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Corporate Governance and Control

Marco Becht
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Patrick Bolton
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics

Ailsa Röell
Princeton University - Bendheim Center for Finance


October 2002

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002

Abstract:     
Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be proven effective.

Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership, takeovers, block holders, boards

JEL Classifications: G32, G34

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 31, 2002 ; Last revised: April 03, 2006

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco, Bolton, Patrick and Röell, Ailsa A.,Corporate Governance and Control(October 2002). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.343461


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Contact Information

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/
Marco Becht
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )
Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50
C.P. 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
+32 2 650 2149 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/~mbecht
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )
19 Av Franklin Roosevelt
1050
Brussels Belgium
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Avenue des Statuaires 120
Brussels 1180
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Ailsa A. Röell
Princeton University - Bendheim Center for Finance ( email )
26 Prospect Avenue
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
609-248-4033 (Phone)
609-258-6419 (Fax)
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References: 579
Citations: 181

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