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Abstract:
What is politics? An oddity of political philosophy is that it spends so little time answering this question. By contrast, "What is law?" is almost universally considered the chief question of legal philosophy, and "What is morality?" is a question moral philosophers regularly address. But political philosophers rarely ask what politics essentially is. Yet this question is important, because unless we answer it, then we shan't know what is common to all instances of politics, wherever and whenever they are to be found. In answer to the question, this paper argues that politics is the activity of either (1) making, breaking, or preserving the general arrangements of a group's affairs, or (2) trying to get a group to take a certain action when some group members of the group oppose taking it, where one can use any means to pursue this activity, except violence against others. I call this the "Arrangements of Affairs Thesis." In arguing for this thesis, I first consider and refute 15 leading analyses of the concept of politics offered by political writers. I then explicate the Thesis by discussing its implications. I then argue for the Thesis and refute two objections to it: an argument from politics's essentially concerning the pursuit of social power, and an argument from manipulation's being sufficient for politics.

Nature of politics, concept of politics, arrangements of affairs, rules, group actions, violence, power

Abstract:
The dissertation has two aims. First, to explain why normative theories of politics, economics, and group decisions depend on ethics. Second, to refute the view that they need not. This latter view has recently been defended by Rawls, Hampshire, Williams, and Habermas. The view that all such theories necessarily depend on some normative ethical theory I call the Dependence Thesis. The dissertation defends the Thesis by an argument I call the Argument from Claims about Interest-Affecting Normative Requirement. Chapters 1-3 defend the Argument's three premises. Chapter 1 offers a conception of normative ethical theories. Chapter 2 offers a conception of normative theories of politics, economics, and group decision. Chapter 3 shows why theories of the second type depend on theories of the first. Chapter 4 defends the Dependence Thesis against objections from the anti-theory position in ethics; from a view of the aim of politics, defended by Hampshire and Williams; from Rawls's criterion of public justification; and from Habermas's view that genuinely democratic lawmaking cannot be controlled by moral principles. Chapter 5 applies the Thesis and tests it against hard cases. It uses the Thesis to resolve the monism-dualism debate in political philosophy. That debate concerns whether there is a fundamental principle for regulating political institutions that does not apply to personal conduct. The Chapter shows that there can be such principles, but that all such principles are shaped by normative ethical theories. The Chapter then shows that the Thesis accurately describes three hard cases: Rawls's political conception of justice, Debreu's theory of the optimality of general equilibrium, and Buchanan and Tullock's normative theory of decision rules.

Ethics, normative political theory, political philosophy, ethical theory, good, value, morality, interests, normative economics, normative decision theory

Abstract:
This Chapter elucidates and defends the following thesis: A theory is a normative ethical theory just in case it claims that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (a) all actions the performance of which would advance or set back persons' interests, or (b) any states of affairs the occurrence of which would advance or set back such interests, or (c) any ways of life the pursuit of which would do the same, or (d) any policies the pursuit of which would do the same, or (e) any character traits the continued manifestation of which would advance or set back such interests. We shall call this the Universal Claims Thesis. This Thesis is the first premise of the dissertation's argument, the Argument from Claims about Interest-Affecting Normative Requirement. The Chapter first explicates the key concepts employed in the Thesis. It then defends the Thesis on the ground that it, considered as a theory about normative ethical theories, possesses more of the theoretical virtues of consistency with observation, explanatory utility, and coherence with widely held theoretical commitments than any of the competing theories of normative ethical theory.

normative ethics, normative ethical theory, normativity, ethics, interests, morality, theoretical virtues

Abstract:
There is an assumption, widely held by political theorists and philosophers, that is seldom discussed and yet has serious consequences for the practice of political theory. The assumption is that critical and normative inquiry conflict. Critical inquiry is the activity of asking what's bad about this or that; normative inquiry is the activity of asking what we should do. Now the assumption - call it the Conflict Thesis - entails that the aims of critical and normative inquiry are incompatible: you cannot consistently accept both. This paper asks whether the Conflict Thesis is true. In answer, it argues that the thesis is false. There is no conflict between critical and normative inquiry, because their aims and presuppositions are compatible. This view I call the No-conflict Thesis. In arguing for this thesis, the paper gives accounts of critical and normative inquiry, identifies their aims and presuppositions, and shows that these are compatible. The paper concludes by showing that a set of neglected but important questions lies at the intersection of critical and normative inquiry.

critical inquiry, critique, justification, normative inquiry, normativity, presuppositions

Abstract:
This Chapter elucidates and defends the second premise of the Argument from Claims about Interest-Affecting Normative Requirement. The premise runs: A theory is a normative political theory just in case it claims that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (a) some actions, or (b) some states of affairs, or (c) some ways of life, or (d) some policies, the actualization of which would advance or set back persons' interests (namely, those actions, states of affairs, ways of life, or policies that would, if actualized, make, break, or preserve the general arrangements of a group's affairs), and any normative group economic theory is a normative political theory, and any normative group decision theory is a normative political theory. We shall call this premise the Particular Claims Thesis. The Chapter gives an argument for this Thesis by giving an argument the premises of which are definitions of normative political theory, normative group economic theory, normative group decision theory, and claims that any normative group economic theory is a normative political theory, and any normative group decision theory is a normative political theory. The Chapter argues for each of these premises.

normative political theory, politics, normative economic theory, economics, normative group decision theory, group decisions, welfare economics, social choice theory

Abstract:
Students of politics cleave to a welter of conflicting conceptions of their subject. We all know that these conceptions shape the questions researchers put to politics, as well as the assumptions on which they make their inquiries. But we lack any serious attempt to classify these conceptions, which prevents us from achieving a clear view of the similarities and differences between different conceptions. This research note thus classifies 46 1/2 conceptions of politics I have found in the scholarly literature. I present the conceptions and divide them into seven classes: power-seeking conceptions, power-distributing conceptions, struggle-and-competition conceptions, collective decision and -action conceptions, group- and social order-production conceptions, authority-asserting conceptions, and shaping -values and -arrangements conceptions. Among those discussed are the Weberian, Marxist, feminist, collective-choice, conservative, and agonistic conceptions of politics.

nature of politics, definitions of politics

Abstract:
The dissertation has two aims. First, to explain why normative theories of politics, economics, and group decisions depend on ethics. Second, to refute the view that they need not. This latter view has recently been defended by Rawls, Hampshire, Williams, and Habermas. The view that all such theories necessarily depend on some normative ethical theory I call the Dependence Thesis. The dissertation defends the Thesis by an argument I call the Argument from Claims about Interest-Affecting Normative Requirement.

Chapters 1-3 defend the Argument's three premises. Chapter 1 offers a conception of normative ethical theories. Chapter 2 offers a conception of normative theories of politics, economics, and group decision. Chapter 3 shows why theories of the second kind must depend on theories of the first kind. Chapter 4 defends the Dependence Thesis against objections from the anti-theory position in ethics; from a view of the aim of politics, defended by Hampshire and Williams; from Rawls's criterion of public justification; and from Habermas's view that genuinely democratic lawmaking cannot be controlled by moral principles. Chapter 5 applies the Thesis and tests it against hard cases. It uses the Thesis to resolve the monism-dualism debate in political philosophy. That debate concerns whether there is a fundamental principle for regulating political institutions that does not apply to personal conduct. The Chapter shows that there can be such principles, but that all such principles are shaped by normative ethical theories. The Chapter then shows that the Thesis accurately describes three hard cases: Rawls's political conception of justice, Debreu's theory of the optimality of general equilibrium, and Buchanan and Tullock's normative theory of decision rules.

Ethics, normative political theory, political philosophy, ethical theory, good, value, morality, interests, normative economics, normative decision theory

Abstract:
What are the different styles by which political theorists deal with intellectual problems? This question is important because if we do not answer it, we shall not know why methodological disagreements are so much more intense and heated than substantive disagreements. Nor shall we know why particular political theorists take the positions they do in methodological controversies. This paper argues that there are now five main styles by which political theorists deal with intellectual problems: the Classicist, the Mannerist, the Baroque, the Romantic, and the Collectivist. Classicism solves the problem it poses, Mannerism presses it, the Baroque resolves it, Romanticism dissolves it, and Collectivism publicizes it. For each style, we give an account of its main features, give examples of how it has been applied to different problems in political theory, and then identify its strengths and weaknesses.

Styles, intellectual problems, questions, political theories, methods, methodology

Abstract:
Philosophical pessimism consists of a set of theses offering a gloomy view of humanity and its destiny. These theses, and the philosophical position they comprise, have been held by Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Camus, Cioran, and perhaps Unamuno and Freud. This paper asks: What are this position's theoretical foundations? What are the theories which underpin and justify the position and its constituent theses? In answer, this paper argues that pessimism's foundations consist of three theories, theories I call the algesic theory of human nature, the hamartiac theory of human reason, and the eikaic theory of the universe. The algesic theory holds that human beings are mortal and conscious of it, acutely conscious of time's passing, prone to keenly desire what they cannot achieve and what cannot be, prone to believe what they strongly desire to be true, prone to suffer when they (realize they) cannot fulfill their desires or when their desire-driven beliefs are undermined, prone to keenly desire that everything come out well, and prone to believe that things in general get better. The hamartiac theory holds that human theoretical reason is a powerful tool for discovering the truth of things; but when using practical reason, humans tend to set themselves ends their pursuit of which leads to bad or unwanted consequences. The eikaic theory holds that the universe and the flow of events have no propensity to make things in general get better; so too, they are both replete with change, chance, and unexpected events.

philosophical pessimism, theoretical foundations, human nature, reason, the universe

Abstract:
This Chapter elucidates and defends the third and final premise of the dissertation's argument. The premise defended here runs thus: Any theory claiming that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (a) some actions, (b) some states of affairs, (c) some ways of life, or (d) some policies, the actualization of which would advance or set back the interests of persons, analytically depends on some theory claiming that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (i) all actions, (ii) any states of affairs, (iii) any ways of life, (iv) any policies, or (v) any character traits, the actualization of which would advance or set back the interests of persons. We shall call this premise the Universal-Particular Thesis. The Thesis implies, first, that any theory of the first kind is a logical consequence of a theory of the second kind. It implies, second, that any theory of the first kind has the meanings of its theoretical terms shaped by the theory on which it depends. The Chapter defends this Thesis with an argument of three premises and one lemma. Parts 2-6 explicate the Thesis and defend each premise and the lemma. Part 7 reviews the argument to the Universal-Particular Thesis. Part 8 considers and replies to an objection to the Thesis. The objection is the famous meaning-change argument, due to Paul Feyerabend. It holds that the meanings of terms denoted by the same word differ across different theories. E.g., "mass" in classical mechanics means something different than mass in relativistic mechanics. Part 9 then proves the dissertation's thesis from the chapter Thesis and the theses of the previous Chapters. Part 10 concludes.

normative political theory, normative ethical theory, theory features, dependence, explication, correspondence rule, deduction, normative requirement

Abstract:
As is well known, there are special tensions between Hobbesian moral psychology and Thomist moral psychology, on the one hand; and between the Hobbesian theory of free will and its Thomist rival, on the other. But what is the fundamental difference between the Thomist and Hobbesian theories of the will? This paper argues that the fundamental difference consists in three things. First, that Hobbes's theory omits, while Aquinas's theory relies on, appeals to such theoretical entities as reason, goodness, intellect, soul, and choice. Second, that Hobbes's theory admits, while Aquinas's theory denies, that brute animals have wills. Third, that Hobbes's theory denies, while Aquinas's theory grants, that the question, Is the will free? has sense. Call these differences the threefold difference, and this thesis the Threefold Difference Thesis. This thesis the paper argues for as follows. Part 2 argues that any theory of the will has nine chief features. It must answer nine questions: What is the will's nature? What is its internal structure? What is its external structure? What is its tendency? What are its functions? What is the class of will-bearers? What if anything does a volition consist in? What does voluntariness consist in? What if anything does free will consist in? Parts 3 and 4 then describe how Hobbes's and Aquinas's theories of the will answer each of these questions. Part 5 then uses these descriptions to argue for the Threefold Difference Thesis. Part 6 meets an objection to the Thesis. The objection is the thesis, inspired by the work of Thomas Pink, that the fundamental difference between the two theories is that the Thomist theory accepts a practical reason-based conception of agency, while the Hobbesian theory rejects it. Part 7 concludes the paper by considering some new questions the inquiry has broached.

the will, structure of a theory of the will, fundamental difference between theories, human nature, practical reason, Hobbes, Aquinas

Abstract:
The questions: "What are the functions of law?" "What is morality's function?" are familiar problems in legal and moral philosophy. But political philosophy has not pressed the corresponding question about politics. This paper accordingly asks: What are politics' main functions? In answer, the paper argues for the Dual-Function Thesis: politics has two main functions: first, to allow groups and their members to make a significant mark on the world and society, a mark more significant than the members individually or severally could make; second, to make the general arrangements of a group's affairs responsive to the wants and fears of at least some of the group's current members. This means, as the paper will show, that politics solves two deep human problems: the Significant Mark Problem and the Responsiveness Problem. The paper starts with an analysis of the concept of politics, refutes six alternative conception of politics' main function, shows that the Dual-Function Thesis implies that politics solves the two problems, mounts a direct argument for the Thesis, and refutes the objection that politics has no main function.

functions of politics, significant mark, wants, fears, group actions, arrangements of affairs

Abstract:
This Chapter aims to defend the Dependence Thesis - proved in Chapter Three - against important objections. Part 2 defends the Thesis against an argument from anti-theory in ethics. The anti-theory position maintains that abstract, general ethical theories do more harm than good. Part 2 rebuts Stuart Hampshire and Bernard Williams's arguments for anti-theory; it then offers a general consideration against the position. Part 3 meets Hampshire and Williams's Aim of Politics Argument against Dependence-like views. Part 4 considers and rebuts Rawls's Argument from Reasonable Pluralism and Public Justification. Part 5 meets Habermas's four strongest objections to Dependence-like views. A common feature in these four objections is the worry that were a political society to put into practice normative political theories depending on normative ethical theories, it would not be able to express its communal will, or allow for its citizens to engage in democratic self-legislation.

normative political theory, anti-theory in ethics, aim of politics, reasonable pluralism, public justification

Abstract:
Anthropocentrism is the view that the only things valuable in themselves are: human beings; their desires, needs, and purposes; and the satisfaction of those. In turn, Gaia theory holds that the Earth and all creatures on it constitute something akin to a vast living being. Many layfolk hold that Gaia theory implies the falsity of anthropocentrism, and thus puts the kibosh on that doctrine. But philosophical writers, insofar as they have considered the matter, deny this implication. In this paper, I defend the layfolk against the learned. I argue for what we may call the Kibosh Thesis, the view that Gaia theory does indeed put the kibosh on anthropocentrism. I defend this thesis by appealing to what I call the Part-Whole Thesis: the view that no parts of a living being which do not constitute the whole being can have as much intrinsic value as the being itself has. And since the evidence in favor of Gaia theory is mounting, this thesis would appear to give us a fairly strong argument against anthropocentrism. In arguing for this thesis, I show why anthropocentrism is a plausible doctrine, meet the main philosophical objections to the Kibosh Thesis, specify the main claims of Gaia theory, and develop the argument from the Part-Whole Thesis.

anthropocentrism, Gaia theory, living being, intrinsic value, definition of life

Abstract:
This Chapter applies the Dependence Thesis to an important problem in political philosophy. It then tests the Thesis against hard cases. By so doing, we aim to lend inductive support to the Thesis, and to demonstrate its usefulness and power. In Part 2, we apply the Thesis to the range problem about basic political principles. This problem was made famous by the monism-dualism debate in political philosophy. The problem concerns whether there is a fundamental normative principle regulating political institutions which does not apply to personal conduct. The view called "monism" holds that there cannot be such a principle. The view called "dualism" holds that there are such principles. Part 2 shows that the Dependence Thesis offers an attractive solution to the problem, one which explains why both monism and dualism seem attractive. In Parts 3-5, we apply the Thesis to three hard cases, cases which prima facie seem to contradict the Thesis. These cases are a normative political theory, a normative group economic theory, and a normative group decision theory, each of them widely considered independent of any normative ethical theory. These are John Rawls's political conception of justice as fairness, the normative part of Gerard Debreu's general equilibrium theory, and the normative part of Buchanan and Tullock's public choice theory of decision rules. Parts 3-5 show that, as the Dependence Thesis predicts, these three theories each depend on a normative ethical theory. They depend on Equal-Respect Contractualism, Paretian Ethics, and Actual Unanimous Consent Ruleism, respectively.

normative political theory, monism-dualism debate, political principles, political conception of justice, general equilibrium theory, public choice theory

Abstract:
This paper outlines and defends a processual theory of peoplehood. On our theory, a people is, roughly speaking, composed of two things. First, an unfolding series of events coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing, or changing a polity's authoritative institutions. Second, individual persons whose lives and interests are intensely affected by these events and institutions. We call this theory deep processualism. We outline the theory by showing how it would answer five questions: the questions of constituents, individuation, origination, termination, and membership: What are the chief constituents of peoples? What individuates peoples? Under what conditions do peoples originate? Under what conditions do peoples cease to be? Under what conditions is a person a member of the people? We also consider alternative theories of the nature of peoples, theories due to Juergen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman, Philip Pettit, and James Fishkin. We defend our theory on the ground that it is not embarrassed by the difficulties that we pin on these alternative theories.

peoples, process, individuation of peoples, membership, Juergen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman

Abstract:
Everyone agrees that freedom is a good, and many would hold that it is a supreme good. But do human beings need freedom? That is, do we need freedom in the same way that we need food, shelter, love, and the respect of others? In this paper, I argue, first, that we do have a vital need for a good measure of negative freedom. I call this "the Negative Necessity Thesis." I then argue, second, that we do not have a vital need for positive freedom. This I call "the Positive Non-necessity Thesis." Following D. Wiggins, I hold that someone vitally needs x if, and only if, it is necessary, things being what they are, that she avoids being severely harmed only if she has x. I reach the first thesis on the ground that if you lack a good measure of negative freedom, then you suffer from imprisoned agency and special vulnerability to having your interests trampled. This suffices for the severe harms involved in a vital needs not being met. I reach the second thesis on the ground that lacking positive freedom does not pose a serious threat to your enjoying all the capabilities essential to ordinary human functioning, and thus does not severely harm you. The two theses help explain the widespread feeling that negative and positive freedom are both very valuable, but that in the end, negative freedom is the more important.

negative freedom, positive freedom, needs, agency, capabilities

Abstract:
This paper asks whether an individual or a political community (henceforth: 'constitutional community') ever incurs moral responsibility for the requirements made by the norms of their constitution. We argue, first, that any constitutional community bears collective moral responsibility for those requirements. We reach this thesis by showing that (i) a constitutional community is a group which can take collective actions attributable to the group as a whole, and (ii) any given set of constitutional norms is the outcome of such collective action. We argue, second, that ordinary citizens of constitutional communities can, in normal circumstances, bear individual moral responsibility for such norms. We reach this second thesis by showing that an average citizen bears individual responsibility for the direct outcome of her polity's collective action whenever she both (1) contributes to the collective action where she need not fear serious reprisals for not contributing, and (2) supports and reflectively endorses the outcome.

constitutions, constitutional norms, collective responsibility, individual responsibility, group agency

Abstract:
It is widely agreed that oppression is wrong. But what, above all, makes it wrong? What is its chief wrong-maker? This paper argues that what chiefly makes oppression wrong is that it violates two principles of political morality. The first is the principle of wrongful benefit: no one should benefit from her own wrong. The second is the principle of institutionalized harm: no social group should be subjected to an unjustified institutionalized harm. Let us call this explanation of oppression's wrongness the two principles thesis. In arguing for this thesis, I give an account of the nature of oppression, explicate the two principles, prove that they both exist, and then show how oppression violates them and thus is wrong. I then defend the thesis on the grounds that it better explains oppression's wrongness than do two rival explanations. First, the view that oppression violates a principle of non-domination. Second, the view that it violates a principle of equal respect. I show that my explanation better satisfies the nine criteria for choice among explanatory theories: evidential adequacy, simplicity, unifying power, falsifiability, testability, neatness, conservativeness, fecundity, and mechanism-informativeness.

oppression, wrong-maker, wrongful benefit, institutionalized harm, domination, equal respect, theory choice

Abstract:
The question: Why, if at all, is justice the first virtue of social institutions? is one of the chief questions of current political philosophy. But political philosophers have not asked: Why should societies strive to be just? In answer, this paper argues that societies should strive for social justice because unless they do so, morality will lack legitimate authority for most of its members. Call this "the undermining morality explanation." The paper first considers and tries to rebut three alternative views: the Rawlsian explanation from the finality condition; the Hegelian explanation from the value of reconciling people to their social world; and the Frankfurt-school solidarity explanation, which is from the value of achieving universal societal solidarity. The paper then argues for the undermining morality explanation, on the grounds that (1) if a society does not strive for social justice, it will not provide a majority of its members with the self-respect necessary for valuing themselves and all other people as human; (2) that if a majority of society's members cannot so value themselves and others, then for them morality lacks its requiring force; and (3) if morality lacks legitimate authority for most of its members, then the evils which morality is designed to reduce and eliminate will beset society. The paper then shows why avoiding causing those evils is obligatory for society, and offers reasons for thinking that this explanation is superior to its three rivals. If the thesis defended here is right, then one of morality's foundations is social justice.

Justice, social justice, morality

Abstract:
Poverty exists in all societies, and is widely considered a bad thing. This suggests two questions. First, why, if at all, is it a bad thing that poverty persists in a given society? Second, why is it a bad thing to be poor? This paper aims to give us a better purchase on the first question by tackling the second. Accordingly, it asks: What is it that, above all else, makes it a bad thing to be poor? What is the chief bad-maker of individual poverty? In answer, the paper argues that what chiefly makes being poor bad is that it throws one into a condition of stigmatized vulnerability. To be in this condition is, on the one hand, to have society consider you socially disgraced and, on the other, to be particularly vulnerable to being harmed by the actions of other people or the workings of social institutions. The paper begins by considering four alternative explanations of poverty's badness: Hegel's theory that it forces the poor into moral degradation; J. Wolff and A. de-Shalit's theory that it constitutes a corrosive disadvantage; social policy researchers’ view that it is a form of social exclusion; and A. Margalit's theory that it is seen as humiliating failure. The paper tries to show that all four theories face grave objections. The paper then defines poverty as a lack of capabilities to achieve basic functionings, presents the stigmatized vulnerability theory, and gives a positive reason for thinking it the best explanation of poverty’s badness. The reason is that stigmatized vulnerability, in addition to its own intrinsic badness, institutionalizes the shaming involved in stigmatization and thus produces a moral bad which masquerades as morally acceptable.

poverty, stigma, vulnerability, functionings

Abstract:
Rawls's principles of justice extend and only extend to those persons and institutions regulated by or constituting the basic structure of society, "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." In the 1980s and 1990s, C. Beitz and T. Pogge claimed that there is a global basic structure (GBS), since there exists an international legal system and an ever-proliferating set of international institutions shaping trade, finance, and economic policy. From this and Rawls's extension thesis, they inferred that the principles of justice are global in scope: that all persons around the world have rights and duties generated by these same principles of justice.

In recent years, T. Nagel, M. Blake, S. Freeman, and J. Heath have all denied that there exists a GBS. Nagel and Blake argue, roughly, that the basic structure could be global only if all people worldwide are joined together in a collective enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political institutions that generates inequalities, where those joined together are subject to the system’s norms. Freeman and Heath argue, roughly, that there exists a GBS only if there exist global institutions regulating how major social and political institutions "fit together into one system of [social interaction that could become a system of] social cooperation, assign basic rights and duties, and regulate the division of advantages arising from social cooperation."

In this paper, I present a new argument for the claim that there exists a GBS, and hence global principles of justice. The argument starts from the view that there exists a worldwide political system we may call "global Dark oppression." This is a condition in which people classed as Black, Brown, or Red are greatly disadvantaged compared to the world’s other racial groups, are and were massively economically exploited by other racial groups, and are seen as culturally and cognitively inferior. Moreover, it is a political system in that it is partly comprised of a system of norms tacitly excusing these evils and permitting inferior treatment of people so classed-a system of norms that shapes the workings and decisions of political organizations and legal systems, both international and domestic. If that view is correct, I argue, then even Nagel, Blake, Freeman and Heath's demanding criteria for a GBS are satisfied. So, since there also exists an ever-proliferating set of international governmental institutions and ties of economic interdependency, there exists a GBS. Hence the principles of justice are global in scope.

global justice, basic structure, race, oppression

Abstract:
Democracy is a powerful ideal; so powerful as to make it plausible that the genuinely democratic decisions of a democratic state have legitimate authority for all that state's citizens. If they have such authority, then citizens are morally required to obey and not interfere with those decisions. Yet we live in a world characterized by global Dark oppression (GDO). This is a condition in which people classed as Black, Brown, or Red are greatly disadvantaged compared to the world's other racial groups, are and were massively economically exploited by other racial groups, and are seen as culturally and cognitively inferior. I shall argue that democratic authority must be rescued from GDO. The first part of the argument shows that under GDO, no state has democratic legitimate authority over its Dark members, even if it is perfectly democratic. The argument's second part shows that to rescue democratic authority, we must ensure that democracy is not embedded in a system of global oppression. On the first argument, GDO is what T. Christiano illuminatingly calls an 'undercutting consideration' against democratic authority. The basic argument runs thus. (1) A political system and its core political organizations have democratic legitimate authority over any member of one of that system's organizations only if that organization provides the person with a fair chance to participate in democratic decision-making and either (a) the organization gives the person a reasonably equal say in the process of deciding political questions; or (b) the organization’s decision procedures are such that there is no arrangement of procedures that all could reasonably agree would better serve substantive justice. (2) GDO is a political system such that any state in a GDO world is one of the system's core political organizations. (3) Under GDO, neither (a) nor (b) is satisfied for any Dark member of any state, even if her state is perfectly democratic. Therefore, under GDO, no state has democratic legitimate authority over its Dark members, even if it is perfectly democratic. In the second argument, I show that to rescue democratic authority from GDO, we need to ensure that democracy is not embedded in a global system of oppression.

democracy, authority, race, oppression