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Abstract:
The failure of academic finance can be considered one of the symbols of the financial crisis. Two important underlying reasons why academic finance models systematically fail to account for real-world phenomena follow directly from two conventions: (a) treating economics not as a 'true' social science (but as a branch of applied mathematics inspired by the methodology of classical physics); and (b) using economic models as if the empirical content of economic theories is not very low. Failure to understand and appreciate the inherent weaknesses of these 'conventions' had fatal consequences for the use and interpretation of key academic finance concepts and models by market practitioners and policymakers. Theoretical constructs such as the efficient markets hypothesis, rational expectations, and market completeness were too often treated as intellectual dogmas instead of (parts of) falsifiable hypotheses. The situation of capture via dominant intellectual dogmas of policymakers, investors, and business managers was made worse by sins of omission - the failure of academics to communicate the limitations of their models and to warn against (potential) misuses of their research - and sins of commission - introducing (often implicitly) ideological or biased features in research programs Hence, the deeper problem with finance concepts such as the 'efficient markets hypothesis' and 'ratex theory' is not that they are based on assumptions that are considered as not being 'realistic'. The real issue at stake with academic finance is not a quarrel about the validity of the assumption of rational behavior but the inherent semantical insufficiency of economic theories that implies a low empirical content (and a high degree of specification uncertainty). This perspective makes the scientific approach advocated by Friedman and others less straightforward. In addition, there is wide-spread failure to incorporate the key implications of economics as a social science. As response to these 'weaknesses' and challenges, five suggested principles or guidelines for future research programmes are outlined.

risk management, academic thought, market efficiency, financial markets, financial crises, efficient market hypothesis

Abstract:
Financial institutions intermediate between savers and investors and contribute to corporate governance. Equity and bond markets in the former centrally planned economies are not yet in a position adequately to provide these services. It is not yet clear that investment funds will provide the necessary financing and corporate management. Therefore the first priority for financial sector reforms must be to establish a healthy commercial banking sector. Banks are the most promising source of financing, provide payment services which are crucial to both the real and financial sectors and, by monitoring the use of loaned funds, will be the primary source of corporate governance during the transformation to a market economy.

Abstract:
Uncertainty about length of life, longevity risk, is a growing financial problem for pension funds and annuity providers. They would like to transfer longevity risk away to institutions better placed to deal with it. Unfortunately, there is a lack of financial instruments to hedge against this longevity risk, thereby complicating risk management by pension funds and hindering the expansion of the annuity market. Consequently, this paper examines the role of government in promoting a private market solution for longevity hedging financial products. Governments could improve the market for annuities by issuing longevity indexed bonds and by producing a longevity index. The paper argues though that this public policy role is hampered by the fact that governments are themselves are already exposed to significant longevity risk. However, governments could take other steps such as producing a longevity index.

Uncertainty; longevity risk; pension funds; DB and DC plans; annuities; financial instruments; hedging; longevity-indexed bonds; indices; longevity index

Abstract:
Since the early eighties volatility of GDP and inflation has been declining steadily in many countries. Financial innovation has been identified as one of the key factors driving this ‘Great Moderation’. Financial innovation was considered to have improved significantly the allocation and sharing of financial risks, both from a macro and micro perspective. In particular, the prevailing opinion was that great progress has been made in developing models and other quantitative methods for measuring and managing risk. However, the global financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 revealed important failures in risk management by financial institutions. Over-optimism prevailed and risks were underpriced, caused by problems of both a conceptual and technical nature. This paper analyses these two angles from the viewpoint of financial institutions. Conceptually, we will show that risk management degenerated into a ‘pseudo’ quantitative science. This in turn gave a false sense of security to financial institutions and their supervisors. Prior to the crisis, supervisory and regulatory regimes assumed that for the financial sector as a whole, risk management had been improved and that, as a result, financial stability was enhanced. The fact that many financial activities were carried out in a rapidly changing landscape – i.e. key decisions had to be taken in situations with uncertainty - was largely ignored. At a very fundamental level it was mistakenly assumed that all uncertainty can be measured in a reliable fashion using a probability distribution – i.e. all uncertainty can be treated as ‘risk’. This attitude had also adverse consequences for the way risk management and decision making were organised in financial institutions. There was too much focus on quantitative models and measurement and too little on the qualitative dimension of risk management, involving such issues as information flows, people and their motives and incentives. In addition, even from a narrow, technical perspective risk management techniques proved to be insufficiently sophisticated. The second part of the paper focuses on the lessons to be learned from the past episode of inadequate risk management at the level of financial institutions. Apart from technical improvements there is a need for a greater emphasis on handling fundamental uncertainty. More specifically, it will be shown that qualitative risk management is particularly important to deal with the latter uncertainty. However, even with better risk management the future remains uncertain and human nature will remain largely unchanged. Finding better ways of dealing with fundamental uncertainty remains therefore a continuous challenge.

risk management, great moderation, credit crisis, mispricing, regulations

Abstract:
Many of the difficulties during the credit crisis have been attributed to derivatives, particularly the use of credit derivatives in structured products built on sub-prime mortgages. Derivatives also played an important role in the leveraging and risk-taking process prior to the crisis. These were very difficult to unwind, and added to liquidity and credit problems. There are also ongoing concerns about settlement rules and counter-party risk in the market for CDS. A key concern is that when hedge funds and other net providers of credit protection default, their counterparties will be left without insurance against credit exposures. Of particular concern is the downgrading of bond insurers, putting at risk the cover on risky debt (via CDS contracts issued by these bond insurers) related to payments on collaterised debt obligations (CDOs). Nonetheless, there are also important differences of view. For example, some analysts have used the demise of Bear Stearns (and before that the collapse of LTCM) as an indication of structural weaknesses in the OTC derivatives market, while others argued that the OTC market had ‘coped quite well’ at a time of heightened price volatility. These opposing opinions can be explained to an important degree by the so-called risk paradox (section 2). The crisis raised also doubts about the effectiveness of risk management systems used by banks. Highly sophisticated banks were confident that their risk management system would be able to deal with market corrections. But risk management systems failed to anticipate the devastating effect of the loss of market liquidity, severely estimated banks’ exposures, and the extent in which institutions would be affected by heightened market stress. Against this backdrop, I will assess in this paper the reasons why banks’ business plans and risk management systems failed (section 3), as well as the required pre-conditions that need to be in place for fully benefitting from complex derivatives for the long run (section 4).

derivatives, risk paradox, risk management

Abstract:

Abstract:
The forces shaping the revolution in banking and capital markets have radically changed the financial landscape during the past three decades. A remarkable feature of this changing new landscape has been the astonishing rate of internationalization of the financial system in the last two decades, with emerging markets becoming increasingly important participants. At times, this participation led to an excessive reliance on foreign financing, making the participation of these countries in the global financial system more vulnerable to shifts in expectations and perceptions. The sovereign debt management strategy suffered from many structural weaknesses, failing to take into account international best practices in financing budget deficits and developing domestic government securities markets. Consequently, emerging markets experienced serious financial crisis episodes. Against this background, the paper focuses on new and more sophisticated strategies to develop domestic bond markets, taking into account the risk profile, complexities and other constraints of emerging markets. The paper's central thesis is that risk-based public debt management and liquid domestic bond markets are important, mutually reinforcing strategies for emerging financial markets to attain: i) enhanced financial stability, and ii) a more successful participation in the global financial landscape. It will also be shown that this twin-strategies approach requires taking a macroeconomic policy perspective.

emerging bond markets, global finance, risk management

Abstract:
This article analyzes the tradeoffs between uncertainties in contributions and benefits embedded in different pension arrangements. The two key criteria for evaluating the risk-sharing characteristics of a private pension plan from the perspective of the plan member are the funding ratio (ratio of assets to liabilities) and the replacement rate (ratio of benefits to salaries). The stochastic simulations performed (considering financial risks only) show that hybrid plans (those in between traditional defined benefit and individual defined contribution) can offer efficient and sustainable forms of risk-sharing. The appeal of different hybrid plans depends very much on the regulatory, social, and economic environment. In situations where funding excesses can be efficiently and fairly apportioned, conditional indexation plans appear to have the greatest potential as sustainable forms of risk-sharing. However, the appropriate design of hybrid plans requires careful consideration of the relative pension plan risks that can be borne by working and retired individuals.

Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, Funding, Hybrid Plans, Pension Benefits, Pension Funds

Abstract:
Before the onset of the ongoing credit crisis I concluded that the available evidence supported the notion that financial markets were (significantly) underpricing risk . It will be argued in this paper that inherent (or structural) difficulties in the pricing of all sorts of risks is an important feature of the fast-moving financial landscape. To that end, I will introduce a methodological framework for assessing the pricing of uncertainty and risks. It will be shown that there are four key reasons why markets are structurally underpricing risks. Firstly, the complexity and opaqueness of a fast-moving financial landscape strain the abilities of market participants to price risks correctly. Secondly, it is a fact of life that financial markets are liable to overshoot. Thirdly, the reasons given by analysts for rationalizing extreme low risk premia in financial markets are far from adequate, thereby strengthening the case that risks are being systematically underpriced. Finally, the sources of much fundamental uncertainty in society are ill-defined, making it very hard or impossible to calculate the associated odds (risks). More specifically, I will distinguish five key features of the new financial landscape that had, and will continue to have, important influences on mispricing.

Abstract:
The principal purpose of this paper is to analyse the trade-off between the uncertainty in contributions on the one hand and benefits on the other that is embedded in different pension arrangements. The paper employs the funding ratio (ratio of assets to liabilities) and the replacement rate (ratio of benefits to salaries) as key criteria for evaluating the risk sharing characteristics of a private pension plan from the perspective of the plan member. The stochastic simulations performed show that hybrid plans (those in between traditional DB and individual DC) appear to be more efficient and sustainable forms of risk sharing than either of the other two. Of the three main hybrid plans analysed, conditional indexation plans appear to have the greatest potential as sustainable forms of risk sharing.

defined benefit, defined contribution, funding, hybrid plans, pension benefits, pension funds