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Domenico Siniscalco's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
3,080 |
Total
Citations
13 |
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Bernardo Bortolotti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA)
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28 Jan 01
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Last Revised:
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10 Aug 04
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1,067 (4,420)
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Abstract:
Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable institutions and developed capital markets.
Privatisation, politics, budget deficit, investor protection, enforcement of law, capital markets
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2.
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Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy Bernardo Bortolotti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA)
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29 Oct 01
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01 Dec 03
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789 (7,293)
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Abstract:
This paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977-99 period. The empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries, endowed with deep and liquid stock markets, and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints. But the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries, where shareholders are poorly protected, banks powerful, and capital markets less developed.
Privatisation, Public Finance, Political Economy, Law and Finance, Capital Markets
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3.
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Gretchen Daily Stanford University - Department of Biological Sciences Partha Dasgupta University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics Bert Bolin Stockholm University Pierre Crosson Resources for the Future Jacques du Guerny United Nations - Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Paul Ehrlich Stanford University - Department of Biological Sciences Carl Folke Stockholm University AnnMari Jansson Stockholm University Bengt-Owe Jansson Stockholm University Nils Kautsky Stockholm University - Department of Systems Ecology Ann Kinzig Arizona State University - Department of Biology Simon Levin Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Karl-Goran Maler The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences - Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics Per Pinstrup-Andersen Cornell University - Department of Economics Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy Brian Walker CSIRO, Lyneham, ACT
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17 Sep 98
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Last Revised:
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18 Sep 98
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730 (8,251)
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Abstract:
There are two broad criteria by which one can judge humanity's success in feeding itself: (i) the proportion of people whose access to basic nutritional requirements is secure; and (ii) the extent to which global food production is sustainable. Even though the two are related, they have usually been discussed separately in popular writings. This has had unfortunate consequences. Writings on (ii) have often encouraged readers to adopt an all-or-nothing position (viz. the future will be either rosy or catastrophic), and this has drawn attention away from the economic misery that is endemic in large parts of the world today. On the other hand, writings on (i) have frequently yielded no more than the catechism that the nearly 1 billion people in poor countries who go to bed hungry each night do so because they are extremely poor. In short, if (ii) has focused on aggregate food production and its prospects for the future, (i) in contrast has isolated food-distribution failure as a cause of world hunger. In this article we will adopt the view that (i) and (ii) should not be studied separately, that their link can be understood if attention is paid to the dynamic interactions between ecological and economic systems operating primarily at the geographically localised level.
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4.
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Carlo Carraro Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Alessandra Pome Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy
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24 Jul 01
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Last Revised:
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30 Nov 03
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212 (40,149)
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Abstract:
This paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate on public vs. private research arising from the genome case, the paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.
Science, Technology, Allocation Mechanisms, Intellectual Property Rights, Welfare
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5.
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Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy Stefania NMI2 Borghini Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Federica Ranghieri Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan
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28 Nov 00
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Last Revised:
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05 Dec 03
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144 (58,673)
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Abstract:
This paper investigates the companies' behavioural response to information-based environmental policies. We perform a panel analysis for 39 big companies in 16 countries, in 3 polluting industries (oil & gas, chemicals, power generation) over a 5- year period (1993-1997) to check whether environmental policies (command and control and energy taxation) and the adoption of information-based environmental strategies affect the companies' economic and environmental performance. The results confirm the positive role of self-regulated environmental audits and compensation programmes on corpo rate environmental performance.
environmental policy, corporate environmental management, corporate compensation programmes, information-based environmental policies
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6.
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Bernardo Bortolotti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy
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29 Dec 00
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Last Revised:
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01 Aug 01
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125 (66,228)
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6
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Abstract:
Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable institutions and developed capital markets.
Privatisation, politics, budget deficit, investor protection, enforcement of law, capital markets.
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7.
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Carlo Carraro Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Alessandra Pome Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy
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01 Aug 01
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Last Revised:
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07 Aug 01
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13 (187,181)
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Abstract:
This Paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate arising from the genome case on public versus private research, the Paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterise some features of an optimal research policy.
Science, technology, allocation mechanisms, intellectual property rights, welfare
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8.
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Giorgio Barba Navaretti University of Milan - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA) Partha Dasgupta University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics Karl-Goran Maler The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences - Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy
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17 Sep 98
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Last Revised:
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05 Dec 03
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper investigates institutions for the creation and transmission of knowledge as efficient resource allocation mechanisms. By looking at Science and Technology it develops a two-way classification. Science is a non-market allocation mechanism, where knowledge is treated as a pure public good and where the rule of priority provides an incentive scheme for disclosure. Technology is a market allocation mechanism, where knowledge is treated as a private good and where patents and copyrights preserve property rights. The distinction between these two entities is based on the institutional arrangements involving the allocation of resources for enquiry, not on the differences in the objects and methods of inquiry. The paper compares the rule of priority and patenting as alternative incentive schemes. It also discusses whether it is optimal for society to preserve two different institutions, partly rival and partly complementary, and examines the major policy implications.
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9.
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Bernardo Bortolotti Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Marcella Fantini National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Serena Vitalini Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan Domenico Siniscalco Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy
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18 Feb 98
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Last Revised:
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01 Aug 01
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Which legal, political, and economic institutions are shaping privatization processes in the world? This paper addresses the issue, presenting new evidence for a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis for the period 1977-96, the decision to privatize appears to be influenced by governments' preferences and budget constraints, but the success of a privatization process requires, in addition, appropriate legal institutions, credible governments and developed capital markets.
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