• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
One intervention intended to ameliorate poverty and its subsidiary effects is the distribution of legal title to land to poor urban dwellers, otherwise known as land titling. Given the billions of dollars that the World Bank, country-based development agencies, regional development banks, and developing countries themselves have spent on land titling programs, it has become one of the most important property law issues confronting the developing world.

Several countries have undertaken comprehensive urban land titling programs to transform the dwellings of those who live in the squalor of squatter settlements into assets recognized by the formal sector. This Article accepts as a given that land titling programs are moving forward and millions of dollars are being spent on them - the purpose of this Article is to take the next step of evaluating how such programs are best designed. The goal of urban titling programs should be to remove structural barriers that contribute to cycles of poverty by limiting indigent populations' access to opportunity and their long-term ability to succeed.

First, this Article reviews the literature regarding land titling to give a sense of how my contributions are situated within the larger academic discussion. Second, I develop a theory of how best to achieve titling mobility, which is a goal attained when the state allocates land title in a manner that eliminates structural barriers that impair poor people's social mobility and ability to accumulate wealth in the long-term. I argue that favorable location of titled land, and procedures that ensure equitable distribution of title among women and men, are essential. Third, I use the Peruvian, Philippine, and South African land titling programs as models to test my theory of how best to achieve titling mobility, by investigating how each government's method of allocating land titles affects poor populations. Fourth, I examine the distributional consequences of titling programs by focusing on who benefits from the resources expended and suggest how the Peruvian, Philippine, and South African models should be adjusted to comport with my theory of how best to achieve titling mobility.

Land title, land registration, poverty, Peru, South Africa, Philippines, urban poverty, urban, concentration of poverty

Abstract:
How does a democratic state legitimize strong property rights when property arrangements are widely perceived to be defined by past theft? The answer, I argue, is through restorative justice measures that redistribute wealth based on past dispossession. This answer, however, leads to two more complex questions: Who gets priority in the restorative process given limited resources and how should the process unfold? The concise answers to these two ancillary questions are:

First, instances of what I call property-induced invisibility should be prioritized as a baseline for achieving legitimacy. When property is confiscated in this manner people are removed from the social contract and made invisible. Widespread invisibility is of particular concern because it can lead to chaos and instability and places the legitimacy of existing property arrangements in serious doubt. Consequently, states must, at minimum, rectify property-induced invisibility in the restorative process.

Second, societies must change the focus from restoration of the physical property confiscated to the larger project of restoring an individual's relationship to society. This will happen if those subject to property-induced invisibility are included in the social contract through a bottom-up process that provides the dispossessed with asset-based choices. The process of allowing people to choose how they are made whole will do a substantial amount of work towards correcting property-induced invisibility and thereby increasing the legitimacy of existing property arrangements.

I use a South African case study to test the practical effect of my theories of invisibility and restoration.

Reparation, restorative justice, restoration, restitution, invisibility, social contract, property, legitimacy, historical injustice, theft, distributive justice, past theft, apartheid, South Africa, land reform, land restitution

Abstract:
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (Helms-Burton Act) is the latest appendage to the Cuban embargo. Title III has caused an international uproar because it gives U.S. victims of Cuban expropriation a right of action within U.S. courts against third parties who traffic in confiscated property. For example, a U.S. citizen can sue a Canadian Mining company doing business in Cuba if they are operating on or using expropriated property. The Helms-Burton Act (HBA) targets U.S. allies who continue to trade and invest in Cuba regardless of pending U.S. claims of expropriation. In response to the HBA, Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (EU) created antidote legislation to protect their domestic interests against the allegedly illegitimate extension of U.S. jurisdiction. This Article investigates the interesting relationship between the economic and political power of a country and its ability to curtail the domestic effects of the HBA.

Part II provides a brief background of the HBA and evaluates the virtues and vices of each of its four titles. Part III argues that the United States is using Title III as a bargaining device to force U.S. allies to adjust their policy towards Cuba and to discourage foreign corporations from investing in the island. Given the United State's acutely unequal level of political and economic power in the world, the mere threat to enforce Title III has had severe implications for Cuba and its trading partners. Part IV presents the legislative offensive launched by Cuba, Canada, Mexico, and the EU to protect their domestic interests in the face of this Title III threat. More importantly, this section explores how power asymmetries limit the ability of foreign governments to block the application of U.S. law within its jurisdiction. Part V explores the utility and efficacy of using antidote legislation as a diplomatic tool.

Embargo, Helms Burton Act, Cuba, EU, European Union, Mexico, Canada, economic sanctions

Abstract:
Land titling is a form of privatization in that public assets are transferred to private families and individuals. This is unlike other forms of privatization, however, because there is a systematic diffusion of economic and decision making power down to indigent populations rather than out of the country or up to its local elites. In light of this uniqueness, the question I will grapple with in this Article is, can property ownership, achieved through land titling programs, bolster democracy?

First, using Peru as an example, I explain the context that necessitated the creation of land titling and the process by which informal holdings are legally recognized. Second, I argue that there are four primary ways that land titling strengthens democracy. By creating a property owning society, land titling:

1. Gives indigent populations a buffer between themselves and the State, which allows them to make the independent electoral decisions vital to a functioning democracy;

2. Makes poor people stakeholders in democratic institutions;

3. Gives people an incentive to secure greater liberties; and

4. Provides a space where individual autonomy is respected and minority viewpoints, critical to a healthy democracy, can thrive.

land titling, informal, property, ownership, democracy, formalization, De Soto, Peru, privatization, formalization, poverty, third world, developing

Abstract:
Past property theft is a volatile political issue that has threatened to destabilize many nascent democracies. How does a state avoid present-day property-related disobedience when past property theft causes a significant number of people to believe that the current property distribution is illegitimate? To explore this question, I first define legitimacy and past property theft relying on empirical understandings of the concepts. Second, I establish the relationship between a highly unequal property distribution that the general population views as illegitimate, and property-related disobedience. Third, I describe the three ways a state can achieve stability when faced with an illegitimate property distribution: by using its coercive powers, by attempting to change people's beliefs about the legitimacy of the property distribution, or by enacting a Legitimacy Enhancing Compensation Program (LECP), which strengthens the average citizen's belief that she ought to comply with the law. Fourth, I develop the legitimacy deficit model, which is a rational choice model that suggests when a state should enact a LECP to avoid property-related disobedience, which can devolve into broader instability. To best promote long-term stability, I argue that states should, at the very least, enact a LECP as the cost of illegitimacy begins to outweigh the cost of compensation. Lastly, since many of the model's relevant costs are subjective, I suggest a process states should use to determine and weigh the costs. In sum, the Article is intended to spark a debate about how compensation for past property theft can keep things from falling apart.

Abstract:
The conception of property that a transitional state adopts is critically important because it affects the state’s ability to transform society. The classic conception of property gives property rights a certain sanctity that allows owners to have near absolute control of their property. But, the sanctity given to property rights has made land reform difficult and can serve as a sanctuary for enduring inequality. This is particularly true in countries where ownership is contested and land reform is essential due to pervasive past property theft. Oddly, the classical conception is flourishing in transitional states, like South Africa and Namibia, where transformation of the property status quo is essential. The specific question this Article addresses is: for states where past property dispossession threatens to destabilize the current state, is the classical conception appropriate or do these states require an alternative conception of real property? In this Article, I develop the transformative conception of real property to explore how the exigent need for societal transformation should inspire us to rethink property rights.

Property, dispossession, restitution, South Africa, transitional justice, human rights