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Abstract:
In the last few decades, mass tort litigation has wrestled with widespread, multijurisdictional problems that have greatly stressed the caseloads of courts. Certifying for trial multiple-incident, product-liability class actions for personal injuries has promised the resolution of expansive problems. But as appellate courts have increasingly held, these actions are not appropriate for class treatment because they involve numerous individualized issues that require unmanageable individualized adjudication. Without a perceived workable alternative, many trial courts have continued to try radical class action trial plans that violate state substantive law and federal constitutional law, but which bring tremendous pressure to settle upon defendants who fear they may not be able to obtain appellate review. Attempting to defuse this crisis, Congress recently passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, greatly expanding federal jurisdiction for class actions. Once class actions are removed to federal court, however, the Act still provides no alternative for federal courts to the Hobson's choice framed by plaintiffs' counsel: certify a class, or be inundated with thousands of unmanageable, wasteful, and repetitive individual cases.

But that is a false dichotomy. This article argues that the alternative to mass tort class actions is not such isolated repetitive litigation, but instead an expansive set of litigation networks of counsel, judges, and clients, using recent advances in information technology, that provide much of the efficiency promised by class actions without violating state substantive or federal constitutional law. As an example, the article discusses the functioning of litigation networks in the ongoing litigation concerning phenylpropanolamine (PPA), an ingredient in cough and cold remedies and appetite suppressants that has been alleged to cause stroke. By sharing information, pooling resources, developing specialized expertise, and coordinating strategy, these networks not only reduce the costs and improve the representation of individual litigation, but also develop accurate claim values for settlement of numerous cases and allow for improved case management over time through pragmatic experimentation. The article concludes that mass tort litigation networks provide a fruitful alternative to impermissible product-liability class actions for personal injuries, and that judges should deny requests to certify such class actions and instead encourage and assist in the creation and functioning of litigation networks.

mass tort, mass torts, mass tort litigation, class action, network, information technology, phenylpropanolamine, PPA, product liability, tort, civil procedure

Abstract:
Mass tort scholars, practitioners, and judges struggle with determining the most efficient approach to adjudicate sometimes tens of thousands of cases. Favoring class actions, mass tort scholars and judges have assumed that litigating any issue once is best. But while litigating any one issue could conceivably save attorneys' fees and court resources, a single adjudication of thousands of mass tort claims is unlikely to further tort goals of corrective justice, efficiency, or compensation in a reliable way. That is because, as recent empirical research on jury behavior shows, any one jury's verdict may be an outlier on a potential bell curve of responses applying the law to the facts before it. Indeed, one aberrational, high jury claim valuation, if extrapolated to thousands of claims through a class action, may inappropriately bankrupt an entire industry. Similarly, one unusually low jury verdict might deny legions of plaintiffs the compensation that they deserve. To illustrate the problems of attempting to resolve a mass tort with a single jury, this Article discusses the Engle tobacco class action of Florida smokers, where the application of a single jury verdict to approximately 700,000 smokers appears to be an outlier verdict in light of prior juries' verdicts in Florida tobacco cases. In contrast, this Article argues that the use of multiple juries in individual cases is a superior method of resolving a mass tort. While the use of multiple juries in class actions to create statistically cobbled claim values has been rejected as violating due process and state tort law, no such problems accompany the approach espoused here: that individual-plaintiff lawsuits, each with its own jury, be tried and that the jury verdicts be used by mass tort litigants to develop claim values for broad mass tort settlement. In addition to remaining within the strictures of constitutional and tort law, this clustering of multiple juries around an accurate valuation of mass tort claims and the resulting likely settlement furthers both the procedural goal of litigant autonomy and the tort aims of efficiency, corrective justice, and compensation.

mass tort, class action, tort, jury, verdict, procedure