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Abstract:
This essay is an introductory overview of the considerations in favor of epistemic infinitism, the view that the demands of justification are that one must have non-terminating series of reasons for one's beliefs if they are to be knowledge.

Epistemology, Justification, Value of Knowledge, Regress

Abstract:
This paper is a survey of a variety of hypocrisy charges levied against Al Gore. Understood properly, these hypocrisy charges actually support Gore's case.

Gore, Hypocrisy, Informal Logic, Tu Quoque, environmental ethics

Abstract:
William James' main argument in "The Will to Believe" against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.

evidentialism, justification, ethics of belief, pragmatism, will to believe

Abstract:
Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent's proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will term tu quoque judo.

Argumentation, Informal Logic

Abstract:
Three objections to the epistemic theory of argument are presented and briefly rebutted. In light of this reply, a case for argumentative eclecticism is made.

Argumentation, Rhetoric, Epistemology

Abstract:
The rhetorical theory of argument, if held as a conclusion of an argument, is self-defeating. The rhetorical theory can be refined, but these refinements either make the theory subject to a second self-defeat problem or tacitly an epistemic theory of argument.

Rhetoric, Epistemic theory of Argument, Tindale, Perelman, Crosswhite

Abstract:
Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. Peirce himself revised the semantic theory later, and in so doing, it seems also his epistemic infinitism.

Epistemology, Infinitism, Peirce, Klein, Regress

Abstract:
Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious extremism are indistinguishable from instances of sincere extremism. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of ways, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles than religion. Further, regular invocations of Poe's Law in critical discussions have the threat of further entrenching and polarizing views.

Epistemology, Satire, Group Polarization, Religion

Abstract:
There is an antinomy with regards to regulative norms of inquiry. On the one hand, there is what I will call the assessment rule (AR), which is that one's commitments must reflect how well those commitments survive critical scrutiny. On the other hand, there is what I call the fiduciary/stability requirement, which is that for views to be adequately articulated and defended, its proponents must maintain commitment to the views. I propose the virtue of holding one's own and the notion of an experiment in bullet-biting as a synthetic solution to the antinomy of norms.

Philosophy, Argumentation, Metaphilosophy