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Abstract:
On 10 November 2001, China finally acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) after a marathon negotiation spanning 15 years. China's membership in the WTO raises interesting questions for both the WTO and China. For the WTO, the question is how to deal with China—a huge country of growing importance as a major global exporter and importer but is still in economic transition. For China, the question is how to implement the numerous obligations in the WTO accession package. This paper sets out by reviewing China's experience in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. It then discusses the benefits and challenges arising from China's WTO accession, in particular the challenges arising from market access commitments and rules obligations. The author is of the view that whilst the market access commitments are relatively easy to deal with, the rules obligations may have much broader implications on both China and the multilateral trading system. This is especially true for the "WTO-minus rights" provisions which are embodied in the Accession Protocol and Working Party Report of China. Finally, the author analyses the actions taken by the Chinese government since its WTO accession to implement the commitments and to deal with the challenges, and suggests some trade policy reforms.

China, WTO, trade, antidumping, subsidy, safeguards, FTA, RTA, dispute settlement

Abstract:
Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, China has made large-scale efforts to shape its trade remedy system through legal and organizational changes. Through these changes, China could clarify the meanings of WTO anti-dumping provisions including the provision relating to the definition of domestic industry. Moreover, procedural disciplines on reviews were fortified in Chinese anti-dumping system. While the overall improvements to the trade remedy system of China are evident, definitions of several key legal terms, including the concept of related producers, the negligible import standard, and adjustment factors for a fair comparison between normal values and export prices are still absent, and some legal problems relating to price undertakings and the countermeasure system remain to be solved. China should continue to proceed with the task of clarification and improvement of its trade rules.

China, WTO, Dumping, Anto-dumping, Antidumping, Trade Law

Abstract:
On 29 June 2003, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China (the Mainland) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). As the first Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) for both sides, the CEPA provides a model for China to use the arrangements allowed under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to further trade liberalisation and promote economic development. This article discusses the legal issues raised under the WTO rules as well as the possible economic implications of CEPA. Legally speaking, the CEPA probably satisfies the requirements for a Free-trade Area (FTA) under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and an Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) under Article V of the GATS. Several provisions of the CEPA, however, might lead to potential legal disputes in the WTO. Economically speaking, the CEPA is unlikely to solve the economic problems in Hong Kong.

CEPA, WTO, China, Hong Kong, FTA, RTA, EIA, GATT, GATS, Dispute Settlement, Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement

Abstract:
"Aggressive Legalism" is defined as a strategy whereby a WTO Member uses the substantive rules of the WTO to counter what it deems to be the unreasonable acts, requests and practices of its major trading partners. When they first joined the GATT, both Japan and Korea were reluctant to use the dispute settlement system. In the 80s and 90s, however, they shifted their policy and became more active in using the dispute settlement system. With China's accession to the WTO, many authors predicted that China would also be jumping on the aggressive legalism bandwagon. After a careful analysis of the three cases China has involved since its accession, the author argues that this optimism is unwarranted and China does not seem to be ready to embrace aggressive legalism yet. At the same time, however, the author also considers it in the best interest of China to follow the examples of Japan and Korea to use WTO rules to protect its legitimate trade interests. Thus, China should try to learn from the experiences of Japan and Korea and become more active and aggressive in using WTO dispute settlement system in the future.

China, WTO, dispute settlement, Agressive Legalism, Korea, Japan, international trade, world trade organization

Abstract:
The relationship between trade and culture has long been a hot topic in the debate on the conflicts between free trade and non-trade values. The recent case brought by the United States against China in the WTO on the measures affecting trading rights and distribution services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products is regarded by many as the latest example of the conflict. This article argues, however, that this case is more about the conflict between economic liberalization and political control. Applying the legal rules under the WTO Agreements and public international law, this paper concludes that the United States has built up a very solid case and it would be difficult for China to try to defend its measures by invoking the exception clauses under the WTO Agreements or some other non-WTO agreements, such as the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Politically, it would be awkward for China to openly defend this case in the WTO as well. Given the legal difficulty and political sensitivity surrounding the case, China might decide to settle the case privately with the United States.

WTO, China, International Trade, Dispute Settlement, Public International Law, Treaty Interpretation, Political Censorship, International Economic Law

Abstract:
While there has been an extensive literature on the challenge procedure of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in general, as well as excellent country studies on the operation of the national challenge procedures of several key GPA Members, no such study has been conducted for Hong Kong yet. In the view of the author, even though Hong Kong has a relatively small procurement market, it combines the features of a clean and effective government and a highly internationalised procurement market, and thus makes an interesting subject of study. In this article, the author examines the efforts made by the Hong Kong Government to implement its obligation under the GPA to provide challenge procedures. The article starts by reviewing Hong Kong's participation in the government procurement agreements under the GATT and WTO, and then sets out the general background to the Review Body for Bid Challenges of Hong Kong. In the next section, the article discusses in detail the bid challenge procedures and how such procedural rules have been applied and elaborated through the cases that came before the Review Body. The article concludes by noting that the bid challenge system in Hong Kong generally conforms to its GPA obligations.

WTO, Government Procurement Agreement, GPA, Bid Challenge

Abstract:
Over the past few decades, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have proliferated globally. Such proliferation of RTAs created a renewed sense of urgency for the WTO to take action in order to avoid the fate of being eclipsed into irrelevance. There are several options for coping with the challenge. Theoretically speaking, the best approach would be to heighten the level of ambition in global trade talks to reduce all trade barriers to zero so that the discriminatory effect created by RTAs could be reduced or even eliminated. In reality, such an approach would be impossible for well-known reasons. The next best option would be for the WTO to draft ‘best practices’ or model RTAs to minimize the effect of further fragmentation created by different breeds of RTAs. The problems with this approach are first the resource constraints of the WTO, second the bounded rationality of human beings, and third, whether a ‘one size fits all’ approach would work. Yet another option offered is to strengthen the WTO's monitoring system of RTAs, with the 2006 rules on transparency being the most recent example. Unfortunately, as the Committee on RTAs (CRTAs), the main enforcer of the monitoring rules in the WTO, has been plagued with ineffectiveness because of the consensus rule, heightened monitoring rules would not be of much help either. In this article, we will discuss a fourth option, i.e. to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a venue for resolving RTA disputes. The rationale underlying this initiative is that, by using the WTO dispute settlement system for RTA disputes, the Members will be able to develop a body of ‘common law’ on RTAs, which would then either form the basis of multilateral rules on RTAs or harmonize RTAs. This way, we can try to minimize the harmful effect of RTAs, and indeed turn RTAs from ‘stumbling blocks’ into ‘building blocks’ of the multilateral trading system.

Abstract:
To many observers, a major challenge raised by China's accession to the WTO is whether the WTO dispute settlement system could cope with China, one of the major traders in the world with an economy that is halfway between a planned economy and a market economy. In this article, the author tries to answer this question by reviewing China's experience in the WTO dispute settlement system. Historically, the senior leadership in China attached disproportionate importance to the WTO dispute settlement system and preferred to avoid using the system. Thus, in the first four cases in which China was sued or threatened to be sued in the WTO, China tried to keep a low profile and settled the cases with the complainants. As more and more cases are being brought against China, however, the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system as a trade policy tool in dealing with China has gradually faded away. This is illustrated by China's reactions to the cases brought against it over the past two years, where China has taken a more and more legalistic approach. While China, just as any other WTO Member, has every right to use the WTO dispute settlement system, an over-aggressive strategy against China runs the risk of dragging everyone into trade wars, which is not conducive to the solution of trade disputes.

WTO, China, Dispute Settlement, Trade, World Trade, International Trade, Panel, Appellate Body, Legalism