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The Fairness of Malpractice Settlements

Philip G. Peters Jr.

University of Missouri at Columbia - School of Law

Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 30-35, Summer 2007

Over the past quarter of a century, more than a dozen studies have collected data on malpractice settlements. With only one exception, they have consistently shown that plaintiffs with strong cases are more likely to receive a settlement payment than plaintiffs with weak cases. Moreover, the data on malpractice settlement strongly suggests that liability insurers possess a palpable advantage in bargaining power.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: the fairness of malpractice settlements, philip g. peters, jr., medical malpractice, malpractice settlements, liability, liability insurers, professional claims adjusters, damages, settlement value, law, precedent, double discounting, quality of care, frivolous claims, bargaining power, disagreement

JEL Classification: D74, D80, D81, D84, I18, K32

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Date posted: July 18, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Peters Jr., Philip G., The Fairness of Malpractice Settlements. Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 30-35, Summer 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001477

Contact Information

Philip G. Peters (Contact Author)
University of Missouri at Columbia - School of Law ( email )
Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Hulston Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-8274 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.missouri.edu/peters/
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