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Abstract:
Governments and vocal institutional shareholders have been exerting pressure on companies they deem to have objectionable operations (such as tobacco or chemical producers). This paper studies the effect of the most important legislative and shareholder boycott to date, the boycott of the South Africa's apartheid regime. We find that the announcement of legislative/shareholder pressure of voluntary divestment from South Africa had little discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets. There is weak evidence that institutional shareholdings increased when corporations divested. In sum, despite the public significance of the boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, financial markets seem to have perceived the boycott to be merely a "sideshow."

Abstract:
In their role as "gatekeepers," the courts are often faced with the issue of assessing the reliability of complex expert testimony in a variety of disciplines. In the area of finance and economics, two recent federal decisions concluded that the "S-curve" approach, which has been described as a method "gaining popularity" among experts, was unreliable. We demonstrate the susceptibility of the "S-curve" approach to manipulation by empirically testing several "S-curve" derived models on a sample of over 2,900 firms. We also explain why the literature on this method does not provide proper foundations for calculating damages in litigation. We conclude that recent assessments of the "S-curve" demonstrate a proper application of the "gatekeeping" role of the courts.

S curve, S-curve, lost profits, damages

Abstract:
This article studies the most important legislative and shareholder boycott to date, the boycott of South Africa's apartheid regime. We find that corporate involvement with South Africa was so small that the announcement of legislative/shareholder pressure or voluntary corporate divestment from South Africa had little discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets. There is weak evidence that institutional shareholdings increased when corporations divested. In sum, despite the publicity of the boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, political pressure had little visible effect on the financial markets.