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Mihir A. Desai's
Scholarly Papers
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25,983 |
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825 |
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1.
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Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions and Managerial Investment Decisions
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Daniel B. Bergstresser Harvard Business School Joshua D. Rauh Northwestern University - Department of Finance Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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29 May 04
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13 Jan 09
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1,801 ( 1,857) |
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Daniel B. Bergstresser Harvard Business School Joshua D. Rauh Northwestern University - Department of Finance Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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18 Jun 04
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13 Jan 09
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Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Firms use higher assumed rates of return when they prepare to acquire other firms, when they issue equity, when they are near critical earnings thresholds and when their managers exercise stock options. Changes in assumed returns, in turn, influence pension plan asset allocations. Instrumental variables analysis indicates that 25 basis point increases in assumed rates are associated with 5 percent increases in equity allocations.
earnings manipulation, pensions, asset allocation,
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Daniel B. Bergstresser Harvard Business School Joshua D. Rauh Northwestern University - Department of Finance Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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29 May 04
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13 Jan 09
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1,512
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Abstract:
Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Firms use higher assumed rates of return when they prepare to acquire other firms, when they issue equity, when they are near critical earnings thresholds and when their managers exercise stock options. Changes in assumed returns, in turn, influence pension plan asset allocations. Instrumental variables analysis indicates that 25 basis point increases in assumed rates are associated with 5 percent increases in equity allocations.
Earnings, Manipulation, Pensions, Defined Benefit Plans, Asset Allocation, Mergers
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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07 Apr 06
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07 Apr 06
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1,580 (2,349)
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This paper describes the International Finance course at Harvard Business School for instructors considering adopting the associated material. The paper begins by arguing that the forces of globalization have fundamentally changed the scope and activities of firms thereby altering the practice of finance within these firms. As a consequence of an increasing reliance on tightly-integrated foreign operations, a parallel world of finance has been opened within every multinational firm and this world has, heretofore, been overlooked. The course materials are designed to address the many aspects of financial decision making within global firms prompted by these changes that are not addressed in traditional materials. The paper provides an overview of the structure of the course and its seven modules with particular emphasis on the three modules that constitute the core of the course. The paper also describes an analytical framework that has been developed through the creation of the course materials to guide critical financial decisions on financing, investment, risk management and incentive management within a multinational firm. This framework emphasizes the need to reconcile conflicting forces in order for multinational firms to gain competitive advantage from their internal capital markets. The paper concludes with a discussion of the course's pedagogical approach and detailed descriptions of all the course materials, including 19 case studies, corresponding teaching notes, several module notes and supplementary materials.
International Finance, Multinational Firms, Finance, Valuation, Hedging, Institutions
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A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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09 May 03
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23 Feb 04
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1,483 ( 2,631) |
101
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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01 Jun 03
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01 Jun 03
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This paper examines the impact of local tax rates and capital market conditions on the level and composition of borrowing by foreign affiliates of American multinational corporations. The evidence indicates that 10 percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8 percent higher debt/asset ratios of American-owned affiliates, and that borrowing from related parties is particularly sensitive to tax rates. Borrowing by American affiliates responds to local inflation and political risks, and is more costly in countries with underdeveloped capital markets and those providing weak legal protections for creditors. Affiliates in environments where external borrowing is costly borrow less from unrelated parties: one percent higher interest rates are associated with 1.4 to 2.0 percent less external debt as a fraction of assets. Instrumental variables analysis reveals that affiliates substitute loans from parent companies for between half and three quarters of the reduced borrowing from unrelated parties stemming from adverse local capital market conditions. These patterns suggest that multinational firms are able to structure their finances in response to tax and capital market conditions, thereby creating opportunities not available to many of their local competitors.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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09 May 03
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23 Feb 04
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1,458
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This paper examines the impact of local tax rates and capital market conditions on the level and composition of borrowing by foreign affiliates of American multinational corporations. The evidence indicates that 10 percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8 percent higher debt/asset ratios of American-owned affiliates, and that borrowing from related parties is particularly sensitive to tax rates. Borrowing by American affiliates responds to local inflation and political risks, and is more costly in countries with underdeveloped capital markets and those providing weak legal protections for creditors. Affiliates in environments where external borrowing is costly borrow less from unrelated parties: One percent higher interest rates are associated with 1.4 to 2.0 percent less external debt as a fraction of assets. Instrumental variables analysis reveals that affiliates substitute loans from parent companies for between half and three quarters of the reduced borrowing from unrelated parties stemming from adverse local capital market conditions. These patterns suggest that multinational firms are able to structure their finances in response to tax and capital market conditions, thereby creating opportunities not available to many of their local competitors.
Multinational, Capital Structure, Internal Capital Markets, Legal Regime, Law and Finance, Corporate Tax
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4.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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24 Jun 02
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15 Jan 09
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1,320 (3,219)
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This paper analyzes dividend remittances by a large panel of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms. The dividend policies of foreign affiliates, which convey no signals to public capital markets, nevertheless resemble those used by publicly held companies in paying dividends to diffuse common shareholders. Robustness checks verify that dividend policies of foreign affiliates are little affected by the dividend policies of their parent companies or parent company exposure to public capital markets. Systematic differences in the payout behavior of affiliates that differ in organizational form, and those that face differing tax costs of paying dividends, reveal the importance of tax factors; nevertheless, dividend policies are not solely determined by tax considerations. The absence of capital market considerations and the incompleteness of tax explanations together suggest that dividend policies are largely driven by the need to control managers of foreign affiliates. Parent firms are more willing to incur tax penalties by simultaneously investing funds while receiving dividends and to regularize dividend payments when their foreign affiliates are partially owned, located far from the United States, or in jurisdictions with inefficient judicial systems, all of which are implied by control theories of dividends.
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5.
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Theft and Taxes
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit I. J. Alexander Dyck University of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of Management Luigi Zingales University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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20 Dec 04
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14 Aug 09
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1,316 ( 3,243) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit I. J. Alexander Dyck University of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of Management Luigi Zingales University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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08 Apr 05
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19 Apr 05
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This Paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the characteristics of a taxation system affect the extraction of private benefits by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance outcomes. In contrast, stronger tax enforcement reduces diversion and, in so doing, can raise the stock market value of a company in spite of the increase in the tax burden. We also show that the corporate governance system affects the level of tax revenues and the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. When the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income), an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues. We test this prediction in a panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have smaller (in fact, negative) effects on revenues when corporate governance is weaker. Finally, this approach provides a novel justification for the existence of a separate corporate tax based on profits.
Corporate taxation, corporate governance
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit I. J. Alexander Dyck University of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of Management Luigi Zingales University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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20 Dec 04
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14 Aug 09
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This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the characteristics of a taxation system affect the extraction of private benefits by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance outcomes. In contrast, stronger tax enforcement reduces diversion and, in so doing, can raise the stock market value of a company in spite of the increase in the tax burden. We also show that the corporate governance system affects the level of tax revenues and the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. When the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income), an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues. We test this prediction in a panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have smaller (in fact, negative) effects on revenues when corporate governance is weaker. Finally, this approach provides a novel justification for the existence of a separate corporate tax based on profits.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit I. J. Alexander Dyck University of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of Management Luigi Zingales University of Chicago Booth School of Business
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06 Dec 05
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22 Apr 08
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1,255
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This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private benefits extracted by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance outcomes. In contrast, stronger tax enforcement reduces diversion and, in so doing, can raise the stock market value of a company, in spite of the increase in the tax burden. We also show that the corporate governance system affects the level of tax revenues and the ensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. When the corporate governance system is ineffective, a decrease in the tax rate can increase tax revenues. This corporate governance view of taxes provides a novel justification for the existence of a separate corporate tax based on profits. Tests of the corporate governance implications using Russian data provide evidence consistent with model implications. We test the tax implications in a panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have smaller effects on revenues when corporate governance is weaker.
Corporate finance, corporate governance, public finance, taxation, tax evasion, Russia
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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20 Mar 05
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21 Aug 07
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1,290 (3,363)
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Do corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests? This paper tests alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance that yield distinct predictions on the valuation of corporate tax avoidance. Unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities are used to proxy for tax avoidance activity. These "book-tax" gaps are shown to be larger when firms are alleged to be involved in tax shelters. OLS estimates indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero, but is positive for well-governed firms as predicted by an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance. An exogenous change in tax regulations that affected the ability of some firms to avoid taxes is used to construct instruments for tax avoidance activity. The IV estimates yield larger overall effects and reinforce the basic result that higher quality firm governance leads to a larger effect of tax avoidance on firm value. The results are robust to a wide variety of tests for alternative explanations. Taken together, the results suggest that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.
Taxes, tax avoidance, tax shelters,book-tax gaps, governance, firm value
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7.
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Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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19 Apr 04
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15 Apr 05
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1,258 ( 3,515) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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20 May 04
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14 Mar 05
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This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristics determine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In order to test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggesting a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predicted by the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering is a function of a firm's corporate governance. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the 'undersheltering puzzle', and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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19 Apr 04
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15 Apr 05
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1,237
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This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. We develop a simple model that highlights the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. Then, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, in a manner consistent with a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. In addition, consistent with a prediction of our model, we find evidence suggesting that this negative effect is driven primarily by firms with relatively weak governance arrangements. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the "undersheltering puzzle," and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.
Incentive Compensation, Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion, Diversion, Tax Shelters, Stock Options
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Czech Mate: Expropriation and Investor Protection in a Converging World
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Alberto Moel Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group
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06 Sep 04
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14 Jul 08
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1,232 ( 3,651) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Alberto Moel Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group
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14 Jul 08
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14 Jul 08
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This paper examines the expropriation of a foreign investor by a local partner and the subsequent resolution of the case through international arbitration in favor of the investor. Despite the investor's 99% interest in the joint venture, the local partner managed to divert the entire value of the underlying entity for his personal benefit. This clinical examination of an expropriation and its aftermath illustrates the interaction of property and contract rights in a global setting, how corporate control is shaped by geography, and how multinational firms may be advantaged by availing themselves of stronger investor protections than local firms.
F21, F23, F36, F42, G15
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Alberto Moel Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group
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06 Sep 04
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01 May 06
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1,232
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This paper examines the expropriation of a foreign investor by a local partner and the subsequent resolution of that case through international arbitration in favor of the investor. Despite the investor's 99% interest in joint venture, the local partner managed to divert the entire value of the underlying entity for his personal benefit. This clinical examination of an expropriation and its aftermath illustrates the interaction of property and contract rights in a global setting, how corporate control is shaped by geography, and how multinational firms may be advantaged by availing themselves of stronger investor protections than local firms.
Investor protections, corporate governance, expropriation, multinational firms, FDI, foreign direct investment, media, bilateral investment
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Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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28 Feb 06
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21 Jan 09
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1,085 (4,562)
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This paper reviews recent evidence analyzing the link between earnings management and corporate tax avoidance and considers the implications for how policymakers should evaluate the financial reporting environment facing firms. A real-world tax shelter is dissected to illustrate how tax shelter products enable managers to manipulate reported earnings. A stylized example is developed that generalizes this view of corporate tax avoidance and empirical evidence consistent with this view is discussed. This view of corporate tax avoidance implies that shareholders and policymakers should question the rationale for distinct financial reports and that greater book-tax alignment may have mutually beneficial effects for investors and tax authorities.
Earnings management, Tax avoidance, Tax shelters; Book-tax conformity
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Institutions, Capital Constraints and Entrepreneurial Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Europe
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Paul A. Gompers Harvard Business School Josh Lerner Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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18 Dec 03
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03 Mar 06
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1,010 ( 5,146) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Paul A. Gompers Harvard Business School Josh Lerner Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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12 Jan 04
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03 Mar 06
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954
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We explore the impact of the institutional environment on the nature of entrepreneurial activity across Europe. Political, legal, and regulatory variables that have been shown to impact capital market development influence entrepreneurial activity in the emerging markets of Europe, but not in the more mature economies of Europe. Greater fairness and greater protection of property rights increase entry rates, reduce exit rates, and lower average firm size. Additionally, these same factors also associated with increased industrial vintage - a size-weighted measure of age - and reduced skewness in firm-size distributions. The results suggest that capital constraints induced by these institutional factors impact both entry and the ability of firms to transition and grow, particularly in lesser-developed markets.
Entrepreneurship, Institutions, Capital Constraints, Firm Size Distributions, Entry, Exit, Legal Regimes
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Paul A. Gompers Harvard Business School Josh Lerner Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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18 Dec 03
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18 Dec 03
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We explore the impact of the institutional environment on the nature of entrepreneurial activity across Europe. Political, legal, and regulatory variables that have been shown to impact capital market development influence entrepreneurial activity in the emerging markets of Europe, but not in the more mature economies of Europe. Greater fairness and greater protection of property rights increase entry rates, reduce exit rates, and lower average firm size. Additionally, these same factors also associated with increased industrial vintage - a size-weighted measure of age - and reduced skewness in firm-size distributions. The results suggest that capital constraints induced by these institutional factors impact both entry and the ability of firms to transition and grow, particularly in lesser-developed markets.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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21 Sep 04
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03 Feb 06
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966 (5,557)
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What types of firms establish tax haven operations, and what purposes do these operations serve? Analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high R&D intensities, are the most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. The evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens, an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm-level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens. One percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with an 1.5 to two percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.
Tax havens, tax competition, foreign direct investment, transfer pricing, investment, multinational firms
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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28 Aug 02
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25 Feb 04
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898 (6,318)
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This paper analyzes the determinants of partial ownership of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms and, in particular, the marked decline in the use of joint ventures over the last 20 years. The evidence indicates that whole ownership is most common when firms coordinate integrated production activities across different locations, transfer technology, and benefit from worldwide tax planning. Because operations and ownership levels are jointly determined, it is helpful to use the liberalization of ownership restrictions by host countries and the imposition of joint venture tax penalties in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 as instruments for ownership levels to identify these effects. Firms responded to these regulatory and tax changes by using wholly owned affiliates instead of joint ventures and expanding intrafirm trade and technology transfer. The implied complementarity of whole ownership and intrafirm trade suggests that the reduced costs of engaging in integrated global operations contributed substantially to the sharply declining propensity of American firms to organize their foreign operations as joint ventures over the last two decades. Estimates imply that as much as one-fifth to three-fifths of the decline in the use of joint ventures by multinational firms is attributable to the increased importance of intrafirm transactions. The forces of globalization appear to have diminished rather than accelerated the use of shared ownership.
Multinational Business, Joint Ventures, Alliances, Organizational Form, Intrafirm Trade
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Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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23 Feb 04
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20 Feb 09
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854 ( 6,819) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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29 Feb 08
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20 Feb 09
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This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and their liberalization on the activities of US multinational firms. These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducing reported local profitability and increasing the frequency of dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27% higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Capital control liberalizations are associated with significant increases in multinational activity-property, plant, and equipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations. The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates discourages investment in countries with capital controls, and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls. (JEL F21, F23, F36, F42, G15, G32, G34)
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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15 Mar 04
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15 Mar 04
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Abstract:
Affiliate-level evidence indicates that American multinational firms circumvent capital controls by adjusting their reported intrafirm trade, affiliate profitability, and dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable to the effect of 24 percent higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8 percent more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.4 percent higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Together, the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates raise the cost of capital, significantly reducing the level of foreign direct investment. American affiliates are 13-16 percent smaller in countries with capital controls than they are in comparable countries without capital controls. These effects are reversed when countries liberalize their capital account restrictions.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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23 Feb 04
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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803
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23
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Abstract:
This paper evaluates the impact of capital controls and their liberalization on the activities of U.S. multinational firms. These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducing reported local profitability and increasing the frequency of dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable to the effect of 27 percent higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8 percent more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.25 percent higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Capital control liberalizations are associated with significant increases in multinational activity - property, plant and equipment grows at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations. The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates discourages investment in countries with capital controls, and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls.
Multinational firms, international finance, capital controls, liberalizations, FDI, repatriation, transfer pricing
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14.
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Financial Constraints and Growth: Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency Depreciations
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Kristin J. Forbes Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Posted:
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15 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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25 Sep 09
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822 ( 7,251) |
30
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Kristin J. Forbes Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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15 Dec 08
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Last Revised:
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25 Sep 09
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0
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29
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Abstract:
This article examines how financial constraints and product market exposures determine the response of multinational and local firms to sharp depreciations. U.S. multinational affiliates increase sales, assets, and investment significantly more than local firms during, and subsequent to, depreciations. Differing product market exposures do not explain these differences in performance. Instead, a differential ability to circumvent financial constraints is a significant determinant of the observed differences in investment responses. Multinational affiliates also access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. These results indicate another role for foreign direct investment in emerging markets-multinational affiliates expand economic activity during currency crises when local firms are most constrained.
F23, F31, G15, G31, G32
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Kristin J. Forbes Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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15 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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05 Jul 06
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822
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30
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Abstract:
This paper examines how financial constraints and product market exposures determine the response of multinational and local firms to sharp depreciations. U.S. multinational affiliates increase sales, assets, and investment significantly more than local firms during, and subsequent to, depreciations. Differing product market exposures do not explain these differences in performance. Instead, a differential ability to circumvent financial constraints is a significant determinant of the observed differences in investment responses. Multinational affiliates also access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. These results indicate another role for foreign direct investment in emerging markets—multinational affiliates expand economic activity during currency crises when local firms are most constrained.
Investment, leverage, foreign direct investment, currency crises, financial constraints, depreciations
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15.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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| Posted: |
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03 May 07
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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643 (10,504)
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12
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Abstract:
How do the tax system and corporate governance arrangements interact? This chapter begins by reviewing an emerging literature that explores how agency problems create such interactions and provides evidence on their importance. This literature has neglected how taxation can interact with the various mechanisms that have arisen to ameliorate the corporate governance problem, such as concentrated ownership, accounting and information systems, high-powered incentives, financing choices, payout policy, and the market for corporate control. The remainder of the chapter outlines potentially fruitful areas for future research into how these mechanisms may respond to the tax system.
Taxes, tax avoidance, tax shelters, governance, firm value
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16.
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Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Economic Activity
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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Posted:
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26 Oct 05
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Last Revised:
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27 May 08
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629 ( 10,840) |
16
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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16 Jan 06
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Last Revised:
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20 Jan 06
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40
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12
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Abstract:
How does rising foreign investment influence domestic economic activity? Firms whose foreign operations grow rapidly exhibit coincident rapid growth of domestic operations, but this pattern alone is inconclusive, as foreign and domestic business activities are jointly determined. This study uses foreign GDP growth rates, interacted with lagged firm-specific geographic distributions of foreign investment, to predict changes in foreign investment by a large panel of American firms. Estimates produced using this instrument for changes in foreign activity indicate that 10% greater foreign capital investment is associated with 2.2% greater domestic investment, and that 10% greater foreign employee compensation is associated with 4.0% greater domestic employee compensation. Changes in foreign and domestic sales, assets, and numbers of employees are likewise positively associated; the evidence also indicates that greater foreign investment is associated with additional domestic exports and R&D spending. The data do not support the popular notion that greater foreign activity crowds out domestic activity by the same firms, instead suggesting the reverse.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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26 Oct 05
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Last Revised:
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27 May 08
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589
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4
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Abstract:
Do firms investing abroad simultaneously reduce their domestic activity? This paper analyzes the relationship between the domestic and foreign operations of American manufacturing firms between 1982 and 2004 by instrumenting for changes in foreign operations with GDP growth rates of the foreign countries in which they invest. Estimates produced using this instrument indicate that 10% greater foreign investment is associated with 2.6% greater domestic investment, and 10% greater foreign employee compensation is associated with 3.7% greater domestic employee compensation. These results do not support the popular notion that expansions abroad reduce a firm's domestic activity, instead suggesting the opposite.
FDI, multinational firms, investment, outsourcing
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17.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Jul 05
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Last Revised:
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27 Jul 05
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618 (11,106)
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22
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Abstract:
U.S. firms are afforded the opportunity to characterize profits to capital markets and tax authorities in distinct ways. How does the latitude afforded managers influence the quality of these corporate profit reports? This paper traces the evolution of the dual reporting system and assesses its impact on corporate profit reporting. Case-based evidence suggests that managers exploit the differences between book and tax reporting opportunistically thereby reducing the quality of corporate profit reporting both to tax authorities and the capital markets. More systematic evidence provided in the paper suggests that both types of profit reporting have degraded in quality and various reasons for this degradation, and its relationship to the dual reporting system, are considered. The degradation of profit reporting brings into question the confidential nature of corporate tax returns, the rationale for two books and the nature of the corporate tax.
Accounting, Taxation, Corporate Governance
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18.
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Capital Structure with Risky Foreign Investment
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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Posted:
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17 May 06
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Last Revised:
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14 Sep 06
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501 ( 15,051) |
6
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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08 Jun 06
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Last Revised:
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08 Jun 06
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17
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6
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Abstract:
American multinational firms respond to politically risky environments by adjusting their capital structures abroad and at home. Foreign subsidiaries located in politically risky countries have significantly more debt than do other foreign affiliates of the same parent companies. American firms further limit their equity exposures in politically risky countries by sharing ownership with local partners and by serving foreign markets with exports rather than local production. The residual political risk borne by parent companies leads them to use less domestic leverage, resulting in lower firm-wide leverage. Multinational firms with above-average exposures to politically risky countries have 8.4 percent less domestic leverage than do other firms. These findings illustrate the impact of risk exposures on capital structure.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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17 May 06
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Last Revised:
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14 Sep 06
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484
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6
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Abstract:
Political risks increase the volatility of multinational firm operating returns, prompting firms to adjust their capital structures. Politically risky countries feature more volatile returns, and the volatility of a parent company's aggregate foreign returns also increases with the extent of the firm's political risk exposure. Parent companies mitigate the cost of return volatility by adjusting their capital structures: a one standard deviation increase in exposure to political risks reduces domestic leverage by 4.4% of its mean level. Foreign political risks most strongly influence the capital structures of firms in industries that are particularly susceptible to political risks. These results suggest that other business risks may similarly affect capital structures.
Capital Structure, Political Risk, Leverage, Expropriation
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19.
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Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Robert J. Yetman University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management
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Posted:
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05 Feb 05
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Last Revised:
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03 Sep 08
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482 ( 15,821) |
6
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Robert J. Yetman University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management
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| Posted: |
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16 Mar 05
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Last Revised:
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16 Mar 05
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21
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6
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Abstract:
In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance - the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Robert J. Yetman University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management
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| Posted: |
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05 Feb 05
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Last Revised:
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03 Sep 08
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461
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6
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Abstract:
In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of governance environment facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger provisions aimed at detecting managerial misbehavior are associated with significantly greater charitable expenditures, increased foundation payouts and lower insider compensation. Instrumental variables analysis confirms the relationship between the governance environment and not-for-profit performance. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance - the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks.
Not-for-Profits, corporate governance, social insurance
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20.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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19 Oct 04
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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464 (16,690)
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18
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Abstract:
This paper reassesses the burden of the current U.S. international tax regime and reconsiders well-known welfare benchmarks used to guide international tax reform. Reinventing corporate tax policy requires that international considerations be placed front and center in the debate on how to tax corporate income. A simple framework for assessing current rules suggests a U.S. tax burden on foreign income in the neighborhood of $50 billion a year. This sizeable U.S. taxation of foreign investment income is inconsistent with promoting efficient ownership of capital assets, either from a national or a global perspective. Consequently, there are large potential welfare gains available from reducing the U.S. taxation of foreign income, a direction of reform that requires abandoning the comfortable, if misleading, logic of using similar systems to tax foreign and domestic income.
Corporate taxation, international taxation, multinational corporations, foreign tax credit
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21.
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Foreign Direct Investment and the Domestic Capital Stock
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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Posted:
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18 Feb 05
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Last Revised:
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28 Mar 06
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443 ( 17,762) |
15
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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18 Feb 05
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Last Revised:
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18 Feb 05
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38
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15
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Abstract:
This paper evaluates evidence of the impact of outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) on domestic investment rates. OECD countries with high rates of outbound FDI in the 1980s and 1990s exhibited lower domestic investment than other countries, which suggests that FDI and domestic investment are substitutes. U.S. time series data tell a very different story, however: years in which American multinational firms have greater foreign capital expenditures coincide with greater domestic capital spending by the same firms. One dollar of additional foreign capital spending is associated with 3.5 dollars of additional domestic capital spending in the time series, implying that foreign and domestic capital are complements in production by multinational firms. This effect is consistent with cross sectional evidence that firms whose foreign operations expand simultaneously expand their domestic operations, and suggests that interpretation of the OECD cross sectional evidence may be confounded by omitted variables.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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23 Mar 06
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Last Revised:
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28 Mar 06
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405
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15
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Abstract:
This paper evaluates evidence of the impact of outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) on domestic investment rates. OECD countries with high rates of outbound FDI in the 1980s and 1990s exhibited lower domestic investment than other countries, which suggests that FDI and domestic investment are substitutes. U.S. time series data tell a very different story, however: years in which American multinational firms have greater foreign capital expenditures coincide with greater domestic capital spending by the same firms. One dollar of additional foreign capital spending is associated with 3.5 dollars of additional domestic capital spending in the time series, implying that foreign and domestic capital are complements in production by multinational firms. This effect is consistent with cross sectional evidence that firms whose foreign operations expand simultaneously expand their domestic operations, and suggests that interpretation of the OECD cross sectional evidence may be confounded by omitted variables.
Multinational firms, investment, FDI, foreign direct investment
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22.
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New Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corporations
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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Posted:
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05 Jan 04
|
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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432 ( 18,364) |
2
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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23 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0
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Abstract:
In order to suggest new foundations for the taxation of multinational corporations, this paper revisits the legislative foundations for much of the international tax regime and distills the lessons of recent economic research. The review of the Revenue Act of 1962 suggests that the international provisions that remain today were the result of a political miscalculation, were targeted at transient concerns, and were expanded well beyond their original scope as the result of administrative complexities. Evidence from the 1960s and 1990s is also suggestive of the fact that anti-deferral provisions may foster the tax avoidance and tax haven activities that they seek to combat. Recent research on the growing role of non-income taxes, the interactions between tax systems and corporate governance and new welfare benchmarks that arise from viewing FDI as being associated with productivity differences all recommend alternative rules for taxing the activities of U.S. multinational firms than are currently in place.
Multinational, Subpart F, deferral, evasion, avoidance, taxation, international
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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05 Jan 04
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Last Revised:
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23 Jun 04
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432
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2
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| |
Abstract:
In order to suggest new foundations for the taxation of multinational corporations, this paper revisits the legislative foundations for much of the international tax regime and distills the lessons of recent economic research. The review of the Revenue Act of 1962 suggests that the international provisions that remain today were the result of a political miscalculation, were targeted at transient concerns, and were expanded well beyond their original scope as the result of administrative complexities. Evidence from the 1960s and 1990s is also suggestive of the fact that anti-deferral provisions may foster the tax avoidance and tax haven activities that they seek to combat. Recent research on the growing role of non-income taxes, the interactions between tax systems and corporate governance and new welfare benchmarks that arise from viewing FDI as being associated with productivity differences all recommend alternative rules for taxing the activities of U.S. multinational firms than are currently in place.
Multinational, subpart F, deferral, evasion, avoidance, taxation, international
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23.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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21 Mar 09
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Last Revised:
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30 Apr 09
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421 (19,012)
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Abstract:
Tax policy toward American multinational firms would appear to be approaching a crossroads. The presumed linkages between domestic employment conditions and the growth of foreign operations by American firms have led to calls for increased taxation on foreign operations - the so-called end to tax breaks for companies that ship our jobs overseas. At the same time, the current tax regime employed by the U.S. is being abandoned by the two remaining large capital exporters - the UK and Japan - that had maintained similar regimes. The conundrum facing policymakers is how to reconcile mounting pressures for increased tax burdens on foreign activity with the increasing exceptionalism of American policy. This paper address these questions by analyzing the available evidence on two related claims - i) that the current U.S. policy of deferring taxation of foreign profits represents a subsidy to American firms and ii) that activity abroad by multinational firms represents the displacement of activity that would have otherwise been undertaken at home. These two tempting claims are found to have limited, if any, systematic support. Instead, modern welfare norms that capture the nature of multinational firm activity recommend a move toward not taxing the foreign activities of American firms, rather than taxing them more heavily. Similarly, the weight of the empirical evidence is that foreign activity is a complement, rather than a substitute, for domestic activity. Much as the formulation of trade policy requires resisting the tempting logic of protectionism, the appropriate taxation of multinational firms requires a similar fortitude.
Tax Policy, Multinational Firms, Protectionism, Investment, Deferral, Corporations
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24.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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20 Jul 03
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Last Revised:
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18 Nov 03
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418 (19,262)
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16
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Abstract:
This paper introduces "capital ownership neutrality" (CON) and "national ownership neutrality" (NON) as benchmarks for evaluating the desirability of international tax reforms, and applies them to analyze recent U.S. tax reform proposals. Tax systems satisfy CON if they do not distort the ownership of capital assets, which promotes global efficiency whenever the productivity of an investment differs based on its ownership. A regime in which all countries exempt foreign income from taxation satisfies CON, as does a regime in which all countries tax foreign income while providing foreign tax credits. Tax systems satisfy NON if they promote the profitability of domestic firms, and therefore home country welfare, by exempting foreign income from taxation. Standard normative benchmarks of capital export neutrality, national neutrality, and capital import neutrality carry very different implications, since they fail to account for the productivity effects of tax-induced changes in capital ownership. Proposed U.S. tax reforms that reduce the taxation of foreign income, thereby bringing the U.S. tax system more in line with the systems of other countries, have the potential to advance both American interests and global welfare.
FDI, Multinational, International, Welfare
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25.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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21 Apr 05
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Last Revised:
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28 Mar 06
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398 (20,405)
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5
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Abstract:
When multinational firms expand their operations in tax havens, do they divert activity from non-havens? Much of the debate on tax competition presumes that the answer to this question is yes. This paper offers a model for examining the relationship between activity in havens and non-havens, and discusses the implications of recent evidence in light of that model. Properly interpreted, the evidence suggests that tax haven activity enhances activity in nearby non-havens.
Tax havens, tax competition, foreign direct investment, investment, multinational firms
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26.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit William M. Gentry Williams College - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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12 Dec 03
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Last Revised:
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12 Dec 03
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374 (22,128)
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3
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes how corporate capital gains taxes affect the capital gain realization decisions of firms. The paper outlines the tax treatment of corporate capital gains, the consequent incentives for firms with gains and losses, the efficiency consequences of these taxes in the context of other taxes and capital market distortions, and the response of firms to these incentives. Despite receiving limited attention, corporate capital gain realizations have averaged 30 percent of individual capital gain realizations over the last fifty years and have increased dramatically in importance over the last decade. By 1999, the ratio of net long-term capital gains to income subject to tax was 21 percent and was distributed across a variety of industries suggesting the importance of realization behavior to corporate financing decisions. Time-series analysis of aggregate realization behavior demonstrates that corporate capital gains taxes impact realization behavior significantly. Similarly, an analysis of firm-level investment and property, plant, and equipment (PPE) disposal decisions and gain recognition behavior similarly suggests an important role for these taxes in determining when firms raise money by disposing of assets and realizing gains.
Corporate Taxation, Capital Gains, Corporate Finanace
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27.
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Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law Winnie Fung Harvard University - Department of Economics
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Posted:
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23 Jun 05
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Last Revised:
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23 Jul 09
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364 ( 22,877) |
4
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law Winnie Fung Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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09 Aug 05
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Last Revised:
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23 Jul 09
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15
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4
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Abstract:
Legal rules, politics and behavioral factors have all been emphasized as explanatory factors in analyses of the determinants of the concentration of corporate ownership and stock market participation. An extension of standard tax clientele arguments demonstrates that changes in the progressivity of taxes can also significantly influence patterns of equity ownership. A novel index of the concentration of corporate ownership over the twentieth century in the U.S. provides the opportunity to quantitatively test for the role of taxes in shaping ownership concentration. The index of ownership concentration is characterized by considerable time series variation, with significant diffusion of ownership in the post WWII era and reconcentration in the late 1990s. Analysis of this index indicates that the progressivity of taxation significantly influences corporate ownership concentration and equity market participation as predicted by the model. This evidence supports the intuition of Berle and Means (1932) that taxation can significantly influence patterns of equity ownership.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law Winnie Fung Harvard University - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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23 Jun 05
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Last Revised:
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01 May 06
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349
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4
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| |
Abstract:
Legal rules, politics and behavioral factors have all been emphasized as explanatory factors in analyses of the determinants of the concentration of corporate ownership and stock market participation. An extension of standard tax clientele arguments demonstrates that changes in the progressivity of taxes can also significantly influence patterns of equity ownership. A novel index of the concentration of corporate ownership over the twentieth century in the U.S. provides the opportunity to quantitatively test for the role of taxes in shaping ownership concentration. The index of ownership concentration is characterized by considerable time series variation, with significant diffusion of ownership in the post WWII era and reconcentration in the late 1990s. Analysis of this index indicates that the progressivity of taxation significantly influences corporate ownership concentration and equity market participation as predicted by the model. This evidence supports the intuition of Berle and Means (1932) that taxation can significantly influence patterns of equity ownership.
Taxes, corporate governance, equity market participation
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28.
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Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets
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Pol Antras Harvard University - Department of Economics Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School
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Posted:
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18 Jan 07
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15 Jan 09
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363 ( 22,955) |
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Pol Antras Harvard University - Department of Economics Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School
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24 Jan 07
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17 Jan 08
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This paper examines how costly financial contracting and weak investor protection influence the cross-border operational, financing and investment decisions of firms. We develop a model in which product developers have a comparative advantage in monitoring the deployment of their technology abroad. The paper demonstrates that when firms want to exploit technologies abroad, multinational firm (MNC) activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows arise endogenously when monitoring is nonverifiable and financial frictions exist. The mechanism generating MNC activity is not the risk of technological expropriation by local partners but the demands of external funders who require MNC participation to ensure value maximization by local entrepreneurs. The model demonstrates that weak investor protections limit the scale of multinational firm activity, increase the reliance on FDI flows and alter the decision to deploy technology through FDI as opposed to arm's length licensing. Several distinctive predictions for the impact of weak investor protection on MNC activity and FDI flows are tested and confirmed using firm-level data.
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Pol Antras Harvard University - Department of Economics Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School
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18 Jan 07
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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334
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Abstract:
This paper examines how costly financial contracting and weak investor protection influence the cross-border operational, financing and investment decisions of firms. We develop a model in which product developers have a comparative advantage in monitoring the deployment of their technology abroad. The paper demonstrates that when firms want to exploit technologies abroad, multinational firm (MNC) activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows arise endogenously when monitoring is nonverifiable and financial frictions exist. The mechanism generating MNC activity is not the risk of technological expropriation by local partners but the demands of external funders who require MNC participation to ensure value maximization by local entrepreneurs. The model demonstrates that weak investor protections limit the scale of multinational firm activity, increase the reliance on FDI flows and alter the decision to deploy technology through FDI as opposed to arm's length licensing. Several distinctive predictions for the impact of weak investor protection on MNC activity and FDI flows are tested and confirmed using firm-level data.
Multinational firms, financial frictions, investor protection, licensing, FDI flows
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29.
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The Comovement of Returns and Investment Within the Multinational Firm
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School
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Posted:
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13 Sep 04
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Last Revised:
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04 Oct 04
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355 ( 23,591) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School
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04 Oct 04
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04 Oct 04
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Can financial integration, particularly the cross-border investments of multinational firms, help explain the synchronization of business cycles? This paper presents evidence on the comovement of returns and investment within U.S. multinational firms to address this question. These firms constitute significant fractions of economic output and investment in most large economies, suggesting that they could create significant economic linkages. Aggregate measures of rates of return and investment rates of U.S. multinational firms located in different countries are highly correlated across countries. Firm-level regressions demonstrate that rates of return and investment rates of affiliates are highly correlated with the rates of return and investment of the affiliate's parent and other affiliates within the same parent system, controlling for country and industry factors. The evidence on these interrelationships and the importance of multinationals to local economies suggests that global firms may be an important channel for transmitting economic shocks. This evidence also sheds light on asset pricing puzzles related to the diversification benefits provided by multinational firms.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School
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13 Sep 04
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04 Oct 04
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327
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Abstract:
Can financial integration, particularly the cross-border investments of multinational firms, help explain the synchronization of business cycles? This paper presents evidence on the comovement of returns and investment within U.S. multinational firms to address this question. These firms constitute significant fractions of economic output and investment in most large economies, suggesting that they could create significant economic linkages. Aggregate measures of rates of return and investment rates of U.S. multinational firms located in different countries are highly correlated across countries. Firm-level regressions demonstrate that rates of return and investment rates of affiliates are highly correlated with the rates of return and investment of the affiliate's parent and other affiliates within the same parent system, controlling for country and industry factors. The evidence on these interrelationships and the importance of multinationals to local economies suggests that global firms may be an important channel for transmitting economic shocks. This evidence also sheds light on asset pricing puzzles related to the diversification benefits provided by multinational firms.
Foreign direct investment, multinational firms, comovement, business cycles
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30.
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The Decentering of the Global Firm
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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Posted:
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07 Oct 08
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Last Revised:
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15 Oct 09
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309 ( 27,897) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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15 Oct 09
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15 Oct 09
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This paper describes recent changes in the relationship between firms and nation states. Firms are typically linked to the nation in which they began and are considered to have fixed national identities. While firms have reallocated various activities around the world in response to value creation opportunities, they have largely retained their national identities and their headquarter activities have remained bundled in their home countries. This characterisation is increasingly tenuous. Firms are redefining their homes by unbundling their headquarters functions and reallocating them opportunistically across nations. A firm’s legal home, its financial home and its homes for managerial talent no longer need to be co-located and, consequently, the idea of firms as national actors rooted in their home countries is rapidly becoming outdated. The implications for policymakers and researchers are outlined.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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07 Oct 08
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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309
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Abstract:
This paper describes recent changes in the relationship between firms and nation states. Firms are typically linked to the nation in which they began and are considered to have fixed national identities. While firms have reallocated various activities around the world in response to value creation opportunities, they have largely retained their national identities and their headquarter activities remained bundled in their home countries. This characterization is increasingly tenuous. Firms are redefining their homes by unbundling their headquarters functions and reallocating them opportunistically across nations. A firm's legal home, its financial home and its homes for managerial talent no longer need to be colocated and, consequently, the idea of firms as national actors rooted in their home countries is rapidly becoming outdated. The implications for policy makers and researchers are outlined.
headquarters, FDI, location, foreign direct investment, multinational, listing, tax
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31.
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Market Reactions to Export Subsidies
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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Posted:
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04 Jan 04
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29 Jun 06
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286 ( 30,504) |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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31 Jan 04
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03 Feb 04
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This paper analyzes the economic impact of export subsidies by investigating stock price reactions to a critical event in 1997. On November 18, 1997, the European Union announced its intention to file a complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the United States provided American exporters illegal subsidies by permitting them to use Foreign Sales Corporations to exempt a fraction of export profits from taxation. Share prices of American exporters fell sharply on this news, and its implication that the WTO might force the United States to eliminate the subsidy. The share price declines were largest for exporters whose tax situations made the threatened export subsidy particularly valuable. Share prices of exporters with high profit margins also declined markedly on November 18, 1997, suggesting that the export subsidies were most valuable to firms earning market rents. This last evidence is consistent with strategic trade models in which export subsidies improve the competitive positions of firms in imperfectly competitive markets.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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04 Jan 04
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29 Jun 06
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270
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the economic impact of export subsidies by investigating stock price reactions to a critical event in 1997. On November 18, 1997, the European Union announced its intention to file a complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the United States provided American exporters illegal subsidies by permitting them to use Foreign Sales Corporations to exempt a fraction of export profits from taxation. Share prices of American exporters fell sharply on this news, and its implication that the WTO might force the United States to eliminate the subsidy. The share price declines were largest for exporters whose tax situations made the threatened export subsidy particularly valuable. Share prices of exporters with high profit margins also declined markedly on November 18, 1997, suggesting that the export subsidies were most valuable to firms earning market rents. This last evidence is consistent with strategic trade models in which export subsidies improve the competitive positions of firms in imperfectly competitive markets.
Multinationals, Trade, Exports, Subsidies, Tax Policies, Event Studies
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32.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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16 Apr 08
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Last Revised:
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19 Jul 09
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256 (34,782)
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This paper investigates how dividend taxes influence portfolio choices, using the response to the distinctive treatment of a subset of foreign dividends in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. An open-economy after-tax capital asset pricing model is used to derive the hypothesis that JGTRRA should lead to a portfolio reallocation by US investors towards equities in tax-favored countries. A difference-in-difference analysis that compares US equity holdings in affected and unaffected countries finds a substantial portfolio reallocation towards the former. This effect cannot be explained by several potential alternative hypotheses, including differential changes to the preferences of American investors, differential changes in investment opportunities, differential time trends in investment, changed tax evasion behavior, or changes in stock prices associated (or contemporaneous) with JGTRRA.
Dividends, Portfolio Choice, Taxes, Tax Treaties, Foreign Portfolio Investment
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33.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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16 May 07
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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197 (45,610)
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5
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Abstract:
Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The worldwide tax regime employed by the U.S. potentially distorts this choice by penalizing FDI, relative to FPI, in low-tax countries. On the other hand, weak investor protections in foreign countries may increase the value of control, creating an incentive to use FDI rather than FPI. By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflects these incentives to bypass home and host country institutional regimes. The results suggest that the residual tax on US multinational firms' foreign earnings skews the composition of outbound capital flows - a 10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings by approximately 10%, controlling for effects on FDI. Investor protections also seem to shape portfolio choices, though these results are not robust when only within-country variation is employed.
Foreign Portfolio Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, Taxes, Investor Protections
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34.
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George Chacko Harvard Business School Maxim Golts State Street Global Markets Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Vladimir Novakovsky Harvard University
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18 Mar 05
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27 Oct 09
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183 (49,113)
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This paper develops a simple approach to solving multi-period consumption and investment problems. All numerical methods in use for these types of problems work by solving the problem backward, i.e., solving the consumption and investment decision at the end of the investment horizon and working backward. For certain problems, such as economies with capital gains taxes, a backward approach is extremely unwieldy. For this reason, this paper develops a forward-solving approach that is based on Monte Carlo simulations. We demonstrate that the methodology in this paper is extremely effective at solving the tax problem and other unwieldy problems. In addition, the methodology works perfectly well with problems that have traditionally used a backward-solving approach.
Numerical, Consumption, Portfolio Choice, Asset Allocation
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35.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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| Posted: |
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10 Sep 08
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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112 (75,994)
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Abstract:
The rise of significant inbound capital flows originating from sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has occasioned a debate over the appropriate regulatory and tax treatment of these funds. In particular, it has been argued that the tax exemption currently enjoyed by SWFs confers an advantage on these entities as providers of capital to U.S. firms relative to private foreign investors, and that a tax should be imposed on SWFs to restore fairness. This brief essay argues that the distinctive nature of the portfolio choices facing SWFs negates this fairness argument. Indeed, changing the tax treatment of SWFs as has been proposed would distort choices that are otherwise efficient and would handicap U.S. firms and workers.
sovereign wealth funds, sovereign immunity, taxes, foreign portfolio investment
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36.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law Monica Singhal Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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24 Jun 08
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17 Sep 09
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111 (76,525)
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Abstract:
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) represents a novel tax expenditure program that employs "investable" tax credits to spur production of low-income rental housing. While it has grown into the largest source of new affordable housing in the U.S. and its structure is now being replicated in other programs, the LIHTC has also drawn skepticism and calls for its repeal. This paper outlines a conceptual framework for exploring the conditions under which investable tax credits may be the most effective mechanism to deliver a production subsidy and discusses the desirability of employing investable tax credits in other policy domains. Estimates of tax expenditures under this program are provided and efficiency costs, distributional issues, and the likely effects of reforms to tax provisions such as the AMT are considered.
housing subsify, tax credit, tax expenditure
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37.
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Daniel B. Bergstresser Harvard Business School Joshua D. Rauh Northwestern University - Department of Finance Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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17 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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17 Jun 04
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85 (92,642)
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19
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Abstract:
Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. We construct a measure of the sensitivity of reported earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on pension assets. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of return as they prepare to acquire other firms and as they exercise stock options, further confirming the opportunistic nature of these increases. Decisions about assumed rates of return, in turn, influence asset allocation within pension plans. Instrumental variables results suggest that a 25 basis point increase in the assumed rate of return is associated with a 5% increase in equity allocation. Taken together, these results suggest that earnings manipulation arising from managerial motivations influences significant managerial investment decisions.
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38.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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28 Mar 02
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Last Revised:
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04 Apr 02
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58 (115,803)
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20
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Abstract:
This paper examines the evolution of the corporate profit base and the relationship between book income and tax income for U.S. corporations over last two decades. The paper demonstrates that this relationship has broken down over the 1990s and has broken down in a manner that is consistent with increased sheltering activity. The paper traces the growing discrepancy between book and tax income associated with differential treatments of depreciation, the reporting of foreign source income, and, in particular, the changing nature of employee compensation. For the largest public companies, proceeds from option exercises equaled 27 percent of operating cash flow from 1996 to 2000 and these deductions appear to be fully utilized thereby creating the largest distinction between book and tax income. While the differential treatment of these items has historically accounted fully for the discrepancy between book and tax income, the paper demonstrates that book and tax income have diverged markedly for reasons not associated with these items during the late 1990s. In 1998, more than half of the difference between tax and book income - approximately $154.4 billion or 33.7 percent of tax income - cannot be accounted for by these factors. This paper proceeds to develop and test a model of costly sheltering and demonstrates that the breakdown in the relationship between tax and book income is consistent with increasing levels of sheltering during the late 1990s. These tests also explore an alternative explanation of these results - coincident increased levels of earnings management - and finds that the nature of the breakdown between book and tax income cannot be fully explained by this alternative explanation.
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39.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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18 Nov 00
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Last Revised:
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25 Jun 01
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56 (117,716)
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7
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Abstract:
This paper investigates the economic impact of tax incentives for American exports. These incentives include a partial tax exemption for export profits (available by routing exports through Foreign Sales Corporations), and the allocation of some export profits to foreign source income for purposes of U.S. taxation. The analysis highlights three important aspects of these policies. First, official figures appear to understate dramatically the tax expenditures associated with some U.S. export incentives. Correctly measured, total export benefits provided through the income tax are equivalent to a one percent ad valorem subsidy. Second, the 1984 imposition of more rigorous requirements for obtaining tax benefits through Foreign Sales Corporations is contemporaneous with a significant change in the pattern of U.S. exports. Estimates imply that the 1984 changes reduced U.S. manufacturing exports by 3.1 percent. Third, there were significant market reactions to the 1997 event in which the European Union charged that U.S. income tax provisions are inconsistent with World Trade Organization rules prohibiting export subsidies. Filing of the European complaint coincides with a 0.1 percent fall in the value of the U.S. dollar and steep drops in the share prices of major American exporters.
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40.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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13 Oct 04
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Last Revised:
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03 Nov 04
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53 (120,823)
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4
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Abstract:
How does the opportunity to use tax havens influence economic activity in nearby non-haven countries? Analysis of affiliate-level data indicates that American multinational firms use tax haven affiliates to reallocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and to defer home country taxes on foreign income. Ownership of tax haven affiliates is associated with reduced tax payments by nearby non-haven affiliates, the size of the effect being equivalent to a 20.8 percent tax rate reduction. The evidence also indicates that use of tax havens indirectly stimulates the growth of operations in non-haven countries in the same region. A one percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate is associated with 0.5 to 0.7 percent greater sales and investment growth by non-haven affiliates, implying a complementary relationship between haven and non-haven activity. The ability to avoid taxes by using tax haven affiliates therefore appears to facilitate economic activity in non-haven countries within regions.
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41.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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10 Jan 02
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Last Revised:
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12 Dec 09
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47 (127,384)
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22
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes dividend remittances by a large panel of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms. The dividend policies of foreign affiliates, which convey no signals to public capital markets, nevertheless resemble those used by publicly held companies in paying dividends to diffuse common shareholders. Robustness checks verify that dividend policies of foreign affiliates are little affected by the dividend policies of their parent companies or parent company exposure to public capital markets. Systematic differences in the payout behavior of affiliates that differ in organizational form, and those that face differing tax costs of paying dividends, reveal the importance of tax factors; nevertheless, dividend policies are not solely determined by tax considerations. The absence of capital market considerations and the incompleteness of tax explanations together suggest that dividend policies are largely driven by the need to control managers of foreign affiliates. Parent firms are more willing to incur tax penalties by simultaneously investing funds while receiving dividends when their foreign affiliates are partially owned, located far from the United States, or in jurisdictions in which property rights are weak, all of which are implied by control theories of dividends.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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42.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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26 Nov 96
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Last Revised:
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07 May 00
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42 (133,413)
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1
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This paper examines the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) on international joint ventures by American firms. The evidence suggests that the TRA had a significant effect on the organizational form of U.S. business activity abroad. The TRA mandates the use of separate credits on income received from foreign corporations owned 50% or less by Americans. This limitation on worldwide averaging greatly reduces the attractiveness of joint ventures to American investors, particularly ventures in low-tax foreign countries. Aggregate data indicate that U.S. participation in international joint ventures fell sharply after 1986. The decline in U.S. joint venture activity is most pronounced in low-tax countries, which is consistent with the incentives created by the TRA. Moreover, joint ventures in low-tax countries use more debt and pay greater royalties to their U.S. parents after 1986, which reflects their incentives to economize on dividend payments
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43.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Li Jin Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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23 Jul 07
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Last Revised:
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05 Oct 07
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41 (134,633)
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8
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Abstract:
This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that dividend-averse institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relationship between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy could reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating to low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional shareholders. Evidence is provided that both effects are operative. Instrumental variables analysis indicates that plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership patterns. Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax code indicate that as the tax cost of paying dividends changes, managers alter their dividend policy to serve their institutional shareholders.
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44.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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26 Aug 01
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Last Revised:
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25 Sep 01
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38 (138,319)
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33
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Abstract:
While governments have multiple tax instruments available to them, studies of the effect of tax policy on the locational decisions of multinationals typically focus exclusively on host country corporate income tax rates and their interaction with home country tax rules. This paper examines the impact of indirect (non-income) taxes on the location and character of foreign direct investment by American multinational firms. Indirect tax burdens significantly exceed foreign income tax obligations for these firms and appear to influence strongly their behavior. The influence of indirect taxes is shown to be partly attributable to the inability of American investors to claim foreign tax credits for indirect tax payments. Estimates imply that 10 percent higher indirect tax rates are associated with 9.2 percent lower reported income of American affiliates and 8.6 percent lower capital/labor ratios. These estimates carry implications for efficient tradeoffs between direct and indirect taxation in raising revenue while attracting mobile capital.
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45.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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19 Sep 02
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Last Revised:
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03 Oct 02
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37 (139,649)
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24
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Abstract:
This paper considers the effect of taxation on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) and taxable income reported by multinational firms with particular attention to the regional dynamics of tax competition and the role of chains of ownership. Confidential affiliate-level data are used to compare the investment and income-reporting behavior of American-owned foreign affiliates across ownership forms and regions. Ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 5.0 percent lower FDI, controlling for parent company and observable aspects of local economies, and 0.9 percent lower returns on assets, controlling for parent company and level of FDI. Tax effects are particularly strong within Europe, where ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 7.7 percent lower FDI and 1.7 percent lower returns on assets. Indirectly owned foreign affiliates also exhibit strong tax effects, ten percent higher tax rates being associated with 12.0 percent lower FDI and 1.4 percent lower returns on assets. American firms finance a growing fraction of their foreign operations indirectly through chains of ownership, which now account for more than 30 percent of aggregate foreign assets and sales. Ownership chains are particularly concentrated among European affiliates. Since multinational firms from countries other than the United States face tax environments similar to those faced by indirectly owned affiliates of American companies, these results suggest a greater sensitivity of FDI to taxes for non-American firms. The results also suggest that European economic integration may have the effect of intensifying tax competition between European jurisdictions.
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46.
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Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions
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hide multiple versions |
Export Bibliographic Info |
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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Posted:
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11 Jul 02
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Last Revised:
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21 Mar 03
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36 (140,993) |
28
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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22 Jan 03
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Last Revised:
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21 Mar 03
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0
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Abstract:
This paper investigates the determinants of corporate expatriations. American corporations that seek to avoid U.S. taxes on their foreign incomes can do so by becoming foreign corporations, typically by "inverting" the corporate structure, so that the foreign subsidiary becomes the parent company and the U.S. parent becomes a subsidiary. Three types of evidence are considered in order to understand this rapidly growing practice. First, an analysis of the market reaction to Stanley Works' expatriation decision implies that market participants expect its foreign inversion to be accompanied by a reduction in tax liabilities on U.S. source income, since savings associated with the taxation of foreign income alone cannot account for the changed valuations. Second, statistical evidence indicates that large firms, those with extensive foreign assets, and those with considerable debt are the most likely to expatriate - suggesting that U.S. taxation of foreign income, including the interest expense allocation rules, significantly affect inversions. Third, share prices rise by an average of 1.7 percent in response to expatriation announcements. Ten percent higher leverage ratios are associated with 0.7 percent greater market reactions to expatriations, reflecting the benefit of avoiding the U.S. rules concerning interest expense allocation. Shares of inverting companies typically stand at only 88 percent of their average values of the previous year, and every ten percent of prior share price appreciation is associated with 1.1 percent greater market reaction to an inversion announcement. Taken together, these patterns suggest that managers maximize shareholder wealth rather than share prices, avoiding expatriations unless future tax savings - including reduced costs of repatriation taxes and expense allocation, and the benefits of enhanced worldwide tax planning opportunities - more than compensate for current capital gains tax liabilities.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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11 Jul 02
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Last Revised:
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19 Jul 02
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36
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28
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Abstract:
This paper investigates the determinants of corporate expatriations. American corporations that seek to avoid U.S. taxes on their foreign incomes can do so by becoming foreign corporations, typically by 'inverting' the corporate structure, so that the foreign subsidiary becomes the parent company and U.S. parent company becomes a subsidiary. Three types of evidence are considered in order to understand this rapidly growing practice. First, an analysis of the market reaction to Stanley Works's expatriation decision implies that market participants expect its foreign inversion to be accompanied by a reduction in tax liabilities on U.S. source income, since savings associated with the taxation of foreign income alone cannot account for the changed valuations. Second, statistical evidence indicates that large firms, those with extensive foreign assets, and those with considerable debt are the most likely to expatriate - suggesting that U.S. taxation of foreign income, including the interest expense allocation rules, significantly affect inversions. Third, share prices rise by an average of 1.7 percent in response to expatriation announcements. Ten percent higher leverage ratios are associated with 0.7 percent greater market reactions to expatriations, reflecting the benefit of avoiding the U.S. rules concerning interest expense allocation. Shares of inverting companies typically stand at only 88 percent of their average values of the previous year, and every ten percent of prior share price appreciation is associated with 1.1 percent greater market reaction to an inversion announcement. Taken together, these patterns suggest that managers maximize shareholder wealth rather than share prices, avoiding expatriations unless future tax savings - including reduced costs of repatriation taxes and expense allocation, and the benefits of enhanced worldwide tax planning opportunities - more than compensate for current capital gains tax liabilities.
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47.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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| Posted: |
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12 May 05
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Last Revised:
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22 Jun 09
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35 (142,410)
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22
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Abstract:
How do investors value managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations? Using a framework in which managers' tax sheltering decisions are related to their ability to divert value, this paper predicts that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value should vary systematically with the strength of firm governance institutions. The empirical results indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero; however, the effect is positive for well-governed firms as predicted. Coefficient estimates are consistent with an expected life of five years for the devices that generate these tax savings for well-governed firms. Alternative explanations for the dependence of the valuation of the tax avoidance measure on firm governance do not appear to be consistent with the empirical results. The findings indicate that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete, given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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48.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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29 Sep 01
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Last Revised:
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02 Jan 10
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31 (148,289)
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33
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the effect of repatriation taxes on dividend payments by the foreign affiliates of American multinational firms. The United States taxes the foreign incomes of American companies, grants credits for any foreign income taxes paid, and defers any taxes due on the unrepatriated earnings for those affiliates that are separately incorporated abroad. This system thereby imposes repatriation taxes that vary inversely with foreign tax rates and that differ across organizational forms. As a consequence, it is possible to measure the effect of repatriation taxes by comparing the behavior of foreign subsidiaries that are subject to different tax rates and by comparing the behavior of foreign incorporated and unincorporated affiliates. Evidence from a large panel of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms from 1982 to 1997 indicates that one percent lower repatriation tax rates are associated with one percent higher dividends. This implies that repatriation taxes reduce aggregate dividend payouts by 12.8 percent, and, in the process, generate annual efficiency losses equal to 2.5 percent of dividends. These effects would disappear if the United States were to exempt foreign income from taxation.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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49.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Kristin J. Forbes Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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18 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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30 Aug 09
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29 (151,747)
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26
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Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of financial constraints on firm growth by investigating if large depreciations differentially impact multinational affiliates and local firms in emerging markets. U.S. multinational affiliates increase sales, assets and investment significantly more than local firms during, and subsequent to, currency crises. The enhanced relative performance of multinationals is traced to their ability to use internal capital markets to capitalize on the competitiveness benefits of large depreciations. Investment specifications indicate that increases in leverage resulting from sharp depreciations constrain local firms from capitalizing on these investment opportunities, but do not constrain multinational affiliates. Multinational parents also infuse new capital in their affiliates after currency crises. These results indicate another role for foreign direct investment in emerging markets multinational affiliates expand economic activity during currency crises when local firms are most constrained.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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50.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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23 Aug 02
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Last Revised:
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30 Aug 02
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27 (155,674)
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6
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes the determinants of partial ownership of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms and, in particular, why partial ownership has declined markedly over the last 20 years. The evidence indicates that whole ownership is most common when firms coordinate integrated production activities across different locations, transfer technology, and benefit from worldwide tax planning. Since operations and ownership levels are jointly determined, it is necessary to use the liberalization of ownership restrictions by host countries and the imposition of joint venture tax penalties in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 as instruments for ownership levels in order to identify these effects. Firms responded to these regulatory and tax changes by expanding the volume of their intrafirm trade as well as the extent of whole ownership; four percent greater subsequent sole ownership of affiliates is associated with three percent higher intrafirm trade volumes. The implied complementarity of whole ownership and intrafirm trade suggests that reduced costs of coordinating global operations, together with regulatory and tax changes, gave rise to the sharply declining propensity of American firms to organize their foreign operations as joint ventures over the last two decades. The forces of globalization appear to have increased the desire of multinationals to structure many transactions inside firms rather than through exchanges involving other parties.
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51.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit William M. Gentry Williams College - Department of Economics
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| Posted: |
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23 Dec 03
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Last Revised:
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13 Sep 09
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24 (162,561)
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3
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes how corporate capital gains taxes affect the capital gain realization decisions of firms. The paper outlines the tax treatment of corporate capital gains, the consequent incentives for firms with gains and losses, the efficiency consequences of these taxes in the context of other taxes and capital market distortions, and the response of firms to these incentives. Despite receiving limited attention, corporate capital gain realizations have averaged 30 percent of individual capital gain realizations over the last fifty years and have increased dramatically in importance over the last decade. By 1999, the ratio of net long-term capital gains to income subject to tax was 21 percent and was distributed across a variety of industries suggesting the importance of realization behavior to corporate financing decisions. Time-series analysis of aggregate realization behavior demonstrates that corporate capital gains taxes impact realization behavior significantly. Similarly, an analysis of firm-level investment and property, plant, and equipment (PPE) disposal decisions and gain recognition behavior similarly suggests an important role for these taxes in determining when firms raise money by disposing of assets and realizing gains.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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52.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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09 Feb 01
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Last Revised:
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14 Aug 01
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21 (170,930)
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2
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Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of tax-based export promotion on exchange rates and patterns of trade. The threatened removal of Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) due to the 1997 European Union complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO) is used to identify the adjustment of exchange rates to reduced after-tax margins for American exporters. The evidence indicates that days associated with significant developments in the European complaint are characterized by predicted changes in the value of the U.S. dollar. Additionally, foreign trading relationships with the United States appear to influence currency responses to the possibility of FSC repeal. Exchange rate movements on the date of the initial European complaint indicate that 10 percent greater net trade deficits with the United States are associated with currency appreciations of 0.2 percent against the U.S. dollar. This evidence is consistent with a combination of trade-based exchange rate determination and important effects of U.S. export promotion policies.
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53.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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| Posted: |
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23 Jul 07
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Last Revised:
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05 Oct 07
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16 (185,483)
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1
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Abstract:
This paper investigates how taxes influence portfolio choices by exploring the response to the distinctive treatment of foreign dividends in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). JGTRRA lowered the dividend tax rate to 15% for American equities and extended this tax relief only to foreign corporations from a subset of countries. This paper uses a difference-in-difference analysis that compares US equity holdings in affected and unaffected countries. The international investment responses to JGTRRA were substantial and imply an elasticity of asset holdings with respect to taxes of -1.6. This effect cannot be explained by several potential alternative hypotheses, including differential changes to the preferences of American investors, differential changes in investment opportunities, differential time trends in investment or changed tax evasion behavior.
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54.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law
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| Posted: |
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27 Jun 07
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Last Revised:
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17 Aug 07
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13 (194,393)
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5
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Abstract:
Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflect efforts to bypass home country tax regimes and weak host country investor protections. The cross-country analysis indicates that a 10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings by 21%, controlling for effects on FDI. This suggests that the residual tax on foreign multinational firm earnings biases capital flows to low corporate tax countries toward FPI. A one standard deviation increase in a foreign country's investor protections is shown to be associated with a 24% increase in US investors' equity FPI holdings. These results are robust to various controls, are not evident for debt capital flows, and are confirmed using an instrumental variables analysis. The use of FPI to bypass home country taxation of multinational firms is also apparent using only portfolio investment responses to within-country corporate tax rate changes in a panel from 1994 to 2005. Investors appear to alter their portfolio choices to circumvent home and host country institutional regimes.
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55.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Dhammika Dharmapala University of Illinois College of Law Monica Singhal Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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30 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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03 Dec 09
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10 (203,403)
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1
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Abstract:
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) represents a novel tax expenditure program that employs “investable� tax credits to spur production of low-income rental housing. While it has grown into the largest source of new affordable housing in the U.S. and its structure is now being replicated in other programs, the LIHTC has also drawn skepticism and calls for its repeal. We provide estimates of tax expenditures under this program and discuss pricing, efficiency, and distributional effects of the program. We also consider the impacts of the recent financial crisis on the LIHTC program and explore implications of resulting policy changes and proposals.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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56.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit James R. Hines Jr. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School
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| Posted: |
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27 Aug 00
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Last Revised:
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27 Aug 00
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10 (203,403)
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2
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Abstract:
This paper estimates the efficiency consequences of interactions between nominal tax systems and inflation in open economies. Domestic inflation changes after-tax real interest rates at home and abroad, thereby stimulating international capital movement and influencing domestic and foreign tax receipts, saving, and investment. The efficiency costs of inflation-induced international capital reallocations are typically much larger than those that accompany inflation in closed economies, even if capital is imperfectly mobile internationally. Differences between inflation rates are responsible for international capital movements and accompanying deadweight losses, suggesting that international monetary coordination has the potential to reduce the inefficiencies associated with inflation-induced capital movements.
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57.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This module note describes the third module of the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. The module focuses on the financial and managerial issues that confront managers who make financial decisions within multinational firms: how subsidiaries should be financed and owned, how repatriations should be conducted, how different tax regimes influence financial decisions, and how firms can measure and compare the performance of businesses and managers in different countries. The module note provides instructors with an overview of the module, the cases and the teaching notes, and explains how this module fits into the overall International Finance course. There is a brief description of the framework developed in the course and the note explains the application of this framework to the cases in this module. The module note includes descriptions of the three cases in the module and the analysis required in each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for the cases; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The module note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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58.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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18 Aug 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
The CFO of General Motors' joint venture in Shanghai, Shanghai General Motors (SGM), wants to refinance almost $900 million of project finance it raised to begin operations. The highest priority is improving the terms of the financing with regard to costs and specific covenants. Several factors complicate the CFO's objective, including the presence of capital controls, the impending entry of China into the World Trade Organization, the joint venture partner's captive finance subsidiary, and the conflicting goals of the joint venture partners. The case illustrates how subsidiary financial decisions must trade off entity-level and parent-level concerns. It also illustrates how multinational financial decision making - including transfer pricing, repatriation, and funding decisions - must be designed to accommodate governance concerns, financial objectives, and the potentially divergent interests of joint venture partners. The framework of the on-going operational and investment decisions that Shanghai General Motors undertakes in its early growth demonstrates the "life cycle" of subsidiary finance. The case also touches on elements of foreign governments' attempts to regulate capital markets, the dynamic between domestic and international banks in competing for lending opportunities to multinational subsidiaries, and how subsidiary management can achieve the most desirable funding terms.
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59.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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18 Aug 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This case explores the use of the EVA - economic value added - methodology at Asahi Glass. EVA is among the changes initiated by the CEO aimed at transforming Asahi Glass from a traditional Japanese company to a global firm. Other changes included a corporate reorganization into worldwide business groups, the appointment of non-Japanese managers to key positions, and corporate governance reforms. The EVA methodology was introduced to improve resource allocation across Asahi's numerous businesses around the world and to evaluate the managerial performance of top executives. It examines how the company calculated EVA and, in particular, how it calculated the weighted average cost of capital for its different businesses in different countries. Is Asahi Glass gaining benefits from the EVA methodology, and does it contribute to the transformation of Asahi Glass into a truly international firm?
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60.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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18 Aug 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This module note describes the fourth module of the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. The module explores how valuation differs in an international context and introduces students to the major issues in cross-border valuations: how to value investments in currencies other than the home currency; how to calculate the appropriate discount rates for projects in different countries; and how and when to incorporate country risk into valuations. The module note provides instructors with an overview of the module, the cases and the teaching notes, and explains how this module fits into the overall International Finance course. There is a brief description of the framework developed in the course and the note explains the application of this framework to the cases in this module. The module note includes descriptions of the three cases in the module and the analysis required in each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for the cases; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The module note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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61.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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18 Aug 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
A team of private equity investors must value the leveraged buyout of a Yellow Pages business that operated in both the United States and the United Kingdom. In the process, they must wrestle with issues of how to conduct cross-border valuations and how to value a stable cash cow business along with a growth business. The case analyzes the economics and incentives of carried interest and compares different valuation methods - Capital Cash Flow and Free Cash Flow.
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62.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
With electricity generating businesses around the world, AES Corp. is seeking a methodology for calculating the cost of capital for its various businesses and potential projects. In the past, AES used the same cost of capital for all of its capital budgeting, but the company's international expansion has raised questions about this approach and whether a single cost of capital adequately accounts for the different risks AES faces in its diverse businesses and diverse environments. The company recently suffered heavy losses from currency devaluations in South America and regulatory changes in other countries. The director of the corporate planning group is developing a methodology for taking account of different country and project risks, and the case allows students to use this methodology to calculate the cost of capital for 15 different projects around the world. Students must consider how a global firm can account for differing risks in evaluating its international operations and in investing abroad.
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63.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
What price should Dow Chemical bid for PBB, a petrochemical complex that is being privatized by the Argentine government? To answer this question, students are forced to consider the role of country risk, the underlying currency exposure of the business, and how to value an investment opportunity that has several stages. Given that it is a privatization, students are also forced to consider the political dynamics involved, the incentives of local managers, and the bidding process of a privatization. The case provides detailed cash flows and discount rate information, allowing students to conduct a thorough valuation for an emerging markets project.
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64.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This module note describes the fifth module in the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. This module explores how segmented capital markets create financing opportunities for firms and the mechanisms that evolve to take advantage of those opportunities. The issues raised in the cases in this module include why and how firms seek foreign listings, how tax differences across countries can create financing opportunities, the kinds of arbitrage opportunities that arise from segmented markets, and how managerial incentives influence decisions to exploit cross-border financial opportunities. The note describes the framework developed in the International Finance course and explains its application to the cases in this module. The module note includes descriptions of the three cases in the module and the analysis required for each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for each case; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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65.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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18 Aug 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
In response to a perceived undervaluation by the capital markets, Nestlé is considering divesting a part of its ophthalmology subsidiary, Alcon, and must decide on a listing location. In the process, students are challenged to wrestle with the valuation of a conglomerate, the tradeoffs involved in listing in the United States versus Europe, and the incentive and tax consequences of that listing decision.
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66.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
The Brazilian oil company, Petrobras, is evaluating the acquisition of an Argentine oil company, the Perez Companc Group (Pecom). The acquisition would increase Petrobras' oil reserves and expand its interests outside Brazil, a significant step for the largest company in Brazil. Pecom is for sale because it has been severely affected by the financial crisis in Argentina. Students have the opportunity to assess the impact of a severe devaluation on a company. There is also considerable uncertainty about how to value Pecom, and students must weigh the importance of country risk in determining the appropriate discount rate to use in the valuation. Finally, there is also uncertainty about Petrobras's own future as the Brazilian government has controlled it. Students are allowed to review the efficacy of changes in corporate governance implemented by Petrobras, despite its ongoing link to the Brazilian state and the associated political uncertainties of that affiliation. Students will consider different methods of valuation and the impact of politics on cross-border acquisitions.
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67.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This case describes the varied instruments that have evolved to facilitate investments in foreign corporations, emphasizing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and cross-border listings. It describes the different types of ADRs and the regulatory requirements foreign corporations must meet to list their shares on U.S. stock exchanges. It examines the evolution of cross-border listings as well as recent developments, such as Globally Registered Shares. It also reviews the academic research on the motivations for cross-border listings and provides information on managerial views on the advantages and disadvantages of cross-border listings.
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68.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This module note describes the sixth module in the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. The module explores the issues confronting firms that operate in weak institutional environments. The cases examine situations where investor protections are limited and how firms can respond to these environments, how they impact the financing choices of firms, and the possibility of non-national recourse in response to an expropriation. The module note provides instructors with an overview of the module, the cases and the teaching notes, and explains how this module fits into the overall International Finance course. There is a brief description of the framework developed in the course and the note explains the application of this framework to the cases in this module. The module note includes descriptions of the two cases in the module and the analysis required in each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for the cases; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The module note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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69.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
The CFO of this infant nutritional products company must choose among competing financing offers. The interplay of Chinese legal and customs restrictions and venture capitalists' bargaining techniques challenge the CFO to navigate a tricky negotiation and to devise a unique business model given these constraints. The case provides a valuation exercise and highlights the ways in which venture capital and entrepreneurial finance differs in emerging markets.
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70.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This module note describes the seventh module in the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. The module focuses on how national and international regulatory regimes influence financial decisions. The module explores how how national regulatory regimes interact, the prospects for multilateral regulatory regimes, and the impact of regulatory regimes on firms and investors. The module note provides instructors with an overview of the module, the cases and the teaching notes, and explains how this module fits into the overall International Finance course. The module note includes descriptions of the two cases in the module and the analysis required in each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for the cases; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The module note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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71.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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18 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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14 Dec 06
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
How should the debt of sovereign countries be restructured when countries approach default? Anne O. Krueger of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is proposing a new approach to sovereign defaults: the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). The SDRM would create a new international legal framework for sovereign defaults, similar to bankruptcy proceedings in the private sector. A new judicial group within the IMF would oversee the SDRM, and it would be implemented through international treaties. Krueger has to construct a convincing case that the SDRM would be more effective than alternative approaches to sovereign defaults. The case provides information on some major sovereign defaults (the crises in Latin America, Mexico, and Asia) and on the existing institutions and processes that creditors and debtors turn to in sovereign defaults. Students must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to sovereign defaults.
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72.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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| Posted: |
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16 Aug 06
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Last Revised:
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16 Aug 06
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Abstract:
This module note describes the second module of the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. The module focuses on how firms identify, measure and manage currency exposures. The cases first introduce students to foreign exchange exposures and the tools used to manage currency risks, and then to the broader issues involved in formulating appropriate foreign exchange hedging strategies in the context of a large multinational firms. The module note provides instructors with an overview of the module, the cases and the teaching notes, and how this module fits into the overall International Finance course. There is a brief description of the framework developed in the course and the note explains the application of this framework to the cases in this module. The module note includes descriptions of the three cases in the module and of the analytic exercise embedded in each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for the cases; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The module note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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73.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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16 Aug 06
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16 Aug 06
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How should a multinational firm manage foreign exchange exposures? The case examines transactional and translational exposures and alternative responses to these exposures by analyzing two specific hedging decisions by General Motors. Describes General Motors' corporate hedging policies, its risk management structure, and how accounting rules impact hedging decisions. The company is considering deviations from prescribed policies because of two significant exposures: an exposure to the Canadian dollar with adverse accounting consequences and an exposure to the Argentinean currency when devaluation is widely anticipated. Students must evaluate the risks General Motors faces in each situation and consider which hedging strategy - if any - might be appropriate. Asks students to analyze the financial costs and accounting treatment of alternative derivative transactions for hedging purposes.
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74.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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16 Aug 06
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16 Aug 06
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Abstract:
How can a multinational firm analyze and manage currency risks that arise from competitive exposures? General Motors has a substantial competitive exposure to the Japanese yen. Although the risks GM faces from the depreciating yen are widely acknowledged, the company's corporate hedging policy does not provide any guidelines on managing such competitive exposures. Eric Feldstein, treasurer and vice-president of finance, has to quantify GM's yen exposure and recommend a way for GM to manage the risks that arise from its competitive exposure. Students must analyze the impact of a yen depreciation on GM sales and profits.
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75.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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16 Aug 06
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16 Aug 06
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Abstract:
Provides information on the foreign exchange market and exchange rate movements. Describes the different types of foreign exchange transactions, including spot transactions, forwards, swaps, futures, and options. Includes worked examples to help students understand the different instruments and an appendix with additional exercises.
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76.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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16 Aug 06
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16 Aug 06
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This note explores the concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) and its practical applications as a management control system for performance measurement and incentive compensation. The note explains how EVA is measured and explores some of the adjustments to financial statements that are required to measure EVA. The note provides a fully worked example of a firm's measurement of its EVA, both before and after adjustments to its financial statements. Several types of EVA bonus schemes are described. Both the benefits and limitations of EVA are discussed in the note.
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77.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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16 Aug 06
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16 Aug 06
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Abstract:
Provides a framework for understanding different types of international tax regimes. Examines how alternative tax regimes tax the foreign income of their citizens (including corporate citizens); how tax regimes define foreign and domestic income; and how foreign tax credits and deductions are used in worldwide tax regimes to mitigate double taxation. Discusses in detail the current U.S. system of worldwide taxation and the managerial incentives created by the U.S. tax system.
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78.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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26 Jul 06
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26 Jul 06
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Currency, Foreign exchange rates, Inflation, Macroeconomics, Monetary policy, Regulatory agencies CASE SETTINGS: Singapore; Government & regulatory; 10,000 employees; 2002 The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is responsible for the country's monetary policy, and its decisions are intended to support the country's overall strategy for sustainable economic growth with price stability. MAS has been very successful in managing exchange rates using a managed float system, which allows more flexibility than a fixed exchange rate but less volatility than freely floating exchange rates. Following the Asian financial crisis, Dr. Khor Hoe Ee and his colleagues must decide whether to continue to manage exchange rates through the managed float or whether alternative monetary policies would be more effective in supporting Singapore's economic goals.
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79.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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06 Jul 06
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28 Jul 06
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Abstract:
This overview note describes the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. The note begins by arguing that the forces of globalization have fundamentally changed the scope and activities of firms thereby altering the practice of finance within these firms. As a consequence of an increasing reliance on tightly-integrated foreign operations, a parallel world of finance has been opened within every multinational firm and this world has been overlooked. The course materials are designed to address the many aspects of financial decision making within global firms prompted by these changes that are not addressed in traditional materials. The second section of the note briefly explains the overall structure of the course. The seven course modules are introduced with a brief discussion of the larger issues considered within each module and the rationale for the structure of the course. The three modules that constitute the core of the course are discussed in greater detail in this section. The third section of the note outlines an analytical framework that has been developed through the creation of the course materials to guide critical financial decisions on financing, investment, risk management and incentive management within a multinational firm. This framework emphasizes the need to reconcile conflicting forces in order for multinational firms to gain competitive advantage from their internal capital markets. The note concludes with a discussion of the course's pedagogical approach and detailed descriptions of all the course materials, including 19 case studies, corresponding teaching notes, several module notes and supplementary materials.
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80.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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06 Jul 06
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28 Jul 06
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Abstract:
This module note describes the first module of the International Finance course at Harvard Business School. This introductory module focuses on the concepts and skills that students need throughout a course on international finance: a familiarity with exchange rates and associated instruments; an understanding of the economics of exchange rates; and how the CAPM translates into an international setting. These concepts are usually taught only through textbooks, so the case studies in this module offer an innovative approach to teaching this material. The note provides instructors with an overview of the module, the cases and the teaching notes. It includes descriptions of the three cases in the module and of the analytic exercise embedded in each case; an explanation of the learning objectives and suggested assignment questions for the cases; and information on additional materials useful in teaching the cases. The module note concludes with references to the relevant academic literature and a bibliography.
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81.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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02 Mar 06
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02 Mar 06
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Prof. Desai notes that a missing element in current debates over the appropriate taxation of capital income is the puzzling treatment of corporate capital gains. Given the rising importance of corporate capital gains and the unique distortions associated with them, he finds the oversight surprising. He notes that the taxation of corporate capital gains is associated with two types of economic distortions. First, the realization-based taxation of corporate capital gains discourages value-enhancing asset reallocation by creating a significant lock-in effect. Because unrealized U.S. corporate capital gains exceed $800 billion, there is a sizable economic cost associated with that lock-in effect. Second, such taxation discourages corporate investments by imposing a third layer of tax on top of the corporate income tax and the personal income tax on corporate income distributed to shareholders. Those distortions, he believes, are all the more notable because of the relief available for analogous transactions in other parts of the tax system. For example, he notes, capital gains earned by individuals are currently taxed at lower rates than apply to ordinary income and dividends received by corporations are afforded relief through the dividends-received deduction. Among his suggested alternatives to taxing corporate capital gains at the same rates as ordinary income are exempting corporate capital gains from taxation altogether or taxing corporate capital gains at preferential rates. Several other countries exempt corporate capital gains from taxation. Reforms to the U.S. taxation of capital gains, he believes, have the potential for sizable efficiency gains relative to other alternatives, given the magnitude of preexisting distortions from the current system of capital taxation. He calculates that a reduction of the corporate capital gains tax rate from 35 percent to 15 percent would be associated with $17 billion per year in efficiency gains.
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82.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Mark F. Veblen Affiliation Unknown Kathleen Lulchs Affiliation Unknown
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10 Nov 05
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10 Nov 05
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Accounting, Corporate control, Financial management, Financial statements, Financial strategy, International finance, Mergers & Acquisitions, Taxation, Valuation CASE SETTINGS: United States; Industrial goods; $2,264 million revenues; 15,000 employees; 2002 In response to Stanley Work's announcement that it is moving to Bermuda - and the associated jump in market value - a major competitor sets out to determine how the market is valuing the consequences of moving to a tax haven and whether his company should invert to a tax haven. In particular, the competitor's CFO needs to attribute Stanley's stock price movements across several dimensions of potential tax savings (tax savings on foreign operations and on interest payments) to see if there might be something else at play (earnings stripping). In the process, the mechanics and incentives created by the international tax regime are illustrated.
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83.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Mark F. Veblen Affiliation Unknown Gabriel J. Loeb Affiliation Unknown
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10 Nov 05
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10 Nov 05
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Financial management, Financial strategy, Financing, International finance, Negotiations, Taxation, Valuation CASE SETTINGS: United States; Entertainment industry; $400 million revenues, 100 employees; 2002 The head of production for Rexford Studios must analyze the terms and value consequences of an international financing involving a German film fund. The financing involves a sale-leaseback structure where international tax rules give rise to a sizable economic pie that is divided up among the fund investors, the studio, and the arrangers. To conduct the negotiation, the producer must value the cash flow streams to each of the parties and recognize the nature of the tax arbitrage in the context of his overall financing needs. As a consequence, the major issues involved in film financing and the nature of sale-leaseback transactions driven by tax considerations are explored, as is the competition between countries for film production. Finally, the underlying determinants of opportunities created by international tax rules are valued.
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84.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Kathleen S. Luchs Harvard Business School Alberto Moel Monitor Corporate Finance, Monitor Group
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10 Nov 05
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10 Nov 05
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: International finance, Joint Ventures, Negotiations, Political risk, Shareholders relations CASE SETTINGS: Czech Republic; Broadcasting industry; $170 million revenues; 1997 This case examines how insiders can expropriate value from shareholders in emerging markets when property rights are ill-defined. As such, it provides a platform for considering how institutions and legal rules impact financing patterns and economic outcomes. CME, controlled by the former U.S. Ambassador to Austria, Ronald Lauder, and its Czech partners win the bidding for the first private broadcast frequency with national coverage in the Czech Republic in 1993. After the entity succeeds dramatically, the primary Czech partner wants to sell his share in the operating company. CME must decide whether to buy the stake and at what price.
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85.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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31 Oct 05
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31 Oct 05
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Currency, Foreign exchange, International finance, Investment management, Money, Stocks CASE SETTINGS: Global; Financial services; 8 employees; 2004 What do international stocks contribute to the portfolio of a U.S. investor? How do currencies interact with stock price movements in determining the benefits of international diversification? This case helps students compare the risks and returns of foreign stock markets with each other and with the U.S. market and to examine the risks and returns of international diversification. Students must calculate returns, adjust for currencies, derive correlations, and map efficient frontiers based on raw data.
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86.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Anders Sjoman Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; European Research Center Vincent Dessain Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; European Research Center
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30 Sep 05
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30 Sep 05
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Currency, Foreign exchange, Foreign exchange rates, Hedging, Travel CASE SETTINGS: London; Education industry; Travel industry; $200 million; 100 employees; 2004 The American Institute for Foreign Studies (AIFS) organizes study abroad programs and cultural exchanges for American students. The firm's revenues are mainly in U.S. dollars, but most of its costs are in eurodollars and British pounds. The company's controllers review the hedging activities of AIFS. AIFS has a hedging policy, but the controllers want to review the percentage of exposure that is covered and the use of forward contracts and options. AIFS sets guaranteed prices for its exchanges and tours a year in advance, before its final sales figures are known. The controllers need to ensure that the company adequately hedges its foreign exchange exposure and achieves an appropriate balance between forward contracts and currency options. To obtain executable spreadsheets (courseware), please contact our customer service department at custserv@hbsp.harvard.edu.
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87.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Mark F. Veblen Affiliation Unknown Belen Villalonga Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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30 Sep 05
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30 Sep 05
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Antitrust laws, Business government relations, Competition, Industrial policy, Mergers, Regulatory agencies CASE SETTINGS: Brussels; Aerospace Industry; 2001 Helps students understand the principles underlying competition and antitrust policy in the context of the proposed GE-Honeywell merger. The U.S. Department of Justice has already approved the transaction and it is being considered by the European Commission. The Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, must analyze the economic consequences of the proposed merger and evaluate how it will affect competitors, customers, and product markets. He must also address key policy choices. In understanding the nuances of the transaction, students identify different sources of value and must confront the question of whether the efficiencies generated enhance social welfare in the long run. The decision of whether to approve the merger, and on what terms, provides students with insights into the complexities of operating under multiple regulatory regimes.
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88.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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27 May 02
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: insurance, mergers & acquisitions, valuation CASE SETTING: April 1996, U.S. disability insurance Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company has made an initial bid to acquire a primary competitor, Paul Revere, from conglomerate, Textron. The due diligence process uncovers a significant block of problematic disability insurance policies. Provident is forced to assess the negative impact of this discovery on its initial valuation and revise its bid. In the process, the divergent views of the evolution of these policies by the bidder and seller have to be translated through discounted cash flow analysis into appropriate bid prices. Finally, this DCF analysis, in combination with multiples analysis, is used in negotiations with Textron and public shareholders. This case provides a platform for (a) introducing students to the insurance industry by examining how insurers pool risks, incorporate asymmetric information in pricing and designing their policies, manage these risks by investing assets over time, and how this industry reports their financial results to investors; (b) demonstrating discounted cash flow analysis and multiples analysis in the insurance industry; and (c) discussing negotiation dynamics in an M&A situation involving a large majority shareholder and a minority public float and divergent views of future expected cash flows.
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89.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit Peter Tufano Harvard Business School
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29 Jan 02
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15 Jan 09
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Real option theory, Valuation, Equity Analyst Research CASE SETTING: May 1999, U.S. Cable/Broadband CSFB equity research analyst, Laura Martin, publishes a report on valuing Cox Communications that introduces an innovative approach to valuation. She contends that EBITDA multiple analysis, typical for the cable industry, is flawed because it overlooks the value of the "stealth tier" (unused capacity on cable companies' fiber optic network). Martin proposes using real options valuation to impute value to the stealth tier, and she thereby arrives at a higher valuation for Cox stock. This provides the context for contrasting several valuation methodologies traditional DCF analysis, regression-based ROIC and multiple analysis, and real option theory and assessing how selected assumptions impact the various valuation techniques. In particular, Martin reviews ways in which the industry is evolving and students can think about how these changes impact what valuation method is most appropriate. More generally, this case provides a context for discussing the role of equity research analysts, highlighting all the constituencies they serve and how this can create conflicts of interest. Martin's application of real options theory provides an opportunity to evaluate where it works, where it doesn't, and why.
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90.
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Mihir A. Desai Harvard Business School - Finance Unit
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29 Jan 02
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15 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Valuation, Entrepreneurial Finance, Corporate Finance CASE SETTING: June 1999, U.S. Software Project Achieve is a startup providing information management solutions for schools. Its founders see a need for software both to manage the volumes of information necessary to administer a school and to connect parents, teachers, and students in a more effective way. Originally funded by angel investors, Project Achieve is raising its first formal round of financing and needs to establish a firm valuation. The case outlines the economics of the business and provides the necessary background figures to build the business model and arrive at a valuation. This case explores quantitative considerations of venture financing: (1) value neutrality of equity issuance is illustrated; (2) cost of capital is computed from raw return series, and the appropriate discount rate is selected based on comparables; (3) decision trees are used to highlight the importance of probabilistic thinking; and (4) subscriber models are compared with annual free cash flow models both for determining financial value and as decision-making tools for business choices. In addition, the case can provide a setting to discuss the more qualitative issues involved in choosing investors. In particular, the founders are comparing two options: an infusion of additional capital from current and new investors or an investment from a potential strategic partner. Each option has very different implications for the direction of the business going forward.
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