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Abstract:
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the seminal case establishing a therapist's civil liability for her patient's violence toward third parties, is as significant today as it was controversial in 1976. Tarasoff has had a unique impact both on law-and-mental-health scholarship and on day-to-day mental health practice, yet legal decision makers and commentators remain divided on the wisdom and proper application of Tarasoff. Therefore, the medical, scientific and policy judgments that undergird Tarasoff decisions need to be revisited regularly. This Symposium brings together some of the nation's leading experts on law and mental health to discuss the most recent scientific advances and best practices in violence risk assessment and mental health care and to contribute fresh ideas about the principles supporting or opposing the imposition of this tort liability. They examine legal and ethical principles that justify or undermine Tarasoff liability, developments in violence risk assessments that make violence predictions more realistic and reliable, and changes in mental health practices that may make Tarasoff interventions less onerous for some patients.

In short, the papers in this Symposium examine the application and implications of Tarasoff - past, present and future - and analyze its virtues, shortcomings, risks and promises.

Tarasoff, mental health, risk assessment, tort liability

Abstract:
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects individuals with a "disability," which the Act defines as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a "major life activity." This Article argues that "belonging" is a major life activity. Belonging has two aspects: personal relationships, including bonds of love, friendship and shared purpose; and social acceptance, or the regard of others that fosters integration into the mainstream of society. Belonging is central to most people's lives. It also is at the heart of the ADA, with its emphasis on the freedom to enjoy life among family, friends, coworkers and fellow citizens and its promise of the inclusion, integration, and participation of people with disabilities in all aspects of modern American life. Belonging also occupies an important role in accounts of the "good life" articulated by philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and prominent thinkers in other fields. This striking consensus among public, political, and scholarly understandings of the importance of belonging provides compelling support for judicial recognition of belonging as a major life activity.

Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA, relationships, inclusion, integration, participation

Abstract:
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) was expected to grant much needed freedom for tens of millions of Americans with physical or mental disabilities, but to the surprise and dismay of many of the Act's supporters, courts routinely refuse to hear the claims of people with physical impairments or diseases such as cancer or epilepsy, in effect saying that these individuals are not "disabled enough." This emphasis on difference is troubling to plaintiffs who seek treatment as equals, and the necessary change in interpretation can be accomplished through the part of the ADA's definition that invites consideration of sameness or equality: the identification of "major life activities."

A wide-ranging, thoroughgoing inquiry into what qualifies as a major life activity is needed, and a philosopher's approach to this investigation is one that the ADA can accommodate. This article first sketches the current legal landscape and proposes a standard for determining whether a life activity is major. Then several philosophical accounts of the "good human life" are explored. Next are brief illustrations from other fields to demonstrate what they could contribute to the inquiry. Last, the article returns briefly to the ADA to note the Act's ambitions and its appreciation of the everyday aspects of life.

ADA, disability, discrimination

Abstract:
Feminist theory and disability theory have much to offer one another, reinforcing each other where their perspectives overlap, informing each other where their interests diverge. In that spirit, this essay addresses questions of family care - needing and providing it - from both feminist and disability perspectives. First, the essay reviews the doctrinal framework for identifying major life activities under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Next, it analyzes and synthesizes feminist literature that establishes the critical role of caring in the perpetuation and flourishing of individuals, families, communities, and society in its principal institutions. Finally, it explores the broader insights that feminism offers to challenge the social structures and cultural myths that perpetuate stereotypes and misconceptions about the concept and consequences of "disability."

Abstract:
War - all war - is disabling. It is designed to be. Fifteen years after Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a new wave of service-related disabilities from the present war in Iraq presents yet another reason and another occasion to reassess and reinvigorate efforts to achieve the ADA’s aspirations. One need not celebrate war to advocate equality of opportunity for veterans disabled by the war, and indeed for all Americans disabled by any cause.

Abstract:
Under the ADA, an employer may not act based on generalized fears about the risk of violence by persons with mental disorders. The ADA's direct threat provision prohibits reliance on such 'common sense' fears, which are often erroneous assessments of risk. Instead, Congress imposed a standard requiring a direct threat determination based on an individualized inquiry into the actual, current risks posed by the individual applicant or employee. Following this assessment, the employer may exclude or restrict the individual only if the risk is 'significant,' rather than remote or speculative. Moreover, if that risk can be sufficiently reduced or eliminated by reasonable accommodations, including modifications to workplace practices, then the employer may not exclude the employee.

This article examines current scientific literature about the link between mental disorders and violence and assesses that evidence under the rigorous standards of the direct threat defense. It then explores two important implications of that assessment for employers. First, employers may not determine categorically that persons diagnosed with mental disorders present a significant risk of workplace violence and therefore must be excluded from the workplace or restricted in their job duties. The direct threat defense is specifically designed to replace such generalized fears with individualized inquiries. Second, under the ADA employers must assess the risk of violence in the workplace, not in a vacuum, and in light of reasonable accommodations to reduce that risk. Here the implications of the social science research are considered, including the emerging consensus that violence arises out of situations and relationships rather than solely from an individual's disposition. Thus, the employer's duty to reduce or eliminate risks through reasonable workplace accommodations may open the door to demands that an employer undertake measures to change workplace dynamics to reduce the risks of violent confrontations.

ADA, Mental Health