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Abstract:
While the advent of DNA has led to more than 100 exonerations in the United States, few of them would have been possible without the existence of innocence projects around the country that have undertaken the often difficult work of exonerating the wrongfully convicted. More than thirty projects are now in operation, with several more in the planning stages.

As these projects have developed, issues have emerged regarding the professional responsibility obligations of attorneys and others engaged in this post-conviction work. These issues were the subject of discussion at national innocence conferences in 2000 and 2002, but that discussion, while helpful, left many issues unresolved. Because of the importance to projects of insuring compliance with ethical requirements, both to maintain the integrity of the projects' work and to model proper practices for the many aspiring lawyers who work with our programs, this article focuses on some basic professional responsibility issues confronting innocence projects today. It recognizes that innocence work poses unique ethical issues and that different types of projects confront varying challenges. It examines existing ethical rules and suggests how they can be best interpreted and applied to facilitate this important work. While on-going discussion and refinement will be important as these programs develop, this article provides some introductory thoughts for those establishing and operating such projects.

DNA, Exoneration, Innocence Projects, Wrongfully convicted, Wrongful conviction, Professional responsibility, Ethics, Ethical, Attorney, Lawyer, Post-conviction, Attorney-Client, Confidentiality, Professional judgment, Conflict of interest, Zealous representation

Abstract:
It is hard to imagine an injustice greater than the incarceration or, worse yet, execution of an innocent. Especially in our system of justice, which purports to accept as a basic premise that it is better that ten guilty go free than that one innocent person be imprisoned, the incarceration of an innocent is simply intolerable. Yet it happens--and much more often than we would like to believe. Questions abound as to why and what can be done about it.

The problem of wrongful convictions has been discussed for some time, but it has often been rejected or downplayed. It was only the advent of DNA technology, which makes it possible to definitively demonstrate that a person did not commit the crime for which he or she is incarcerated, that has forced doubters to acknowledge that wrongful convictions actually do occur. Unfortunately, the incidence of wrongful conviction is almost impossible to determine, because DNA evidence is not available in a large majority of cases. There is reason to believe, however, that the number of wrongfully convicted individuals should cause us to have real concern about how the criminal justice system is functioning.

The problem of wrongful convictions must be addressed on several fronts. First, we must get a better understanding of what leads to such convictions in order to determine what can be done to remedy them. Next, we must find ways to identify those cases in which wrongful convictions have occurred and means by which to prove innocence and secure the inmate's release. Finally, it is crucially important that we focus as well on the larger, systemic issues to prevent such injustices from occurring.

The articles in this Symposium cover many facets of wrongful convictions and do so in an interdisciplinary fashion. They span the geographic spectrum as well, with articles focusing on Missouri issues, as well as issues of national and international significance.

Wrongful conviction, Innocence, Innocent, Imprisonment, Incarceration, DNA, Crime, Evidence, Death penalty

Abstract:
In 1982, Duncan Kennedy's essay on hierarchies in legal education appeared in the Journal of Legal Education and publicly recognized what many had acknowledged to be problems and gaps in contemporary legal education. At the time the article was written, academic support as an institution in legal education was in its infancy. Looking back at the development of the academic support movement demonstrates that, in many respects, it was designed to address at least some of the issues raised by Kennedy. This essay looks at the emergence of academic support in legal education in the context of Kennedy's article, examining the genesis of academic support programs, their development in the last two decades, possible future directions, and their implications for legal education and the broader legal profession. It concludes that academic support programs that focus on learning and empowering students to develop the skills to practice law in a complex and diverse society while developing positive, meaningful professional identities will become more central to the education mission of the law school and in so doing some of the existing hierarchies in legal education may be challenged and the issues raised by Duncan Kennedy positively addressed.

Academic support, Legal education, Law school, Pedagogy, Lawyers, Attorneys, Legal profession, Practice of law, Learning theory, Bar exam, Bar prep, Bar passage

Abstract:
Denials are a basic and often automatic response to an allegation that we have committed some wrong. Every parent has heard not me more times than he or she wants to acknowledge. The not me response is instinctive in young children, but as we mature, we learn that not me is often followed by the question: If not you, then who? Accordingly, we discover that denial is not nearly as effective unless we shift the blame to someone else. This phenomenon of childhood applies with equal force in criminal cases, where a defendant has been accused of wrongdoing. Where that defendant denies responsibility, says not me, and attempts to introduce evidence to address the then who question, what, if any, responsibilities does defense counsel have before engaging in blame-shifting behavior? Are there specific rules or considerations that apply in such situations? This Article addresses those questions, examining both ethical considerations and evidentiary rules, and concludes with proposals for change to address the apparent disjunction between the perceived ethical obligations of reasonably zealous criminal defense attorneys and evidentiary rules that improperly restrict that zeal.

Ethics, Ethical, Legal ethics, Denial, Blame, Shifting, Blame-shifting, Professional responsibility, Model code, Defense lawyer, Accused, Criminal defense, False defense, False accusation, Direct connection doctrine