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Abstract:
A venture capitalist faces a trade-off between the extent of managerial advice allocated to each start-up and the total number of firms advised. Diminishing returns to advice per firm call for a larger portfolio. As advice gets diluted, further expansion of the portfolio eventually becomes unprofitable.

Venture capital finance, double-sided moral hazard, company portfolio

Abstract:
Start-up entrepreneurs are often commercially inexperienced. In giving managerial advice, venture capitalists can importantly enhance the success of innovative but highly risky ventures. The supply of experienced venture capitalists is not easily increased, however. When the rate of business formation accelerates, the incumbent venture capitalists tend to include more firms in their portfolio which dilutes the quality of advice, making project risks excessively high in the short-run. The supply of advisory capacity eventually becomes more elastic as new venture capitalists are attracted to the industry. Company portfolios then tend to become more focused again, the quality of advice is restored and the risk of business failure declines.

Venture Capital, Company Portfolio, Managerial Advice, Economic Rents

Abstract:
This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.

Venture capital, moral hazard, managerial advice, public policy

Abstract:
This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.

Venture Capital, Moral Hazard, Managerial Advice, Public Policy

Abstract:
Many of today's successful technology firms started out as venture capital (VC) backed firms.The ventures of today are expected to play a key role in the continuance of technological innovation.Thus, the focus here is on strategic policies aimed at promoting innovative businesses and on the validity of using a microeconomic model as the basis of VC-supported entrepreneurship. Many empirical studies are presented to demonstrate the importance of venture capital as opposed to bank finance.The framework of analysis is discussed, including exploration of the market structure, the formal framework as influenced by factors including demand, bank finance, and venture capital, the key margins, and the public policies.Various policies are analyzed regarding their effectiveness and potential distortions. Based on this analysis, several policies endorsing venture capital support are presented, as are the effects of future policy reform.Considering all the evidence, it is proposed that a selective tax break on capital gains, along with a tax on start-up investment costs for VC backed firms, be provided to act as an incentive for firms to provide consistent VC support.With continued, consistent VC support, firms are more likely to be successful.A discussion of the model-based analysis used in is also provided. (AKP)

Firm performance, Taxes, Innovation process, Startups, Tax policies, Venture capital, Debt financing, Bank loans, Public policies, Capital gains

Abstract:
This paper proposes and analyses a model of start-up investment. Innovative entrepreneurs are commercially inexperienced and can benefit from venture capital support. Only part of them succeed in matching with a venture capitalist while the rest must resort to standard bank finance. We consider a number of policies to promote entrepreneurship and venture capital backed innovation.

Venture Capital Bank Finance, Matching, Moral Hazard, Public Policy

Abstract:
The paper proposes a simple equilibrium model of venture capital, entrepreneurship and innovation. Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise start-up entrepreneurs and thereby add value to new firms. The paper demonstrates how a productive and active VC industry boosts innovation driven growth.

Venture Capital, Double Moral Hazard, Innovation, Growth

Abstract:
A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. In this situation, the capital gains tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small tax impairs managerial advice and leads to first order welfare losses. Once the tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship and welfare.

Venture Capital, Capital Gains Taxation, Double Moral Hazard

Abstract:
This paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasizes four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, entrepreneurial effort and venture capital advice during the start-up period, and introduction of new goods by successful start-ups. The paper considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of policy reform with regard to capital gains taxation, innovation subsidies, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives.

Innovation, venture capital, double moral hazard, public policy

Abstract:
This paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasizes four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, entrepreneurial effort and venture capital advice during the start-up period, and introduction of new goods by successful start-ups. The paper considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of policy reform with regard to capital gains taxation, innovation subsidies, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives.

innovation, venture capital, double moral hazard, public policy

Abstract:
This Paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasises four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, simultaneous entrepreneurial effort and managerial advice subject to double moral hazard, and mark-up pricing when the successful firm introduces a new good. The Paper derives an optimal policy that succeeds to implement a first best allocation in decentralized equilibrium. It also considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of piecemeal reform with regard to the capital gains tax, innovation subsidy, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives.

Innovation, venture capital, double moral hazard, public policy

Abstract:
This paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasizes four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, simultaneous entrepreneurial effort and managerial advice subject to double moral hazard, and mark-up pricing when the successful firm introduces a new good. The paper derives an optimal policy that succeeds to implement a first best allocation in decentralized equilibrium. It also considers short- and long-run comparative static and welfare effects of piecemeal reform with regard to the capital gains tax, innovation subsidy, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives.

Innovation, venture capital, double moral hazard, public policy

Abstract:
Eastern enlargement of the EU promises gains, but also imposes fiscal costs on incumbent countries. A sensitive issue concerns immigration, jobs and wages. We address these issues in a general equilibrium framework, both analytically and through numerical simulations. Analytical results identify capital accumulation as a prime transmission channel. Using a dynamic CGE model with search unemployment of high- and low-skilled labor, we simulate the effects of enlargement on Germany finding small effects from trade, but more pronounced labor market effects from migration. Based on German model elasticities, we approximate expected benefits and costs for other member countries as well.

EU Enlargement, Economic Integration, Economic Growth, Capital Accumulation, Search Unemployment, Computable General Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract:
In recent years, venture capital has increasingly become a factor in the financing of new firms. We examine how the value of mature firms determines the incentives of entrepreneurs to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. We examine how capital gains taxes as well as subsidies to start-up costs of new firms affect venture capital backed entrepreneurship. We also argue that dividend and capital gains taxes on mature firms have important consequences for start-up firms as well.

Taxes, venture capital, entrepreneurship, double moral hazard

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the likely economic consequences of a specific proposal for corporate income tax reform in Switzerland that is based on the recent ERU (2001) report. The proposal includes a partial dividend tax relief, more effective taxation of capital gains, and a property tax reduction, all relating to qualified stakes in corporate firms. Based on an analytical and quantitative analysis, we find that the reform removes an important tax barrier against dividend payments, reduces the cost of equity capital, thereby reduces debt leverage and encourages investment in the corporate sector. In stimulating transitional growth towards higher long-run income levels, the reform expands tax bases and thereby becomes considerably less costly in the long-run. A sensitivity analysis shows that the quantitative results are rather robust.

Tax reform, financial policy, organizational choice, dynamic general equilibrium modeling

Abstract:
In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm's success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss offset may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework.

venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard.

Abstract:
We evaluate potential costs and benefits of Eastern enlargement of the EU. In addressing fiscal costs of enlargement in addition to tariff and nontariff barriers, we arrive at important conclusions: 1) Overall, extending EU membership to Eastern applicants is more than worth its price for Austria. The (dynamic) gains from integration clearly outweigh the budgetary costs. 2) Somewhat surprisingly, the wage spread between skilled and unskilled labor is narrowed rather than widened. 3) significant sectoral and intergenerational redistribution, however, may render EU enlargement difficult on political grounds whereby the agricultural sector and young generations are at the losing end.

Abstract:
In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects, design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with value enhancing managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce self-selection among entrepreneurial firms with different qualities by designing appropriate contracts and offering commercial support. We study the efficiency of the competitive market equilibrium with respect to the level and quality of entrepreneurship and the level of effort by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. We also provide comparative statics results with respect to basic preference and technology parameters.

venture capital, entrepreneurship, self-selection, moral hazard

Abstract:
This study starts from the premise that youngentrepreneurial firms are an important source of innovation and growth,andlooks at ways in which tax policy can contribute to a more activestyle of capital investments. An optimal tax policy is derived, moving theprivate equilibrium toward a first best allocation. The article presents a model of a venture capital (VC)fund with aportfolio of firms, arguing that VC support and the number of firms in a VCportfolio are too low in private equilibrium. The findings indicate that theoptimal tax policy is a performance related revenue subsidy, or negativecapital gains tax, combined with a non-performance related tax on start-upinvestment cost. It is concluded that the optimal policy calls for a positivestart-up tax combined with a revenue subsidy.(CBS)

Taxes, Capital investments, Venture capital, Public policies, Tax policies, Equilibrium, Revenue subsidies, Venture capital portfolios, Moral hazard problem, Capital gains taxes

Abstract:
Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise and thereby add value to young innovative firms. The prospects of venture capital backed firms thus depend on joint efforts of entrepreneurs and informed venture capitalists, and are subject to double moral hazard. In financing a portfolio of firms, venture capitalists additionally face a trade-off between the number of companies and the amount of managerial advice allocated to each individual venture. The paper argues that managerial support and the number of portfolio firms are inefficiently low in private equilibrium. An optimal tax policy is derived that succeeds to move the private equilibrium towards a first best allocation.

Venture Capital, Double Moral Hazard, Optimal Taxation

Abstract:
The paper investigates the consequences of outsourcing of labor intensive activities to lowwage economies. This trend challenges the two basic functions of the welfare state, redistribution and social insurance when private unemployment insurance markets are missing. The main results are: (i) outsourcing raises unemployment and labor income risk of unskilled workers; (ii) it increases inequality among high- and low-income groups; and (iii) the gains from outsourcing can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. We finally derive the welfare optimal redistribution and unemployment insurance policies.

outsourcing, unemployment, social insurance, redistribution

Abstract:
Outsourcing of labour intensive activities challenges the welfare state and undermines the protection of low-skilled workers. The stylized facts are that profits are concentrated among the high-skilled, involuntary unemployment is mostly among the low-skilled, and private unemployment insurance is missing. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of redistribution and social insurance and characterizes the optimal welfare policy when heterogeneous firms can outsource labour intensive components to low-wage economies.

Outsourcing, redistribution, social insurance, unemployment

Abstract:
Outsourcing of labor intensive activities challenges the welfare state and undermines the protection of low-skilled workers. The stylized facts are that profits are concentrated among the high-skilled, involuntary unemployment is mostly among the low-skilled, and private unemployment insurance is missing. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of redistribution and insurance policies when heterogeneous firms can outsource labor intensive components to low-wage economies. The main results are: (i) Social insurance props up wages, leading to more outsourcing and unskilled unemployment. (ii) Redistribution from the skilled to the working poor acts as a wage subsidy to unskilled workers, thereby reducing gross wages, outsourcing and unemployment. (iii) A trend to outsourcing, induced by lower transport costs of imported components, depresses low-skilled wages, raises unemployment, and boosts profits. The resulting polarization of society and the increased income risk of unskilled workers emphasize the social gains from redistribution and insurance and thus call for a more active role of the welfare state in more open economies.

Outsourcing, unemployment, social insurance, redistribution

Abstract:
This paper investigates the dynamic consequences of demographic change and various pension reform scenarios for Austria. The analysis is based on a computable overlapping generations model with life-cycle labor supply, savings, and search unemployment. The public sector is decomposed into general government and an unfunded pension system with a tax benefit linkage. Our quantitative analysis considers several pension reform scenarios on top of the demographic transition in an aging society. We find that lowering the pension replacement rate and increasing the retirement age can have strong labor market effects. They strengthen labor supply both in terms of job search intensity, leading to lower unemployment rates, and hours worked.

Pension reform, demographic change, unemployment

Abstract:
The paper develops a unified general equilibrium model including savings with overlapping generations, investment and search unemployment. Long-run analytical results for the small open economy identify capital accumulation as a prime transmission channel. The effects of integration on unemployment, however, depend importantly on the nature of wage taxation and unemployment compensation. As a separate methodological contribution, we extend a dynamic CGE model for Germany to allow for search unemployment of high- and low-skilled labour. Simulating the effects of Eastern EU enlargement, we find quantitatively small effects of integration but more pronounced labour market effects from immigration.

Finite lives, search unemployment, capital accumulation, trade, immigration

Abstract:
This paper proposes a growth-oriented dual-income tax by combining an allowance for corporate equity with a broadly defined flat tax on personal capital income. Revenue losses are compensated by an increase in the value added tax. The paper demonstrates the neutrality properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and organizational choice. Tax rates are chosen to prevent income shifting from labor to capital income. The reform decisively strengthens investment of domestically owned firms as well as home and foreign based multinationals and boosts savings. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland indicate that the reform could add between 2 to 3 percent of GDP in the long run, depending on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it also imposes considerable costs in the short run. We also consider a tax smoothing scenario to offset the intergenerationally redistributive effects.

tax reform, investment, financial structure, growth

Abstract:
This paper develops a model of a monopolistically competitive industry with extensive and intensive business investment and shows how these margins respond to changes in average and marginal corporate tax rates. Intensive investment refers to the size of a firm's capital stock. Extensive investment refers to the firm's production location and reflects the trade-off between exports and foreign direct investment as alternative modes of foreign market access. The paper derives comparative static effects of the corporate tax and shows how the cost of public funds depends on the measures of effective marginal and average tax rates and on the behavioral elasticities of extensive and intensive investment.

Exports, foreign direct investment, corporate taxation, extensive and intensive investment, costs of public funds

Abstract:
This paper provides a theory and firm-level evidence on the incorporation decision of entrepreneurs in a model of taxes and corporate governance. The theory explains how the incorporation decision of entrepreneurs is driven by taxation (corporate and personal income taxes), corporate transparency, access to external capital and limited liability. We estimate features of this model using a large cross-section of more than 540, 000 firms in European manufacturing. We find that higher personal income tax rates favor incorporation while higher corporate tax rates reduce the probability to incorporate. These findings are robust to the inclusion of other economic and institutional determinants of external financing and choice of organizational form.

incorporation, governance, taxes, discrete choice models

Abstract:
This paper provides theory and firm-level evidence on the incorporation decision of entrepreneurs in a model of corporate governance and taxation. The theory explains how the incorporation decision of entrepreneurs is driven by taxation (corporate and personal income taxes), corporate transparency, access to external capital and limited liability. We estimate features of this model using a large cross-section of more than 540,000 firms in European manufacturing. The impact of taxation on the incorporation decision is at the heart of this analysis. We find that higher personal income tax rates and their progression are associated with an increase in the probability of incorporation, while higher corporate tax rates entail an impediment to incorporate. This finding is robust to the inclusion of other economic and institutional determinants and to a variety of functional form assumptions about the latent variable in the estimated discrete choice model.

Incorporation, governance, taxes, discrete choice models

Abstract:
This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax benefit link affects retirement incentives and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers, or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We also provide a sharp characterization of the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the behavioral supply elasticities on the extensive and intensive margins and the effective tax rates implicit in contribution rates.

Pension reform, retirement, hours worked, tax benefit link, actuarial adjustment, excess burden

Abstract:
Venture capital has become an important source of financing young entrepreneurial firms. Venture capital backed firms are often perceived as more innovative and as creating more value than others. Perhaps for this reason, policy makers are keen to create a good institutional framework to facilitate the development of an active venture capital industry. We explore the role of tax policy in determining the incentives of individuals to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. In particular, we examine how business taxation at the company and investor level together with start-up capital subsidies affect the volume and quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship.

Entrepreneurship, venture capital, taxes, subsidies

Abstract:
The paper develops an overlapping generations model with probabilistic aging of households. We define age as a set of personal attributes such as earnings potential, health and tastes that are characteristic of a person's position in the life-cycle. In assuming a limited number of different states of age, we separate the concepts of age and time since birth. Agents may retain their age characteristics for several periods before they move with a given probability to another state of age. Different generations that share the same age characteristics are aggregated analytically to a low number of age groups. The probabilistic aging model thus allows for a very parsimonious yet rather close approximation of demographic structure and life-cycle differences in earnings, wealth and consumption. Existing classes of overlapping generations models follow as special cases.

overlapping generations, aging, demographics, life-cycle earnings

Abstract:
The labor market effects of pension reform stem from retirement behavior and from job search and hours worked of prime age workers. This paper investigates the impact of four often proposed policy measures for sustainable pensions: strengthening the tax benefit link, moving from wage to price indexation of benefits, lengthening calculation periods, and introducing more actuarial fairness in pension assessment. We provide some analytical results and use a computational model to demonstrate the economic and welfare impact of recent pension reform in Austria.

pension reform, retirement, job search, life-cycle unemployment

Abstract:
This paper presents a generalized model of overlapping generations with economic aging of households. Economic age is defined as a set of personal attributes such as earnings potential and tastes that are characteristic of a person's position in the life-cycle. We separate the concepts of economic age and time since birth in assuming only a small number of different states of age. Agents sharing the same economic characteristics are aggregated analytically to a low number of age groups. The model thus allows for a very parsimonious approximation of life-cycle differences in earnings, wealth and consumption. As an illustration, we quantitatively apply the model to study the impact of demographic change.

Overlapping Generations, Aging, Demographic Change, Life-cycle

Abstract:
For present member countries, eastern EU enlargement entails gains from integration as well as fiscal costs. The authors use a calibrated model to quantify the dynamic effects of discriminatory trade liberalization and immigration from eastern applicants. It is found that enlargement is expansionary and yields a remarkable fiscal dividend. Surprisingly, integration compresses the wage spread between skilled and unskilled labor. Overall, the (dynamic) gains from integration clearly outweigh the fiscal cost. While ambiguous a priori, enlargement is found to hold a remarkable net welfare gain for Austria.

Abstract:
For present member countries, eastern EU enlargement entails gains from integration as well as fiscal costs. The authors use a calibrated model to quantify the dynamic effects of discriminatory trade liberalization and immigration from eastern applicants. It is found that enlargement is expansionary and yields a remarkable fiscal dividend. Surprisingly, integration compresses the wage spread between skilled and unskilled labor. Overall, the (dynamic) gains from integration clearly outweigh the fiscal cost, while ambiguous enlargement is found to hold a remarkable net welfare gain for Austria.

Abstract:
We evaluate potential costs and benefits of Eastern enlargement of the EU. In addressing fiscal costs of enlargement in addition to tariff and non-tariff barriers, we arrive at important conclusions: 1) Overall, extending EU membership to Eastern applicants is more than worth its price to Austria. The (dynamic) gains from integration clearly outweigh the budgetary costs. 2) Somewhat surprisingly, the wage spread between skilled and unskilled labour is narrowed rather than widened. 3) Significant sectoral and intergenerational redistribution may nevertheless render EU enlargement difficult on political grounds, with the agricultural sector and the young losing out.

Abstract:
The routine way of anticipating the effects of the corporate (profit) tax on investments and location choice is to calculate the effective marginal and average tax rates. This paper introduces a model of monopolistic competition to show how investment on the extensive and intensive margins responds to changes in the effective marginal and average tax rates. Intensive investment reflects the marginal expansion of established businesses. Extensive investment refers to the location of new production sites and reflects the choice between exports and foreign direct investments as alternative strategies of foreign market access. The paper calculates the comparative static effects of the corporate tax and shows how the dead weight loss of the tax depends on the elasticities of extensive and intensive investments.

Exports, foreign direct investment, corporate tax, dead weight loss

Abstract:
The paper compares the impact of corporate taxation and social insurance on foreign direct investment (FDI) and unemployment. Four main results are derived: (i) the optimal size of the welfare state depends on the degree of risk-aversion and the unemployment rate as a measure of labor income risk. The unemployment rate partly reflects the country's exposure to globalization; (ii) corporate taxation and social insurance have equivalent effects on unemployment and outbound FDI; (iii) while an increase in the corporate tax can raise corporate tax revenue, it is rather likely to worsen the government's total fiscal stance. A corporate tax cut can thus be self-financing due to fiscal increasing returns in the presence of a large public sector; (iv) a corporate tax should be used to contribute to welfare state financing only in exceptional cases when job creation is excessive and the unemployment rate is inefficiently low. These conditions are probably unlikely to hold in Europe's generous welfare states with high structural unemployment rates.

Corporate tax, foreign direct investment, unemployment, welfare state

Abstract:
The paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide equity finance. They must structure the entrepreneur's profit share and base salary to assure their incentives for full effort. In addition to providing equity finance, venture capitalists assist with valuable business advice to enhance survival rates. Within a general equilibrium framework with a traditional and an entrepreneurial sector, the paper investigates the effects of taxes on the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship and managerial advice. It considers dierential wage and capital income taxes, a comprehensive income tax, incomplete loss offset, progressive taxation as well as investment and output subsidies to the entrepreneurial sector.

Abstract:
The Paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high-risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide equity finance. They must structure the entrepreneur's profit share and base salary to assure their incentives for full effort. In addition to providing equity finance, venture capitalists assist with valuable business advice to enhance survival rates. Within a general equilibrium framework with a traditional and an entrepreneurial sector, the Paper investigates the effects of taxes on the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship and managerial advice. It considers differential wage and capital income taxes, a comprehensive income tax, incomplete loss offset, and progressive taxation, as well as investment and output subsidies to the entrepreneurial sector.

Entrepreneurship, moral hazard, subsidies, taxes, venture capital

Abstract:
In recent years, venture capital has increasingly become a factor in the financing of new firms. We examine how the value of mature firms determines the incentives of entrepreneurs to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. We examine how capital gains taxes as well as subsidies to start-up costs of new firms affect venture capital-backed entrepreneurship. We also argue that dividend and capital gains taxes on mature firms have important consequences for start-up firms as well.

Taxes, venture capital, entrepreneurship, double moral hazard

Abstract:
We study the role of public policy in promoting efficiency in human capital accumulation. Agents accumulate human capital by allocating time to home study and school attendance. The return to time spent in school is subject to congestion. The individual also faces an aggregate externality in skill accumulation. We find that a tuition fee combined with personal stipends can correct the resulting distortions by partly shifting educational effort from schools and universities to noninstitutional forms of learning, such as home study. The dynamic effects of education policy as well as their welfare implications are also calculated in the paper.

Abstract:
A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack their own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. In this situation, the capital gains tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small tax impairs managerial advice and leads to first order welfare losses. Once the tax is in place, limitations on loss offset may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship and welfare.

Venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard

Abstract:
Depending on the definition of the tax base, the statutory corporate tax rate implies rather different measures of effective average and marginal tax rates. This paper develops a model of a monopolistically competitive industry with extensive and intensive business investment and shows how these margins respond to changes in average and marginal corporate tax rates. Intensive investment refers to the size of a firm's capital stock. Extensive investment refers to the firm's production location and reflects the trade-off between exports and foreign direct investment as alternative modes of foreign market access. The paper derives comparative static effects of the corporate tax and shows how the cost of public funds depends on the elasticities of the extensive and intensive investment responses.

Exports, foreign direct investment, corporate taxation, costs of public funds

Abstract:
In the absence of financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the user cost of capital. With finance constraints due to moral hazard, investment becomes sensitive to cash-flow and own equity of firms. We propose a corporate finance model of investment and derive three central results: (i) Even small taxes impose first order welfare losses on financially constrained firms; (ii) ACE and cash-flow tax systems, which are investment neutral in the neoclassical model, are no longer neutral when firms are finance constrained. (iii) When banks are active and provide external finance together with monitoring services, the two systems not only reduce investment, but are also no longer equivalent. With active banks, investment is subject to double moral hazard and the timing of tax payments becomes important. The ACE system gives tax relief at the return stage and provides better incentives than a cash-flow tax which gives tax relief upfront.

ACE tax, cash-flow tax, Finance constraints, profit tax

Abstract:
To prevent profit shifting by manipulation of transfer prices, tax authorities typically apply the arm's length principle in corporate taxation and use comparable market prices to 'correctly' assess the value of intracompany trade and royalty income of multinationals. We develop a model of heterogeneous firms subject to financing frictions and offshoring of intermediate inputs. We find that arm's length prices systematically differ from independent party prices. Application of the principle thus distorts multinational activity by reducing debt capacity and investment of foreign affiliates, and by distorting organizational choice between direct investment and outsourcing. Although it raises tax revenue and welfare in the headquarter country, welfare losses are larger in the subsidiary location, leading to a first order loss in world welfare.

arm's length principle, corporate finance, Corporate tax, foreign direct investment, outsourcing, transfer prices

Abstract:
Venture capitalists provide risk capital and valuable monitoring services that are essential for the success of upstart companies. The financial sectoris expertise in monitoring investment proposals may increase with the accumulated experience in funding such projects. In the other direction, the productivity gains from learning lower the cost of venture capital finance and reinforce start-up investment. Since learning depends on aggregate investment, the effect is external to individual agents. The paper demonstrates how the nature of the externality depends on the state of financial sector development, and how the appropriate tax/subsidy policy should be tailored to it.

Abstract:
The paper proposes an intertemporal equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and start-up investment with variable capacity to explain the nexus between business formation and medium-run growth. An investment externality is identified that results in under-accumulation of capital in the decentralized market equilibrium and, thus, creates investment multipliers. Some form of investment promotion is called for. The paper compares the effectiveness of policies to promote small business formation with a general investment tax credit.