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Terry L. Boles's
Scholarly Papers
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Terry L. Boles University of Iowa - Department of Management & Organizations
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07 Jun 03
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07 Jun 03
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250 (36,674)
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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to highlight through examples and discussion the challenges that business faculty, and in particular those who teach negotiation and conflict resolution, face when teaching Western business principles to international students. The paper begins by differentiating the types of international students that American faculty members may encounter and emphasizing the importance of understanding the different cultural backgrounds and expectations these students bring to the learning environment. The roles that assumptions, attributions, trust, power and accountability play in teaching in the international or cross-cultural classroom are examined.
International Teaching, International Students, Cross-Cultural Teaching
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Terry L. Boles University of Iowa - Department of Management & Organizations Rachel T.A. Croson University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department J. Keith Murnighan Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
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07 Jun 01
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22 Jul 05
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Abstract:
This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions.
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Judi McLean Parks Washington University, St. Louis - John M. Olin School of Business Terry L. Boles University of Iowa - Department of Management & Organizations Donald E. Conlon Michigan State University - Department of Management Eros DeSouza Illinois State University Wallace Gatewood Morgan State University Kevin W. Gibson Marquette University - Department of Philosophy Jennifer J. Halpern ZevGroup Don C. Locke University of North Carolina Jamie C. Nekich affiliation not provided to SSRN Paul G. Straub affiliation not provided to SSRN George Wilson North Carolina Central University (NCCU) J. Keith Murnighan Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
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18 Jun 97
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17 Dec 97
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Abstract:
Research on the distribution of resources typically focuses on anticipated outcomes. This paper investigates the social norms people use to distribute adventitious (unanticipated) outcomes. Participants in this study read a scenario where either they, or the person they were with (an acquaintance or a friend) received either an unexpected gain or loss which was or was not easily divisible. Participants were then asked to continue the story by describing what they believed would happen after the adventitious event. We measured if and how the outcome was divided between the two individuals involved as well as subjects' and an outside observer's perceptions of the fairness of these divisions and any expectations they had about the effect of the event on the quality of the relationship between the two. Results suggest that people endorse a "losers weepers norm more often than they do a "finders keepers" or "share and share alike" (equality) norm, although all were endorsed. Egocentric distributions and expectations permeated the story continuations. Although participants frequently suggest that they would share gains, they also expected that their sacrifices (sharing their own gain or in another's loss) would help improve the future relationship between the two more than would similar sacrifices by the other (i.e. they were often egocentric martyrs). Friendship and the divisibility of the outcome also affected allocation rule and expectations for the future relationship. The discussion highlights the irony associated with the finding that when an adventitious gain is not shared with another, the future relationship between the two is expected to be harmed. Thus, adventitious outcomes (and gains in particular) can be a double-edged sword.
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