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Abstract:
Graduate students often lack concrete advice on publishing. This essay is an attempt to fill this important gap. Advice is given on how to publish everything from book reviews to articles, replies to book chapters, and how to secure both edited book contracts and authored monograph contracts, along with plenty of helpful tips and advice on the publishing world (and how it works) along the way in what is meant to be a comprehensive, concrete guide to publishing that should be of tremendous value to graduate students working in any area of the humanities and social sciences.

Thom Brooks, publishing advice, publish. publications, reply, replies, discussion, article, book, book contracts, graduate advice, graduate students, humanities, social sciences, philosophy

Abstract:
Most graduate students are intimidated by both the pressures to publish and the barriers to publishing. This article explains step by step how they can begin successful academic careers.

publishing, postgraduate, graduate, student, publish

Abstract:
In this article, I argue that - despite the absence of any clear influence of one theory on the other - the legal theories of Dworkin and Hegel share several similar and, at times, unique positions that join them together within a distinctive school of legal theory, sharing a middle position between natural law and legal positivism. In addition, each theory can help the other in addressing certain internal difficulties. By recognizing both Hegel and Dworkin as proponents of a position lying in between natural law and legal positivist jurisprudence, we can gain clarity in why their general legal theories seem to fit uncomfortably, if indeed they can be said to fit at all, within so many different camps - while fitting comfortably in no particular camp - as well as highlight what has been overlooked.

Dworkin, Hegel, Brooks, legal positivism, natural law, jurisprudence, legal theory, philosophy of law, Raz, philosophy, between, natualism, positivism

Abstract:
In this article, I argue that - despite the absence of any clear influence of one theory on the other - the legal theories of Dworkin and Hegel share several similar and, at times, unique positions that join them together within a distinctive school of legal theory, sharing a middle position between natural law and legal positivism. In addition, each theory can help the other in addressing certain internal difficulties. By recognizing both Hegel and Dworkin as proponents of a position lying in between natural law and legal positivist jurisprudence, we can gain clarity in why their general legal theories seem to fit uncomfortably, if indeed they can be said to fit at all, within so many different camps - while fitting comfortably in no particular camp - as well as highlight what has been overlooked.

Dworkin, Hegel, Brooks, legal positivism, natural law, jurisprudence, legal theory, philosophy of law, Raz, philosophy, between, natualism, positivism

Abstract:
What is the most acceptable theory of punishment? Philosophers have advanced several competing models as answers, including retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitative theories, punishment as communication, and many others. This article claims that each has its strengths and weaknesses and proposes a new way forward with a new theory of punishment.

Each competing view of punishment has a number of intuitively attractive features, as well as real problems. I attempt to lay out a theory of punishment that can best account for the attractive features while avoiding the various problems faced by retributivist or deterrent theories, for example.

My aim is to argue for a new theory of punishment that can overcome difficulties with the views of Rawls, Hart, Duff, and others.

Comments are most welcome!

idealism, punishment, law, legal theory, Hegel, Kant, Fichte, Collingwood, Green, Bradley, Seth, Pringle-Pattison, Bosanquet, German Idealism, British Idealism, retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitation, Rawls, Hart, Duff, mixed theories, restorative justice, restitution, mixed, philosophy, hybrid

Abstract:
Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to Hegel and beyond, has argued that democracy is an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy working today - whether in an analytic or postmodern tradition - endorses democracy in one variety or another. Should we conclude then that the traditional canon is meaningless for helping us theorize about a just state? In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and Hegel. At first glance, each is rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have been represented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian) democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we can uncover a new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and Hegel not enemies of modern democratic thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a positive, not negative, manner.

Thom, Brooks, Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Hobbes, Plato, democracy, totalitarianism, legal philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy, jurisprudence, legal theory, Schumpeter, Popper, democratic, ancient philosophy, authoritarianism

Abstract:
The problem of global poverty has reached terrifying proportions. Since the end of the Cold War, ordinary deaths from starvation and preventable diseases amount to approximately 250 million people, most of them children. Thomas Pogge argues that wealthy states have a responsibility to help those in severe poverty. This responsibility arises from the foreseeable and avoidable harm the current global institutional order has perpetrated on poor states. Pogge demands that wealthy states eradicate global poverty not merely because they have the resources, but because they share responsibility for its continuation. For Pogge, global poverty is more than a wrong imposed on the poor: it is a violation of human rights and a crime.

In this paper, I critically examine Pogge's claim that global poverty is a crime. My aim is to demonstrate that Pogge's conclusions do not follow from his arguments. That is, if affluent states have a negative duty to assist those in severe poverty, their duty is not absolute because they are not fully responsible for this poverty. Moreover, if global poverty is one of the greatest crimes against humanity, then it seems inappropriate at best to champion proposals, pace Pogge, that lets the guilty parties walk free.

Brooks, Pogge, Rawls, Mill, human rights, rights, poor, poverty, global, global poverty, global justice, justice, jurisprudence, law, distributive justice, negative duties, assistance, obligation, starvation, institutional order, affluence, crime, rights violation, punishment, retributivism

Abstract:
Polygamy is a hotly contested practice and open to widespread misunderstandings. This practice is defined as a relationship between either one husband and multiple wives or one wife and multiple husbands. Today, 'polygamy' almost exclusively takes the form of one husband with multiple wives. In this article, my focus will centre on limited defences of polygamy offered recently by Chesire Calhoun and Martha Nussbaum. I will argue that these defences are unconvincing. The problem with polygamy is primarily that it is a structurally inegalitarian practice in both theory and fact. Polygamy should be opposed for this reason.

polygamy, Calhoun, Nussbaum, Brooks, Parekh, Barry, marriage, polygyny, polyandry, polyamory, egalitarianism, egalitarian, inegalitarian, multiculturalism, toleration

Abstract:
Most philosophers working on punishment endorse a monistic outlook: they support a theory of punishment against other theories. Thus, retributivists pit themselves against deterrent proponents and so. This way of doing the philosophy of punishment is deeply problematic because these views fail to acknowledge both (a) the shortcomings of their endorsed views and (b) the good reasons supporting rival views. This article seeks to make the claim for rethinking punishment in a more pluralistic manner, whereby we seek to reintegrate different theories of punishment together rather than hopelessly split them apart.

punishment, idealism, monism, pluralism, monistic, pluralistic, jurisprudence, philosophy, Brooks, Thom, Hegel, Kant, Green, Bosanquet, Collingwood, retribution, retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitation, Hampton, Davis, prevention, crime, criminals, penal theory, theory, law, reintegration

Abstract:
In her Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum claims that society should not impose shame punishments. I will argue that she correctly directs our attention to the fact that emotions are integral to any proper understanding of our laws. Her views are not only consistent with current law, but perhaps go further than she realizes.

Nussbaum does not endorse the use of shame punishment primarily on the grounds that shaming offenders often amounts to their losing dignity. Yet, her concerns about dignity and insistence that shaming ought never be imputed purely for the sake of humiliating offenders have, in fact, been addressed by the courts in a way which overcomes her important reservations. Thus, her account of law is not only correct to highlight the relationship that exists between emotions and the law, but, in addition, her views are also consistent with the legitimacy of shame punishment in current practice as well. As a result, she need not be opposed to the use of legitimate shame punishment.

My argument takes the following form. I first discuss Nussbaum's arguments in favor of accounting for our emotions in our thinking about law. Second, I next explain why she singles out shame as an emotion that should be treated differently: the only emotions that should be avoided in our legal thinking are shame and disgust. This drives her opposition to shame punishment for reasons grounded in her rejection of shame more generally. Third, I turn to her discussion of guilt and its close relationship with shame, arguing that shame may well have a legitimate role in bringing apathetic offenders to undergo a change of heart and recognize their own wrongdoing. I conclude with the recent case U.S. v. Gementera where the Court of Appeals sanctioned the use of shame punishments on grounds acceptable to Nussbaum's account.

Nussbaum, Brooks, shame, punishment, shaming, punishments, law, philosophy, legal, theory, crime, emotion, disgust, Gementera, Court of Appeals, guilt, humiliation, recognition, wrongdoing, dignity, Kant, Kantianism, Aristotle, Aristotelian, reason, reasons, apathy, offenders, criminals, apathetic

Abstract:
In Philosophical Quarterly, Anthony Ellis attempts to offer a deterrence theory of punishment that overcomes a number of common criticisms of deterrence theories in general. While his discussion does suggest many interesting responses that proponents of deterrence theories might use, the theory he defends is problematic for several reasons.

Ellis, deterrence, punishment, law, criminal law, legal theory, retribution, retributivism, self defense, crime, criminal justice, punishment, theory, jury, English law, Welsh law, state of mind, justifiability, effective, Brooks

Abstract:
When can ever be justified in banning a religious practice? This paper focusses on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Certain religious practices create a clash between capabilities where the capability to religious belief and expression is in conflict with the capability of equal status and nondiscrimination. One example of such a clash is the case of polygamy. Nussbaum argues that there may be circumstances where polygamy may be acceptable. On the contrary, I argue that the capabilities approach cannot justify polygamy in any circumstance. Her approach rules out polygamy, but may not rule out all non-monogamous relationships, such as polyamory. Finally, I conclude that the capabilities approach would benefit from a more robust understanding of recognition.

Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, Sen, capability, capabilities approach, religion, religious practices, liberty of conscience, polygamy, Thom Brooks, Brooks, female genital mutilation, sati, peyote, freedom, rights, liberties, equality, nondiscrimination, recognition, Hegel, Green, T.H. Green

Abstract:
The most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is retributivist, as the criminal punished is demonstrated to be deserving of a punishment commensurable in value to the severity of his crime. Thus, Hegel's theory is individualistic because the only factor involved in determining a punishment's magnitude is the criminal's action itself. The problem with this interpretation is that it is limited to Hegel's preliminary discussion of punishment within his theory of abstract right. In this paper, I take seriously the structure of the Philosophy of Right to underscore the relationship between Hegel's treatment of punishment in abstract right and his later treatment within his theory of civil society. This reading produces substantive new insights, presenting us with a theory which determines the severity of punishments commensurable with the threat a criminal act poses for civil society, committing itself to a minimal retributivism at most.

Kant, Hegel, Brooks, Wood, retributivism, deterrence, retribution, right, philosophy, philosophy of right, phenomenology, abstract right, ethical life, punishment, logic, system

Abstract:
I want to raise the question of why we should give the Preface this special treatment. What do we hope to learn from such an extended examination of the Preface that will help further the study of Hegel's work beyond its present state? My comments will be limited to a few central issues, such as (a) the relationship between the Phenomenology and the system, (b) the Phenomenology as an introduction to the system, and (c) the Phenomenology as a ladder, in order to best address what is of value in the Phenomenology's Preface for us today.

G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, phenomenology, logic, Science of Logic, Thom Brooks, Brooks, Yovel, Stern, Houlgate, speculative philosophy, dialectic

Abstract:
It is now commonplace to argue that punishment must fit a particular crime, if this crime's punishment is to be just. The aim of this paper is to look at how one particular theory of punishment, namely retributivism, determines the justifiable fit of a crime and its punishment. I will argue that retributivism is impossible to enact as a practice. My contention is that if retributivist justice demands that criminals receive only what they deserve, then our inability to know what is deserved in itself may proof problematic. All we can claim is what we believe a criminal deserves, not what is deserved in itself. If I am correct, the legitimate use of punishment will require further justification than retributivism can offer us.

retributivism, punishment, crime, criminals, Kant, Hegel, justice, desert, knowledge

Abstract:
This paper offers two potential worries in Robert B. Talisse's A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. The first worry is that is that the picture of democracy on offer is incomplete. While Talisse correctly argues that democracy is about more than elections, democracy is also about more than deliberation between citizens. Talisse's deliberative democracy is problematic to the degree its view of deliberation fails to account for democracy. The second worry we may have concerns the relationship between Talisse's Peircean pragmatism and deliberative democracy. If this pragmatism is always open to revision and change in light of future evidence, then no pragmatist should adhere to only one particular political system, such as democracy. When we claim that only one system can ever be justified, then we fail to honour our professed openness to revision and change in the future. If my analysis is correct, then I do not aim to demonstrate that Talisse's Peircean pragmatism is incorrect, only incomplete. Thus, the hope of this paper is to help develop this pragmatism further.

democracy, deliberative democracy, deliberation, pragmatism, authoritarianism, scepticism, skepticism, Peirce, Dewey, Rawls, Talisse, Brooks, bureaucracy, judiciary

Abstract:
This Comment demonstrates that policy judgements are not masked by philosophical references, nor do philosophers play any crucial role in contentious judicial decisions. Neomi Rao's study is flawed for many reasons: incomplete content analysis, poor assessment of data, and an inadequate definition of philosophy. She should be criticised for hypocritically praising Court philosopher references in some instances and not others, especially with regard to the Court's early development. This Comment searched unsuccessfully for an instance where philosophers were cited just once in controversial cases regarding racial integration, capital punishment's abolition and re-legality, and the 2000 Presidential election. Philosophers are peculiarly absent from major controversial cases.

Rao claims the Court's majority decisions avoided the "Philosophers' Brief" because the philosophers' argument was grounded in theory, not substantive legal argument surrounding issues of judicial precedent. This Comment challenges Rao's use of "philosophy" as something entirely abstract and steeped in metaphysics. Philosophy is presented as a large umbrella covering diverse sub-fields, two of which are philosophy of law and political philosophy. These sub-fields are of great use to law. Thus, the Court has not illegitimately used philosophers to support personal policy preferences. Nor is the use of philosophy incommensurable with judicial decision-making.

Rao, philosophy, philosophers, legal, jurisprudence, supreme court, brief, vacco, glucksberg, Rehnquist, Dworkin, Rawls, Nussbaum, Roe, Wade, abortion, euthanasia, Plato, O'Connor,Scalia, justice, metaphysics, The Philosopher's Brief, Scanlon, Palko, Blackmun, Cruzan, Bush, Furman, Jurek, Georgia

Abstract:
It is widely accepted by the scientific community and beyond that human beings are primarily responsible for climate change and that climate change has brought with it a number of real problems. These problems include, but are not limited to, greater threats to coastal communities, greater risk of famine, and greater risk that tropical diseases may spread to new territory. In keeping with J. S. Mill's 'Harm Principle', green political theorists often respond that if we are contributing a harm to others in contributing to climate change and its negative effects, we then have a negative duty to assist those we have harmed and to reduce our carbon emissions. In this paper, I will take seriously negative duties stemming from a contribution to climate change and demonstrate that our negative duties do not demand that we necessarily end our contribution to climate change if we were able to compensate those who may be affected by climate change. Thus, the conclusion of many green political theorists - that we must reduce our carbon emissions - does not necessarily follow from the view that humans are primarily responsible for climate change and its attended ill effects.

climate change, negative duties, Mill, John Stuart Mill, Brooks, environmental citizenship, ecological footprint, footprint, PPP, polluter pays principle, Singer, Dobson, atmosphere sink, Pogge, global justice, human rights

Abstract:
What is the relationship between our moral sentiments and the justification of punishment? One position is that our moral sentiments provide for punishment’s justification. My focus will be on Adam Smith’s theory of punishment and the role that moral sentiments play in this theory. First, I will argue that interpreters are mistaken to view Smith’s position as essentially retributivist. In fact, he defends a unified theory where punishment serves retributivist, deterrent, and rehabilitative goals. Secondly, I will argue that his view that punishment is warranted in cases where we should feel resentment fails to account for much of what we would want included in our criminal law. I conclude that while Smith’s account is problematic, it nevertheless may point us toward a more moderate position. Moral sentiments may be relevant to criminal law, although they should not serve as the sole determinant of what should be criminalized and how crimes should be punished.

Adam Smith, emotions, punishment, moral sentiments, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Thom Brooks, Brooks, retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitation, unified theory, mala prohibita, mala in se, traffic offences

Abstract:
The problem of global poverty has reached terrifying proportions. Since the end of the Cold War, ordinary deaths from starvation and preventable diseases amount to approximately 250 million people, most of them children. Thomas Pogge argues that wealthy states have a responsibility to help those in severe poverty. This responsibility arises from the foreseeable and avoidable harm the current global institutional order has perpetrated on poor states. Pogge demands that wealthy states eradicate global poverty not merely because they have the resources, but because they share responsibility for its continuation. For Pogge, global poverty is more than a wrong imposed on the poor: it is a violation of human rights and a crime.

In this paper, I critically examine Pogge's claim that global poverty is a crime. My aim is to demonstrate that Pogge's conclusions do not follow from his arguments. That is, if affluent states have a negative duty to assist those in severe poverty, their duty is not absolute because they are not fully responsible for this poverty. Moreover, if global poverty is one of the greatest crimes against humanity, then it seems inappropriate at best to champion proposals, pace Pogge, that lets the guilty parties walk free.

Brooks, Pogge, Rawls, Mill, human rights, rights, poor, poverty, global, global poverty, global justice, justice, jurisprudence, law, distributive justice, negative duties, assistance, obligation, starvation, institutional order, affluence, crime, rights violation, punishment, retributivism

Abstract:
Virginia Held’s recent How Terrorism is Wrong offers us any number of important contributions to how we think about terrorist violence. My discussion will focus on only one of these contributions, namely, how terrorism may be justified. This justification rests upon a group being denied a voice. Thus, terrorism may become justified where this demand to be heard is denied, coupled with the corollary that all non-violent options have been exhausted. I will argue that we should require a more narrow justification of terrorism. This is because I believe Held’s understanding may be open to abuses which we should close off.

Virginia Held, Held, Thom Brooks, Brooks, terrorism, war, just war, violence, global justice, expression, political expression, political philosophy, Jeff McMahan, McMahan

Abstract:
No abstract available.

Abstract:
No abstract available.