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Abstract:
The role of debt forgiveness is to alleviate what is known as "debt overhang." This concept is the core idea of the Brady deals, and it now comes to the African debt crisis. How can one gauge the hypothesis of the debt overhang? To what extent can one attribute the growth slowdown of the 1990s to the debt crisis of the 1980s? Using data from the past decade, the author finds that debt variables play a significant role in that slowdown. In one exercise, he finds that more than half the growth slowdown of the large debtor countries in the 1980s could be attributed to the debt crisis. To what reasonable debt ratio should African debt be written down? Most exercises set the threshold of sustainability of debt at about 200 percent. The easiest way to rationalize such a threshold is first to measure the average value of debt-to-export ratios reached at the time of the first rescheduling of debt in a given country. Using Latin America as a benchmark, one finds an average threshold of 248 percent. However short-sighted such a ratio might be, it goes a long way toward rationalizing the view that a debt-to-export ratio between 200 and 300 percent is a strong signal of a forthcoming crisis. This naive approach takes no account of the changing environment (growth and interest rates) a country must confront. A more subtle approach should allow for the prospect of a country's growth to assess the sustainability of the debt it inherits. With the author's formula for so doing, Africa's debt-to-export ratio should be brought to 198 percent. Another way to assess the sustainability of debt is to look at the secondary market, which allows one to estimate the prospect of repayment expected by market participants. Few African debts are actually quoted on secondary markets, but the author presents a formula for reconstructing estimates of repayment prospects econometrically. By that method, Africa's debt-to-export ratio should be 210 percent, suggesting that a threshold between 200 and 250 percent is about right.

Abstract:
Against all odds, the euro turned out to be a weak currency. We argue that this outcome can readily be explained by the policy mix that was chosen at the onset of the period: tight fiscal policies following the convergence mechanism that was imposed by the Maastricht treaty and loose monetary policy that resulted from the convergence of interest rates to the lower point of the spectrum. We investigate this outcome empirically and show that the euro's weakness can be understood as the result of an excess supply in the zone, which is channelled abroad in the usual 'beggar thy neighbour' way. We also outline how an optimal policy mix could be set in the future and discuss a suggestion that has been made by Alessandra Casella on the proper way to determine the fiscal deficit of the zone.

Euro, policy coordination

Abstract:
This Paper presents a new set of data on human capital. It is constructed so as to stay as close as possible to the censuses compiled by national, OECD or UNESCO sources. We then use these data to test a model that embeds the Mincerian approach to human capital into the Mankiw, Romer and Weil version of the neo-classical model. We find that the model performs extremely well. Physical and human capital appears to carry social returns that are essentially identical to the private ones.

Growth, education, human capital

Abstract:
If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good' over the 'bad' equilibrium. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that breaks down the origin of crises into three components: confidence (spreads and currency crisis), fundamentals (real growth rate), and economic policy (primary deficit). Theory then suggests a set of circumstances in which a lender of first resort would be desirable. The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives. Theory also illuminates the potential role of collective action clauses in reducing the risk of self-fulfilling debt crises.

market discipline, sovereign debt, country spreads, financial crises

Abstract:
At this stage, it is difficult to conclude that the euro will have substantial macroeconomic impact on sub-Saharan Africa, unless launch of the euro becomes the tool of a major policy shift, such as the euroization of the continent - which is currently unlikely.

In considering how the euro will affect Sub-Saharan Africa, Cohen, Kristensen, and Verner examine the transmission channels through which the euro could affect economies in the region. They examine the risks and opportunities the euro presents for Sub-Saharan African countries.

They especially examine the effects from the trade channel, through changes in European economic activity and the real exchange rate. Because of the relatively low income elasticity for primary commodities - which is what Sub-Saharan Africa mainly exports - an increase in activity in Europe is considered to have a marginal impact on Africa.

Exchange rate regimes and geographical trade patterns point to large differences in exposure to changes in the real exchange rate.

Capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa can be affected through portfolio shifts or through changes in foreign direct investment.

Changes in competitiveness in Europe are not expected to influence foreign direct investment, so the euro is not expected to affect foreign direct investment significantly.

Portfolio diversification could increase greatly. But Sub-Saharan Africa is not expected to realize the increased potential from portfolio diversification because of its severely underdeveloped domestic capital markets. It is vitally important that Sub-Saharan African countries strengthen their financial integration into global markets.

How the euro will affect such parts of the financial system as banks and debt and reserve management varies across countries. Generally the effect is expected to be limited.

This paper - a product of Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study the effect of the euro on developing countries. The authors may be contacted at nkristensen@worldbank.org or dverner@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good equilibrium' over the 'bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives.

Abstract:
If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good equilibrium' over the 'bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives.

Market discipline, sovereign debt, country spreads, financial crises

Abstract:
The paper attempts to explain why single factor explanations of the poverty of nations are usually found to be unsatisfactory. Poor countries outside Africa, for instance, have an income per head which stands at about one third of the rich countries' income per head. Yet each of the three items of the Solow model, namely human capital, physical capital (appropriated weighted) and total factor productivity, are each equal to about 70% of the corresponding levels of the rich countries. But 70% to the power of three is 35%! Multiplying small or relatively benign handicaps can yield dramatic effects on a country's income. The paper then moves on to explain each of the three items. It argues that the Lucas paradox on why capital is scarce can readily be solved, once market prices rather than PPP prices are used to assess the return to capital mobility, and on the same ground it argues that PPP calculations bias downwards the TFP of poor countries. It then argues that human capital is lower in poor countries because of the fact that the returns to human capital are non concave so that the marginal propensity to turn one additional year of life expectancy into higher education is lower in poor countries than in the rich. The message of hope is that "transpiration" strategies a la Singapore may work elsewhere.

Growth, Lucas paradox, education, life expectancy

Abstract:
If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the 'good equilibrium' over the 'bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). Theory then suggests a set of circumstances in which a lender of first resort would be desirable. The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives. Theory also illuminates the potential role of collective action clauses (CACs) in eliminating the risk of self-fulfilling debt crises.

Market discipline, sovereign debt, country spreads, financial crises

Abstract:
This paper presents a theoretical model to describe the effects of default risk on international lending to LDC sovereign borrowers. The threat of defaults in international lending is shown to give rise to many characteristics of the syndicated loan market: (1) quantity rationing of loans; (2) LDC policies designed to enhance creditworthiness; (3) prevalence of short maturities on international loans; and (4) a prevalence of bank lending relative to bond-market lending

Abstract:
We analyze the pattern of growth of a nation which borrows abroad and which has the option of repudiating its foreign debt. We show that the equilibrium strategy of competitive lenders is to make the growth of the foreign debt contingent on the growth of the borrowing country. We give a closed-form solution to a linear version of our model. The economy, in that case, follows a two-stage pattern of growth. During the first stage, the debt grows more rapidly than the economy. During the second stage, both the debt and the economy grow at the same rate, and more slowly than in the first stage. During this second stage, the total interest falling due on the debt is never entirely repaid; only an amount proportional to the difference of the rate of interest and the rate of growth of the economy is repaid each period.

Abstract:
The Paper highlights one critical difference between Europe and the US regarding the Phillips curve: the behaviour of prices. While they are quickly restored to an equilibrium level in the US, European prices are driven by highly counter-cyclical mark-ups. In bad times, European firms manage to keep their price high relative to cost, while their US counterparts are pressed into cuts and discounts of various forms. We show that this behaviour is the critical reason why Phillips curve look different across the Atlantic, much more than because of differences arising on the labour markets.

Phillips Curve, mark-up, labour market

Abstract:
The paper develops the view that the perspective on the HIPC initiative is distorted by the fact that - contrary to the Brady deal itself - it lacks all perspective on the 'market value' of the debt which is written down. The appropriate 'market value' is one that takes account of the risk of non-payment: arrears, rescheduling and 'constrained' refinancing of various sorts. Building upon econometric evidence that relies on middle income debtors in the eighties, the paper argues that the initiative is about ten times less generous than face value accounting
would suggest.

Aid, debt, HIPC

Abstract:
We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyze both one-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the designer should allow an unlimited number of tie-breaks until a winner is decided.

Contests, all-pay auctions

Abstract:
This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the effect on exchange rates of integrating monetary policy in Europe. It shows that the likely effect will be to generate a tighter European monetary policy. This argument is that trade disequilibria will be less of a threat to European monetary policy than it is at the moment.

Abstract:
This paper addresses two puzzles of the growth literature: the failure of standard growth equations to account for slow growth in Latin America and Africa; and the surprising failure of trade to explain growth when trade liberalization appears to play a significant role. The paper shows that: i) African growth is readily explained by macroeconomic mismanagement and low investment; ii) trade liberalization should be taken as a proxy for good "macroeconomic" management rather than a genuine measure of the effect of trade upon growth; and iii) poor growth in Latin America (which does not seem to be explained by the preceding feature) is explained well by a variable (constructed in the text) representing the likelihood of debt crisis.