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Daniel L. Rubinfeld's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
5,100 |
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Citations
106 |
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1.
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Franklin M. Fisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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29 Nov 00
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21 Oct 03
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1,964 (1,477)
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Abstract:
In May, 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against the Microsoft Corporation claiming a number of violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The case was tried from October 19, 1998 through June 24, 1999. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ruled as to the findings of fact on November 5, 1999 and conclusions of law on April 3, 2000. As this paper is drafted, the remedy phase of the trial is about to begin. If the case does not settle, the appeals process will follow. This paper presents perspective and commentary on the economic issues from the viewpoint of two economists who were active in the case. Fisher was one of the U.S. Government's economic witnesses at the trial, and this paper is based in part on his testimony. Rubinfeld was Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) for Economics in the Antitrust Division during much of the investigation, and DAAG and then consultant for the U.S. Government during the trial. Our roles as testifying expert and chief economist at the Antitrust Division, respectively, carry with them the advantage of seeing the issues from the inside as participants, and the disadvantage that one's perspective is inevitably affected by one's own viewpoint. Because our goal is to explicate the merits of the Government's case and to highlight important issues, we are hopeful that the advantages will outweigh any disadvantages. Most of what follows summarizes our views at the time of trial; subsections that contain retrospective commentary are starred.
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2.
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Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law Hal J. Singer Empiris LLC
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07 May 01
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11 Mar 09
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1,378 (2,849)
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This Article provides a framework for the analysis of the potential effects of the recent AOL/Time Warner merger on the markets forbroadband Internet access and broadband Internet content. We consider two anticompetitive strategies that a vertically integrated firm such as AOL Time Warner, offering both broadband transport and portal services, could in theory profitably pursue. First, an integrated provider could engage in conduit discrimination?insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting its distribution of affiliated content and services over rival platforms. Second, an integrated provider could engage in content discrimination?insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content. After examining the competitive conditions in the broadband portal and transport markets, we evaluate the post-merger incentives of AOL Time Warner to engage in either or both forms of discrimination.
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3.
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Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 May 03
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02 Jun 03
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389 ( 19,933) |
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 May 03
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02 Jun 03
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The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clients is well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the case even when it is not in the best interest of the client, may spend more hours working on the case than the client would want, and may reject a settlement when the client would be better off if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee arrangement - under which he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlement but bears all of the cost of litigation - the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the client would be better off going to trial. In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingent fee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have the lawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation - the same fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement. We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyer bears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that he obtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under our modified contingent fee system, a third party would compensate the lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer would pay that party an up-front fee. In this way, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case is lost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system.
litigation, conflict of interest between lawyers and clients, trial versus settlement, hourly fee, contingent fee, compensation of lawyers
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 May 03
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30 May 03
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The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clients is well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the case even when it is not in the best interest of the client, may spend more hours working on the case than the client would want, and may reject a settlement when the client would be better off if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee arrangement - under which he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlement but bears all of the cost of litigation - the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the client would be better off going to trial. In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingent fee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have the lawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation - the same fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement. We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyer bears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that he obtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under our modified contingent fee system, a third party would compensate the lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer would pay that party an up-front fee. In this way, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case is lost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system.
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4.
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A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 May 03
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06 Aug 03
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245 ( 34,506) |
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 May 03
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06 Aug 03
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It is commonly thought that a lawyer working under a contingent fee arrangement has an excessive motive - relative to his client's interest - to settle the case, leading to a lower-than-desirable settlement amount and a high settlement rate. The conventional analysis that generates this conclusion omits an important consideration - that if the case were to go to trial, the lawyer would spend an inadequate amount of time on it. We demonstrate that once this effect is taken into account, the lawyer could have an insufficient motive to settle, the opposite of what is usually believed. Specifically, the lawyer's settlement demand could be too high and the resulting settlement rate too low.
litigation, contingent fee, lawyer compensation, trial versus settlement, conflict of interest between lawyer and client
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 May 03
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30 May 03
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It is commonly thought that a lawyer working under a contingent fee arrangement has an excessive motive - relative to his client's interest - to settle the case, leading to a lower-than-desirable settlement amount and a high settlement rate. The conventional analysis that generates this conclusion omits an important consideration - that if the case were to go to trial, the lawyer would spend an inadequate amount of time on it. We demonstrate that once this effect is taken into account, the lawyer could have an insufficient motive to settle, the opposite of what is usually believed. Specifically, the lawyer's settlement demand could be too high and the resulting settlement rate too low.
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5.
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Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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Posted:
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05 Dec 03
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19 Dec 03
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220 ( 38,691) |
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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17 Dec 03
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17 Dec 03
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This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. Under a coupon remedy, injured consumers are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated, that is, below the competitive price. Under a discount remedy, any consumer, without proof of injury, may purchase the good for a limited period of time at a price that is set below the competitive price. Both remedies generally cause consumers to buy an excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. Under the coupon remedy only a subset of consumers are affected in this way (those holding a relatively high number of coupons), while under the discount remedy all consumers are affected. We show nonetheless that the resulting deadweight loss could be lower under the discount remedy. We also consider how the deadweight loss changes when the length of the remedy period is increased - by extending the expiration date for the use of coupons or by employing a lower discount for a longer period of time. The deadweight loss may or may not decline under the coupon remedy, though it does decline under the discount remedy. In neither case, however, does it go to zero in the limit.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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05 Dec 03
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19 Dec 03
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201
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This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. Under a coupon remedy, injured consumers are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated, that is, below the competitive price. Under a discount remedy, any consumer, without proof of injury, may purchase the good for a limited period of time at a price that is set below the competitive price. Both remedies generally cause consumers to buy an excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. Under the coupon remedy only a subset of consumers are affected in this way (those holding a relatively high number of coupons), while under the discount remedy all consumers are affected. We show nonetheless that the resulting deadweight loss could be lower under the discount remedy. We also consider how the deadweight loss changes when the length of the remedy period is increased - by extending the expiration date for the use of coupons or by employing a lower discount for a longer period of time. The deadweight loss may or may not decline under the coupon remedy, though it does decline under the discount remedy. In neither case, however, does it go to zero in the limit. Keywords: Price fixing, antitrust remedies, coupons, discounts, deadweight loss
price fixing, antitrust remedies, coupons, discounts, deadweight loss
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6.
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Roy J. Epstein Independent Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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09 Feb 04
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09 Feb 04
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203 (42,010)
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We present a method to calibrate empirically the demand parameters in a merger simulation model by using brand-level profit margin data. While the approach can be generalized, we develop these ideas within an articular framework - the PCAIDS (proportionality-calibrated AIDS) model. We show that the brand-level margins effectively define product "nests" (products that are especially close substitutes) and substantially increase the flexibility of PCAIDS for modeling critical own- and cross-price elasticities. The model is particularly valuable for transactions at the wholesale level (where scanner data do not exist) and for geographic markets that span national borders (where comparable data may not be available), since other methods to derive elasticities, particularly those based on econometric estimation, may not be possible or may not be reliable.
merger simulation, unilateral effects
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7.
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Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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04 Mar 96
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04 Apr 02
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179 ( 47,704) |
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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04 Apr 02
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04 Apr 02
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This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive, in contrast to common practice in the United States. By penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising the award to winning plaintiffs (relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not penalized), it is possible to discourage relatively low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs from suing without discouraging relatively high-probability plaintiffs, and thereby to achieve the desired degee of deterrence with lower litigation costs. This result is developed first in a model in which all suits are assumed to go to trial and then in a model in which settlements are possible.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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04 Mar 96
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30 Jun 98
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This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive, in contrast to common practice in the United States. By penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising the award to winning plaintiffs (relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not penalized), it is possible to discourage relatively low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs from suing without discouraging relatively high-probability plaintiffs, and thereby to achieve the desired degree of deterrence with lower litigation costs.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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01 Feb 97
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20 Jun 98
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162
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Abstract:
This article derives the optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs. Optimality is defined in terms of achieving a specified degree of deterrence of potential injurers with the lowest litigation cost. Our main result is that the optimal penalty on a losing plaintiff is positive, in contrast to common practice in the United States. By penalizing losing plaintiffs and raising the award to winning plaintiffs (relative to what it would be if losing plaintiffs were not penalized), it is possible to discourage relatively low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs from suing without discouraging relatively high-probability plaintiffs, and thereby to achieve the desired degree of deterrence with lower litigation costs.
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8.
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Aaron S. Edlin University of California at Berkeley Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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30 Oct 04
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07 Dec 04
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143 (59,080)
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Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.
Exclusive dealing, exclusion, bundling, barriers to entry, publishing
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9.
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A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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17 Mar 05
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06 Aug 09
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112 ( 72,505) |
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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23 Jun 08
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23 Jun 08
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This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount and cash-a coupon-cash remedy-is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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04 May 05
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06 Aug 09
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This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount -- a "coupon-cash remedy" -- is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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17 Mar 05
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04 May 05
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Abstract:
This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount - a "coupon-cash remedy" - is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.
class action remedies, coupons, damage revelation, accuracy
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Daniel P. Kessler Stanford Graduate School of Business Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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25 Oct 04
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11 Nov 04
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In this essay, we discuss empirical research on the economic effects of the civil justice system. We discuss research on the effects of three substantive bodies of law - contracts, torts, and property - and research on the effects of the litigation process. We begin with a review of studies of aggregate empirical trends and the important issues involving contracts and torts, both positive and normative. We survey some of the more interesting empirical issues, and we conclude with some suggestions for future work. Because studies involving property law are so divergent, there is no simple description of aggregates that adequately characterizes the subject. In its place, we offer an overview of a number of the most important issues of interest. We describe (selectively) the current state of empirical knowledge, and offer some suggestions for future research. The section on legal process builds on the previous substantive sections. With respect each of the steps, from violation to trial to appeal, we review some of the more important empirical contributions.
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Jonathan B. Baker American University - Washington College of Law Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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29 Feb 08
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29 Feb 08
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No abstract available.
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Robert P. Inman University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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03 May 04
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03 May 04
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28 (147,436)
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The existing political and legal institutions of fiscal policy-making are under challenge. As the United States and the eastern European and Soviet states experiment with policy decentralization, the states of western Europe are looking to a more centralized policy structure via the E.E.C. This paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts--notably, the need to consider, and balance, the inefficiencies of fiscal policy decentralization (spillovers and wasteful fiscal competition) against the inefficiencies of fiscal policy centralization (policy cycles and localized "pork barrel" spending and taxes). The need to develop new fiscal policy institutions emphasizing voluntary agreements and responsive "agenda-setters" is stressed.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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07 Oct 00
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07 Oct 00
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This paper analyzes optimal fines in a model in which individuals can commit up to two offenses. The fine for the second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense. There are four natural cases in the model, defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the offense. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In another case, it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders. And in the two remaining cases, the optimal penalty does not change.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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28 Jan 02
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14 Apr 08
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One of the principal results in the economic theory of liability is that, assuming litigation is costless, the rule of strict liability with compensatory damages leads the injurer to choose the socially appropriate level of care. This paper reexamines this result when litigation is costly. It is shown that strict liability with compensatory damages generally leads to a socially inappropriate level of care and to excessive litigation costs. Social welfare can be increased by adjusting compensatory damages upward or downward, with the desired direction depending on the effect of changes in the level of liability on the injurer's decision to take care and on the victim's decision to bring suit.
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Robert P. Inman University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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24 Jan 08
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22 Feb 08
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We present a model of a peaceful transition in South Africa from white, elite rule under apartheid to a multi-racial democracy. We ask how can the emerging majority credibly promise not to exploit the once ruling elite? Under South Africa's democratic federalism the constitution creates an annual policy game where the new majority and the elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other. The game has a stable, stationary democratic equilibrium that the elite prefer to autocratic rule. For the elite, the move to democracy means higher tax rates, but also higher economic growth; democracy is preferred to apartheid if the elite's rate of time preference is less than the transition's rate of return.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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27 Dec 06
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09 Sep 08
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13 (187,291)
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No abstract is available for this paper.
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Theodore C. Bergstrom University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics Judith Roberts Independent Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law Perry Shapiro University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
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08 Jul 04
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08 Jul 04
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13 (187,291)
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Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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Paul N. Courant University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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19 Jun 04
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19 Jun 04
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8 (201,147)
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The validity of using local market data to measure the benefits associated with policies adopted in an urban area is investigated .It is shown that the rest of the world is affected by taxing decisions undertaken in a single urban area, so that local data cannot perfectly measure the welfare effects of a policy change. Specifically, the fact that the willingness to pay for a tax increase is positive in the rest of the world suggests that cost-benefit analyses which do not account for the rest of the world may be biased.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky Stanford Law School Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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14 Jul 08
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19 Aug 08
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Abstract:
Consumers injured by price overcharges often are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated. Coupon remedies cause a deadweight loss by inducing excessive consumption by consumers with relatively low demand during the remedy period. The magnitude of the loss can be comparable to that caused by the price overcharge. As demand variability goes to zero, the deadweight loss from coupon remedies goes to zero. Eliminating the expiration date for the use of coupons does not eliminate the loss.
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20.
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Roy J. Epstein Independent Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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28 Nov 01
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06 Apr 02
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Abstract:
Merger simulation is growing in importance as a tool to evaluate the unilateral competitive effects of mergers. This paper offers a relatively non-technical description of the principles of merger simulation. In addition, it introduces PCAIDS, a new and highly flexible "calibrated-demand" merger simulation methodology that is based on a simplified version of AIDS. PCAIDS can be implemented on a conventional spreadsheet using market shares and two price elasticities; scanner or transaction-level data are not required. The paper offers some applications of merger simulation with PCAIDS that include comparisons with other simulation models. It also shows how PCAIDS can be applied to the analysis of efficiencies, divestiture, and product repositioning/entry. Finally, the paper offers an analysis of the Merger Guidelines safeharbors. A detailed mathematical appendix is included.
Antitrust, merger simulation, unilateral effects, empirical methods
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21.
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Misconceptions, Misdirection and Mistakes
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Published in DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS? TWO OPPOSING VIEWS, David S. Evans, Franklin M. Fisher, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Richard L. Schmalensee, eds., AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, AEI Press, Washington, DC, 2000
Accepted Paper Series
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Franklin M. Fisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Daniel L. Rubinfeld University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
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22 Apr 01
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03 May 01
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Abstract:
Fisher was the principal economic witness for the Antitrust Division in Microsoft. This paper is a rebuttal piece to a paper by David S. Evans and Richard L. Schmalensee, the latter of whom was the principal economic witness for Microsoft. The paper points out that Microsoft did, in fact, harm consumers but beyond that, such harm is not and should not be a requisite for a finding of liability in an antitrust case. The antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, and competition is presumed to protect consumers.
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