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Abstract:
Unlike previous research, this study examines the relation between the reputation of investment bankers and the long-term performance of IPOs in a framework that simultaneously controls for the influence of venture capital. Using 456 IPO transactions over the 1989-1994 period, our analysis provides no evidence in support of the view that the quality of underwriters exerts more influence on the long-term performance of IPO firms than venture capital. The findings of this paper suggest that previous studies overstate the relation between the quality of underwriters and the long-term performance of IPOs by ignoring the role of venture capital. Consistent with Brav and Gompers (1997), it is also shown that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs. When returns are adjusted for size, book-to-market and industry characteristics, the performance of IPOs is not significantly different from that of their peers. Overall, the evidence suggests that it pays for investors to rely on the venture capital than the reputation of investment banker in certifying the quality of IPOs.

Initial public offerings; long-term performance; venture capitalists; investment bank reputation

Abstract:
Previous work on the exposure of firms to exchange rate risk has primarily focused on U.S. firms and, surprisingly, found stock returns were not significantly affected by exchange-rate fluctuations. The equity market premium for exposure to currency risk was also found to be insignificant. In this paper, we examine the relation between Japanese stock returns and unanticipated exchange-rate changes for 1,079 firms traded on the Tokyo stock exchange over the 1975-1995 period. Second, we investigate whether exchange-rate risk is priced in the Japanese equity market using both unconditional and conditional multifactor asset pricing testing procedures. We find a significant relation between contemporaneous stock returns and unanticipated yen fluctuations. The exposure effect on multinationals and high-exporting firms, however, is found to be greater in comparison to low-exporting and domestic firms. Lagged-exchange rate changes on firm value are found to be statistically insignificant implying that investors are able to assess the impact of exchange-rate changes on firm value with no significant delay. The industry level analysis corroborates the cross-sectional findings for Japanese firms in that they are sensitive to contemporaneous unexpected exchange-rate fluctuations. The co-movement between stock returns and changes in the foreign value of the yen is found to be positively associated with the degree of the firm's foreign economic involvement and inversely related to its size and debt to asset ratio. Asset pricing tests show that currency risk is priced. We find corroborating evidence in support of the view that currency exposure is time varying. Our results indicate that the foreign exchange-rate risk premium is a significant component of Japanese stock returns. The combined evidence from the currency exposure and asset pricing analyses, suggests that currency risk is priced and, therefore, has implications for corporate and portfolio managers.

Abstract:
Previous work on the exposure of firms to exchange rate risk has primarily focused on U.S. firms and, surprisingly, found stock returns were not significantly affected by exchange-rate fluctuations. The equity market premium for exposure to currency risk was also found to be insignificant. In this paper we examine the relation between Japanese stock returns and unanticipated exchange-rate changes for 1079 firms traded on the Tokyo stock exchange over the 1975-1995 period. Second, we investigate whether exchange-rate risk is priced in the equity market of Japan using both unconditional and conditional multifactor asset pricing testing procedures. We find a significant relation between contemporaneous stock returns and unanticipated yen fluctuations. The exposure effect on multinationals and high-exporting firms, however, is found to be greater in comparison to low-exporting and domestic firms. Lagged-exchange rate changes on firm value are found to be statistically insignificant implying that investors are able to assess the impact of exchange-rate changes on firm value with no significant delay. The industry level analysis corroborates the cross-sectional findings for Japanese firms in that they are sensitive to contemporaneous unexpected exchange-rate fluctuations. The co-movement between stock returns and changes in the foreign value of the yen is found to be positively associated with the degree of the firm's foreign economic involvement and inversely related to its size and debt to asset ratio. Asset pricing tests show that currency risk is priced. We find corroborating evidence in support of the view that currency exposure is time varying Our results indicate that the foreign exchange-rate risk premium is a significant component of Japanese stock returns. The combined evidence from the currency exposure and asset pricing analyses, suggests that currency risk is of hedging concern to investors with implications for corporate and portfolio management.

Exchange-rate exposure of Japanese firms and industries, non-contemporaneous foreign currency exposure, sources of exchange-rate exposure, unconditional and conditional pricing of currency risk

Abstract:
Using a large international equity market database that has not been previously used for such a purpose, this paper documents that value (i.e., high book-to-market ) stocks outperform growth (i.e., low book-to-market ) stocks, on average, in most countries during the January 1975 - December 1995 period, both absolutely and after adjusting for risk. The international evidence confirms the findings of previous work reported for the U.S.. For 1975-1995, the annual difference between the average returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks is 12.94% in North America, 10.42% in Europe, 17.26% in Pacific-Rim per year, and value stocks outperform growth stocks in 17 out of 18 national capital markets. Our analysis also shows that a three-factor model explains most of the cross-sectional variation in average returns on industry portfolios across countries and that the superior performance of the value investing strategy, documented in this study, is a manifestation of size and book-to-market effects. These results are consistent with those reported by Fama and French (1994, 1996) that show that the value-growth pattern in stock returns is largely explained by a three-factor asset pricing model. Our results suggest that the Fama and French (1996) three-factor asset pricing model is not limited to the U.S. stock market.

Abstract:
Several portfolio managers and stock analysts subscribe to the view that value (high book-to-market) investment strategies yield superior returns relative to glamour (low book-to-market) strategies. Empirical studies confirm that value investment strategies yield higher returns. However, the source of the superior performance of the value strategy and interpretation of the evidence remain controversial. In this paper we examine whether (i) investors systematically overestimate (underestimate) the future earnings performance of glamour (value) stocks, and (ii) value stocks are riskier than glamour stocks over the 1979-1998 period. Our results fail to support the view that the superior performance of value stocks is because investors make systematic errors in predicting future growth in earnings of out-of-favor stocks. Consistent with Fama and French (1992, 1996), our findings suggest that the return advantage of value investing strategies reflects compensation for bearing risk.

Abstract:
We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Our findings do not support the internal capital market hypothesis that postulates information asymmetries and market imperfections enhance the value of diversification. We find that the typical bidder is a growing firm while the target has a weaker performance than its industry competitors. Performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core business rather than diversify in peripheral lines of business. The announcement gains are also greater for firms that chose to expand their core lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. This implies that agency costs associated with diversification outweigh possible benefits arising from the creation of internal capital markets. Further, we find that concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders does mitigate the losses of diversifying bidders.

Acquisitions; Corporate Focus; Diversification

Abstract:
In this paper we conduct an out-of-sample test of two behavioural theories that have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual-information-diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and the investor conservatism bias model of Barberis et al. (1998) in a sample of 13 European stock markets during the period 1988 to 2001. These two models predict that momentum comes from the (i) gradual dissemination of firm-specific information and (ii) investors' failure to update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe new public information. The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the behavioural models of Hong and Stein's (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998). The evidence shows that momentum is the result of the gradual diffusion of private information and investors' psychological conservatism reflected on the systematic errors they make in forming earnings expectations by not updating them adequately relative to their prior beliefs and by undervaluing the statistical weight of new information.

Abstract:
In this paper we conduct an out-of-sample test of two behavioral theories that have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual-information-diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and the investor conservatism bias model of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) in a sample of 13 European stock markets during the period 1988 to 2001. These two models predict that momentum comes from the (i) gradual dissemination
of firm-specific information and (ii) investors' failure to update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe new public
information. The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the behavioral models of Hong and Stein's (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998). The evidence shows that momentum is the result of the gradual diffusion of private information and investors' psychological conservatism reflected on the systematic errors they make in forming earnings expectations by not updating them adequately relative to their prior beliefs and by undervaluing the statistical weight of new information.

Abstract:
This study investigates the potential effects of investment-banking reputation and venture capital on the long-term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) simultaneously. Our findings do not support the view that IPOs perform differently compared with other firms, with the only exception of venture-backed IPOs. We show that venture-backed IPOs are associated with longterm gains when we account for investment bankers' reputation, size and book-to-market effects. Zero investment portfolios, based on combinations of underwriter's reputation and venture capital involvement's in IPOs, provide additional evidence in support of the view that venture-backed IPOs, regardless of the reputation of underwriters, are associated with significant post-issue gains. Our results also indicate that the reputation of investment bankers matters only in the absence of venture capital.

Abstract:
This study investigates the potential effects of investment-banking reputation and venture capital on the long-term underperformance of IPOs simultaneously. Our findings do not support the view that IPOs perform differently than other firms, with the only exception of venture backed IPOs. We show that venture backed IPOs are associated with long-term gains when we account for investment bankers' reputation, size and book-to-market effects. Zero investment portfolios, based on combinations of underwriter reputation and venture capital involvement in IPOs, provide additional evidence in support of the view that venture backed IPOs, regardless of the reputation of underwriters, are associated with significant post-issue gains.

Initial public offerings, long-term performance, venture capitalists, investment bank reputation

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed-end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out-of-sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the USA. We fail to provide supporting evidence for the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton et al. (1998), who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed-end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out-of-sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the U.S. We fail to provide supporting evidence of the claim of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998), who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.

Closed-end-funds, discounts/premiums, investor sentiment, stock returns

Abstract:
We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self-attribution. Self-attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realize lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long-term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self-attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high-order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three-year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low-order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high-order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self-selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.

Managerial Overconfidence, Self-Attribution Bias, Mergers and Acquisitions, Corporate Governance, Short-term and Long-term Performance.

Abstract:
This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and nonmultinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debtbut more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6,951 firm-year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988-1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs havestatistically significant negative effects on firm long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increasedby the firm s degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm s increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. Thisresult is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.

Abstract:
This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and non-multinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debt but more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6,951 firm-year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988-1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs have statistically significant negative effects on firm long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increased by the firm's degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm's increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. This result is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs' lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the monitoring activity of security analysis from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Using a unique data set of more than 400 UK firms tracked by security analysts over the 1999-2000 period, our preliminary evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs for the three measures of agency costs employed by this paper. More importantly, we also find that security analysts are more effective in reducing managerial non-value maximising behaviour for smaller firms than for larger firms supporting the supposition that as firms grow in size and become more complex, the monitoring activity of security analysis becomes less effective. In addition, we find that security analysis has a positive and significant impact on firm value for smaller as opposed to larger firms.

Security analysts; Agency costs, Firm value, United Kingdom UK

Abstract:
In this paper we appraise the monitoring activity of security analysis from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Using a data set of more than 7000 firm-year observations for manufacturing firms tracked by security analysts over the 1988-1994 period, our evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. However, we also find that security analysts are more effective in reducing managerial non-value maximizing behavior for single-focused than multi-segment (diversified) firms. In addition, the shareholder gains from the monitoring activity of security analysis are found to be larger for focused than for diversified firms.

security analysis, diversification, agency costs

Abstract:
Several empirical studies show that investment strategies that favor the purchase of stocks with low prices relative to dividends, earnings, book values or other measures of value yield higher returns. Some of these studies imply that investors are too optimistic about (glamour) stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about (value) stocks had had performed poorly. Others argue that value strategies are fundamentally riskier. In this paper we examine whether value stocks are riskier than glamour stocks over the 1976-1998 period. Consistent with Fama and French (1992, 1996), our findings suggest that the return advantage of value strategies reflects compensation for bearing risk. We find this risk to be associated with investor uncertainly, manifested in security analysts' divergence of opinion about the future growth in earnings of value stocks. Multifactor asset pricing tests show that investor uncertainty risk is important in explaining the superior return of value stocks. The results also suggest that the uncertainty risk factor is a state variable that predicts economic growth.

Abstract:
This paper examines the relation between short selling and returns and the impact of arbitrage costs on short sellers' behavior. Using daily UK short selling data, we find that stocks with low short interest levels experience significant positive returns on both an equal- and value-weighted basis. Economic theory predicts that short sellers avoid establishing positions in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. Our results indicate a negative relation between short interest and returns among high idiosyncratic risk stocks and that short selling activity is mostly concentrated in low idiosyncratic risk stocks where it is less costly to arbitrage fundamental risk.

Short-sale, Idiosyncratic Risk

Abstract:
We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.

Abstract:
We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realize significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.

Conglomerate and Non-conglomerate Acquisitions; Corporate Focus; Diversification

Abstract:
Several empirical studies show that investment strategies that favor the purchase of stocks with low prices relative to dividends, earnings, book value or other measures of value yield higher returns. Some of these studies imply that investors are too optimistic about (glamour) stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about (value) stocks that had performed poorly. In this paper we examine whether investors systematically overestimate (underestimate) the future earnings performance of glamour (value) stocks over the 1976-1997 period. Our results fail to support the extrapolation hypothesis that posits that the superior performance of value stocks is because investors make systematic errors in predicting future growth in earnings of out-of-favor stocks.

Abstract:
Several empirical studies show that investment strategies that favor the purchase of stocks with low prices relative to dividends, earnings, book value or other measures of value yield higher returns. Some of these studies imply that investors are too optimistic about (glamour) stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about (value) stocks that had performed poorly. In this paper we examine whether investors systematically overestimate (underestimate) the future earnings performance of glamour (value) stocks over the 1976-1997 period. Our results fail to support the extrapolation hypothesis that posits that the superior performance of value stocks is because investors make systematic errors in predicting future growth in earnings of out-of-favor stocks.

Abstract:
We investigate whether divergence of opinion among investors, manifested in the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts, plays an important role in asset pricing. Specifically, we test whether disagreement can explain the cross-sectional return difference between value and growth stocks over the 1983-2001 period. Consistent with the theoretical proposition of Williams (1977), that stocks subject to greater investor disagreement earn higher returns, we find value stocks to be exposed to greater investor disagreement than glamour stocks. Our findings suggest that the return advantage of value strategies is a reward for the greater disagreement characterizing their future growth in earnings. Alternative multifactor asset pricing tests show that investor disagreement plays an important role in explaining the superior return of value stocks.

Abstract:
In this paper, we examine whether the external financing and investment rate of the firm are influenced by abnormal analyst coverage. We find that firms with high (low) excess analyst coverage have consistently higher (lower) external financing and investment rate than firms of similar size in the same industry. The results show that he impact of analyst coverage on firms' financing and investment decisions works through a direct mechanism that hypes investors' long-term growth prospects of the firm. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage realize lower future returns than firms with low analyst coverage. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that analyst coverage is primarily motivated by the pay structure of analysts and investment-banking incentives that favor the coverage of firms with the potential to engage in profitable investment banking business (i.e., external financing).

Abstract:
This paper sheds empirical light on whether investor sentiment affects the profitability of price momentum strategies. We hypothesize that when investors are optimistic, their expectations will be more miscalibrated relative to those obtained from objective probabilities, and arbitrage will be more difficult with short-selling constraints. Our results show that momentum rises only when investors are optimistic, and that optimistic momentum portfolios experience long-run reversals. These results provide support to the behavioral theories, suggesting that short-run momentum and long-run reversal commonly arise from investors’ behavioral biases.

behavioral finance, investor sentiment, momentum, market efficiency

Abstract:
In this paper we appraise the monitoring activity of security analysis from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Using a data set of more than 7,000 firm-year observations for manufacturing firms tracked by security analysts over the 1988-1994 period, our evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. However, we also find that security analysts are more effective in reducing managerial non-value maximizing behavior for single- (focused) than multi-segment (diversified) firms. In addition, the shareholder gains from the monitoring activity of security analysis are larger for focused than diversified firms.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the valuation effects and long-term performance of U.S. multinational firms involved in forced transfers of their foreign operating assets during the 1965-1988 period. The evidencesuggests that the operational hedging ability of the firm to address country risk (nationalization threats) is related to the level of its intangible assets. While it is well known that firms with high levels of intangible assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible assets have hidden properties of protection against country risk as well. We document significantly negative abnormal returns only for divesting firms with low levels of intangible assets, but not for firms with high levels of intangible assets. Inaddition, we show that low (high) growth firms are involved in partial (complete) withdrawals, and show that the long-term economic performance of firms choosing the complete withdrawal strategy is better than those that opt to remain. We argue that management's attempt to maintain economic links in a hostile foreign environment can be attributed in part to the firm's low growth opportunities, performance, and lack ofcontingent plans to address country risk.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the valuation effects and long-term performance of U.S. multinational firms involved in forced transfers of their foreign operating assets during the 1965-1988 period. The evidencesuggests that the operational hedging ability of the firm to address country risk (nationalization threats) is related to the level of its intangible assets. While it is well known that firms with high levels of intangible assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible assets have hidden properties of protection against country risk as well. We document significantly negative abnormal returns only for divesting firms with low levels of intangible assets, but not for firms with high levels of intangible assets. Inaddition, we show that low (high) growth firms are involved in partial (complete) withdrawals, and show that the long-term economic performance of firms choosing the complete withdrawal strategy is better than those that opt to remain. We argue that management's attempt to maintain economic links in a hostile foreign environment can be attributed in part to the firm's low growth opportunities, performance, and lack ofcontingent plans to address country risk.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the valuation effects and long-term performance of U.S. multinational firms involved in forced transfers of their foreign operating assets during the 1965-1988 period. The evidencesuggests that the operational hedging ability of the firm to address country risk (nationalization threats) is related to the level of its intangible assets. While it is well known that firms with high levels of intangible assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible assets have hidden properties of protection against country risk as well. We document significantly negative abnormal returns only for divesting firms with low levels of intangible assets, but not for firms with high levels of intangible assets. Inaddition, we show that low (high) growth firms are involved in partial (complete) withdrawals, and show that the long-term economic performance of firms choosing the complete withdrawal strategy is better than those that opt to remain. We argue that management's attempt to maintain economic links in a hostile foreign environment can be attributed in part to the firm's low growth opportunities, performance, and lack ofcontingent plans to address country risk.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the valuation effects and long-term performance of US multinational firms involved in forced transfers of their foreign operating assets during the 1965-88 period. The evidence suggests that the operational hedging ability of the firm to address country risk (nationalization threats) is related to the level of its intangible assets. While it is well known that firms with high levels of intangible assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible assets have hidden properties of protection against country risk as well. We document significantly negative abnormal returns only for divesting firms with low levels of intangible assets, but not for firms with high levels of intangible assets. In addition, we show that low (high) growth firms are involved in partial (complete) withdrawals, and show that the long-term economic performance of firms choosing the complete withdrawal strategy is better than those that opt to remain. We argue that management's attempt to maintain economic links in a hostile foreign environment can be attributed in part to the firm's low growth opportunities, performance, and lack of contingent plans to address country risk.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the valuation effects and long-term performance of U.S. multinational firms involved in forced transfers of their foreign operating assets during the 1965-1988 period. The evidence suggests that the operational hedging ability of the firm to address country risk (nationalization threats) is related to the level of its intangible assets. While it is well known that firms with high levels of intangible assets prefer foreign direct investment, our results show that intangible assets have hidden properties of protection against country risk as well. We document significantly negative abnormal returns only for divesting firms with low levels of intangible assets, but not for firms with high levels of intangible assets. In addition, we show that low (high) growth firms are involved in partial (complete) withdrawals, and show that the long-term economic performance of firms choosing the complete withdrawal strategy is better than those that opt to remain. We argue that management's attempt to maintain economic links in a hostile foreign environment can be attributed in part to the firm's low growth opportunities, performance, and lack of contingent plans to address country risk.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine the relation between equity mispricing and arbitrage risk, and find that stocks with high arbitrage risk have higher estimated mispricing than stocks with low arbitrage risk. These results are not limited to high book-to-market or small capitalization stocks, and they are not sensitive to transaction and short selling costs. In addition, they remain robust to alternative multifactor return generating specification models and mispricing measures. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the conjecture that mispricing manifests the inability of arbitrageurs to hedge idiosyncratic risk, a major deterrent to arbitrage activity.

equity mispricing, arbitrage risk, idiosyncratic risk

Abstract:
In this paper, we examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) excess analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than firms with low analyst coverage. We obtain similar results when we replicate the analysis using analyst coverage initiations. Our empirical findings are not sensitive to various firm characteristics. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts, motivated by trading commissions, investment-banking incentives and their pay structure, favor the coverage of firms with the potential to engage in profitable investment banking business (i.e., external financing).

analysts, coverage, external financing, investment

Abstract:
This study provides new evidence on the effects of macroeconomic news announcements on the Canadian dollar futures price. Previous work on foreign exchange futures has focused only on the impact of U.S. news, ignoring the bi-national character of information flows that affect exchange rates. The study highlights the bilateral nature of exchange rates proving that both U.S. and Canadian news announcements affect the price of the futures contract. Since both countries markets operate with the same trading hours, linking both countries' news to market prices is more straightforward than in the case of other exchange rate futures contracts that are linked to the U.S. dollar (such as the EURO or the YEN). We find that news from both countries is shown to significantly affect futures prices. Noteworthy are U.S. housing starts, leading indicator and to a lesser degree federal funds rate and merchandise trade deficit. The Canadian news announcements that were found to be most significant was the official bank rate change followed by Canadian unemployment and Canadian Building permits. While announcement day volatility is shown to persist throught the trading day, we also show departures from mean variance that do not coincide with any of the announcements.

Abstract:
This paper examines the relation between short selling and returns and the impact of arbitrage costs on short sellers' behavior. Using daily UK short selling data, we find that stocks with low short interest levels experience significant positive returns on both an equal- and value-weighted basis. Economic theory predicts that short sellers avoid establishing positions in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. Our results indicate a negative relation between short interest and returns among high idiosyncratic risk stocks and that short selling activity is mostly concentrated in low idiosyncratic risk stocks where it is less costly to arbitrage fundamental risk.

short interest, short selling, idiosyncratic risk

Abstract:
This study documents that high book-to-market (value) and low book-to-market (glamour) stock prices react asymmetrically to both common and firm-specific information. Specifically, we find that value stock prices exhibit a considerably slow adjustment to both common and firm-specific information relative to glamour stocks. The results show that this pattern of differential price adjustment between value and glamour stocks is mainly driven by the high arbitrage risk borne by value stocks. The evidence is consistent with the arbitrage risk hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), predicting that idiosyncratic risk, a major impediment to arbitrage activity, amplifies the informational loss of value stocks as a result of arbitrageurs' (informed investors) reduced participation in value stocks because of their inability to fully hedge idiosyncratic risk.

Price Speed of Adjustment, High and Low Book-to-Market Stocks, Limits to arbitrage, Idiosyncratic Risk

Abstract:
In this paper we examine whether the negative excess value of stocks (stock discounts in the Berger and Ofek (1995) spirit) is associated with low excess analyst coverage over the 1979-1997 period. We define excess analyst coverage as the difference between a firm s actual analyst following and its imputed coverage. We hypothesize that firms with high excess (low) analyst coverage are exposed to less (more) information asymmetry between managers and investors, managerial misconduct and uncertainty about future earnings than do other firms. Therefore, stocks with low excess analyst coverage profile are expected to trade at low prices, as they would be more difficult for investors to value. Our findings provide evidence in support of the view that excess analyst coverage explains a significant portion of stocks discount, indicating that higher (lower) excess analyst coverage leads to more (less) informative stock prices and offers an information-based explanation on why stocks trade at a premium (discount) . Our empirical results are also consistent with the notion that stocks of firms with high managerial power (i.e., low investor rights/weak corporate governance) trade at a discount. Finally, our analysis indicates that the information inherent in the dispersion of analyst forecasts, a surrogate for investor uncertainty, plays an important role in the determination of asset prices.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine whether the negative excess value of stocks (stock discounts in the Berger and Ofek (1995) spirit) is associated with low excess analyst coverage over the 1979-1997 period. We define excess analyst coverage as the difference between a firm's actual analyst following and its imputed coverage. We hypothesize that firms with high excess (low) analyst coverage are exposed to less (more) information asymmetry between managers and investors, managerial misconduct and uncertainty about future earnings than do other firms. Therefore, stocks with low excess analyst coverage profile are expected to trade at low prices as they would be more difficult for investors to value. Our findings provide evidence in support of the view that excess analyst coverage explains a significant portion of stocks discount, indicating that higher (lower) excess analyst coverage leads to more (less) informative stock prices and offers an information-based explanation on why stocks trade at a premium (discount). Our empirical results are also consistent with the notion that stocks of firms with high managerial power (i.e., low investor rights/weak corporate governance) trade at a discount. Finally, our analysis indicates that the information inherent in the dispersion of analyst forecasts, a surrogate for investor uncertainty, plays an important role in the determination of asset prices.

Abstract:

Abstract:
We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts¿ self-selection bias.

Analyst coverage, Mis-pricing

Abstract:
We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self-attribution. Self-attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long-term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self-attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high-order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three-year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low-order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high-order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self-selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.

Abstract:
We study the impact of diversification on firm cash flows and excess value. Specifically, we investigate whether there is a direct link between the discount to diversification and excess cash flow reductions around related and unrelated acquisitions. Our results provide empirical support for a positive and significant association between excess cash flow declines and excess value losses after the acquisition. Our findings also show that bidders who conduct unrelated acquisitions experience larger excess cash flow declines and valuation discounts than do bidders who engage in related acquisitions. Our results are robust to the targets' excess cash flow and valuation characteristics.

The views expressed in these papers are those of the author(s), they do not reflect the opinions of LECG, LLC and should not be construed as representing the positions of other experts at LECG, LLC.

Abstract:
We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts' self-selection bias.

Abstract:
Divergence of opinions among investors, manifested in the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts, may play an important role in asset pricing. This article reports tests of whether disagreement can explain the cross-sectional return difference between value and growth (or glamour) stocks in the U.S. market over the 1983-2001 period. Consistent with the theoretical proposition that stocks subject to greater investor disagreement earn higher returns, the tests found value stocks to be exposed to greater investor disagreement than growth stocks. This finding suggests that the return advantage of value strategies is a reward for the greater disagreement about their future growth in earnings. Alternative multifactor asset-pricing tests supported the proposition that investor disagreement plays an important role in explaining the superior return of value stocks.

Portfolio Management, Equity Strategies, Investment Theory, Behavioral Finance

Abstract:
We appraise the monitoring activity of security analysis from the perspective of the manager-shareholder conflict. Using a data set of more than 7,000 company-year observations for manufacturing companies tracked by security analysts over the 1988-94 period, we found that security analysis acts as a monitor to reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. We also found, however, that security analysts are more effective in reducing managerial non-value-maximizing behavior for single-segment than for multisegment companies. In addition, the shareholder gains from the monitoring activity of security analysis are larger for single-segment than for multisegment companies.

Abstract:
Previous work on the exposure of firms to exchange-rate risk has primarily focused on U.S. firms and, surprisingly, found stock returns were not significantly affected by exchange-rate fluctuations. In this paper we conduct a comprehensive analysis that examines the relation between Japanese stock returns and unanticipated exchange-rate changes. In addition, we investigate whether exchange-rate risk is priced in the equity market of Japan using a conditional testing procedure that allows risk premia to change through time in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. We find a reliable relation between stock returns and unanticipated yen fluctuations. The exposure effect on multinationals and high-exporting firms, however, is found to be greater compared to low-exporting and domestic firms. Lagged-exchange rate changes on firm value are found to be statistically insignificant and without any predictive power for future stock returns based on the asset pricing tests. The co-movement between stock returns and the value of the yen is found to be positively associated with the degree of firm's foreign involvement. Our multi-period conditional asset pricing tests show that the foreign exchange-rate risk premium is a significant component of Japanese stock returns. Specifically, the results suggest that currency- risk exposure commands significant risk premium for multinationals and high-exporting Japanese firms. Finally, Japanese stock returns are found to be related to the relative distress, size and market factors, as shown by Fama and French (1995) for U.S. stocks above and beyond the covariation by the foreign currency factor.