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Framing Effects on Selected Information and Market Behavior - An Experimental Analysis

ERICH KIRCHLER
University of Vienna - Department of Psychology
BORIS MACIEJOVSKY
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute of Economics
MARTIN WEBER
University of Mannheim - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

July 2002

Humboldt-University of Berlin Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 181
 

Abstract:     
The results of an asset market experiment, in which 64 subjects trade two assets on eight markets in a computerized continuous double auction, indicate that (i) objectively irrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and negatively framed information leads to a particular trading pattern. However (ii), a probability variation of the framed information has no influence on trading volume. In addition, the results (iii) confirm the disposition effect. Participants who experience a gain sell their assets more rapidly than participants who experience a loss, and positively framed subjects generally sell their assets later than negatively framed subjects.

 
Keywords: Financial markets, Prospect theory, Anchoring and adjustment, Experimental economics, Disposition effect
 
JEL Classifications: C90, D44, D80, G12
 
Working Paper Series
 

Suggested Citation
Kirchler, Erich, Weber, Martin and Maciejovsky, Boris, "Framing Effects on Selected Information and Market Behavior - An Experimental Analysis" (July 2002). Humboldt-University of Berlin Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 181. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=303386 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.303386

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Contact Information for ERICH KIRCHLER (Contact Author)


Email address for ERICH KIRCHLER
University of Vienna - Department of Psychology
Universitaetsstrasse 7
A-1010 Vienna
Austria
+43 1 42 7747880 (Phone)
+43 1 42 7747889 (Fax)


Contact Information for BORIS MACIEJOVSKY


Email address for BORIS MACIEJOVSKY
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute of Economics
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena
Germany
+49 3641 686626 (Phone)
+49 3641 686623 (Fax)


Contact Information for MARTIN WEBER


Email address for MARTIN WEBER
University of Mannheim - Department of Banking and Finance
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 621 181 1532 (Phone)
+49 621 181 1534 (Fax)

(No e-mail address available for MARTIN WEBER
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom


 
 


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