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Abstract:
We document strong persistence in the performance of trades of individual investors. The correlation of the risk-adjusted performance of an individual across sample periods is about 10 percent. Investors classified in the top performance decile in the first half of our sample subsequently outperform those in the bottom decile by about 8 percent per year. Strategies long in firms purchased by previously successful investors and short in firms purchased by previously unsuccessful investors earn abnormal returns of 5 basis points per day. These returns are not confined to small stocks nor to stocks in which the investors are likely to have inside information. Our results suggest that skillful individual investors exploit market inefficiencies to earn abnormal profits, above and beyond any profits available from well-known strategies based upon size, value, or momentum.

Individual Investors, Market Efficiency, Performance Persistence

Abstract:
We examine the accuracy and contribution of the default forecasting model based on Merton's (1974) bond pricing model and developed by the KMV corporation. Comparing the KMV-Merton model to a similar but much simpler alternative, we find that it performs slightly worse as a predictor in hazard models and in out of sample forecasts. Moreover, several other forecasting variables are also important predictors, and fitted hazard model values outperform KMV-Merton default probabilities out of sample. Implied default probabilities from credit default swaps and corporate bond yield spreads are only weakly correlated with KMV-Merton default probabilities after adjusting for agency ratings, bond characteristics, and our alternative predictor. We conclude that the KMV-Merton model does not produce a sufficient statistic for the probability of default, and it appears to be possible to construct such a sufficient statistic without solving the simultaneous nonlinear equations required by the KMV-Merton model.

We include the SAS code we use to calculate KMV-Merton default probabilities in an appendix.

Default, Merton Model

Abstract:
I argue that hazard models are more appropriate for forecasting bankruptcy than the single-period models used previously. Single-period bankruptcy models give biased and inconsistent probability estimates while hazard models produce consistent estimates. I describe a simple technique for estimating a discrete-time hazard model with a logit model estimation program.

Applying my technique, I find that about half of the accounting ratios that have been used in previous models are not statistically significant bankruptcy predictors. Moreover, several market-driven variables are strongly related to bankruptcy probability, including market size, past stock returns, and the idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns. I propose a model that uses a combination of accounting ratios and market-driven variables to produce more accurate out-of-sample forecasts than alternative models.

Abstract:
I argue that hazard models are more appropriate for forecasting bankruptcy than the single-period models used previously. Single-period bankruptcy models give biased and inconsistent probability estimates while hazard models produce consistent estimates. I describe a simple technique for estimating a discrete-time hazard model with a logit model estimation program.

Applying my technique, I find that about half of the accounting ratios that have been used in previous models are not statistically significant bankruptcy predictors. Moreover, several market-driven variables are strongly related to bankruptcy probability, including market size, past stock returns, and the idiosyncratic standard deviation of stock returns. I propose a model that uses a combination of accounting ratios and market-driven variables to produce more accurate out-of-sample forecasts than alternative models.

Abstract:
Psychological evidence and casual intuition predict that sunny weather is associated with upbeat mood. This paper examines the relationship between morning sunshine in the city of a country's leading stock exchange and daily market index returns across 26 countries from 1982 to 1997. Sunshine is strongly significantly correlated with stock returns. After controlling for sunshine, rain and snow are unrelated to returns. Substantial use of weather-based strategies was optimal for a trader with very low transactions costs. However, because these strategies involve frequent trades, fairly modest costs eliminate the gains. These findings are difficult to reconcile with fully rational price setting.

Abstract:
Psychological evidence and casual intuition predict that sunny weather is associated with upbeat mood. This paper examines the relation between morning sunshine at a country's leading stock exchange and market index stock returns that day at 26 stock exchanges internationally from 1982-97. Sunshine is strongly positively correlated with daily stock returns. After controlling for sunshine, other weather conditions such as rain and snow are unrelated to returns. If transactions costs are assumed to be minor, it is possible to trade profitably on the weather. These results are difficult to reconcile with fully rational price-setting.

Abstract:
Using a large sample of individual investor records over a nine-year period, we analyze survival rates, the disposition effect and trading performance at the individual level to determine whether and how investors learn from their trading experience. We find evidence of two types of learning: some investors become better at trading with experience, while others stop trading after realizing that their ability is poor. A substantial part of overall learning by trading is explained by the second type. By ignoring investor attrition, the existing literature significantly overestimates how quickly investors become better at trading.

Learning, Behavioral Biases, Disposition Effect, Individual Investor Performance

Abstract:
This paper examines expected option returns in the context of mainstream asset pricing theory. Under mild assumptions, expected call returns exceed those of the underlying security and increase with the strike price. Likewise, expected put returns are below the risk-free rate and increase with the strike price. S&P index option returns consistently exhibit these characteristics. Under stronger assumptions, expected option returns vary linearly with option betas. However, zero-beta, at-the-money straddle positions produce average losses of approximately three percent per week. This suggests that some additional factor, such as systematic stochastic volatility, is priced in option returns.

Abstract:
This paper examines expected option returns in the context of mainstream asset pricing theory. Under mild assumptions, call options have expected returns which exceed those of their underlying security and which are increasing in their strike prices. Likewise, put options have expected returns which are below the risk-free rate and which are also increasing in their strike prices. Across a variety of time periods and return frequencies, S&P 500 and 100 index option returns strongly exhibit these characteristics. Under stronger assumptions, expected option returns are a linear function of option betas. Fama-MacBeth-style option return regressions produce risk premia close to the expected market return. However, the regression intercepts are significantly below zero. As a result, zero-beta, at-the-money straddle positions produce average losses of approximately three percent per week. Zero-beta straddles in other markets also lose money consistently. These findings suggest that some additional factor, such as systematic stochastic volatility, is priced in option returns.

Abstract:
This paper documents strong evidence of behavioral biases among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders and investigates the effect these biases have on prices. Our traders appear highly loss-averse. Traders who experience morning losses are about 16 percent more likely to assume above-average afternoon risk than traders with morning gains. This behavior has important short-term consequences for afternoon prices, as losing traders are prepared to purchase contracts at higher prices and sell contracts at lower prices than those that prevailed previously. However, during the ten minutes that follow these trades, prices revert strongly to their earlier levels. Consistent with these findings, short-term afternoon price volatility is positively related to the prevalence of morning losses among locals, but overall afternoon price volatility is not.

Loss Aversion

Abstract:
I develop and test an equilibrium asset pricing model based on loss averse investors. The model specifies a pricing kernel that is a nonmonotonic function of the market return. It also implies that investors demand a higher risk premium for risk associated with negative market returns than for positive market returns. The model assumes rational expectations and is consistent with no-arbitrage pricing. Estimates of the model's parameters are similar to values reported elsewhere. As the loss aversion literature predicts, the accuracy of the model depends on the frequency with which data is observed. Consistent with Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the model explains annual returns better than competing models, but it does not explain monthly, quarterly, or half-year returns. The model fits both returns that reflect the equity premium and stock returns alone.

Abstract:
This Paper analyzes the information content of the ambient noise level in the Chicago Board of Trade's 30-year Treasury Bond futures trading pit. Controlling for a variety of other variables, including lagged price changes, trading volumes, and news announcements, we find that the sound level conveys information which is highly economically and statistically significant. In particular, we find increases in the sound level precede periods of high price volatility and increased trading volumes. Increases in the sound level also presage the placement of block trades and relative increases in customer-driven trading. Our results add to our understanding of the market price formation process and offer important implications for the future of open outcry and floor-based trading mechanisms.

Abstract:
We examine the accuracy and contribution of the Merton distance to default (DD) model, which is based on Merton's (1974) bond pricing model. We compare the model to a naïve alternative, which uses the functional form suggested by the Merton model but does not solve the model for an implied probability of default. We find that the naïve predictor performs slightly better in hazard models and in out-of-sample forecasts than both the Merton DD model and a reduced-form model that uses the same inputs. Several other forecasting variables are also important predictors, and fitted values from an expanded hazard model outperform Merton DD default probabilities out of sample. Implied default probabilities from credit default swaps and corporate bond yield spreads are only weakly correlated with Merton DD probabilities after adjusting for agency ratings and bond characteristics. We conclude that while the Merton DD model does not produce a sufficient statistic for the probability of default, its functional form is useful for forecasting defaults.

G12, G13, G33

Abstract:
We investigate the bias in CRSP data due to missing returns for many of the stocks delisted from Nasdaq. We find that missing returns are far more common when the delisting is for reasons of poor performance, and we find the missing returns to be large and negative on average. This implies a bias for studies using Nasdaq data which is 4.7 times larger than the delisting bias previously documented for CRSP's NYSE/AMEX data. We estimate that using a corrected return of -55 percent wherever a performance-related delisting return is missing will correct the bias.We revisit previous work which finds a size effect in Nasdaq data and find that when the data are corrected for the delisting bias, the evidence for a size effect in Nasdaq data disappears.

Abstract:
This study explores the hypothesis that firm size, past returns, and book-to-market equity predict stock returns because of a premium for default or distress risk. Small size, low past returns, and high leverage all forecast default. However, book-to-market is only weakly correlated with default risk. The firm-specific probability of default is both statistically and economically significant in returns regressions. Furthermore, both size and past returns lose their ability to forecast returns when combined with default risk in regressions. The size and overreaction effects may be manifestations of a default premium, but the book-to-market effect cannot be described as a distress effect.