct 03
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0
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Abstract:
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Enforcement of contracts, courts, judicial efficiency
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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04 Jun 02
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Last Revised:
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05 Jan 04
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34
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45
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Abstract:
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Enforcement of contracts, courts, judicial efficiency
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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11 Apr 02
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Last Revised:
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20 Nov 09
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35
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45
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Abstract:
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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19 Mar 02
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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754
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45
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Abstract:
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
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15.
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The Regulation of Labor
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Juan Carlos Botero American Bar Association - World Justice Project Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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05 Jun 03
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Last Revised:
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07 Jul 08
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729 ( 8,211) |
225
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Juan Carlos Botero American Bar Association - World Justice Project Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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24 Mar 05
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Last Revised:
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07 Jul 08
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0
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Abstract:
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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Juan Carlos Botero American Bar Association - World Justice Project Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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03 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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07 Jul 08
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0
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Abstract:
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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Juan Carlos Botero American Bar Association - World Justice Project Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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08 Jun 03
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Last Revised:
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07 Jul 08
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66
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225
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Abstract:
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that richer countries regulate labor less than poorer countries do, although they have more generous social security systems. The political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems. Socialist and French legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries, and the inclusion of legal origin wipes out the effect of the political power of the left. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are difficult to reconcile with efficiency and political power theories of institutional choice, but are broadly consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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Juan Carlos Botero American Bar Association - World Justice Project Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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05 Jun 03
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Last Revised:
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07 Jul 08
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663
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225
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|
| |
Abstract:
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that richer countries regulate labor less than poorer countries do, although they have more generous social security systems. The political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems. Socialist and French legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries, and the inclusion of legal origin wipes out the effect of the political power of the left. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are difficult to reconcile with efficiency and political power theories of institutional choice, but are broadly consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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16.
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Markus Glaser University of Mannheim - Department of Banking and Finance Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Zacharias Sautner University of Amsterdam - Business School
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| Posted: |
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25 Mar 08
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Last Revised:
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07 Oct 09
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719 (8,433)
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Abstract:
How do firms allocate capital internally across units? Do more powerful and better connected managers inside a conglomerate get larger capital allocations? To answer these questions, we put together a unique five-year business-unit panel data set on planned and actual capital allocations inside a world-wide conglomerate with 5 divisions and 22 business units, and construct measures of managerial power and connections from profile data and a questionnaire carried out for unit CEOs. Our conglomerate shows the same kind of inefficiencies in capital allocation and investment behavior documented in previous studies. In the search for a potential channel behind such behaviour, we test if cash windfalls at the headquarters are distributed inside the conglomerate according to managerial power or connections. In contrast to planned capital allocations, which are not affected by connections, we find that units with more powerful and better connected managers get substantially larger parts of the windfalls. Our estimates show powerful managers increasing their actual vs. planned investment between 10 and 32% more than their less powerful peers. These results are not explained by managers’ abilities or an endogenous allocation of managers across units. In support of bargaining power theories, our results provide direct empirical evidence of an important channel of capital misallocation inside firms.
Internal Capital Allocation, Internal Capital Markets, Power Inside the Firm, Managerial Power, Capital Budgeting
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17.
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The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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Posted:
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18 Oct 98
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Last Revised:
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27 Jun 00
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595 ( 11,082) |
93
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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| Posted: |
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27 Jun 00
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Last Revised:
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27 Jun 00
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41
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93
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Abstract:
Criticisms of privatization have centered around the possibility that the observed higher profitability of privatized companies comes at the expense of the rest of society. In this paper we focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on the market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts. Using data for all 218 non-financial privatizations that took place in Mexico between 1983 and 1991 we find that privatized firms quickly bridge the pre-privatization performance gap with industry-matched control groups. For example, privatization is followed by a 24 percentage point increase in the ratio of operating income to sales. We roughly decompose those gains in profitability as follows: 10 percent of the increase is due to higher product prices; 33 percent of the increase represents a transfer from laid-off workers; and productivity gains account for the residual 57 percent. Transfers from society to the firm are partially offset by taxes which absorb slightly over half the gains in operating income. Finally, we also find evidence indicating that deregulation is associated with faster convergence to industry benchmarks.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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| Posted: |
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18 Oct 98
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Last Revised:
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05 May 99
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554
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93
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Abstract:
Criticisms of privatization have centered around the possibility that the observed higher profitability of privatized companies comes at the expense of the rest of society. In this paper we focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on their market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts. Using data for all 18 non-financial privatizations that took place in Mexico between 1983 and 1991 we find that privatized firms quickly bridge the pre-privatization performance gap with industry-matched control groups. For example, privatization is followed by a 24 percentage point increase in the ratio of operating income to sales. We roughly decompose those gains in profitability as follows: 10 percent of the increase is due to higher product prices, 33 percent of the increase represents a transfer from laid-off workers; and productivity gains account for the residual 57 percent. Transfers from society to the firm are partially offset by taxes which absorb slightly over half the gains in operating income. Finally, we also find evidence indicating that deregulation is associated with faster convergence to industry benchmarks.
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18.
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Related Lending
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Guillermo Zamarripa National Banking and Securities Commission, Mexico
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Posted:
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23 Mar 02
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Last Revised:
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10 Oct 02
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587 ( 11,320) |
74
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Guillermo Zamarripa National Banking and Securities Commission, Mexico
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| Posted: |
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23 Mar 02
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Last Revised:
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29 Mar 02
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23
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74
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Abstract:
In many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank's owners. We examine the benefits of related lending using a newly assembled dataset for Mexico. Related lending is prevalent (20% of commercial loans) and takes place on better terms than arm's-length lending (annual interest rates are 4 percentage points lower). Related loans are 33% more likely to default and, when they do, have lower recovery rates (30% less) than unrelated ones. The evidence supports the view that rather than enhance information sharing, related lending is a manifestation of looting.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Guillermo Zamarripa National Banking and Securities Commission, Mexico
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| Posted: |
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31 Mar 02
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Last Revised:
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10 Oct 02
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564
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74
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Abstract:
In many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank's owners. We examine the benefits of related lending using a newly assembled dataset for Mexico. Related lending is prevalent (20% of commercial loans) and takes place on better terms than arm's-length lending (annual interest rates are 4 percentage points lower). Related loans are 33% more likely to default and, when they do, have lower recovery rates (30% less) than unrelated ones. The evidence supports the view that rather than enhance information sharing, related lending is a manifestation of looting.
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19.
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Judicial Checks and Balances
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Show Abstracts |
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Versions (3)
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hide multiple versions |
Export Bibliographic Info |
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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05 Jun 03
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Last Revised:
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08 Apr 04
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443 ( 16,794) |
71
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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08 Mar 04
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Last Revised:
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08 Apr 04
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0
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Abstract:
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new database of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common-law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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15 Jun 03
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Last Revised:
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31 Jul 03
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25
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71
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Abstract:
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Cristian Pop-Eleches Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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05 Jun 03
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Last Revised:
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08 Mar 04
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418
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71
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Abstract:
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.
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20.
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Law and Finance
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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Posted:
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27 Sep 96
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Last Revised:
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14 May 00
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328 ( 24,558) |
1,886
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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26 Nov 98
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Last Revised:
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27 Nov 98
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0
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Abstract:
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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27 Sep 96
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Last Revised:
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14 May 00
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328
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1,886
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Abstract:
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
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21.
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Alberto Chong Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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| Posted: |
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08 Jan 03
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Last Revised:
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20 Dec 04
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233 (36,297)
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11
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Abstract:
Some critics of privatization argue that poor labor force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish better retrenchment programs. Using new data from a sample of 400 companies in the world, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes test competing theories about the wisdom of retrenchment programs and their effect on prices paid by buyers, and rehiring policies by private owners after privatization. The results show that adverse selection plagues retrenchment programs carried out by governments before privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, several labor retrenchment policies yield a negative impact on net privatization prices. In confirmation of the adverse selection argument, various types of voluntary downsizing lead to a higher frequency of rehiring of the same workers by the new private owners. Compulsory skill-based programs are the only type of program that is marginally associated with higher prices and lower rehiring rates after privatization, but the political and economic costs of this policy may make it somewhat impractical. While a qualified non-intervention policy appears to be the safest bet in labor retrenchment before privatization, another one might be to set up a social safety net or labor reallocation program before privatization, and then let the new private owners decide who is redundant and who is not. Setting up the program before privatization may help with the political viability of the process and letting the new owners manage the retrenchment may help avoid adverse selection. This paper - a product of Public Services, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the labor implications of public sector reform. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Public Sector Downsizing" (RPO 683-69).
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22.
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Legal Determinants of External Finance
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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Posted:
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12 Mar 97
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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177 ( 48,096) |
1,114
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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27 Jun 97
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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0
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Abstract:
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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12 Mar 97
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Last Revised:
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09 May 00
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177
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1,114
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Abstract:
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
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23.
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Aron Balas National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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12 Feb 08
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Last Revised:
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12 Feb 08
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120 (68,347)
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7
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Abstract:
Djankov et al. (2003a) propose and measure for 109 countries in the year 2000 an index of formalism of legal procedure for two simple disputes: eviction of a non-paying tenant and collection of a bounced check. For a sub-sample of 40 countries, we compute this index every year starting in 1950, which allows us to study the evolution of legal rules. We find that between 1950 and 2000, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries. At least in this specific area of law, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules.
common law, civil law, legal procedure, formalism
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24.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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26 Jul 00
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Last Revised:
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17 Apr 08
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117 (69,775)
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28
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Abstract:
Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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25.
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The Quality of Government
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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Posted:
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18 Oct 98
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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90 ( 84,851) |
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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18 May 99
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Last Revised:
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26 Nov 03
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0
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Abstract:
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government, and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We also find that the larger governments tend to be the better performing ones. The importance of historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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18 Oct 98
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Last Revised:
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03 Jul 00
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90
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Abstract:
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government, and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French of socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We also find that the larger governments tend to be the better performing ones. The importance of historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions.
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26.
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Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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28 Mar 97
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Last Revised:
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08 May 00
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87 (86,852)
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139
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Abstract:
Several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society, and therefore of performance of social institutions. We argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations. In a cross-section of countries, evidence on government performance, participation in civic and professional societies, importance of large firms, and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis. Moreover, trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions, which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross-section of countries.
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27.
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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29 Jan 09
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Last Revised:
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01 Nov 09
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76 (94,778)
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1
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Abstract:
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
Transparency, Corruption
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28.
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Steven T. Berry Yale University - Department of Economics Vittorio Grilli Independent Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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| Posted: |
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05 Jul 04
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Last Revised:
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05 Jul 04
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49 (119,626)
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1
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Abstract:
This paper considers the likely effect on the automobile industry of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico. As there are currently restrictions on imports into Mexico, one important outcome of a free trade agreement would be the opening of the Mexican market to U.S. producers. This is consistent with the history of the international auto industry and the fact that the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact opened a new, large market to U.S. manufacturers. The current state of the Mexican auto industry is considered in great detail, suggesting that the Mexican industry will continue to prosper, increasing output but also relying heavily on production from U.S. owned plants and on inputs imported from the U.S. and Canada. However, much of the existing domestically oriented industry is likely to be replaced by other North American producers. Finally, an econometric demand analysis implies that economic growth together with declines in prices to world levels could rapidly expand the size of the Mexican auto market. The free trade agreement represents an opportunity for product diversification and rationalization in the auto industry.
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29.
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A New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions
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Oliver D. Hart Harvard University - Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School John Hardman Moore University of Edinburgh - Economics
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Posted:
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25 Sep 97
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Last Revised:
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31 Mar 08
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36 (135,057) |
7
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Oliver D. Hart Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Drago Pennsylvania State University - Department of Labor Studies and Industrial Relations Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School John Hardman Moore University of Edinburgh - Economics
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| Posted: |
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08 Jul 00
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Last Revised:
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31 Mar 08
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36
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7
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Abstract:
We develop a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions. The procedure" is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example in developing" economies, or in economies in transition) -- although it can be used in all economies."
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Oliver D. Hart Harvard University - Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School John Hardman Moore University of Edinburgh - Economics
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| Posted: |
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25 Sep 97
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Last Revised:
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01 Jan 99
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0
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Abstract:
Whether to reorganize or auction an insolvent debtor corporation is a question at the heart of debate among bankruptcy scholars and practitioners. Proponents of reorganization frequently argue that an auction cannot properly allocate resources where capital markets function poorly. In this paper, we propose a new multiple-auction bankruptcy procedure that would mitigate the problem of weak capital markets. Although any economy could usefully employ this procedure, it is designed to work effectively in developing and transitional economies, where capital markets are not yet well formed.
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30.
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Privatization in the United States
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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Posted:
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29 Jul 97
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Last Revised:
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16 Jul 00
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34 (137,736) |
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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16 Jul 00
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Last Revised:
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16 Jul 00
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34
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Abstract:
In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are inhouse provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as privatization. We examine empirically how United States counties choose their mode of providing services. The evidence indicates that state clean- government laws and state laws restricting county spending encourage privatization, whereas strong public unions discourage it. The evidence is inconsistent with the view that efficiency considerations alone govern the provision mode, and points to the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer resistance to government spending in the privatization decision.
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Robert W. Vishny University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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| Posted: |
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29 Jul 97
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Last Revised:
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02 Dec 97
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0
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Abstract:
In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are in-house provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as privatization. We examine empirically how U.S. counties choose the mode of providing services. The evidence indicates that state clean-government laws and state laws restricting county spending encourage privatization, whereas strong public unions discourage it. This points to the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer resistance to government spending in the privatization decision.
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31.
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Olivier J. Blanchard Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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14 Aug 07
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Last Revised:
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14 Aug 07
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32 (140,574)
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85
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| |
Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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32.
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Determinants of Privatization Prices
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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Posted:
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23 Mar 98
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Last Revised:
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12 May 00
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24 (155,828) |
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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| Posted: |
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23 Mar 98
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Last Revised:
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30 Apr 98
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0
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Abstract:
Generating government revenue is a common objective in privatization. This paper asks what determines privatization prices using firm-level data for all 236 Mexican companies privatized between 1983 and 1992. There are three main reasons why net prices--auction prices net of the cost of prior restructuring measures--are low, averaging 54 cents per dollar of assets. First, privatization prices are very sensitive to the level of competition in the auction and restrictions often limited participation. Second, the privatization process took too long, and lengthier privatizations are associated with lower premiums. Third, firm prior restructuring measures absorbed an average of 33 percent of the auction price. Most restructuring measures do not increase price and delay privatization further. Net prices would have increased by 71 cents per dollar of assets if the government had emphasized speed, succeeding in divesting assets in one year less than the average, and firing the CEO were the only restructuring step taken.
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School
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| Posted: |
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28 Jun 98
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Last Revised:
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12 May 00
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24
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Abstract:
Generating government revenue is a common objective in privatization. This paper asks: what determines privatization prices? Pursuing this query helps resolve the current controversies about the bearing of speed and the role for government actions prior to privatization. The data, gathered from primary sources, encompass 361 privatized Mexican companies in 49 four-digit industry codes. The determinants of auction privatization prices are divided into three groups: (1) company performance and industry parameters; (2) the auction process and its requirements; and (3) the prior restructuring actions taken by the government. Controlling for company and industry effects reveals the significant impact of the costs and characteristics of the labor force. Minority control packages carry large discounts. Auction requirements that allow foreign investors result in higher sale premia, while restrictions constraining participation or payment forms reduce net prices. The speed of privatization substantially influences net prices: the longer it takes to put the company on the block, the more severe the deterioration in performance, and the lower the premium obtained. Pre-sale reductions in labor force, and particularly the firing of CEOs, lead to significantly higher premiums. Debt absorption, investment, and performance improvement programs do not increase the net price, while de-investment measures prove more beneficial. Overall, the results show increased premia for government actions that stimulate bidder participation and expedite the privatization process.
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33.
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Juan Carlos Botero American Bar Association - World Justice Project Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics Alexander Volokh Emory University - School of Law
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| Posted: |
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29 Feb 08
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Last Revised:
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29 Feb 08
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23 (158,402)
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5
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Abstract:
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility.
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34.
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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17 Feb 09
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Last Revised:
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17 Feb 09
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20 (166,810)
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1
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| |
Abstract:
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
|
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35.
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Aron Balas National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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15 Feb 08
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Last Revised:
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25 Mar 08
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15 (181,153)
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7
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| |
Abstract:
Djankov et al. (2003a) propose and measure for 109 countries in the year 2000 an index of formalism of legal procedure for two simple disputes: eviction of a non-paying tenant and collection of a bounced check. For a sub-sample of 40 countries, we compute this index every year starting in 1950, which allows us to study the evolution of legal rules. We find that between 1950 and 2000, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries. At least in this specific area of law, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules.
|
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36.
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School James R. Markusen University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics Thomas F. Rutherford Centre for Energy Policy and Economics
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| Posted: |
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07 Apr 04
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Last Revised:
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07 Apr 04
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14 (184,045)
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Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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37.
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Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School James R. Markusen University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics Thomas F. Rutherford Centre for Energy Policy and Economics
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| Posted: |
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28 Dec 06
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Last Revised:
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28 Dec 06
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5 (207,450)
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Abstract:
Regional trade agreements must specify domestic-content rules (rules of origin) that define the conditions under which a good qualifies as 'domestic' and so may be freely traded within the block. The paper analyzes such rules, focussing in particular on oligopolistic industries in which foreign multinationals producing within the block rely much more on imported intermediate inputs than do domestic firms. In such a situation, we argue that domestic content provisions are anti-competitive, reducing overall final output of the industry, and shift rents (in the absence of free entry) to domestic firms. It is possible that the anti-competitive aspect of the rules are sufficiently strong that total industry profits rise and the equilibrium demand for the substitute domestic inputs falls (the scale effect of reduced output outweighs a substitution effect in favor of domestic intermediates). The latter effect is more likely to the extent that the foreign multinationals can switch from producing within the block to exporting to the block. These ideas are then examined numerically using an applied general-equilibrium model of the North American auto industry.
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38.
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Simeon Djankov Ministry of Finance Rafael La Porta Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School Andrei Shleifer Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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18 Feb 09
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Last Revised:
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18 Feb 09
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1 (215,502)
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1
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| |
Abstract:
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
Business interests, Conflict of interest, Disclosure, Politicians
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