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Abstract:
Often a client desires to accomplish an objective that contradicts Jewish law. For example, he may want to collect money to which, under Jewish law, he is not entitled. This chapter comprehensively explores whether, as a matter of Jewish law, a Jewish attorney is permitted to represent such a client. If the client would not have succeeded but for the assistance of this particular attorney, the chapter asks whether the attorney has violated the biblical prohibition against enabling another to transgress Jewish law. Second, even if the client would have prevailed without the help of this particular attorney, the chapter examines whether the attorney has nonetheless violated a biblical, or at least a rabbinic, injunction. Finally, the chapter asks a separate question, one largely, if not entirely, ignored by prior writers, namely, whether, depending on what the attorney may have said to the client in the course of the representation, the attorney may have violated a distinct prohibition against merely encouraging someone to violate Jewish law.

This chapter is probably the most extensive treatment in English of the relevant issues, and it provides copious citations to Talmudic and post-Talmudic sources.

Attorney, lawyer, lihafrish meissura, lihokhiah, kiddoshim tihiyu, novel birishut haTorah, hezek, lo taamod, oy lirosho, hillul HaShem, Shulhan Arukh, shoggegim, Jewish, Judaism, Jewish law, commandment, secular court, issur arkhaot, issur gezel, responsum, responsa, mummar, arevut, posek, poskim

Abstract:
By practicing law, Jewish attorneys can promote many important Jewish values. For example, they can defend people from physical, financial or psychological oppression, they can protect children in family disputes, and they can advance communal interests by representing organizations committed to Jewish priorities. Nevertheless, secular lawyering involves a number of significant, dangerous pitfalls. For example, Jewish law values powerfully militate against the acceptance of certain matters or the use of specific strategies or conventions. Among other things, Jewish law opposes actions that unfairly harm third parties, that cast the Jewish faith in a falsely unflattering light, or that, because of the actions' spiritually corrosive character, eat away at the attorney's intrinsic holiness. Moreover, Jewish law affirmatively requires an attorney to take some steps that, although morally correct, may be inconsistent with secular regulations.

This article provides a framework for exploring two chief concerns associated with the practice of civil law, i.e., the extent to which Jewish law discourages an attorney from assisting the accomplishment of particular ends, and, irrespective of the ends, from employing particular means. The article does this by identifying and explicating the principally relevant Jewish law doctrines, including the rules against (1) enabling or even facilitating the violation of Jewish law; (2) inflicting verbal or emotional distress or shame; and (3) lying, and the rule requiring one to act to protect another from victimization.

Attorney, lawyer, Jewish, Judaism, Jewish law, letter of the law, commandment, cognitive dissonance, confidentiality, ethics, legal ethics, professional ethics, Jewish values, halakha, halakhah, halacha, halachah, model code, model rules, religious professional, Talmud, lifnei iver, rabbinic, biblic

Abstract:
Many religious systems purport to govern both the financial and ritual activities of their adherents at the same time that these activities are ruled by secular legal systems. This phenomenon raises fascinating questions regarding the conceptual and practical interrelationships between these overlapping systems. Under Jewish law, for instance, a persons rights or responsibilities may decisively depend on whether a person is deemed the owner of a particular piece of property. In contemporary times, however, Jews often participate in various business organizations that are, at least ostensibly, creations of secular law. As a result, it becomes critical to establish whether, and if so to what extent, such entities affect Jewish law's view of property rights.

This article specifically focuses on the interplay between the secular law's corporate construct and Jewish law. The article first identifies and explores various secular theories regarding the essence of a corporation and the status of corporate shareholders. The article then exhaustively examines the alternative ways in which corporations are perceived by Jewish law authorities and the consequences of each.

Jewish, halakha, corporation, Talmud, partnership, rabbinical courts, stockholder, shareholder, stakeholder, religious, dina demalkhuta dina, Shulhan Arukh, hefker beit din

Abstract:
Jewish law pervasively impacts corporate conduct, but does so without positing any distinct doctrinal rules pertaining to corporations. Instead, the foci of Jewish law are the individual, on the one hand, and the community as a whole, on the other. By restricting the conduct of individuals - such as those who serve as a corporation's employees, managers, directors and shareholders - Jewish law controls corporate conduct from within. By authorizing and requiring communally imposed regulation, Jewish law controls corporate conduct from without.

A thorough exploration of the many Jewish law precepts that apply to commerce would require far more than the space allotted for this paper. Our more modest intentions, therefore, are to survey some of the principal ways in which the rules Jewish law imposes on individuals and communities affect business ethics, generally, and then to examine whether the corporate context presents any unique questions.

Jewish law, corporations, business ethics, socially responsible conduct, role differentiated morality, autonomy, collective responsibility, duty to rescue, halakha

Abstract:
This article explores two related, but distinct, questions: (1) whether, under Jewish law, it is ethical for someone to buy or sell human body parts, and (2) whether, given Jewish law's perspective, it would be appropriate for the United States to adopt a distribution system that would give preference to people who volunteer to be prospective donors.

These questions should interest three different kinds of people: (1) those who seek to abide by Jewish law and, therefore, need to know its rules; (2) those who respect Jewish law, who are curious about it, and who might be persuaded by its teachings; and (3) those who, even if they neither follow nor respect Jewish law, are nonetheless concerned lest secular law unnecessarily, and painfully, impinge upon the religious values of those who do. This last group, perhaps the largest, needs to know what Jewish law prescribes in order to ensure that secular law is carefully circumscribed to avoid any needless conflict.

Jewish law, organ transfers, body parts, distribution system, preferences, reciprocity, religious freedom, autonomy, ethics, definition of death, brain death, halakha, Harvard criteria, live donors, cadavaric donors, sanctity of life, human dignity

Abstract:
Can desirable ends justify what would otherwise be undesirable means? The answers to this question depends on a variety of factors, including the ends to be accomplished, the means to be employed, the person who would use them, and the parties against whom they would be directed. This article begins by discussing American rules regarding lying by lawyers. The article argues that those rules place insufficient importance on the protection of innocents, have a corrosive effect on the moral values of lawyers who obey them and alienate lawyers who disobey them. The article then examines the Jewish law approach which, by contrast to secular law, eschews role-differentiated ethics and requires more contextual, nuanced decisionmaking. Finally, the article explores whether the Jewish law rules would provide useful guidance for revision of America's secular legal ethics laws.

God, Jewish, rabbinic, legal ethics, ethics, professional ethics, lying, lawyers, lawyering,model rules, McDade, morality, role-differentiated, categorical imperative, Talmud, cognitive dissonance

Abstract:
In Hebrew, the process of earning a living is sometimes referred to as Milhemet ha-Hayyim (literally, the 'war of life'), because it involves daily battles against dangerous adversaries. And there are many casualties in this war. Consider, for instance, the countless thousands of employees and investors who lost their entire life savings in the corporate collapses between 2000-2003. Consider, also, the equally countless numbers of people who, influenced by the immoral ambiance of the commercial environment in which they struggle, have developed so thick an ethical callous that they have lost all touch of what constitutes proper conduct.

While secular ethics, especially but not merely professional ethics, seem predicated on the assumption of role-differentiated morality, whereby separate sets of normative rules apply to a person's private and commercial lives, Jewish law demands a single, consistently high level of moral behavior.

This article focuses on one ethical concept: fulfilling one's oral commitments. The article attempts to accomplish two principal objects. First, it illustrates the Jewish law process. It shows how Jewish law rules are derived from the analytical exegesis of primary sources. Second, it shows how Jewish law flexibly employs a wide range of sanctions to ensure that a person fulfills his or her oral commitments.

Jewish, biblical, rabbinic, religious, Talmud, oral commitment, Flood, God, holy, imitation dei, moral, generation of the Flood, credible, trustworthy, faithful, vows, Mehusar Amanah

Abstract:
Professors Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran, Jr., state that an attorney, vis-ý-vis her client, acts as either (1) a godfather; (2) a hired gun; (3) a guru; or (4) a friend. These paradigms principally differ as to the extent to which the attorney, rather than the client, controls the relationship and the degree to which the interests of persons other than the client are deemed important. Shaffer and Cochran contend that the friend model is to be preferred. As the client's friend, the attorney not only considers which possible decision would be ethically correct but she engages her client in moral discourse so that the client may make the ethically correct decision. However, the attorney does not attempt to manipulate the client into making this decision.

This article explains that Jewish law assumes the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent Creator and the existence of a network of relationships between and among the Creator and all human beings. The purpose of the article is to examine how, in light of these assumptions and other applicable Jewish law doctrines, none of the Shaffer-Cochran models captures Jewish law's view of the attorney-client relationship. Moreover, the article argues that the Jewish law model is ethically superior to the friend paradigm favored by Shaffer and Cochran.

Attorney, lawyer, attorney-client relationship, autonomy, godfather, guru, hired gun, friend, moral agent, Jewish, Judaism, Jewish law, cognitive dissonance, confidentiality, ethics, professional ethics, Jewish values, halakha, Talmud, religion, lifnei iver, collective responsibility, inquisitorial