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Abstract:
We demonstrate how the introduction of liability-side feedbacks affects the properties of a quantitative model of systemic risk. The model is known as RAMSI and is still in its development phase. It is based on detailed balance sheets for UK banks and encompasses macro-credit risk, interest and non-interest income risk, network interactions, and feedback effects. Funding liquidity risk is introduced by allowing for rating downgrades and incorporating a simple framework in which concerns over solvency, funding profiles and confidence may trigger the outright closure of funding markets to particular institutions. In presenting results, we focus on aggregate distributions and analysis of a scenario in which large losses at some banks can be exacerbated by liability-side feedbacks, leading to system-wide instability.

systemic risk, financial stability models, funding liquidity risk, contagion

Abstract:
This paper contrasts Real-Time Gross Settlement and hybrid payment systems that are based on payment offset, using a two-period, multi-bank model. The comparison is performed according to two criteria: liquidity needs and speed of settlement. We assume that the existence of a payment is common knowledge but that the specific degree of time-criticality of a payment is the private information of the bank sending the payment. Hybrid payment systems are shown to outperform Real-Time Gross Settlement when payments are offset in the first period and when they are offset in both periods. This suggests that in a hybrid system, the offsetting facility should be in operation all day, or, at the very least, for some time after the system opens in the morning. A system in which the offsetting facility was only switched on late in the day would not necessarily be preferred to Real-Time Gross Settlement. These results are shown to be robust to changes in the transparency of the central queue of payments awaiting offset. However, this robustness may not hold with different forms of information asymmetry.

Abstract:
Banks often rely on collateralised intraday liquidity from the central bank in order to be able to effect payments in a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system. If a bank is holding insufficient eligible collateral in a particular country, and therefore cannot obtain credit from the local central bank, it may have to delay payments. This constitutes a liquidity risk to the system. Furthermore, a bank operating in multiple systems may face a mismatch between the location of its collateral holdings and liquidity needs. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the liquidity risk arising from such a mismatch may be mitigated by allowing cross-border use of collateral. We develop a two-country, two-bank model in which risk-neutral banks minimise expected costs with respect to their collateral choice in each country. In our baseline model, in which each bank faces a liquidity need in only one country, we find that liquidity risk is indeed reduced by cross-border use of collateral. This result holds despite the fact that banks may find it optimal to economise on their total holdings of collateral. However, when we extend the model to allow for the possibility that a bank faces liquidity needs in both countries simultaneously, the total quantum of collateral held is important. Indeed, when a bank finds it optimal to reduce its total holdings, there may be an increase in liquidity risk in at least one country when simultaneous liquidity demands are realised.

Payment systems, collateral, liquidity risk

Abstract:
The Bank of England's second core purpose is to maintain the stability of the financial system. Payment systems, by supporting transactions, are a key aspect of this. In this paper, we examine the importance of smoothly functioning payment systems to the economy by extending a recently developed theoretical model of banks. In the model the risk of theft implies a cost to using cash. This risk can be avoided by depositing cash in banks and transferring money through an interbank payment system. However, agents are then exposed to the risk that the payment system is unreliable. Agents will use a payment system (rather than cash) to make transactions if the system is sufficiently cheap to use and/or it is sufficiently reliable. We show that the introduction of a payment system that buyers and producers choose to use unambiguously increases social welfare if it expands the number of trades occurring in the economy. This is more likely the more reliable is the payment system. When the introduction of a payment system does not increase the number of trades, social welfare may increase or decrease depending on the trade-off between the risk of using cash and the risk that the payment system is unreliable. We again show that the more reliable is the payment system, the more likely welfare is increased by its introduction and we illustrate how this benefit might be quantified.

Abstract:
We demonstrate how the introduction of liability-side feedbacks affects the properties of a quantitative model of systemic risk. The model is based on detailed balance sheets for UK banks and encompasses macro-credit risk, interest and non-interest income risk, network interactions, and feedback effects. Funding liquidity risk is introduced by allowing for rating downgrades and incorporating a simple framework in which concerns over solvency, funding profile and confidence may trigger the outright closure of funding markets. In presenting results, we focus on how policymakers could use the model with reference to both aggregate distributions and analysis of a scenario in which large losses at some banks can be exacerbated by liability-side feedbacks, leading to system-wide instability.

Systemic Risk, Financial Stability Models, Funding Liquidity Risk