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Guido Tabellini's
Scholarly Papers
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Citations
56 |
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1.
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Guido Tabellini
Bocconi University
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06 Jun 08
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06 Jun 08
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3
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20
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Abstract:
How and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions? This paper argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the missing link. Evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings. First, individual values consistent with generalized (as opposed to limited) morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non-despotic political institutions in the distant past. Second, well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are consistent with generalized morality, and under different identifying assumptions this suggests a causal effect from values to institutional outcomes. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications for future research.
culture, growth, institutions, political economics
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Guido Tabellini
Bocconi University
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05 Jun 08
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05 Jun 08
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34
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Abstract:
What explains the range of situations in which individuals cooperate? This paper studies a theoretical model where individuals respond to incentives but are also influenced by norms of good conduct inherited from earlier generations. Parents rationally choose what values to transmit to their offspring, and this choice is influenced by the quality of external enforcement and the pattern of likely future transactions. The equilibrium displays strategic complementarities between values and current behaviour, which reinforce the effects of changes in the external environment. Values evolve gradually over time, and if the quality of external enforcement is chosen under majority rule, there is hysteresis: adverse initial conditions may lead to a unique equilibrium path where external enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation.
cooperation, cultural transmission, culture, institutions
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3.
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Torsten Persson
Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) Guido Tabellini
Bocconi University
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27 May 08
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08 Jul 08
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1
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6
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Abstract:
We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of -2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results.
democracy, economic growth, matching estimators
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