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Abstract:
The "Fed Model" has become a very popular yardstick for judging whether the U.S. stock market is fairly valued. The Fed Model compares the stock market's earnings yield (E/P) to the yield on long-term government bonds. In contrast, traditional methods evaluate the stock market purely on its own without regard to the level of interest rates. My goal is to examine the theoretical soundness, and empirical power for forecasting stock returns, of both the "Fed Model" and the "Traditional Model". The logic most often cited in support of the Fed Model is that stocks should yield less and cost more when bond yields are low, as stocks and bonds are competing assets. Unfortunately, this reasoning compares a real number to a nominal number, ignoring the fact that over the long-term companies' nominal earnings should, and generally do, move in tandem with inflation. In other words, while it is a very popular metric, there are serious theoretical flaws in the Fed Model. Empirical results support this conclusion. The crucible for testing a valuation indicator is how well it forecasts long-term returns, and the Fed Model fails this test, while the Traditional Model has strong forecasting power. Long-term expected real stock returns are low when starting P/Es are high and vice versa, regardless of starting nominal interest rates. I also examine the usefulness of the Fed Model for explaining how investors set stock market P/Es. That is, does the market contemporaneously set P/Es higher when interest rates are lower? Note the difference between testing whether the Fed Model makes economic sense, and thus forecasts future long-term returns, versus testing whether it explains how investors set current P/Es. If investors consistently confuse the real and nominal, high P/Es will indeed be contemporaneously explained by low nominal interest rates, but these high P/Es lead to low future returns regardless. I confirm that investors have indeed historically required a higher stock market P/E when nominal interest rates have been lower and vice versa. In addition, I show that this relationship is somewhat more complicated than described by the simple Fed Model, varying systematically with perceptions of long-term stock and bond market risk. This addition of perceived risk to the Fed Model also fully explains the previously puzzling fact that stocks "out yielded" bonds for the first half of the 20th century, but have "under yielded" bonds for the last 40 years. Finally, I note that as of the writing of this paper, the stock market's P/E (based on trend earnings) is still very high versus history. A major underpinning of bullish pundits' defense of this high valuation is the Fed Model I discredit. Sadly, the Fed Model perhaps offers a contemporaneous explanation of why P/Es are high, but no true solace for long-term investors.

Abstract:
Many market observers point to the very high fraction of earnings retained (or low dividend payout ratio) among companies today as a sign that future earnings growth will be well above historical norms. This view is sometimes interpreted as an extension of the work of Miller and Modigliani. They proved that, given certain assumptions about market efficiency, dividend policy should not matter to the value of a firm. Extending this concept intertemporally, and to the market as a whole, as many do, whenever market-wide dividend payout ratios are low, higher reinvestment of earnings should lead to faster future aggregate growth.

However, in the real world, many complications exist that could confound the expected inverse relationship between current payouts and future earnings growth. For instance, dividends might signals managers' private information about future earnings prospects, with low payout ratios indicating fear that the current earnings may not be sustainable. Alternatively, earnings might be retained for the purpose of "empire-building," which itself can negatively impact future earnings growth.

We test whether dividend policy, as we observe in the payout ratio of the market portfolio, forecasts future aggregate earnings growth. This is, in a sense, one test of whether dividend policy "matters." The historical evidence strongly suggests that expected future earnings growth is fastest when current payout ratios are high and slowest when payout ratios are low. This relationship is not subsumed by other factors such as simple mean reversion in earnings. Our evidence contradicts the views of many who believe that substantial reinvestment of retained earnings will fuel faster future earnings growth. Rather, it is fully consistent with anecdotal tales about managers signaling their earnings expectations through dividends, or engaging in inefficient empire building, at times; either of these phenomena will conform with a positive link between payout ratios and subsequent earnings growth.

Our findings offer a challenge to optimistic market observers who see recent low dividend payouts as a sign of high future earnings growth to come. These observers may prove to be correct, but history provides scant support for their thesis. This challenge is potentially all the more serious, as recent stock prices, relative to earnings, dividends and book values, rely heavily upon this expectation of superior future real earnings growth.

Abstract:
In addition to attractive returns, many hedge funds claim to provide significant diversification for traditional portfolios. This paper empirically examines the return and diversification benefits of hedge fund investing using the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indices from 1994-2000. We, like many others, find that simple regressions of monthly hedge fund excess returns on monthly S&P 500 excess returns seem to support the claims. The regressions show only modest market exposure and positive added value. However, this type of analysis can produce misleading results. Many hedge funds hold, to various degrees and combinations, illiquid exchange-traded securities or difficult-to-price over-the-counter securities. For the purposes of monthly reporting, hedge funds often price these securities using either last available traded prices or estimates of current market prices. These practices can lead to reported monthly hedge fund returns that are not perfectly synchronous with monthly S&P 500 returns due to the presence of either stale or "managed" prices. Non-synchronous return data can lead to understated estimates of actual market exposure. We employ standard techniques that account for this problem and find that hedge funds in the aggregate contain significantly more market exposure than simple estimates indicate. Furthermore, after accounting for this increased market exposure, we find that taken as a whole the broad universe of hedge funds does not add value over this period. With the stock market still near all-time high valuations, investors who view their hedge funds as protection from a market correction should consider this a potentially serious issue.

Abstract:
Better proxies for the information about future returns contained in firm characteristics such as size, book-to-market equity, cash flow-to-price, percent change in employees, and various past return measures are obtained by breaking these explanatory variables into two industry-related components. The components represent (1) the difference between firms' own characteristics and the average characteristics of their industries (within-industry variables), and (2) the average characteristics of firms' industries (across-industry variables). Each variable is reliably priced within-industry and measuring the variables within-industry produces more precise estimates than measuring the variables in their more common form. Contrary to Moskowitz and Grinblatt [1999], we find that within-industry momentum (i.e., the firm's past return less the industry average return) has predictive power for the firm's stock return beyond that captured by across-industry momentum. We also document a significant short-term (one-month) industry momentum effect which remains strongly significant when we restrict the sample to only the most liquid firms.

Abstract:
A bull market, and the incentives of those who make their living from bull markets, can create its own form of logic. This book explores some of the stories that encourage the purchase or retention of stocks or mutual funds and the logic behind these stories. Some of these stories are honest attempts to explain new phenomenon, and may or may not prove true going forward. Some seem to be unintended falsehoods that come from an incomplete or lazy application of economic reasoning. Finally, some seem less well intended. The stories, and the logical analyses behind them, generally originate with Wall Street (both sell side and buy side), sometimes riding the coattails of academia, and are often readily absorbed by investors engaged in wishful thinking. Such wishful thinking has led to a stock market, and the growth/tech sector of the market in particular, that is priced so expensively that even very long-term investors will probably end up disappointed, perhaps greatly so.

Abstract:
Value and momentum ubiquitously generate abnormal returns for individual stocks within several countries, across country equity indices, government bonds, currencies, and commodities. We study jointly the global returns to value and momentum and explore their common factor structure. We find that value (momentum) in one asset class is positively correlated with value (momentum) in other asset classes, and value and momentum are negatively correlated within and across asset classes. Liquidity risk is positively related to value and negatively to momentum, and its importance increases over time, particularly following the liquidity crisis of 1998. These patterns emerge from the power of examining value and momentum everywhere simultaneously and are not easily detectable when examining each asset class in isolation.

value effect, momentum, commonality, liquidity risk

Abstract:
The Financial Analysts Journal's 60th anniversary happens to coincide with the five-year anniversary of the peak of the Great Stock Market Bubble of 1999-2000. The combination of proximity in time, with just a bit of distance, makes this year an appropriate time to consider what we may have learned from this momentous event. This article suggests lessons that, if we haven't learned them, we should have.

Investment Industry, Future Directions and Sources of Change, Portfolio Management, Asset Allocation, Equity Strategies

Abstract:
The debate about whether stock options should be expensed at the time they are issued is really no debate at all. Although legitimate issues exist about how to carry out this endeavor (what model to use, what time period to expense them over, how and when to tax them), there is simply no strong argument against expensing - and very powerful arguments in its favor. This article reviews many of the arguments against expensing and the slam-dunk case for it. A great many attacks on expensing have been undertaken, but they systematically fall short of the mark, with some of them intellectually dishonest to a degree not normally observed in dialogue among serious people.

Equity Investments: Fundamental Analysis and Valuation Models; Financial Statement Analysis: Financial Accounting Standards and Proposals; Derivative Instruments: Equity Derivatives

Abstract:
We investigate whether dividend policy, as observed in the payout ratio of the U.S. equity market portfolio, forecasts future aggregate earnings growth. The historical evidence strongly suggests that expected future earnings growth is fastest when current payout ratios are high and slowest when payout ratios are low. This relationship is not subsumed by other factors, such as simple mean reversion in earnings. Our evidence thus contradicts the views of many who believe that substantial reinvestment of retained earnings will fuel faster future earnings growth. Rather, it is consistent with anecdotal tales about managers signaling their earnings expectations through dividends or engaging, at times, in inefficient empire building. Our findings offer a challenge to market observers who see the low dividend payouts of recent times as a sign of strong future earnings to come.

Portfolio Management: asset allocation; Investment Theory: efficient market theory

Abstract:
Book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), market equity (ME), and one- year past return (momentum) (MOM) help explain the cross- section of expected individual stock returns within the U.S. and within other countries. Examining equity markets as a whole, in contrast to individual stocks, we uncover strong parallels between the explanatory power of these variables for individual stocks and for countries. First, country versions of BE/ME, ME, and MOM help explain the cross-section of expected country returns. Second, the January seasonal in ME's explanatory power for stocks also appears for countries. Third, portfolios formed by sorting stocks and countries on these variables produce similar patterns in profitability before and after the portfolio formation date.

Abstract:
Researchers have demonstrated convincingly that both "value" and "momentum" strategies have power to predict the cross-section of stock returns. This paper examines whether these strategies are independent or related. Measures of momentum and value are negatively correlated across stocks, yet each is univariately positively related to the cross-section of average stock returns. We examine whether the marginal power of value or momentum differs depending upon the level of the other variable. Value strategies work in general, but are strongest among low momentum (loser) stocks and weakest among high momentum (winner) stocks. The momentum strategy works in general, but is particularly strong among low value (expensive) stocks. We uncover these results despite finding comparable spreads in our value measures among stocks with different levels of momentum, and comparable spread in our momentum measure among stocks with different levels of value. Any explanation for why value and momentum work must also explain the interaction we document.