Abstract

 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings


David A. Jaeger


City University of New York Graduate Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Cologne - Department of Economics

M. Daniele Paserman


Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

June 2007

IZA Discussion Paper No. 2890

Abstract:     
In this paper we assess the effectiveness of suicide attacks and targeted killings in the Second Intifada. We find evidence that the targeted killings of Palestinian leaders by Israel reduce realized Palestinian violence. We find, however, that intended Palestinian violence is increasing at low levels of targeted killings, but decreasing at higher levels. There is little evidence to suggest that suicide bombings against Israelis reduce the number of subsequent Palestinian fatalities. Rather, we find that suicide attacks that kill at least one Israeli lead to subsequent increased incidence and levels of Palestinian fatalities. Our results do not support the notion that suicide attacks and targeted killings follow the "tit-for-tat" pattern that is commonly postulated in the literature.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: suicide terrorism, targeted killings, assassinations, Second Intifada, Palestinians, Israel

JEL Classification: C32, D71, D74, H56

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 19, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Jaeger, David A. and Paserman, M. Daniele, The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings (June 2007). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2890. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000138

Contact Information

David A. Jaeger (Contact Author)
City University of New York Graduate Center ( email )
365 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10016
United States
212-817-8261 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.djaeger.org
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )
Cologne, 50923
Germany
M. Daniele Paserman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )
Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel
+972 2 588 3365 (Phone)
+972 2 581 6071 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 883
Downloads: 163
Download Rank: 90,732
Citations:  3

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.578 seconds