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Abstract:
In this speech, John Vickers, Executive Director and Chief Economist at the Bank, discusses possible links between monetary arrangements - in particular monetary union - and economic growth. He stresses that growth depends ultimately on how the real economy works: there is no monetary magic that can conjure up growth. But monetary policy can contribute to conditions for sustainable growth by securing and maintaining price stability; and monetary union might extend this. It might also deepen the single market. The elimination of nominal exchange rate movement among members of the union removes some sources of shock but also some ways of adjusting to shocks. This underlines the importance of other adjustment mechanisms - especially supply-side flexibility, which is crucial for growth in any event.

Abstract:
In this speech, John Vickers, Executive Director and Chief Economist at the Bank, discusses some possible implications for inflation - and hence for monetary policy - of some current developments on the supply side, in particular the ongoing revolution in information and communications technology. He argues that, while prospects for a recovery in UK productivity growth are good, it does not follow that supply-side improvement necessarily implies lower inflation. Indeed demand might rise by more than supply initially. He concludes that, whatever the supply side may have in store, delivering low and stable inflation - and being expected to do so - is how monetary policy can give sustainable growth its best chance.

Abstract:
How should competition law deal with anti-competitive behaviour by firms with market power? In the light of recent EC and US cases, this is perhaps the most controversial current issue for competition policy. Lax policy would jeopardise the competitiveness of markets, but rigid policy would chill pro-competitive, pro-consumer conduct. This paper gives an economic assessment of evolving legal standards in the area. The importance of developing a stronger economic basis for EC law on abuse of market dominance is stressed.

Abstract:
We model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers. The equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship pi(u) between profit and average utility per consumer. Public policy constraints on the "deals" firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on pi(u). From this perspective we examine the profit, utility, and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework. We also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two-part tariffs.

Abstract:
How should asset prices affect monetary policy, and how do they? It is argued that asset prices should not be included in the measure of inflation targeted by monetary policy, which should focus on the prices of goods and services for current consumption. The information yielded directly by asset prices, e.g. about inflation expectations and interest rate expectations, is examined. Finally, the question of what asset prices add to other indicators is considered, and it is concluded that asset prices matter for monetary policy because they help to inform judgements about inflation prospects.

Abstract:
We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. The regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose. When there is private information only about costs, the firm should always have a degree of discretion over its pricing policy. When uncertainty concerns demand, whether discretion is desirable depends on how demand elasticities vary with the scale of demands. If a positive demand shock is associated with a reduction in the market elasticity, discretion is good for overall welfare; otherwise it is not.

Abstract:
It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives, for example, managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation. We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency. The overall welfare effects of CPI are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure.