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Abstract:
Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. Using these markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public sectors.

We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide information that will benefit the private sector and government alike.

prediction markets, public policy, forecasting, regulation

Abstract:
Broadband, or high-speed access to the Internet, has generated significant economic benefits. Certain regulations, however, are slowing investment and deterring entry into the broadband market. In this statement, we make two recommendations that would remedy these regulatory defects and thereby lower artificial barriers to competitive provision of broadband services.

Abstract:
Many transactions are now computer mediated, making it possible for sellers to condition their pricing on the history of interactions with individual consumers. This paper investigates conditions under which price conditioning will or will not be used. Our simplest model involves rational consumers with constant valuations for the good being sold and a monopoly seller who can commit to a pricing policy. In this framework, the seller will not find it profitable to condition pricing on past behavior. We consider various generalizations of this model, such as allowing the seller to offer enhanced services to previous customers, making the seller unable to commit to a pricing policy, and allowing competition in the marketplace. All of these generalizations have equilibria with price conditioning.

Price discrimination, Price conditioning, Privacy, Ecommerce, Microeconomics

Abstract:
We describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.

Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that in designing government debt and tax-transfer policies, it is important to consider their implications for the allocation of risk between generations. There is no reason to presume that the market or the family can allocate risk efficiently to future generations, implying that stochastic government policies have the potential to create first-order welfare improvements. The model provides a non-Keynsian justification for debt-finance of wars and recessions, as well as an added rationale for Social Security type tax-transfer schemes which aid unlucky generations, e.g., the Depression generation,at the expense of luckier generations.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This article examines three recent topics in copyright policy from an economic perspective: (i) term extensions, (ii) the orphan works problem, and (iii) mass digitization projects. Copyright term extensions will make it even more difficult to locate rights holders in the future than it is at present' however there are some recent legislative proposals to address this problem. Term extensions will also make finding works more difficult, but here mass digitization projects may be helpful.

Abstract:
An earlier version of Service Architecture and Content Provision, as presented at the Telecom Policy Research Conference 1995. There are some additional mathematical examples, and a short section on the effects of architecture on content creation that we did not include in the published version.

Abstract:
This paper was prepared for the Tenth Michigan Public Utility Conference at Western Michigan University March 25-27, 1993. We describe the history, technology and cost structure of the Internet. We also describe a possible smart-market mechanism for pricing congestion on the Internet.

Abstract:
This is a set of Frequently Asked Questions (and answers) about the economic, institutional, and technological structure of the Internet. We describe the history and current state of the Internet, discuss some of the pressing economic and regulatory problems, and speculate about future developments.

Abstract:
We describe the basic economic theory of pricing a congestible resource such as an ftp server, a router, a Web site, etc. In particular, we examine the implications of "congestion pricing" as a way to encourage efficient use of network resources. We explore the implications of flat pricing and congestion pricing for capacity expansion in centrally planned, competitive, and monopolistic environments.

Abstract:
We describe the technology and costs of the Internet, then discuss how to design efficient pricing in order to allocate scarce Internet resources. We offer a "smart market" as a device to efficiently price congestion.

Abstract:
This is a list of Frequently Asked Questions about usage-based pricing of the Internet. We argue that usage-based pricing is likely to come sooner or later and that some serious thought should be devoted to devising a sensible system of usage-based pricing.