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Abstract:
World power and gas markets have a natural relationship with global tradable carbon permits markets, including the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the latter officially launched in January 2005. Electric utilities operate their power plants based in part on the price of the power and the relative cost of coal and natural gas. As both carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide are by-products of the coal burning process, the new factors of SO2 and CO2 emissions allowances come into play in a carbon constrained economy. Now that a price has been put on such allowances, the differences in carbon intensity for coal and gas could potentially change the way companies run their power plants. Moreover, knowledge of the statistical distribution of emission trading allowances, and its forecastability, becomes crucial in constructing optimal hedging and purchasing strategies in the carbon market. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of available data addressing the unconditional tail behavior and the inherent heteroskedastic dynamics in the returns on the emissions allowances.

Environmental Finance, GARCH, Greenhouse Gases, Mixture Models, Tail Estimation

Abstract:
Market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating somewhat scarce but unpriced rights and resources, and the European Emission Trading Scheme is an example. By means of dynamic optimization in the contest of firms covered by such environmental regulations, this paper generates endogenously the price dynamics of emission permits under asymmetric information, allowing inter-temporal banking and borrowing. In the market there are a finite number of firms and each firm’s pollution emission follows an exogenously given stochastic process. We prove the discounted permit price is a martingale with respect to the relevant filtration. The model is solved numerically. Finally, a closed-form pricing formula for European-style options is derived.

Asymmetric Information, Environmental Finance, European Emission Trading, Scheme, Trading Decisions

Abstract:
This paper reviews fundamental concepts in environmental economics and explores theoretical results regarding the choice of the key policy instruments for the control of externalities: taxes, subsidies and marketable permits. The paper explains why today market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating unpriced rights and scarce resources. We survey how significant market imperfections, a pre-existing regulatory environment and concentration in both permit and output markets can impede the proper functioning of a permit system. The main factors that affect the effectiveness of marketable permits are then discussed. Given the importance of understanding the emission permit price formation, we overview recent attempts at developing valid price models for emission permits, taking into account banking and borrowing opportunities, pollution abatement measures, strategic trading interactions and the presence of asymmetric information in the permit market.

Dynamic Price Modeling, Emission Permits, Market Imperfections

Abstract:
This paper develops a simple model to evaluate the value and the activation frequencies of a generation system consisting of coal-fired and a gas-fired power plants using a real options approach, and the notions of clean-spark and clean-dark spreads. Under a cap-and-trade scheme, the use of emission permits represents an opportunity cost. In the energy industry different generation technologies produce different levels of CO2 emissions and, therefore, different opportunity costs. Addressing the question of how expected windfall profits affect the profitability of a generation plant and its activation frequencies, the paper shows that conventional findings are reversed. When the opportunity cost is internalized, the rate of activation of the gas plant decreases while that of the coal plant increases.

Activation frequency, Dark-spread, Emission permits, Generation Mix, Spark-spread

Abstract:
We study investment and disinvestment decisions in situations where there is a time lag 0 from the time t when the decision is taken to the time when the decision is implemented. Applying the probabilistic approach to the combined entry and exit decisions under the Parisian implementation delay, we solve the constrained maximization problem, obtaining an analytic solution to the optimal "starting" and "stopping" levels. We compare our results with the instantaneous entry and exit situation, and show that an increase in the uncertainty of the underlying process hastens the decision to invest or disinvest, extending a result of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996).

Brownian excursion, Implementation Delay, Parisian Option, Optimal Stopping, Wald's Identity