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Abstract:
The revival of pragmatism has brought renewed enthusiasm for John Dewey's conception of democracy. Drawing upon Rawlsian concerns regarding the fact of reasonable pluralism, the author argues that Deweyan democracy is unworthy of resurrection. A modified version of Deweyan democracy recently proposed by Elizabeth Anderson is then taken up and also found to be lacking. Then the author proposes a model of democracy that draws upon Peirce's social epistemology. The result is a non-Deweyan but nonetheless pragmatist option in democratic theory.

Deweyan Democracy, Pragmatism, Charles Peirce, Elizabeth Anderson, Social Epistemology

Abstract:
Isaiah Berlin repeatedly attempted to derive liberalism from value pluralism. It is generally agreed that Berlin's arguments fail; however, neo-Berlinians have taken up the project of securing the entailment. This paper begins with an account of why the Berlinian project seems attractive to contemporary theorists. I then examine Berlin's argument. With this background in place, I criticize William Galston's recent attempts to rescue the Berlinian project.

Value Pluralism, Liberalism, Isaiah Berlin, William Galston

Abstract:
In introduce the concept of a "folk epistemology" and argue that norms arising from our folk epistemic commitments provide a compelling social epistemic justification for democratic political norms.

social epistemology, democracy, political justification

Abstract:
The author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version of liberalism is sufficiently accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism. The conclusion is that the founding premise of political liberalism admits of a counterexample; there is a version of comprehensive liberalism that is sufficiently pluralistic.

Liberalism, Pluralism, Social Epistemology, Rawls, Political Liberalism

Abstract:
This short paper summarizes the main line of argument in my book, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy* (Routledge, 2007), which is the subject of a forthcoming symposium issue of the journal *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*.

Democracy, Pragmatism, Peirce, Dewey

Abstract:
This is a short essay written for the forthcoming *Handbook of American Pragmatism* (Cheryl Misak, ed., Oxford University Press). The author argues that the standard narrative, according to which pragmatism went into eclipse in the years of the Cold War is nonviable.

Pragmatism, Cold War, Dewey, Hook

Abstract:
My response to Ralston's paper "In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life," both presented at the Eastern APA meeting (2008).

Dewey, democracy, pluralism

Abstract:
The author defends a version of justificatory liberalism against a line of criticism developed by Christopher Eberle. Along the way, a conception of respect that liberal citizens owe to each other qua citizens is proposed. According to thins conception, respect requires citizens to both seek and find public justifications for their favored coercive laws.

Liberalism, Justificatory Liberalism, Public Reason, Christopher Eberle

Abstract:
This brief paper responds to Matthew Festenstein's 'Pragmatism, Inquiry, and Political Liberalism.'

Festenstein, Pragmatism, Rawls, Dewey, democracy