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John Roberts's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
2,428 |
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Citations
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John John Roberts Stanford Graduate School of Business Eric Van den Steen Harvard Business School - Competition & Strategy Unit
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11 Jul 00
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07 Sep 00
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1,627 (2,109)
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Abstract:
Corporations simultaneously claim that human capital is increasingly important to their success - "People are our most important asset" - and that their executives are the loyal agents of shareholders - "Our primary goal is the maximization of shareholder value." This paper studies the relationship between these two claims in a context of incomplete contracting. We show that the strict pursuit of shareholder interests may require ceding a role in corporate governance to employees in order to motivate their investing in firm-specific human capital. We consider three versions of such involvement: profit-sharing (applicable when profits are contractible), ex post bargaining effectuated by giving workers representation on the board, and comitting to respect the human capitalists' interests. Ceding a role to workers becomes more attractive as their investments increase in importance. This result bears on the on-going debate about reforming European and Japanese governance systems in the direction of the American system, reducing employees' influence. In this context, we present a model on the optimal choice of governance systems based on ideas suggested by Bengt Holmstrom. The model allows firms to respond to changes in the environment by changing strategy, which benefits shareholders but hurts workers. The workers can accept the change, quit, or use open conflict (strikes) to try to limit the change in strategy. The firm can reduce the likelihood of conflict by granting workers a say in strategy selection. The model predicts that there will be two regimes: one with shareholders in complete control and with strikes from dissatisfied workers, and the other with workers having a sufficient role in governance to ensure labor peace. Comparative statics analyses of the model suggest that differing historical conditions in the US and Europe made the selection of different regimes appropriate. The increasing pace of globalization and technological change, however, does favor shareholder dominance. On the other hand, increasing the importance of human capital favors granting a role in governance to workers, which is then associated with larger investment in specific capital and with inertia in firms' strategic choices.
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Organizational Design: Decision Rights and Incentive Contracts
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Susan Athey Stanford University - Department of Economics John John Roberts Stanford Graduate School of Business
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09 Mar 01
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26 Nov 03
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801 ( 7,136) |
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Susan Athey Stanford University - Department of Economics John John Roberts Stanford Graduate School of Business
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09 Mar 01
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26 Nov 03
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Abstract:
We explore the interaction between the allocation of decision rights over investment opportunities and the design of incentive contracts to induce unobservable effort in a multiagent, multitasking agency framework. These are linked in our model because the only available performance measures confound the two: the returns to investments are not directly observed by the principal, but instead affect the means of the signals on effort. In our model, the optimal effort-inducing incentives give very bad incentives for selecting investments, while providing incentives to make the right investment decisions is costly in terms of inducing effort. In this set-up, hierarchy can emerge endogenously, with one agent being given authority to decide about implementing projects developed by another. The agents then get very different incentive contracts. Other solutions may involve each agent being empowered to adopt projects he has developed or both having to agree before a project is accepted. Bringing in a third agent to make investment decisions may also be optimal.
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Susan Athey Stanford University - Department of Economics John John Roberts Stanford Graduate School of Business
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02 Apr 01
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05 Jun 01
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Abstract:
We explore the interaction between the allocation of decision rights over investment opportunities and the design of incentive contracts to induce unobservable effort in a multiagent, multitasking agency framework. These are linked in our model because the only available performance measures confound the two: the returns to investments are not directly observed by the principal, but instead affect the means of the signals on effort. In our model, the optimal effort-inducing incentives give very bad incentives for selecting investments, while providing incentives to make the right investment decisions is costly in terms of inducing effort. In this set-up, hierarchy can emerge endogenously, with one agent being given authority to decide about implementing projects developed by another. The agents then get very different incentive contracts. Other solutions may involve each agent being empowered to adopt projects he has developed or both having to agree before a project is accepted. Bringing in a third agent to make investment decisions may also be optimal.
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3.
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Paul R. Milgrom Stanford University John John Roberts Stanford Graduate School of Business
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04 Aug 99
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12 Mar 08
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Abstract:
We develop an ordinal approach to comparing the equilibria of economic models. The main advantages of this approach, compared to the traditional approach based on signing derivatives, are that (1) it utilizes only a subset of the assumptions traditionally made, resulting in a simpler theory, (2) it applies to discrete changes and even when there are multiple equibilria and when some equilibria do not vary smoothly with the parameters, and (3) it incorporates a formal theory of the robustness of conclusions to assumptions, which helps modelers distinguish which assumptions are "critical" to their comparative statics conclusions.
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