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Abstract:
We distinguish between discovery information and private foreknowledge in the valuation of initial public offerings of corporate securities. An underwriter gathers discovery information to value and price the issue. The issuing firm relies on this information to make the optimal investment decision. In the absence of syndicate restrictions, the inevitable errors in pricing give outsiders the opportunity to acquire private foreknowledge to effect wealth transfers from the underwriter. Because this activity is costly but has no influence on the issuer's investment, it reduces the parties' joint wealth. They therefore have an incentive to organize their arrangements to avoid the associated losses. We show how various features of the syndicate system perform this function, increasing the returns to investment banking and decreasing the cost of capital to issuing firms.

Abstract:
No abstract available.

Abstract:
Contract stipulations tend to be subject to commodity standards. Standards make it clearer what transactors have agreed upon. They also bring stipulations from different contracts under a common denominator. The lower the cost of measuring an attribute and the wider the range of its application, the higher the likelihood that the attribute will become subject to new standards. New standards are predicted to increase the role of contracts in agreements and to reduce that of long-term relations; to lower the prices of the commodities that use the standards; to increase the rate of theft of these commodities; and, by making it clearer what it is that parties exchange, to reduce the level of vertical integration. Finally, new standards propel markets toward perfect competition. (JEL D23, L14, L15, L22)

Abstract:
This paper argues that in the middle ages voting institutions emerged as mechanisms that allowed rulers to cooperate with subjects on mutually profitable projects. In spite of their utility, many of these voting institutions eventually declined. We test the model on the English parliament and the French estates general. The historical evidence strongly supports our view that these institutions declined in France, but not in England, due to increases in the heterogeneity of voters' interests and the insecurity of French rulers, since these factors made cooperation between French rulers and their subjects more difficult.