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Jacopo Carmassi's
Scholarly Papers
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Downloads
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Citations
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1.
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Carmine Di Noia
CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa) - Divisione Mercati Stefano Micossi
affiliation not provided to SSRN Jacopo Carmassi
ASSONIME Fabrizia Peirce
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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25 Mar 09
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25 Mar 09
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90
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Abstract:
With the aim of restoring a strong global framework for economic governance, this study proposes new rules of the game - imposed through the Group of 20 and the IMF - for the macroeconomic and exchange rate policies of the main players, including the United States. It also advocates stricter prudential rules for banks, centred around the introduction of a simple leverage ratio calculated with reference to total assets, with no exemptions or risk mitigation. The authors warn against the risk of a massive wave of new regulation, which is not needed and might cripple capital markets for years, and call instead for a simplification and a better enforcement of rules. Carmine Di Noia is Deputy Director General of Assonime and member of the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) at the European Commission. Stefano Micossi is Director General of Assonime, Professor at the College of Europe and a member of CEPS Board of Directors. Jacopo Carmassi is a researcher at Assonime and Fellow of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. Fabrizia Peirce is an economist in Assonime's economic unit.
Financial, Market, Regulation
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2.
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Richard J. Herring
affiliation not provided to SSRN Jacopo Carmassi
ASSONIME
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30 Jan 08
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30 Jan 08
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3
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4
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Abstract:
In this paper the authors note that, over the last decade, in many countries the financial supervisory functions that were once performed by central banks have been combined with those performed by other official agencies and/or self-regulatory organizations to form a single financial services regulator. They consider three questions: (1) Why has this change occurred? (2) What role in supervision, if any, should the central bank continue to play? and (3) Do these organizational changes in financial supervision pose risks to financial stability?
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3.
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Jacopo Carmassi
ASSONIME Daniel Gros
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels Stefano Micossi
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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21 Oct 09
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21 Oct 09
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Abstract:
The massive financial instability of 2007–08 was, in the main, the result of lax monetary policy. Regulation compounded this error by allowing and encouraging excessive leverage and maturity transformation by banks. Innovation did contribute to reckless credit expansion and investments, but without lax money and excessive leverage, reckless bets on asset price increases would not have been possible. Therefore, a repeat of this instability could be avoided by correcting these two policy faults. There is no need for intrusive rules constraining non-bank intermediaries and financial innovation. The main message is: keep it simple.
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