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Abstract:
With the global spread of judicial review has come increased scholarly interest in comparative dimensions of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" and, thus, in the activities of courts in new democracies. This Article broadens the growing discourse in this area to incorporate the African experience, which has received virtually no airing thus far.

Explaining the early "fall" of judicial review in postcolonial Africa as resulting from a severe deficit of legitimacy for the courts in the heady days after decolonization, the Article notes the recent rise to prominence of Africa's courts, as democracy has gained a foothold in several states long ruled by autocrats. Contemporaneous constitutional reforms accompanying recent democratic transitions have given African courts express and extensive constitutional review authority. However, because of Africa's postcolonial history of "constitutions without constitutionalism," the current constitutionalism revival has met with skepticism.

The Article argues that while current trends in Africa represent a significant new opportunity to build constitutionalism in Africa, the model of constitutionalism that Africa's lawyer-dominated constitutional reformers appear to have settled on - "juridical constitutionalism" - is a "quick fix" that ignores, or fails to redress, persistent defects in the structure and distribution of power in the postcolonial African state. Efforts at building constitutionalism in Africa through reliance on courts also places undue faith in judicial review and fails to reckon longstanding limitations that confront constitutional litigation and adjudication in Africa. The Article highlights, in particular, deficiencies in the jurisprudence, legitimacy, and independence of Africa's judiciaries, and counsels Africa's reformers to focus more attention on structural constitutionalism, using constitutional design to constrain executive hegemony and the centralized unitary state through the horizontal and vertical dispersion of governmental power.

Judicial review, democratization, Africa, judicial power

Abstract:
Several African states have implemented democratic and liberal constitutional reforms during the last two decades. Regime change, the ending of decades of autocratic rule, and the emergence of independent courts are among the important changes produced by these reforms. Yet Africa's constitutional moment has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. With the notable exception of South Africa, African nations continue to lie largely outside the mainstream of contemporary comparative constitutional discourse. This article traces the origins, and examines the scope, content and shortcomings, of the recent constitutionalism revival in Africa. Against the backdrop of the continent's postcolonial history of constitutions without constitutionalism, the article identifies important transformative currents in contemporary Africa that suggest the dawn of a new era; nonetheless, it notes how the persistence of certain constitutive and regressive elements of the ancient régime continues to define and bedevil African constitutional politics.

Africa, democracy, constitutionalism

Abstract:
One of the paradoxes of modern democratic government is the phenomenon of the chief executive who rules without regard to formal checks and balances. As democratic institutions and constitutional government have spread to regions of the world once dominated by authoritarian regimes, a longstanding feature of the ancient régime - the imperial presidency - has persisted. While constitutional scholars have shown a great deal of interest in new constitutional courts in the world's newest democracies, the contemporaneous phenomenon of persistent imperial presidency has been largely ignored. Although relatively little attention has been paid to it in comparative constitutional discourse, Africa, too, has witnessed, since 1990, a dramatic transition to democratic rule that has resulted in the toppling of many of the region's long-reining autocrats and the installation of new counter-authoritarian constitutions. However, following the global trend, Africa's longstanding tradition of imperial presidency has survived these recent constitutional changes.

Refuting "cultural" explanations rooted in notions of African exceptionalism, the Article traces the rise of imperial presidency in Africa to authoritarian conceptions and policies of "national integration" and "development" embraced by Africa's postcolonial leadership in the founding moments of the 1960s and identifies ways in which the structure of colonial rule and certain influential models of presidential power may have influenced agency in the direction of authoritarianism. Examining why the phenomenon of imperial presidency has survived recent constitutional reforms, the Article uncovers omissions and shortcomings in Africa's contemporary constitutional design and democratic project that have enabled the force of path dependency to undermine prospects for constitutionalism. The Article offers some tentative constitutional reform proposals to tame presidential supremacy in Africa and thereby enhance constitutionalism in Africa's emerging democracies.

Africa, imperial presidency, constitutional design, presidential power, imperial presidency, post-authoritarian

Abstract:
This essay reviews Princeton political scientist Jennifer A. Widner's book, "Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa" (2001).

Africa, judicial independence, judicial activism, courts

Abstract:
Despite progress in the democratization of power in many African states, the tradition of the "imperial president" survives. In this essay, the author examines why this notable feature of the ancient regime persists and how appropriate constitutional drafting might help to tame presidential supremacy in Africa's new democracies.

African politics, imperial presidency, presidential power, democracy, comparative constitutionalism

Abstract:
In this essay, the author argues that, despite the adoption of new rights-friendly constitutions in Africa's emerging democracies, an old "jurisprudence of executive supremacy," fashioned during the era of authoritarianism (colonial and postcolonial) and characterized by a high degree of deference to state (executive) power and a general skepticism about individual rights, remains highly influential within Africa's common-law judiciaries. There is thus a danger that judicial review and constitutional interpretation would retard, instead of facilitate, progress towards constitutional liberalism in Africa's new democracies.

judicial review, comparative constitutionalism, Africa democracy, courts

Abstract:
Several African states have implemented democratic and liberal constitutional reforms during the last two decades. Regime change, the ending of decades of autocratic rule, and the emergence of independent courts are among the important changes produced by these reforms. Yet Africa's constitutional moment has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. With the notable exception of South Africa, African nations continue to lie largely outside the mainstream of contemporary comparative constitutional discourse. This article traces the origins, and examines the scope, content and shortcomings, of the recent constitutionalism revival in Africa. Against the backdrop of the continent's postcolonial history of constitutions without constitutionalism, the article identifies important transformative currents in contemporary Africa that suggest the dawn of a new era; nonetheless, it notes how the persistence of certain constitutive and regressive elements of the ancien régime continues to define and bedevil African constitutional politics.