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Michael Gibbs's
Scholarly Papers
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2,507 |
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Citations
32 |
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Kenneth A. Merchant University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting Wim A. Van der Stede London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) Mark E. Vargus University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Accounting & Information Management
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13 Feb 02
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28 Feb 02
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646 (9,873)
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Abstract:
This study empirically examines two basic questions. First, where and why do firms make greater or lesser use of subjectivity in the performance evaluations that lead to annual bonuses? Second, what are the effects of greater or lesser use of subjectivity on employee pay satisfaction? We examine these questions using data collected from a sample of 526 department managers in 250 automobile dealerships. Our findings suggest that subjective bonuses are used to complement perceived weaknesses in bonus awards based on quantitative performance measures. Overall, we find that the use of subjective bonuses is positively related to: (1) the extent of departmental interdependencies; (2) the department reporting a net loss; (3) the manager's tenure; and (4) the extent that the achievability of the formula-based bonus is difficult and leads to significant consequences if not achieved. We also find that the use of subjective bonuses is negatively related to the degree to which the formula bonus exhibits a short-term focus. Competition significantly influences the level of subjective bonuses but not the frequency. We also show that the incremental economic effects of these determinants are highly significant. Our results regarding the effects of the use of subjective bonuses on employee pay satisfaction, however, are inconclusive.
Incentives; Discretionary bonus; Subjective bonus; Pay satisfaction
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Kenneth A. Merchant University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting Wim A. Van der Stede London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) Mark E. Vargus University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Accounting & Information Management
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15 Mar 04
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25 Oct 04
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645 (9,895)
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We examine the effects of performance measure properties on incentive system design, using data on incentive contracts for auto dealership managers. The data include information on five properties: two indicators of risk; two indicators of distortion; and one indicator of potential manipulation. We find that these properties have important effects on incentive system design. First, firms appear to choose the "best" performance measure available along these dimensions, and use it for the most important (primary) formula bonus. Second, the properties of this primary performance measure are important determinants of the weight placed on the measure for explicit. Third, firms appear to use other performance measures to balance multitask incentives relative to the primary performance measure. Specifically, we find evidence that second and third bonuses are used to provide better incentives for cooperation and to reduce incentives for manipulation. Fourth, we present evidence that subjectivity, through discretionary bonuses based on subjective performance evaluations, and also through implicit incentives for promotions and other rewards, also appear to play the same roles.
Incentives, performance measures
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3.
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The Economic Approach to Personnel Research
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Alec R. Levenson University of Southern California - Center for Effective Organizations (CEO)
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03 Oct 00
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25 Jul 01
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Alec R. Levenson University of Southern California - Center for Effective Organizations (CEO)
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08 Feb 01
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25 Jul 01
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We compare the economic approach to research on personnel and organizational design to approaches from behavioral disciplines. Instead of a survey of the field, our emphasis is on topics which are important in organizational research outside of economics, yet have been little emphasized by economics. We contend that many of these topics hold great promise for insights from the economic approach. In some cases we sketch ways in which economists can approach these topics. We also briefly discuss empirical methods in personnel economics.
Personnel Economics, Economics of Organization, Decentralization, Intrinsic Motivation
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Alec R. Levenson University of Southern California - Center for Effective Organizations (CEO)
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03 Oct 00
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03 Oct 00
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Abstract:
We compare the economic approach to research on personnel and organizational design to approaches from behavioral disciplines. Instead of a survey of the field, our emphasis is on topics which are important in organizational research outside of economics, yet have been little emphasized by economics. We contend that many of these topics hold great promise for insights from the economic approach. In some cases we sketch ways in which economists can approach these topics. We also briefly discuss empirical methods in personnel economics.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Wallace E. Hendricks University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance
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01 Feb 97
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10 Jul 97
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257 (32,690)
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Using detailed personnel data from a firm, we analyze the real effects of the kind of compensation system that is used in many large firms--the Hay system. Such compensation systems are highly centralized and bureaucratic, with little ability for managers to adjust incentives for different job designs, individuals, and circumstances. We find that this system does appear to have real effects, particularly for those who are at the maximum salary in their allowable range. Such employees tend to have falling performance ratings and salary growth, are less likely to win promotion, and are more likely to exit the firm. We interpret these facts as suggesting that such employees have lower motivation from the incentive system than other employees. Moreover, the firm's bonus system is not designed to mitigate these effects. These findings suggest that theories emphasizing such formal, bureaucratic pay systems (e.g., influence costs) may be very important in understanding actual incentive contracting schemes.
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Cynthia Zoghi U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Alec R. Levenson University of Southern California - Center for Effective Organizations (CEO) Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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14 Mar 05
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15 Mar 05
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In this paper we study job design. Will an organization plan precisely how the job is to be done ex ante, or ask workers to determine the process as they go? We first model this decision and predict complementarity between these job attributes: multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence of tasks. We argue that characteristics of the firm and industry (e.g., product and technology, organizational change) can explain observed patterns and trends in job design. We then use novel data on these job attributes to examine these issues. As predicted, job designs tend to be "coherent" across these characteristics within the same job. Job designs also tend to follow similar patterns across jobs in the same firm, and especially in the same establishment: when one job is optimized ex ante, others are more likely to be also. There is some evidence that firms may segregate different types of job designs across different establishments.
job design, organization design, specialization, job enrichment, intrinsic motivation
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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29 Oct 01
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07 Apr 05
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173 (49,326)
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Personnel records are used to examine compensation, recruitment, and retention of a group of very highly skilled workers: civilian scientists and engineers in U.S. Department of Defense laboratories. In contrast to the private sector, returns to skills were largely flat for this group from 1982-1996. Despite this, quality and performance of recruits relative to earlier cohorts, and of those retained relative to those who left, remained stable. One explanation is the importance of defense-industry-specific human capital. These results hold for three different pay plans, including the federal government's primary plan and two intended to introduce greater flexibility in personnel management.
Compensation, skills, recruitment, retention
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Valerie Smeets Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Kathryn Ierulli University of Chicago Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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26 Nov 06
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06 Dec 06
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153 (55,510)
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We examine the dynamics of post-merger organizational integration. Our basic question is whether there is evidence of conflict between employees from the two merging firms. Such conflict can arise for several reasons, including firm-specific human capital, corporate culture, power, or favoritism. We examine this issue using a sample of Danish mergers. Controlling for other effects, employees from the acquirer fare better than employees from the acquired firm, suggesting that they have greater power in the newly merged hierarchy. As a separate effect, the more that either firm dominates the other in terms of number of employees, the better do its employees fare compared to employees from the other firm. This suggests that majority/minority status is also important to assimilation of workers, much as in ethnic conflicts. Finally, greater overlap of pre-merger operations decreases turnover. This finding is inconsistent with the view that workers of the two firms substitute for each other, creating efficiencies from merger. However, that result and our other findings are consistent with the view that more similar workers (in terms of either firm- or industry-specific human capital) are easier to integrate post merger.
mergers, internal organization, conflicts
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8.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Mikel Tapia Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration Frederic Warzynski University of Aarhus - Department of Economics
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15 Feb 09
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13 Jun 09
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91 (84,425)
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We develop a simple model of the effects of reputation on wine prices. An increasing fraction of consumers who are "naive" (less well informed about wine quality) results in a stronger sensitivity of wine prices to ratings of quality. We then use data on prices and Robert Parker's ratings of wines, to show that prices have become more related to Parker ratings over time. In addition, we find that a change in Parker rating has a stronger effect on price, the stronger is the wine's reputation.
Reputation, Globalization, Wine
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9.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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05 Jun 06
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30 Mar 07
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28 (147,436)
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Abstract:
Personnel records are used to examine compensation, recruitment, and retention of a group of highly skilled workers: civilian scientists and engineers in U.S. Department of Defense laboratories. In contrast to those of the private sector, returns to skills were largely flat for this group from 1982 to 1996. Despite this, quality and performance of recruits relative to earlier cohorts, and of those retained relative to those who left, remained stable. One explanation is the importance of defense industry-specific human capital. These results hold for three different pay plans, including the federal government's primary plan and two intended to introduce greater flexibility in personnel management.
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10.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Kenneth A. Merchant University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting Wim A. Van der Stede London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) Mark E. Vargus University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Accounting & Information Management
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27 Apr 09
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16 Jun 09
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1 (216,028)
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Abstract:
We analyze effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and manipulation) on incentive plan design, using data from auto dealership manager incentive systems. Dealerships put the most weight on measures that are "better" with respect to these properties. Additional measures are more likely to be used for a second or third bonus if they can mitigate distortion or manipulation in the first performance measure. Implicit incentives are used to provide ex post evaluation, to motivate the employee to use controllable risk on behalf of the firm, and to deter manipulation of performance measures. Overall, our results indicate that firms use incentive systems of multiple performance measures, incentive instruments, and implicit evaluation and rewards as a response to weaknesses in available performance measures.
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11.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Kenneth A. Merchant University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting Wim A. Van der Stede London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) Mark E. Vargus University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Accounting & Information Management
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25 Mar 06
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28 Mar 06
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0 (216,028)
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Abstract:
This study examines two questions: when do firms make greater use of subjectivity in awarding bonuses, and what are the effects of subjectivity on employee pay satisfaction and firm performance? We examine these questions using data from a sample of 526 department managers in 250 car dealerships. First, the findings suggest that subjective bonuses are used to complement perceived weaknesses in quantitative performance measures and to provide employees insurance against downside risk in their pay. Specifically, use of subjective bonuses is positively related to: (1) the extent of long-term investments in intangibles; (2) the extent of organizational interdependencies; (3) the extent to which the achievability of the formula bonus target is both difficult and leads to significant consequences if not met; and (4) the presence of an operating loss. Second, we find that the effects of subjective bonuses on pay satisfaction, productivity, and profitability are larger the greater the manager's tenure, consistent with the idea that subjectivity improves incentive contracting when there is greater trust between the subordinate and supervisor.
Incentives, performance evaluation, subjectivity
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12.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business Wallace E. Hendricks University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance
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03 Oct 04
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03 Oct 04
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Drawing on a single large U.S. corporation's personnel records for the years 1989-93, the authors analyze an example of the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms. They find that this firm's practices were consistent with most of the important conclusions of prior empirical research on internal labor markets. The system was highly centralized, covering salary levels, salary ranges, raises, and bonuses. Supervisors had little discretion over pay other than through subjective performance ratings. The firm held fairly strictly to the salary rules, leading to observable constraints on pay for employees near the top of the salary range. These constraints, however, apparently did not impose important costs on the firm in the form of increased turnover. Although the system operated without any apparent connection to external factors, the authors conclude that it transmitted external labor market forces with little distortion.
Formal salary systems, internal labor markets
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13.
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Michael Gibbs University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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20 Dec 98
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13 Feb 01
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
A theoretical and empirical analysis of within-job and promotion-based incentives for middle managers is presented, using personnel data from a firm. Within-job incentives are stronger than implied by previous studies. Evidence is provided that promotions sort employees by ability, and also generate incentives. Promotions are associated with large increases in lifetime earnings, as long as performance is sustained in the future. There is little evidence that the firm trades-off within-job and promotion-based incentives as predicted. Instead, it appears to use a simple incentive scheme, resulting in declining incentives for those passed over for promotion.
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