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Abstract:
These remarks were presented at the AALS 2009 Women in Legal Education Panel: The Cleopatra Syndrome: Golda, Indira, Bella, Shirley, Margaret, Geraldine and Hillary - Educating Women for Leadership Roles in the 21st Century.

In these comments, I argue that women lag in leadership roles because the model of leadership to which society in general and women in particular subscribe is based on following the script of previous leaders, who are almost always men. In order to properly value women's lives, and to ensure vibrant female leadership, a model of leadership that takes into account and gives credence to women's different lives must be established. Women's lives include much more time caring for young children and balancing work with family. A new model for leadership must give proper accord to the essential and vital role of caregiving.

A model of leadership that values women's lives should not fight work/family balance but accept it. Family values advocates should value people who spend time with their families - male or female. Balance in work/family, reflects a balanced perspective and those traits that make great caregivers may also make great leaders. Men and women should not be embarrassed of their caregiving or feel that it is irrelevant but champion their committment to family in their leadership endeavors. Educators must also bring these lessons into the classrooms to ensure that women and their male peers are more comfortable with and give proper credence to caregiving activities.

I also apply this argument in the context of the 2008 presidential election and argue that Sarah Palin made great strides in being comfortable with her different life as a woman and caregiver and that Hillary Clinton could have been more appealing if she had been more comfortable with her different life. Ultimately, women's leadership suffers because women are too focused on being men and they should use their strengths in creating their own mold of leadership that values the strengths and important contributions stemming from women's different experiences.

Gender, Sexuality, Women, Leadership, Caregiving, Children

Abstract:
In this article I consider how gender differences generally, and the gendered role of the caretaker in particular, should be treated in divorce law. The theory of gender neutrality continues to dominate the law of divorce. I explain how gender neutrality's influence on divorce law has created a legal system that ignores the different roles that the caretaker and primary earner perform during marriage, leaving those caretakers in distress at the time of divorce. After exploring the benefits and drawbacks of various alternative paradigms for treating gender difference in the law, I argue that gender differences should be recognized selectively, in order to promote important societal interests, such as caretaking. In the context of divorce law, gender difference should be recognized through support for the different and important contribution of caretaking. Primary caretakers should have the presumption of custody at divorce, so as to be freed from the need to bargain for custody in fear of the uncertainty of the discretionary best interest standard. Equally as important, I argue that primary caretakers should be financially supported through alimony or "caretaker support" payments after divorce. I posit that while different family contributions during marriage should be recognized as such, different contributions should result in different, but livable and dignified, consequences upon the dissolution of the marriage.

gender, family law

Abstract:
The law of custody and visitation is expanding to include the possibility of non-biological and non-adoptive parents' legal access to children. The concept of the psychological parent or functional caretaker is becoming increasingly prevalent and influential in state law. Moreover, the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution include two categories of psychological parents - parents by estoppel and de facto parents - in its proposed guidelines for who can petition for custody and visitation rights to children. Yet, both state law and the ALI Principles exclude caretakers who receive compensation - including foster parents, paid child care providers and surrogate mothers - from the categories of psychological parents to whom courts may grant such rights. In this article, I argue that the receipt of compensation for child care should not automatically disqualify caretakers from potentially achieving de facto legal status if the psychological bond is otherwise strong and the other requisites are met. In fact, I argue that such a rigid approach sacrifices significant benefits to children and caretakers. Excluding those who receive compensation for the care they give denigrates the value of care given by paid caregivers, misjudges the strength of the psychological bond between paid caregivers and children, and discriminates against the poor and racial minorities. While legitimate concerns regarding allowing a third party to use the power of the state to infringe on the parent-child relationship, as well as more general anxiety about mixing money and the personal relationship of care, must be addressed, I recommend a more nuanced approach to addressing these concerns. This approach takes into account both the paid nature of the relationship as well as the strength of the psychological bond involved. Just as feminists have argued that caretaking work needs to be compensated, compensated caretaking work needs to be legally recognized for the value it provides.

Children, Caregivers, Commodification, Visitation