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Abstract:
Why a "right to die" could be a coercive option.

medical ethics, bioethics, death, euthanasia, assisted suicide

Abstract:
Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another - namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

personal identity, self, Buddhism, Kurt Vonnegut, Derek Parfit, time

Abstract:
This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics.

philosophy of mind, belief, fantasy, pretence, psychoanalysis

Abstract:
How can agent causation be accommodated in our conception of the causation as a relation between events?

action, agent causation, Roderick Chisholm

Abstract:
Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations.

One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is inclined to care about them. The problem with the resulting conception, as we have seen, is that it entails the normative judgment that one ought to be inclined to care about the specified features, on pain of irrationality, and this normative judgment requires justification.

The advantage of internalism is that it avoids these normative commitments. It says that things count as reasons for someone only if he is inclined to care about them, and so it leaves the normative question of whether to care about them entirely open. Yet if we try to leave this question open, by defining things as reasons only for those inclined to care about them, we'll end up with a definition that's relativized to the inclinations of particular agents — won't we?

Not necessarily. For suppose that all reasons for acting are features of a single kind, whose influence depends on a single inclination. And suppose that the inclination on which the influence of reasons depends is, not an inclination that distinguishes some agents from others, but rather an inclination that distinguishes agents from nonagents. In that case, to say that these features count as reasons only for those who are inclined to care about them will be to say that they count as reasons only for agents — which will be to say no less than that they are reasons for acting, period, since applying only to agents is already part of the concept of reasons for acting. The restriction on the application of reasons will drop away from our definition, since it restricts their application, not to some proper subset of agents, but rather to the set of all agents, which is simply the universe of application for reasons to act.

action, practical reason, internal reasons, Christine Korsgaard, Bernard Williams

Abstract:
The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good.

This agent is conceived as being capable of intentional action — and hence as being an agent — only by virtue of being a pursuer of value. I want to question whether this conception of agency can be correct. Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so narrow a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized, not the generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a particularly bland species of agent, at that. It has characterized the earnest agent while ignoring those agents who are disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic, or punk. I hope for a moral psychology that has room for the whole motley crew.

I shall begin by examining why some philosophers have thought that the attitudes motivating intentional actions involve judgments of value. I shall then argue that their conception of these attitudes is incorrect. Finally, I shall argue that practical reason should not be conceived as a faculty for pursuing value.

action, Donald Davidson, practical reason, motivation, value

Abstract:
By "deciding how to decide," I mean using practical reasoning to regulate one's principles of practical reasoning. David Gauthier has suggested that deciding how to decide is something that every rational agent does. According to Gauthier, we assess rival principles of practical reasoning, which tell us how to choose among actions.

One of my goals in this essay is to argue, in opposition to Gauthier, that assessing rival principles of practical reasoning is a job for theoretical rather than practical reasoning. How to decide is something that we discover rather than decide.

The idea that our principles of practical reasoning can be regulated by practical reasoning is essential to Gauthier's defence of his own, somewhat unorthodox conception of those principles. And although I do not endorse the specifics of Gauthier's conception, I do endorse its spirit. There is a flaw in the orthodox conception of practical reasoning, and Gauthier has put his finger on it. Unfortunately, Gauthier's account of why it is a flaw, and how it should be fixed, ultimately rests on practical considerations, whose relevance is open to question if, as I believe, practical reasoning cannot regulate itself.

This essay therefore has a second goal, which complicates matters considerably. Although I want to reject Gauthier's notion that we decide how to decide, I also want to preserve what rests upon that notion, in Gauthier's view: I want to resettle Gauthier's critique of the orthodoxy on a new foundation.

intention, practical reason, David Gauthier, prisoners' dilemma, rationality

Abstract:
Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm any one of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism.

action, free will, G.E.M Anscombe

Abstract:
An explanation of how intentions can literally be shared.

intention

Abstract:
Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the theory are embodied in a single mathematical proof. The problem in the foundations of decision theory is to explain how elements of one and the same proof can serve both functions.

I hope to solve this problem in a way that anchors the decision-theoretic norms of rational preference in fundamental intuitions about rationality in general. I will thus depart from the tradition of anchoring those norms in intuitions about gambling strategies or preference structures of the sort that are the special concern of the theory itself. Although my interpretation is meant to capture what is right about the decision-theoretic conception of rational preference, it will lead me to argue that there is also something fundamentally wrong about that conception. In my view, decision theory tells us how to be rational in our preferences because it tells us how to have preferences that make sense; but there are ways of making sense that outrun, and may in fact conflict with, the prescriptions of decision theory.

rational action, decision theory

Abstract:
On the ethics of donor conception.

reproduction, procreation, ethics, donor conception, reproductive technology

Abstract:
We explore the implications of the Holocaust for analytic moral philosophy.

Holocaust, Nazi, ethics, Hannah Arendt, Barbara Herman

Abstract:
Just as observation is conditioned by our concepts of observables, so action is conditioned by our concepts of "doables". This phenomenon has implications for the question of moral universals, for the methodology of moral theory, and for the concept of moral responsibility.

ethics, metaethics, relativism, action, sociology, anthropology, Harvey Sacks, Harold Garfinkel, Emanuel Schegloff, Alfred Schutz, Barbara Herman

Abstract:
The terms 'endurance' and 'perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what they are. The common approach is to define them in terms of temporal parts. We argue that this approach is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives. We argue that endurance so defined becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true, but a conceptual truth. Instead we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than temporal parts. An object endures, we propose, if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists. We make precise what it means for the identity of an object to be determined at a moment. Finally, we discuss what role the endurance - perdurance distinction so understood should play in the metaphysics of time and material objects, and in the debate about personal identity. The discussion of the latter will also make clear why the old distinction seemed coherent, even though it is not.

metaphysics, persistence, endurance, perdurance, time

Abstract:
As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good.

When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way that does it justice. To say that the will is a good thing, however, would imply that having a will is better than not having one, or that using it is better than not using it - neither of which I am prepared to assert as a general rule.

Speaking metaphorically, I would say that the will is like a magic wand. In fairy tales, the character who looks upon a magic wand as an unalloyed good is destined to be sadder but wiser in the end. Being a magician isn't better than being an ordinary human, just different; and a magician must value his powers by respecting them and therefore using them appropriately, even sparingly, not by using them as much as possible.

action, will, intention, moral psychology, Michael Bratman, G.E.M. Anscombe

Abstract:
I offer a new interpretation of Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of action, as it was presented in his book The Importance of What We Care About. I then suggest that kinds of activity celebrated in the Daoist doctrine of wu wei and in Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi's theory of "flow" would qualify as instances of "higher wantonness" under Frankfurt's theory.

action, moral psychology, Harry Frankfurt, Zhuangzi, Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi, flow, wu wei