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Abstract:
We study endogenous liquidity trading in a market with long-lived asymmetric information. We distinguish between public information, tractable information that can be acquired and intractable information that cannot be acquired. Besides information asymmetry and noise, the adverse-selection spread depends on the diffusion of intractable information and on the interest rate. With endogenous liquidity trading, efficiency is lower than that implied by noise-trading models. Liquidity traders benefit from the information released through the insider's trades in spite of their monetary losses. We study factors that affect the insider's information acquisition decision, including the amount of intractable information, observability and information acquisition costs.

Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of liquidity trading on the dynamics of a financial market under long-lived asymmetric information. Informed traders maximize the expected trading gains they can extract using their superior information, whereas risk-averse liquidity traders with disparate liquidity preferences maximize their expected utility. We describe a multi-period discrete time model and find the equilibrium. We then examine the continuous time analogue of the model, find the corresponding equilibrium for a single informed trader and obtain closed-form expressions and time patterns for the operating characteristics of the market. We find that liquidity traders' reaction to informed trading impedes information dissemination to the market. When information acquisition by the insider is endogenous, we find that in contrast to models with pure noise traders, it is in the insider's best interest to curtail the amount of information he acquires. Further, the acquisition of some information by the insider makes liquidity traders better off, although at zero cost the insider acquires more information than is necessary to maximize liquidity traders' welfare. For a wide range of parameter values, the informed trader chooses to voluntarily release information to the market if he is allowed to do so. Moreover, voluntary information disclosure helps solve the problem of reduced incentives for information acquisition by inducing the informed trader to acquire full information.

Abstract:
We study the effect of trading consolidation by examining the response of liquidity and stock price to the exercise of deep in-the-money corporate warrants. This enables a relatively clean test of the value of trading consolidation. The exercise at the warrant expiration is fully anticipated and has no information content. An effect can come from the value of trading consolidation that improves liquidity. Indeed, we find that liquidity and stock prices both increase significantly at warrant expiration. Further, the price increase is positively related to the pre-exercise extent of fragmentation, to post-exercise improvement in stock liquidity and to the proportional increase in the number of shares following the warrant exercise.

Trading fragmentation; market microstructure; value of liquidity.

Abstract:
This paper examines the value effects of improvements in the trading mechanism. Stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange were transferred gradually from a daily call auction to a mechanism where the call auction was followed by iterated continuous trading sessions. This event was associated with a positive and permanent price appreciation. The cumulative average market-adjusted return over a period that started five days prior to the announcement and ended 30 days after the stocks started trading by the new method was approximately 5.5%. In addition, we find positive liquidity externalities (spillovers) across related stocks, and improvements in the value discovery process due to the improved trading method. Finally, there was a positive association between liquidity gains and price appreciation. Our results suggest that improvements in market microstructure are valuable.

Abstract:
This paper examines the value effects of improvements in the trading mechanism. Stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange were transferred gradually from a daily call auction to a mechanism where the call auction was followed by iterated continuous trading sessions. This event was associated with a positive and permanent price appreciation. The cumulative average market-adjusted return over a period that started five days prior to the announcement and ended 30 days after the stocks started trading by the new method was approximately 5.5%. In addition, we find positive liquidity externalities (spillovers) across related stocks, and improvements in the value discovery process due to the improved trading method. Finally, there was a positive association between liquidity gains and price appreciation. Our results suggest that improvements in market microstructure are valuable.

Abstract:
The authors also suggest that the liquidity of a company's securities can be managed by corporate policies and actions. For those companies whose value is likely to be increased by having more liquid securities which is by no means true of all companies (mature firms that don't need outside capital may well benefit from having more concentrated ownership and hence less liquidity) management should consider actions such as reducing leverage and substituting dividends for stock repurchases as well as measures designed to increase the effectiveness of their disclosure and investor relations program and the size of their investor base. The theory of corporate finance has been based on the idea that a company's market value is determined mainly by just two variables: the company's expected after-tax operating cash flows or earnings, and the risk associated with producing them. The authors argue that there is another important factor affecting a company's value: the liquidity of its own securities, debt as well as equity. The paper supports this argument by reviewing the large and growing body of evidence showing that differences and changes in liquidity can have major effects on the pricing of corporate stocks and bonds or, equivalently, on investors' required returns for holding them. The authors also suggest that the liquidity of a company's securities can be managed by corporate policies and actions. For those companies whose value is likely to be increased by having more liquid securities which is by no means true of all companies (mature firms that don't need outside capital may well benefit from having more concentrated ownership and hence less liquidity) management should consider actions such as reducing leverage and substituting dividends for stock repurchases as well as measures designed to increase the effectiveness of their disclosure and investor relations program and the size of their investor base.

Abstract:
An asset is liquid if it can be traded at the prevailing market price quickly and at low cost. We show that in addition to risk, liquidity affects asset prices and returns. Theories of asset pricing suggest that the expected return on an asset is increasing in its risk, because risk-averse investors require a compensation for bearing more risk. Because investors are also averse to the costs of illiquidity and want to be compensated for bearing them, asset returns are increasing in illiquidity. Thus, asset prices should depend on two asset characteristics: risk and liquidity. This paper surveys research on the effects of liquidity on asset prices and returns. We find that liquidity is an important factor in capital asset pricing.

Market efficiency, liquidity risk premia, asset prices

Abstract:
This paper proposes that the issuer of a security should have the exclusive right to determine in which markets its securities will be traded. This is in contrast to the current regime, where markets can decide to trade securities unilaterally, without the issuer's consent. The trading regime of a security affects its liquidity and consequently its value, and multimarket trading by some securities holders may produce negative externalities that harm securities holders taken as a group. Our proposed regime will shift the focus of inter-market competition from traders (which sometimes implies a "race to the bottom") to issuers. Since the issuer has an incentive to maximize the value of the traded securities, its choices will be consistent with those of securities holders taken as a group and with those of a hypothetical benevolent regulator. Under our proposed regime, markets will adopt and self-enforce rules and regulations that enhance liquidity and securities' values in order to attract issuers, thereby providing a market-based solution to regulation of trading markets. The paper also discusses the implementation of the rule for derivative securities, following a "fair use" approach.