The Fairness of Malpractice Settlements
Philip G. Peters Jr.
University of Missouri at Columbia - School of Law
Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 30-35, Summer 2007
Over the past quarter of a century, more than a dozen studies have collected data on malpractice settlements. With only one exception, they have consistently shown that plaintiffs with strong cases are more likely to receive a settlement payment than plaintiffs with weak cases. Moreover, the data on malpractice settlement strongly suggests that liability insurers possess a palpable advantage in bargaining power.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Keywords: the fairness of malpractice settlements, philip g. peters, jr., medical malpractice, malpractice settlements, liability, liability insurers, professional claims adjusters, damages, settlement value, law, precedent, double discounting, quality of care, frivolous claims, bargaining power, disagreement
JEL Classification: D74, D80, D81, D84, I18, K32Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 18, 2007
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.329 seconds