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Abstract:
We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show "Deal or No Deal" and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well-defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake.

Decision making under risk, Expected utility theory, Prospect theory

Abstract:
Behavioral finance argues that some financial phenomena can plausibly be understood using models in which some agents are not fully rational. The field has two building blocks: Limits to arbitrage, which argues that it can be difficult for rational traders to undo the dislocations caused by less rational traders; and psychology, which catalogues the kinds of deviations from full rationality we might expect to see. We discuss these two topics, and then present a number of behavioral finance applications: To the aggregate stock market, to the cross-section of average returns, to individual trading behavior, and to corporate finance. We close by assessing progress in the field and speculating about its future course.

Abstract:
Behavioral finance argues that some financial phenomena can plausibly be understood using models in which some agents are not fully rational. The field has two building blocks: limits to arbitrage, which argues that it can be difficult for rational traders to undo the dislocations caused by less rational traders; and psychology, which catalogues the kinds of deviations from full rationality we might expect to see. We discuss these two topics, and then present a number of behavioral finance applications: to the aggregate stock market, to the cross-section of average returns, to individual trading behavior, and to corporate finance. We close by assessing progress in the field and speculating about its future course.

behavioral finance, market efficiency, limits to arbitrage, psychology, investor behavior

Abstract:
Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitations and complications. We begin with a preliminary question about relevance. Does some combination of market forces, learning and evolution render these human qualities irrelevant? No. Because of limits of arbitrage less than perfect agents survive and influence market outcomes. We then discuss three important ways in which humans deviate from the standard economic model. Bounded rationality reflects the limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem solving. Bounded willpower captures the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not in their long-run interest. Bounded self-interest incorporates the comforting fact that humans are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others. We then illustrate how these concepts can be applied in two settings: finance and savings. Financial markets have greater arbitrage opportunities than other markets, so behavioral factors might be thought to be less important here, but we show that even here the limits of arbitrage create anomalies that the psychology of decision making helps explain. Since saving for retirement requires both complex calculations and willpower, behavioral factors are essential elements of any complete descriptive theory.

Abstract:
Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitations and complications. We begin with a preliminary question about relevance. Does some combination of market forces, learning and evolution render these human qualities irrelevant? No. Because of limits of arbitrage less than perfect agents survive and influence market outcomes. We then discuss three important ways in which humans deviate from the standard economic model. Bounded rationality reflects the limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem solving. Bounded willpower captures the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not in their long-run interest. Bounded self-interest incorporates the comforting fact that humans are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others. We then illustrate how these concepts can be applied in two settings: finance and savings. Financial markets have greater arbitrage opportunities than other markets, so behavioral factors might be thought to be less important here, but we show that even here the limits of arbitrage create anomalies that the psychology of decision making helps explain. Since saving for retirement requires both complex calculations and willpower, behavioral factors are essential elements of any complete descriptive theory.

Abstract:
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice. Often people's preferences are ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people's choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection.

paternalism, savings, behavioral economics, libertarianism

Abstract:
A question of increasing interest to researchers in a variety of fields is whether the incentives and experience present in many real world settings mitigate judgment and decision-making biases. To investigate this question, we analyze the decision making of National Football League teams during their annual player draft. This is a domain in which incentives are exceedingly high and the opportunities for learning rich. It is also a domain in which multiple psychological factors suggest teams may overvalue the right to choose in the draft - non-regressive predictions, overconfidence, the winner's curse and false consensus all suggest a bias in this direction. Using archival data on draft-day trades, player performance and compensation, we compare the market value of draft picks with the historical value of drafted players. We find that top draft picks are overvalued in a manner that is inconsistent with rational expectations and efficient markets and consistent with psychological research.

Market efficiency, rational expectations, behavioral decision theory, labor markets

Abstract:
One of the most important predictions of the dividend-signaling hypothesis is that dividend changes are positively correlated with future changes in profitability and earnings. Contrary to this prediction, we show that after controlling for the well-known non-linear patterns in the behavior of earnings, dividend changes contain no information about future earnings changes. We also show that dividend changes are negatively correlated with future changes in profitability (return on assets). Finally, we investigate the out-of-sample forecasting ability of dividend changes. We find that models that include dividend changes do not outperform those that do not include dividend changes. In fact, our evidence indicates that investors are better off not using dividend changes in their earnings forecasting models.

Abstract:
Recent equity carve-outs in U.S. technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate this blatant mispricing due to short-sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Abstract:
Recent equity carve-outs in US technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate these blatant mispricing due to short sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Abstract:
Recently equity carve-outs in US technology stocks appear to violate a basic premise of financial theory: identical assets have identical prices. In our 1998-2000 sample, holders of a share of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B, but the price of A is less than x times the price of B. A prominent example involves 3Com and Palm. Arbitrage does not eliminate these blatant mispricing due to short sale constraints, so that B is overpriced but expensive or impossible to sell short. Evidence from options prices shows that shorting costs are extremely high, eliminating exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

Carve-out, mispricing, arbitrage, put-call parity, short-sale constraints

Abstract:
The assumption that utility is always maximized allows often surprising inferences about the nature of the desires that guide people's ever-rational choices. This methodology has had many uses and undeniably has charm for economists, but it rests on the shaky foundation of an implausible and untestable assumption. In this paper we discuss a version of the utility maximization hypothesis that can be tested - and we find that it is false.

Utility Maximization, Experienced Utility, Behavioral Economics

Abstract:
Saving for retirement is a difficult problem, and most employees have little training upon which to draw in making the relevant decisions. Perhaps as a result, investors are relatively passive. They are slow to join advantageous plans; they make infrequent changes; and they adopt naïve diversification strategies. In short, they need all the help they can get. Fortunately, many effective ways to help participants are also the least costly interventions: namely, small changes in plan design, sensible default options and opportunities to increase savings rates and rebalance portfolios automatically. These design features help less sophisticated investors while maintaining flexibility for more sophisticated types.

Retirement savings, 401(k) plans, behavioral finance

Abstract:
We argue that narrow framing, whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, separately from other risks she already faces, may be a more important feature of decision-making under risk than previously realized. To demonstrate this, we present evidence on typical attitudes to independent monetary gambles with both large and small stakes and show that across a wide range of utility functions, including all expected utility and many non-expected utility specifications, the only ones that can easily capture these attitudes are precisely those exhibiting narrow framing. Our analysis also makes predictions about the kinds of preferences that might be able to address the stock market participation and equity premium puzzles. We illustrate these predictions in simple portfolio choice and equilibrium settings.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We argue that narrow framing, whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, separately from other risks she already faces, may be a more important feature of decision-making under risk than previously realized. To demonstrate this, we present evidence on typical attitudes to independent monetary gambles with both large and small stakes and show that across a wide range of utility functions, including all expected utility and many non-expected utility specifications, the only ones that can easily capture these attitudes are precisely those exhibiting narrow framing. Our analysis also makes predictions about the kinds of preferences that might be able to address the stock market participation and equity premium puzzles. We illustrate these predictions in simple portfolio choice and equilibrium settings.

risk aversion, framing, loss aversion, stock market participation, equity premium

Abstract:
There is a worldwide trend towards defined contribution savings plans, where investors are often able to select their own portfolios. How much is this freedom of choice worth? We present retirement investors with information about the distribution of outcomes they could expect to obtain from the portfolios they picked for themselves, and the same information for the median portfolio selected by their peers. A majority of our survey participants actually prefer the median portfolio to the one they picked for themselves. We investigate various explanations for these findings and offer some evidence that the results are partly attributable to the fact that investors do not have well-defined preferences.

Abstract:
There is a worldwide trend towards increasing investor autonomy. Investors are increasingly able to pick their own portfolios. How good a job are they doing? We present individuals saving for retirement with information about the distribution of outcomes they could expect from the portfolios they picked and also the median portfolio selected by their peers. A majority of our survey participants actually prefer the median portfolio to the one they picked for themselves. Furthermore, we find that a majority of investors who preferred to form their own portfolio rather than accept one that was picked for them by a professional investment manager, preferred the distribution of returns implied by the suggested portfolio to the one they selected on their own. We investigate various alternatives to these findings and offer some evidence to support the view that part of the results are attributable to the fact that investors do not have well-defined preferences.

Abstract:
Nominal prices of common stocks have remained constant at around $30 per share since the Great Depression as a result of firms splitting their stocks. It is surprising that firms actively maintained constant nominal price for their shares while general prices in the economy went up more than ten fold. This is especially puzzling given that commissions paid by investors on trading ten $30 shares are about ten times those paid on a single $300 share. We estimate, for example, that had share prices of General Electric kept up with inflation, investors in that stock would have saved $100 million in commissions in 2005. We review potential explanations, including signaling and optimal trading range and find that none of the existing theories are able to explain the observed constant nominal prices. We suggest that the evidence is consistent with the idea that Norms (e.g. Akerlof, 2006) can explain the nominal price puzzle.

nominal prices, stock splits, norms

Abstract:
Monetary transactions in which consumption is temporally separated from purchase naturally lend themselves to multiple frames and to alternative accounting schemes, which nonetheless maintain a modicum of discipline and authenticity. We investigate some of the relevant accounting rules, and find that advanced purchases (e.g., a case of wine) are typically treated as "investments" rather than spending. At the same time, consumption of a good purchased earlier and used as planned (a wine bottle opened for dinner) is often coded as "free", or even as savings. However, when it is not consumed as planned (a bottle is dropped and broken), then the relevant account, long dormant, is resuscitated and costs associated with the event are perceived as the cost of replacing the good, especially if replacement is actually likely. Related phenomena and assorted implications are discussed.

Mental Accounting, Intertemporal Choice, Consumer Behavior

Abstract:
Some eleven million 401(k) plan participants take a concentrated equity position in their retirement savings account, investing more than 20% of the balance in their employer's common stock. Yet investing in the stock of one's employer is a risky investment on two counts: single securities are riskier than diversified portfolios (such as mutual funds), and the employee's human capital is typically positively correlated with the performance of the company. In the worst-case scenario, illustrated by the Enron bankruptcy, workers can lose their jobs and much of their retirement wealth simultaneously. For workers who expect to work for the company for many years, a dollar of company stock can be valued at less than 50 cents to the worker after accounting for the risks. But employees still invest voluntarily in their employers' stock, and many employers insist on making matching contributions in stock, despite the fact that a dollar of investment or contribution may be worth only 50 cents on the dollar. How can competitive labor markets sustain a situation in which employers and employees make such a fundamental miscalculation? We provide evidence that employees underestimate the risk of owning company stock, while employers overestimate the benefits associated with employee stock ownership relative to its costs. This evidence provides strong reasons to consider legal reforms in this domain. We make suggestions that would increase employees' freedom of choice and improve their welfare, but without imposing significant costs on well-meaning but ill-informed employers.

Bounded rationality, company stock, behavioral economics, employee compensation

Abstract:
We argue that "narrow framing," whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, separately from other risks she already faces, may be a more important feature of decision-making than previously realized. Our starting point is the evidence that people are often averse to a small, independent gamble, even when the gamble is actuarially favorable. We find that a surprisingly wide range of utility functions, including many non-expected utility specifications, have trouble explaining this evidence; but that this difficulty can be overcome by allowing for narrow framing. Our analysis makes predictions as to what kinds of preferences can most easily address the stock market participation puzzle, as well as other related financial puzzles. We confirm these predictions in a simple portfolio choice setting.

risk aversion, framing, loss aversion, stock market participation

Abstract:
In its attempt to model financial markets and the behavior of firms, modern finance theory starts from a set of normatively appealing axioms about individual behavior. Specifically, people are said to be risk-averse expected utility maximizers and unbiased Bayesian forecasters, i.e., agents make rational choices based on rational expectations. The rational paradigm may be criticized, however, because (1) the assumptions are descriptively false and incomplete, and (2) the theory often lacks predictive power. One way to make progress is to characterize actual decision-making behavior. Efforts along these lines are made by behavioral economists and psychologists. This paper provides a selective review of recent work in behavioral finance. First, we ask why economists should be concerned with the psychology of decision-making. Next, we discuss a series of key behavioral concepts, e.g., people's well-known tendencies to give too much weight to vivid information and to show excessive self-confidence. The body of the paper illustrates the relevance of these concepts to important topics in investment theory and corporate finance. In each case, behavioral finance offers a new perspective on results that are anomalous within the standard approach.

Abstract:
The equity premium puzzle, first documented by Mehra and Prescott, refers to the empirical fact that stocks have greatly outperformed bonds over the last century. As Mehra and Prescott point out, it appears difficult to explain the magnitude of the equity premium within the usual economics paradigm because the level of risk aversion necessary to justify such a large premium is implausibly large. We offer a new explanation based on Kahneman and Tversky's 'prospect theory'. The explanation has two components. First, investors are assumed to be 'loss averse' meaning they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently, even if they have long-term investment goals such as saving for retirement or managing a pension plan. We dub this combination 'myopic loss aversion'. Using simulations we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually. That is, investors appear to choose portfolios as if they were operating with a time horizon of about one year. The same approach is then used to study the size effect. Preliminary results suggest that myopic loss aversion may also have some explanatory power for this anomaly.

Abstract:
Although many economists, most notably Strotz, have discussed dynamic inconsistency and precommitment, none have dealt directly with the essence of the problem: self-control. This paper attempts to fill that gap by modeling man as an organization. The Strotz model is recast to include the control features missing in his formulation. The organizational analogy permits us to draw on the theory of agency. We thus relate the individual's control problems with those that exist in agency relationships.

Abstract:
Initiations and omissions of dividend payments are important changes in corporate financial policy. This paper investigates the market reaction to such changes in terms of prices, volume, and changes in clientele. Consistent with the prior literature we find that short run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations (-7.0% vs. +3.4% three day return). However, we show that, when we control for the change in the magnitude of dividend yield (which is larger for omissions), the asymmetry shrinks or disappears, depending on the specification. In the 12 months after the announcement (excluding the event calendar month), there is a significant positive market-adjusted return for firms initiating dividends of +7.5% and a significant negative market-adjusted return for firms omitting dividends of -11.0%. However, the post dividend omission drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples (long in initiation stocks and short in omission stocks) earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. Although these changes in dividend policy might be expected to produce shifts in clientele, we find little evidence for such a shift. Volume increases, but only slightly and briefly, and there are no important changes in institutional ownership.

Abstract:
Initiations and omissions of dividend payments are important changes in corporate financial policy. This paper investigates the market reaction to such changes in terms of prices, volume, and changes in clientele. Consistent with the prior literature we find that short run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations (-7.0% vs. +3.4% three day return). However, we show that, when we control for the change in the magnitude of dividend yield (which is larger for omissions), the asymmetry shrinks or disappears, depending on the specification. In the 12 months after the announcement (excluding the event calendar month), there is a significant positive market-adjusted return for firms initiating dividends of +7.5% and a significant negative market-adjusted return for firms omitting dividends of -11.0%. However, the post dividend omission drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples (long in initiation stocks and short in omission stocks) earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. Although these changes in dividend policy might be expected to produce shifts in clientele, we find little evidence for such a shift. Volume increases, but only slightly and briefly, and there are no important changes in institutional ownership.

Abstract:
How is risk-taking affected by prior gains and losses? While normative theory implores decision makers to only consider incremental outcomes, real decision makers are influenced by prior outcomes. We first consider how prior outcomes are combined with the potential payoffs offered by current choices. We propose an editing rule to describe how decision makers frame such problems. We also present data from real money experiments supporting a "house money effect" (increased risk seeking in the presence of a prior gain) and "break-even effects" (in the presence of prior losses, outcomes which offer a chance to break even are especially attractive).

decision making, prospect theory, sunk costs, mental accounting

Abstract:
A question of increasing interest to researchers in a variety of fields is whether the incentives and experience present in many "real world" settings mitigate judgment and decision-making biases. To investigate this question, we analyze the decision making of National Football League teams during their annual player draft. This is a domain in which incentives are exceedingly high and the opportunities for learning rich. It is also a domain in which multiple psychological factors suggest teams may overvalue the "right to choose" in the draft - non-regressive predictions, overconfidence, the winner's curse and false consensus all suggest a bias in this direction. Using archival data on draft-day trades, player performance and compensation, we compare the market value of draft picks with the historical value of drafted players. We find that top draft picks are overvalued in a manner that is inconsistent with rational expectations and efficient markets and consistent with psychological research.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
As firms switch from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans, employees bear more responsibility for making decisions about how much to save. The employees who fail to join the plan or who participate at a very low level appear to be saving at less than the predicted life cycle savings rates. Behavioral explanations for this behavior stress bounded rationality and self-control and suggest that at least some of the low-saving households are making a mistake and would welcome aid in making decisions about their saving. In this paper, we propose such a prescriptive savings program, called Save More Tomorrow (hereafter, the SMarT program). The essence of the program is straightforward: people commit in advance to allocating a portion of their future salary increases toward retirement savings. We report evidence on the first three implementations of the SMarT program. Our key findings, from the first implementation, which has been in place for four annual raises, are as follows: (1) a high proportion (78 percent) of those offered the plan joined, (2) the vast majority of those enrolled in the SMarT plan (80 percent) remained in it through the fourth pay raise, and (3) the average saving rates for SMarT program participants increased from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent over the course of 40 months. The results suggest that behavioral economics can be used to design effective prescriptive programs for important economic decisions.

Abstract:
Economic analysis of law usually proceeds with the behavioral assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives us much reason to doubt these assumptions; people are boundedly rational and boundedly self-interested, and they have bounded willpower. The result is to call into question many of the predictions and prescriptions offered by traditional law and economics .In this paper we offer a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior. Our analysis divides into three categories: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive analysis of law concerns how agents behave in response to legal rules and how legal rules are produced; here we suggest that in many areas, a behavioral approach improves predictions about both the effects and content of law. Prescriptive analysis concerns what rules should be adopted to advance specified ends; here we offer alternatives (in areas including informational disclosure and criminal law) to standard law and economics prescriptions based on behavioral insights. Finally, normative analysis attempts to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system: Should the system always respect people's choices? What is the appropriate domain of paternalism? By drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems, behavioral law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis. In addressing many specific topics in law, we attempt to provide some answers, and also to outline an extended research agenda for future work in behavioral law and economics.

Abstract:
Economic analysis of law usually proceeds with the behavioral assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives us much reason to doubt these assumptions; people are boundedly rational and boundedly self-interested, and they have bounded willpower. The result is to call into question many of the predictions and prescriptions offered by traditional law and economics .In this paper we offer a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior. Our analysis divides into three categories: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive analysis of law concerns how agents behave in response to legal rules and how legal rules are produced; here we suggest that in many areas, a behavioral approach improves predictions about both the effects and content of law. Prescriptive analysis concerns what rules should be adopted to advance specified ends; here we offer alternatives (in areas including informational disclosure and criminal law) to standard law and economics prescriptions based on behavioral insights. Finally, normative analysis attempts to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system: Should the system always respect people's choices? What is the appropriate domain of paternalism? By drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems, behavioral law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis. In addressing many specific topics in law, we attempt to provide some answers, and also to outline an extended research agenda for future work in behavioral law and economics.