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Abstract:
This study investigates the differential effectiveness of cultural values and normative beliefs as predictors of behavior in a competitive group decision-making task in three countries, Israel, Japan, and the United States. Its purpose is to test hypotheses about how cultural values and norms influence the display and use of power in groups. Our initial findings present very similar values- and norms-based pictures of the groups in Israel and the U.S. However, their resource allocation behaviors were remarkably different. The "power" players in Israel claimed significantly more of the resources than either the power players in Japan or the U.S. There was no distinguishable difference between the outcomes in Japan and the U.S.

norms, cultural values, and culture

Abstract:
The development of trust, a fundamental, complex aspect of human interaction, requires a combination of both controlled and automatic mental processes. Most trust models suggest that individuals' cognitive consciousness assess whether to trust. Nonconscious cognitive processes, however, can also play a part in the initiation and development of trust. This paper investigates the effects of both subtle interpersonal association cues and unsubtle reputation information on the automatic, nonconscious instigation of trust. In an experiment, we examined individuals' trust toward unacquainted others after they experienced subliminal presentations of a positive interpersonal association cue and were consciously presented with positive or negative reputation information. The data show that, consistent with our previous studies (Huang & Murnighan, 2008), positive subliminal interpersonal association cues generate more automatic trust than subliminal meaningless syllables, and this effect occurs without individuals' awareness. Moreover, subliminal presentations of a positive interpersonal association cue reproduce the effects of positive reputation information on trust behavior and emotional reactions to possible reciprocity, even when the trustee has a negative reputation. The discussion explores possible perceptual and emotional mechanisms of nonconsciously instigated trust and the implications of building a more comprehensive trust model.

Abstract:
Greed is a classic topic in human development (Balot, 2001; Robertson, 2001) and it inevitably affects many of our choices and decisions. Although greed is typically viewed as uniformly negative and reprehensible, we propose that people's attitudes and opinions about greed are actually subject to change. In particular, studying economics may help legitimize and even beautify greed. Previous research shows that economics education might make people more self-interested because self-interest maximization is central to most economic models (Marwell & Ames, 1981; Frank, et al, 1993). Because greed and maximizing self-interest are sometimes difficult to separate, conceptually or empirically, we propose that studying economics may make people view greed as potentially positive and beneficial. Two complementary studies support our proposition. Study 1 shows that students who are pursuing economics view greed more positively than students who are pursuing other majors and taking other courses. Study 2 indicates that positively priming greed can significantly increase people's positive attitudes and opinions about greed.

Abstract:
Arousal is a diffuse emotional response that can have multiple effects. We present three studies that investigated arousal's effects on auctions, which are increasingly important engines of contemporary economies and represent social contexts particularly likely to generate and be influenced by arousal. We manipulated arousal in three ways: by changing two essential elements of auctions (stakes and time pressure); by asking participants to recall a competition in which they felt aroused or calm; and by creating cognitive dissonance. Across the studies, arousal consistently increased interest and bidding. The results support the competitive arousal model (Ku, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005) and provide a more complete picture of the effects of arousal, extending theoretical perspectives from romantic attraction, which suggest that arousal is a diffuse emotional state that can be misattributed as interest, to auctions. The discussion explores the broader implications of the role of arousal in decision making and markets.

Abstract:
Research on deception in negotiation has regularly emphasized the benefits of not disclosing personal information because others may take advantage of those who are honest. In the current study we show that this advice may backfire in distributive multiparty negotiations in which individuals need to form a coalition to obtain payoffs. In Study 1, we show that participants fail to realize that they need to be an attractive coalition partner in order to be included in a coalition. Participants who were able to generate an excess of payoffs were only included in a coalition when all other players also were aware of this advantage. In Study 2 we went one step further and assessed the willingness to disclose information about one's potential earnings. Results showed that fairness motivations mediated the decision to disclose private information about potential earnings, and that those who told the truth made more attractive offers to their fellow coalition players.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions.

Abstract:
Research on the distribution of resources typically focuses on anticipated outcomes. This paper investigates the social norms people use to distribute adventitious (unanticipated) outcomes. Participants in this study read a scenario where either they, or the person they were with (an acquaintance or a friend) received either an unexpected gain or loss which was or was not easily divisible. Participants were then asked to continue the story by describing what they believed would happen after the adventitious event. We measured if and how the outcome was divided between the two individuals involved as well as subjects' and an outside observer's perceptions of the fairness of these divisions and any expectations they had about the effect of the event on the quality of the relationship between the two. Results suggest that people endorse a "losers weepers norm more often than they do a "finders keepers" or "share and share alike" (equality) norm, although all were endorsed. Egocentric distributions and expectations permeated the story continuations. Although participants frequently suggest that they would share gains, they also expected that their sacrifices (sharing their own gain or in another's loss) would help improve the future relationship between the two more than would similar sacrifices by the other (i.e. they were often egocentric martyrs). Friendship and the divisibility of the outcome also affected allocation rule and expectations for the future relationship. The discussion highlights the irony associated with the finding that when an adventitious gain is not shared with another, the future relationship between the two is expected to be harmed. Thus, adventitious outcomes (and gains in particular) can be a double-edged sword.