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Abstract:
Until 1962, there were no recorded cases of international election observation in sovereign states. Today, election monitoring is widely referred to as an international norm, and it is rare for a developing country to hold an election without inviting international observers. Many leaders engage in the puzzling behavior of inviting foreign observers and orchestrating obvious electoral fraud in front of them. Why has the decision to invite foreign election observers - and the corresponding international involvement in clearly domestic political processes - become an international norm? Unlike the most prominent theories of international norm development, election observation was not initiated by norm entrepreneurs, nor does it necessarily help facilitate international cooperation. Using the logic of signaling in international relations, I offer an interest-based theory of international norm development that explains how international norms can be generated even in the absence of norm entrepreneurs and incentives for cooperation. Triggered by growing international support for democracy, I argue that some leaders chose to invite international observers to signal their commitment to democratization. As the benefits tied to democracy increased, pseudo-democrats began mimicking the signal, and the growing demand for election monitors, combined with the increasing value of democracy to international actors changed international expectations about appropriate behavior for leaders of developing countries. This theory has the potential to explain other unintended yet consequential international norms that result from diffuse but strategic responses by state leaders to changes in the international environment.

international norms, elections, democratization, second-image reversed

Abstract:
Before democracy becomes the only game in town, when are leaders motivated to hold democratic elections? We argue that in the absence of institutionalized democracy, information about election quality plays an important role. When a government's true actions are not communicated credibly to the electorate, leaders have no incentive to hold democratic elections. In many countries in the developing world, such credible sources of information are scarce. We suggest that the rise of international election observation as an institution provides one solution to this informational problem. Drawing on substantive knowledge about election observation and using a new global dataset of elections, we show that observers not only increase the quality of available information on the electoral process but also make it more costly for leaders to cheat. We conclude that international election monitoring helps solve a real and hitherto underappreciated problem in the study of democratization.

elections, international dimensions of democratization, self-enforcing democracy

Abstract:
Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation - spending more or taxing less prior to an election - is an important tool that governments may use to enhance their chances for reelection. This article examines how international political scrutiny (in the form of international election monitoring) and international economic scrutiny (in the form of IMF agreements) constrain governments' decisions to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. Using data from 1990-2004 on fiscal manipulation, competitive elections, IMF agreements, and international election monitoring, the evidence suggests strong support for the argument that international scrutiny constrains government decision making; pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is most likely when incumbents are subject to international political scrutiny from election monitors, but are not subject to international economic scrutiny resulting from an IMF agreement. The results are robust to alternative specifications, and suggest that leaders of developing countries are more constrained in their policy choices than suggested by the existing literature.

Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation, election observation, elections in developing countries