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Abstract:
To avoid complexities: I claim that comparative law may sometimes feel like a Wonderland. Obviously, this sort of claim calls for explanation - what kind of wonderland and in what specific sense. So, I should first explain myself shortly before presenting an argument for flexible understanding of comparative law methodology.

Now, comparative law literature is sometimes quite confusing, occasionally even slightly disturbing. Especially if one is interested in comparative law methodology i.e. the question concerning how to do comparative law. Comparative law and comparative legal studies are today vast fields with different scholarly orientations, inner debates and even schools of thought with very different academic orientations. To name a few: there are those who seek similarities, those who prefer to stress differences, those who are interested in western law, those who are interested in non-western law, there are generalists and there are country-specialists. As an academic discipline comparative study of law has developed a wide range of internal styles and methodological debates normally reflecting the same debates that take place in legal academia in general.

In this presentation methodology of comparative law is analysed by using the metaphoric device of Wonderland, originally known from the famous novel Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll (pen name of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson). But, the assumed rhetorical approach does not reflect the ideas of the novel itself, rather it reflects some of the personal feelings of a writ who has sometimes felt as being in a Wonderland and falling, constantly, into different rabbit-holes while trying to make sense what is - or what might be - the method of comparative law.

comparative law, comparative law methodology, comparative legal studies

Abstract:
In this review essay the problem of an exclusive legal mind is tackled with the help of the ideas originating from the seminal book by H. Patrick Glenn - Legal Traditions of the World. This review essay consists of four parts which are the introduction, a dense personal presentation of Glenn's basic ideas, a demonstration of the (epistemic) problem of exclusion of other, and a resolution in which the themes of this article are gathered together and a further contemplation over the theme is presented.

Comparative Law, Legal Traditions

Abstract:
This article grew from a desire to look deeper into the relationship between legal history and comparative public law and, also, from a will to deploy legal history while trying to conceive contemporary European constitutional culture. The ideas and approach entertained in this article are somewhat dissident in their relation with the mainstream debates regarding this subject. Yet, the purpose of this article is not to criticise the novum IUS commune Europaeum movement as such. Nor is it to defend or attack the idea of a Common European Civil Code. Rather, the point is to try to inquire if there is something in today's European public law sphere that could be conceived somewhat equivalent to the past IUS commune.

The quintessential methodological idea here is to use historical legal material as a conceptual tool for modern day discussion. Instead of trying to embark deeper into a private law oriented debate the focus here is shifted towards constitutional law i.e. an area of law that originally was not connected with the IUS commune tradition. By means of a close-reading-approach this article tries to conceive if there really is something of IUS commune in Europe. Further, could there be, perhaps, a kind of transnational epistemic judicial grammar, taking shape in dialogue between judges, to be found? And, if there is such a thing how it should be regarded: positively as healthy form of non-national constitutionalism or negatively as a popular sovereignty hostile form of international judicial elitism?

Constitutional law, Legal history, Law and language

Abstract:
We find references to Nordic law in legal academic literature quite often. It seems to be the case that many authors quite intuitively connect Nordic law with particular ideals and conceptions of law, without thinking about the issue, as detailed studies to support these intuitions would be in any case difficult to carry out because of language problems.

This is where we seek to intervene with our hypotheses, findings and insights, in order to invite a more detailed discussion. As comparatively minded scholars of Nordic law, we have some preconceptions about what Nordic law might be like. We want to explore the mentality underlying it, and explain its relationship with both long-term cultural tradition and the forces that account for its historical continuity, but at the same time we wish to explore how it has been turned into a vehicle of social change, progress and instrumentalism. We are, in some sense, also discussing legal-historical aspects of the emergence of the Nordic welfare state. Our fundamental claim is that the Nordic law has for centuries already been informed by an inclusive and status-oriented view of social justice and social ethics which has been relevant to the general outlining of the legal system, and which has survived many processes of social and cultural transformation. Nordic law could thus be characterised by its commitment to a specific set of values. In the following we will try identify these values in order to give a fuller account of the nature of Nordic law.

Nordic law, Legal culture, Comparative law

Abstract:
The academic writing on comparative law can deal with many kinds of questions. Here the discussion concentrates on a theoretical question: What is the core of functionalism’s methodology and what is its relation to new strands of comparative law? This means that questions concerning macro-level comparison (e.g. classification of legal families and/or legal cultures) are not discussed in detail in this article. This is partly because functionalism can seldom be very fruitful in the comparison of legal families, mentalities or legal cultures. In other words: Functionalism’s possibilities are limited, it cannot be understood as a method that would fit to all comparative studies. It is sought here to present a scholarly re-reading of the essential features of the new and old theories of comparative law. Nonetheless, this article is not intended as a purely defensive statement of a threatened tradition. Instead it is suggestes here to place functionalism in comparative law in a legitimate but restricted position as an interesting and sometimes even fruitful, but certainly not exclusive form of comparative methodology within the field of legal studies. The strategy here is as follows: In chapter 2 the old school or the old canon is being presented and stripped of a certain ‘scientific’ flavour in favour of a moderate version of functionalism. In chapter 3 some of the challengers and a few key features of their ideas are introduced and then assessed. Chapter 4 consists of discussion and, hopefully, also a personally constructed reflective analysis of the state of affairs of current comparative law; relation of functionalism and new approaches. Finally, the article ends in conclusions in chapter 5. (Final page contains abstract in German)

comparative law, methodology, functionalism

Abstract:
The argument in this paper draws inspiration from the pedagogical theory of so-called constructivism. An effective law curriculum is one which can stimulate students to learn legal thinking. The constructivist approach suggests that the learner is more actively involved in a joint enterprise with the law teacher of constructing new legally relevant, and perhaps competing, meanings. Comparative law and/or foreign law and even approximate knowledge of different foreign approaches to similar types of questions may be regarded as a valuable tool for the construction of a primary pluralistic legal mind.

Legal education, Constructivist approach

Abstract:
This review-article deals with Werner Menski’s interesting argument (Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 2006) for pluralistic and genuinely global comparative law. The content and general structure of this argument is described while it is also highlighted against the present literature on general comparative law. Also, the state of comparative law as a discipline is looked at side by side with the presentation of Menski’s argument and its key points. In the end, the author highlights some of the contributions and problems that Menski’s argument contains. In conclusion, the contribution of pluralistic and global comparative law is assessed specifically from the point of view of the European legal mind – what value, if any, does the argument for a pluralistic and diverse open comparative law epistemology have from the point of view of european centred and somewhat inside-looking scholarly debate.

comparative law, methdology, Asian law, African law